In the aftermath of the terrorist attack on the U.S. Navy destroyer Cole (DDG-67), two U.S. investigations have been most critical of security lapses at several levels of command, including some 30 "force protection" measures that the crew of the Cole failed to implement. The reports present a damning picture of U.S. military security in the face of increasing threats of terrorism.
In Washington, the top-level commission looking into overall military activities to defend U.S. military forces from terrorist attacks concluded that there were significant security shortcomings in the region before the bombing of the Cole in Aden last October. The commission was cochaired by retired Navy Admiral Harold W. Gehman and retired Army General William W. Crouch. Admiral Gehman, a veteran surface warfare officer, recently retired as Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Joint Forces Command (formerly U.S. Atlantic Command). General Crouch's last assignment was vice chief of staff of the Army; when he was the commander of U.S. Army forces in Europe he had special concerns with force protection of U.S. troops in Bosnia.
The Gehman-Crouch commission has recommended steps to tighten security for U.S. forces in the Middle East. The bombing of an Air Force barracks in Saudi Arabia more than four years ago caused major changes in security procedures at U.S. bases around the world. But the commission found commanders in the Persian Gulf still were not devoting enough attention to protecting U.S. forces from attack. In particular, the commission identified shortcomings in security procedures for military aircraft and naval ships as they move through the region.
Some defense officials explained that although extensive security measures have been implemented, concern for terrorist attacks has not yet become part of the U.S. military "culture."
Meanwhile, the Navy investigation of the attack on the Cole has been partially rejected by Admiral Robert J. Natter, Commander-in-Chief, Atlantic Fleet. The investigation-which focused only on actions on board the Cole concluded that the destroyer's commanding officer, Commander Kirk S. Lippold, failed to implement some 30 of the 62 planned force protection measures applicable to the ship.
That inquiry still is being reviewed by the Navy's senior leadership. Admiral Natter, however, has concluded that no one should be punished because the actions of Commander Lippold and his crew saved the Cole from sinking-twice. Immediate damage control actions were taken after the explosion to save the ship, and 48 hours later there was an apparent failure of shaft seals that led to progressive flooding, which again put the ship in danger. Simultaneously, all electric power in the ship failed. The damage-control teams-exhausted from the previous two days again had to battle to save the Cole.
Commenting on the efforts of Commander Lippold and his crew, General Crouch said, "It was an inspired performance, and one of which every American should be very, very proud. Those sailors saved themselves, their shipmates. They saved the USS Cole."
Admiral Natters comments on the findings of the investigation imply that Commander Lippold acted correctly given the information provided to him. This implies that the staffs of U.S. Central Command and the Fifth Fleet, which have responsibility for naval operations in the Middle East region, failed to provide adequate information and warnings.
With respect to the 62 force protection measures, the investigation found that many of those that were not followed by the crew of the Cole were irrelevant to the situation. However, at least 11 possibly could have prevented the attack or reduced the damage and casualties (17 crewmen died and 39 were injured). The latter included identifying small craft approaching the ship and having fire hoses ready to use against boats that did not properly identify themselves.
The Cole arrived at Pascagoula, Mississippi, on 13 December aboard the commercial heavy lift ship Blue Marlin. trol where he should not have been. The ambassador, fleet commander, and Macedonians all supported the action-it was the right thing to do consistent with the ROEs. Perhaps more important is the message it sent to an area that understands only force-Marines are on duty here, and this is what will happen if you don't ask to come in.
Later, when the Marines entered Kosovo after the cease-fire, the NATO ROEs and U.S. ROEs were looked at carefully to ensure that the force would be able to defend itself, which it did on several occasions-another topic for continuing ROEs discussions.