"Harding the Cole"
(See J. Cushman, p. 2, January 2001 Proceedings)
Commander Randall G. Bowdish, U.S. Navy, Commanding Officer, USS Simpson (FFG-56)-It is refreshing sometimes to hear commentary from outside the lifelines. A different perspective often can lead to new insight and subsequent improvement in the way the Navy does business. No such revelations will occur, however, from Lieutenant General Cushman's commentary. In fact, it will do more harm than good.
Lieutenant General Cushman bases his commentary on his years of commanding Army forces and the belief that the "preparedness" principles he developed over the course of his career "apply to ships and naval commands as well, and that they apply to the Cole." While it is questionable that this qualifies General Cushman as an expert on naval matters, the principles he articulates are indeed germane. I can assure you that these principles are in the forefront of every commanding officer's thoughts, not only prior to entering port, but at sea as well. A small-boat attack is something well within the scope of a commanding officer's imagination.
While General Cushman grasps the obvious as to what a commanding officer should do, he does not make the effort to find out what a commanding officer can do. General Cushman misses the mark on the actions available to the commanding officer to counter such a threat. Instead, he bases his argument on third-party information-40-year-old anecdotal information from a Fletcher (DD-445)-class captain and a midshipman's sea story about what he did last summer. I question the timeliness of the first experience and the credibility of the second source.
Answers to the following questions need to be answered prior to judgment being made on the Cole or her commanding officer:
> What responsibility did the host nation have in ensuring a "safe haven"?
> What responsibility does Navy fleet support have in ensuring the host nation provides a "safe haven"?
> What responsibility does Navy fleet support have in making up any shortfalls between host-nation measures and those requested by the ship?
> Does an unarmed small boat approaching a Navy ship in a foreign port really constitute hostile intent to the extent it should be fired on?
>What force protection measures requested by a commanding officer are disallowed due to host-nation "diplomatic" sensitivities?
General Cushman will likely find the answer to the last question enlightening.
General Cushman is further respectfully reminded that there is great power in the pen-the power to shape perceptions and opinions across a wide audience. An author bears the responsibility of ensuring his words ring true. A good author will use those words to make things better, rather than to incite a witch hunt. The facts surrounding the Cole tragedy have yet to be released. I would ask General Cushman and other well-intentioned armchair quarterbacks to wait for the results of the investigation before passing judgment.
Editor's Note: The Simpson and the Cole left Norfolk together as the two late deployers of the George Washington (CVN-73) battle group. Both ships were assigned to Destroyer Squadron 22. The Simpson will return from deployment alone later this month.
Lieutenant Commander Pete McVety, US. Navy-This article was of interest not because of its relevance but because it shows the perceptions of other services about naval warfare and its environment.
To say the article was inflammatory enough to generate a reaction is putting it mildly. The article has many comments that demonstrate ignorance about naval matters. For example:
> The statements by the author that the terrorist threat warning (or lack thereof) was immaterial and the commanding officer (CO) is responsible for his own risk assessment are simplistic and wrong. The input for the risk estimate comes from outside the ship from agencies over which the CO has no control. Unlike ground based troops, the Navy does not have the ability to send scouts ashore to determine specific threats. Instead, the Navy has developed an intelligence community that has to share time between designated hot spots and the possibility that a Navy ship could be called on for a port visit anywhere in the world. An inherent difference between ground- and water-based warfare is that you cannot hold the water and danger can originate from any direction. One cannot assume everyone is friendly or that everyone is an enemy. Based on the threat estimate, the commanding officer made his own assessment and submitted his counterterrorist plan, which was reviewed and approved by higher headquarters. Although the CO should (and will) be held responsible for what happened in Yemen, higher headquarters agreed with the Cole's assessment. While the threat warning available to the CO of the Cole may have been inadequate (by default), it certainly was adequate for the multitudes of ships that preceded her.
> In regard to the CO putting boats over the side to ward off potential terrorists, there is more to the picture than a skipper deciding to put boats in the water and inspecting every vessel that comes close to his ship. As a matter of national policy, the U.S. Navy has a mission of engagement and therefore visits ports in countries throughout the world. To think that a U.S. ship can put armed small boats in the sovereign water of another country and board/inspect vessels at will is both naive and contradictory to that policy of engagement. The U.S. State Department would need to establish an agreement with the host nation to allow that to happen, and chances are, it would not, yielding instead to the individual nations' internal security. Can you imagine a Yemeni, French, or Russian ship lowering armed small boats into Norfolk's Elizabeth River and boarding any small craft that came within 50 meters of the ship? It is a fact that the U.S. Navy operates in hazardous environments and it is an acceptable risk.
> The author's example of a Naval Academy midshipman describing a submarine captain's preparation for surfacing ("crew members on deck armed with shotguns and other small arms in an alert posture prepared for any contingency") is irrelevant to the argument. What did the sub captain direct his crew to do with the weapons if they felt threatened? Would they have been effective given an enemy willing to give his life? Being ready to use deadly force and the rules that allow the use of deadly force are two different things. The only way to prevent a surprise attack in port by a cunning enemy is to stay at sea. The Cole was ordered to refuel in Yemen, as were many ships that had gone before her. The well-planned surprise attack could not have been prevented using reasonable means and the scenario at the time. Afterthought usually obscures these facts.
> The last couple of paragraphs, based on unofficial reports, call for court-martial of the skipper of the Cole. This call is inflammatory and is not consistent with the rule of law by which we are governed. If there is a formal judgment of the CO of the Cole, the CO will accept the rebuke and carry on. To jump to the opinion that a court-martial is the appropriate venue is wrong and the Uniform Code of Military Justice has been misinterpreted. Prudent care was taken in accordance with the situation and given the information at hand. The United States asks sailors to put themselves in uncertain situations of danger. We shouldn't expect that this comes without cost.
"Cole and Her Crew Send a Message"
(See p. 48, December 2001 Proceedings)
Corporal David Carter, Royal Yeomanry (Retired)-I was disappointed to read the attack on the USS Cole (DDG-67) being described as an "act of cowardice." Please do not get me wrong here. I in no way wish to detract from the bravery, suffering, and sacrifice displayed by the Cole, her crew, and their families during and after this incident, and my heartfelt sympathy goes out to them. But the act of approaching a U.S. warship in a high state of readiness in a small boat loaded with a large improvised explosive device, and then to detonate it at the cost of one's own life, is far from an act of cowardice. Misguided, callous, and ruthless maybe, but not cowardly. We have to come to terms with the fact that one man's terrorist is another man's freedom fighter. In fact, I feel that to dismiss the attack in this way detracts from the bravery of the U.S. service personnel themselves.
They were not wide-eyed innocents caught unawares by a cowardly sneak attack, but trained professionals taking calculated risks in the service of their country under constant threat from a brave and determined covert enemy who could strike at any time unannounced. On this occasion they did, and 17 U.S. sailors made the ultimate sacrifice as a result. The fact that they did so in facing an equally brave enemy makes them all the more worthy of our admiration and respect.
"Combating Terrorism"
(See T. Rancich, pp. 66-69, November 2000; W.
Parks, p. 14, December 2000; E. Dailey, pp. 1618, January 2001 Proceedings)
Lieutenant Commander Guy Maiden, U.S. Navy, action officer, Joint Staff, J34, Combating Terrorism-A critical sentence within Commander Rancich's article correctly articulates that the "active combatant (terrorist) will maintain an advantage over the reactive combatant (Navy)." While we should have learned from Beirut, Khobar, the Twin Towers, and Oklahoma City, we have culturally remained reactive. Frankly, our answer to antiterrorism amounted to casting off all lines and shifting colors if the bad guys showed up. Notwithstanding increasingly easy access to simple technologies-technologies that generate tremendous concerns for a future disastrous chemical, biological, nuclear or radiological attack-the recent loss of 17 of our shipmate warriors in Yemen ought to prompt a substantive change in course.
Commander Rancich rightly articulates that air, sub, and surface threats constitute the principal consideration for our commanders. This does not represent a "prejudice." Department of Defense guidance does not articulate antiterrorism (AT) as a mission for good reason: AT should not constitute a mission. Rather, antiterrorism and force protection should be imbedded within every mission. Unacceptable aircraft and personnel losses during the 1950s-60s prompted the Navy's adoption of the Naval Air Training and Operations Procedures Standardization Program (NATOPS). We don't operate engineering plants without the engineering operations sequencing system (EOSS) or reactor plant manuals. It took more than a decade to convince the American public that wearing seatbelts saves lives. NATOPS, EOSS, and wearing seatbelts on the way home from the waterfront are not missions in and of themselves, but part of the culture of the way we do business.
Likewise, we need to embrace antiterrorism as a way of doing business. The Navy's investment in operational risk management (ORM) can be a significant tool in institutionalizing AT planning fleetwide. ORM provides a template for careful consideration of the threat-the presence, operational capability, activity, and intentions of terrorist groups-and the operating environment commanders may find themselves in. Antiterrorism planning is no more than assessing physical and other vulnerabilities in context of the likely threat. Such planning facilitates three alternatives for commanders: (1) committing resources and procedures to mitigate those vulnerabilities under their control; (2) identifying to competent authority those vulnerabilities they cannot mitigate; or (3) making rationale decisions to accept risk where it is sound to do so.
Whether or not one endorses the idea that "if [the terrorists] want to get you, they will," Commander Rancich misses the point in stating, "the Navy is unwilling to take the steps needed to prevent a terrorist from getting you." I submit that the Navy is not unwilling, but simply doesn't know how. Within the context of antiterrorism/force protection, I do not believe that our commanders know entirely what makes them uncomfortable. There is a fleetwide need for Navy-institutionalized, unit-specific tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) that will support planning, prompt command recognition of situations that do not look quite right, and generate sound decision making in response. And there is no need to reinvent the wheel in doing so. Expeditious consideration, development, and/or refinement of Navy-specific TTP demand that we lean "joint." Resident within our sister services are volumes of lessons learned and TTP that can be taught and applied tomorrow.
Aside from TTP, we must be willing to resource antiterrorism adequately. Force protection and quality of life often are diametrically opposed. This is partly why it is such a challenge for commanders to devote precious resources to AT while all appears quiet. However, the Navy must overcome the sense that all is quiet. The bad guys are always out there, and they are watching for seams. The good news: joint staff integrated vulnerability assessments have documented that approximately 60% of all vulnerabilities forcewide could be mitigated through procedural-not programmatic-enhancements. This means that there are TIP right now that commanders could adopt tomorrow-at little cost-to decrease their susceptibility to a terrorist attack. Where TTP and procedural solutions cannot mitigate unacceptable risk, the Navy must commit to writing the checks that generate trained and equipped forces.
Finally, we need to regain our warrior ethos. In testimony on 8 February 2000, General Henry Shelton, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, stated, "Terrorists will strike-but fear of this cannot be allowed to influence military operations." Naval operations around the globe in support of the National Military Strategy will result in casualties. As a service, we must first be able to say that we have done all within our control to mitigate risk and to protect our warriors. This includes asking for help when we need it. Second, whenever and wherever threatened, we must be able to respond appropriately within the limits of applicable law to defend our commands and our sailors.
Old assumptions no longer are valid-- intelligence may not provide early warning. This is precisely the reason we must generate enthusiasm for a cultural shift that facilitates antiterrorism and force protection as our way of doing business.
"How Many Subs Do We Need?"
(See A. Konetzni, pp. 56-57, November 2000 Proceedings)
Vice Admiral James H. Doyle Jr., U.S. Navy (Retired)-The 1997 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) math also is flawed when it comes to surface combatant requirements. These requirements should be based on a combination of warfighting and peacetime needs. The ever-widening range of missions includes operating with aircraft carrier battle groups, attacking land targets, supporting amphibious ready groups, defending against cruise and ballistic missiles, conducting antisubmarine warfare (ASW), participating in humanitarian relief, evacuating civilian personnel, conducting maritime interception, training with allies, and deploying forward in all oceans. The 1997 QDR number of 116 surface combatants is now considered high risk for war fighting. In addition, it does not adequately recognize the surface combatant cycle of predeployment workup, deployment, interdeployment training, and maintenance/modernization, as well as the Chief of Naval Operations' policy of 50% time in home port over a five-year period. When combined with inadequate funding for maintenance and spare parts, the result is degraded readiness and a deleterious effect on retention.
The Surface Combatant Force Levels Study II documents that 135 surface combatants are required in the 2015 timeframe. This number, if matched with required capabilities, seems to fit reasonably well with a need for at least 360 ships for three carrier battle groups and associated amphibious ready groups in three forward deployment hubs. At a minimum, 135 probably is reflective of all surface combatant missions and the forward presence cycle as mentioned above. But the 135 number also can be broken down in terms of cruiser and destroyer requirements and capabilities.
With 27 active Aegis cruisers and plans for their conversion, the requirement for 27 multimission cruisers is well documented. This number may increase in the future if new tasks are added, such as participation in national missile defense. In addition to the general surface combatant missions, the specific tasks of land attack, theater air defense, force protection, and command and control, along with matched capabilities, are spelled out. Historically, cruisers have been more heavily armed and instrumented than destroyers and, in many cases, are tasked with different missions. The Aegis cruisers continue this trend, particularly with the added capabilities of theater-wide ballistic missile defense and area air-defense control that are made possible by the flexibility and growth engineered in the initial design. With improvements to their land-attack systems and greater instrumentation, they also can function as strike leaders in offensive operations. Therefore, in the surface combatant force level equation, the requirement and rationale for cruisers and destroyers should each stand on its own justification.
Assuming a requirement for 135 surface combatants that includes 27 cruisers, the remaining requirement should be 108 multimission destroyers, or 100 active destroyers and 8 naval reserve force frigates, if the latter are to remain in the force. DDG-51s are robust in land attack, air defense, and antisubmarine warfare. They are fully capable of aircraft carrier battle group and amphibious ready group operations, maritime interception, independent missions, and continuous forward presence. With a long-range surveillance and air-defense system, they are able to protect other forces from aircraft and missile attack and deconflict the airspace. This multimission capability is essential because history has shown that operational flexibility and the capacity to grow are prerequisites to adapting to a variety of threats in an uncertain future.
This flexibility and growth in the initial design of DDG-51s, like the CG-47s, for backfits and forward-fit updates will enable the new capability in area ballistic missile defense (Aegis Baseline 6 Phase III and SM-2 Block IVA). Likewise, the strike- and land-attack capability will be enhanced by tactical Tomahawk and its associated weapon control system and the land-attack Standard missile. Antisubmarine warfare improvements also must be made in the SQS-53 series active sonars, including broadband active, environmental adaptation, and active detection of torpedoes. DDG-51 s must be able to participate fully in coordinated operations, and also have the capability to orchestrate the entire ASW evolution of air, surface, and underwater assets. Of particular importance to naval fire support will be the addition of the 5-inch/62 gun, extended range munitions, and eventually the naval fire support system. Embedded in the tactical Tomahawk control system will be the foundation to receive fire support missions from the Army's field artillery tactical data system. This is important because DD-21, the land-attack destroyer, is not scheduled to join the fleet until 2009.
In the current world crisis environment, a surface combatant requirement of 135 would be more realistic and less risky and debilitating than 116. The ability to meet war plans, deployment commitments, training, unplanned contingencies and emergencies, off-line maintenance and modernization, and the CNO's home port policy would improve. The latter is important to the quality of life of crews and their families.
With a new requirement of 27 cruisers and 100 destroyers, we are some 19 multimission destroyers short, even including the single-mission DD-963s and FFGs that eventually will be replaced. We must continue building DDG-51 s at the maximum rate feasible each year in the shipbuilding budget with the new capabilities and innovations in land attack, naval fire support, area ballistic missile defense, and ASW. We also must continue modernizing CG-47s to double their service life to add new capabilities in theater-wide ballistic missile defense, land attack, and area air-defense control. These actions are essential to maintain critical core industrial base skills and avoid a severe drop in production, particularly if DD-21 is delayed. In any event, the 1997 QDR surface combatant number of 116 should be increased to at least 135 and should not be used arbitrarily to curtail the DDG-51 shipbuilding program or to force premature retirement of needed DD963s and FFGs.
"The Leaders Must Lead"
(See M. Dunne, pp. 68-70, December 2000 Proceedings)
Lieutenant Colonel Stephen A. Ingalls, U.S. Army, Commander 1st Battalion, 2d Aviation Regiment-Although I am encouraged by Lieutenant Dunne's enthusiasm and agree with her premise of the importance of a commander in the larger retention process, I don't think she sees enough of the picture or that the specifics of her proposals will attack the problem she's outlined.
Mentorship is a term often confused with leader development, and I think Lieutenant Dunne has fallen into that trap. True, commanding officers should become mentors. But in the strictest sense, mentoring would be more appropriate for those outside their command than an intense senior-subordinate relationship inside the command that might be perceived by some as special treatment. I develop my junior officers and encourage them to seek out mentors, but refuse to mentor them myself. I might provide that opportunity under different circumstances.
The military offers a number of perks, not the least of which is true satisfaction at the end of a difficult task, mission, or deployment. However, most who have served for more than a few years see at least a gradual erosion of benefits, continued challenges for soldiers and their health care or housing, and are privately worried that retirement may not offer the same incentives it did when we first began wearing our uniforms. As a commander, my job is to represent the truth, not just the good parts. To carry the thought a bit further, my responsibility is to fight aggressively to change those parts of service to our country that aren't to standard in whatever arena is appropriate. My soldiers know a line when they hear it. I don't think accentuating the "free workout facilities and guaranteed housing" will carry the day when they're looking to reenlist.
I don't think a job in the military is fun either. It's hard to pour heart and soul into something you haven't truly adopted as a lifestyle. As I was pondering leader development for Army captains and majors, I found myself thinking about the distinction between these grades. My conclusion was that the vast majority of captains continue to treat the Army as a job while majors, in large part, have adopted the service as their profession; a subtle, but important difference. My responsibility isn't to make their jobs fun but to make them passionate about duty, honor, and country to the point where the military no longer defines what they do but who they are. Retention becomes far easier once that hurdle has been cleared.
I'm afraid there's simply no easy solution to "doing more with less" except to do it. I would, however, offer that Lieutenant Dunne's notion that commanders involve themselves in culling out what their units, organizations, or boats will and will not do has merit. In a "mission over men" profession, leaders are the single most important cog in concentrating on the important stuff, deciding to cast the unimportant off, and focusing on the things that soldiers, sailors, airmen, and Marines enlisted to do. Commanders who succeed in focusing their organizations' time, energy, and limited resources to those "mission-essential tasks" will find a synergy to retention and quality of life. The trick is in making it all stick.
It seems vogue these days to find someone else to blame for what's wrong with our military. I agree wholeheartedly with the author that commanders take on the largest responsibility "chunk." If they don't want to, pass the opportunity of command along. I suspect Lieutenant Dunne knows that leadership is a two-way street, one that doesn't work just because the commander wants it to. The led decide who the leaders are. This commander is in the arena waiting on the junior officers and the rest of my battalion to join me.
"Can the U.S. Help Them All?"
(See D. Sullivan, pp. 52-55, December 2000 Proceedings)
Carl Jakobsson-One important aspect of the formulation of future foreign policies that Captain Sullivan did not emphasize in his excellent article is also one that has been absent from the foreign policy discussions conducted by the country as a whole: the importance of strong alliances with other elected governments around the world to promote democracy and protect human rights wherever it is possible to do so.
It is obvious that we are not big enough to act as police officers for the rest of the world, and we probably are not smart enough to do a good job of it, even if we were big enough. We are both big and smart enough, however, to work with other elected governments to build a global network to promote democracy. Such a network would not compile a perfect record of democratizing the world and protecting the rights of all people, but it could compile a good enough record to prevent a third world war.
The NATO alliance would be an important part of a global network. The ongoing importance of this alliance is illustrated by the situation in the Balkans, which still has the potential for escalating into a third global war. The network of our traditional democratic allies in the western Pacific could be made stronger by the inclusion of India, which would go a long way toward the achievement of an improved relationship with China. The young African democracies of South Africa and Namibia also would be an important addition because of the concept of nonracial, nonsectarian democracy that drove the revolution that created the government in both countries.
Both idealists and realists can agree that the prevention of a third global war is a vital strategic interest of this country. At the beginning of both world wars, the leaders and people of our country thought that our geographical position distant from the fighting would enable us to remain neutral. It turned out in both conflicts that our country got an invitation that could not be refused. If we do not want to fight another world war, we cannot allow that world war to happen. It is outside our capability to unilaterally prevent a global war, but such an effort is within the capability of a strong global network of elected governments with active U.S. participation. A strong, healthy alliance is a great force multiplier.
"Regionalization Creates Confusion"
(See R. Dean, p. 78, September 2000 Proceedings)
Captain William C. Zobel, Commanding Officer, NAS Oceana-I am a commanding officer from the Navy's Mid-Atlantic Region who has some information that will help with the concerns expressed in Captain Dean's article about regionalization. The bottom line is that regionalization works and does save money, especially in a fleet concentration area such as Hampton Roads in southeast Virginia. Valuable resources, whether they are personnel, vehicles, security, morale, welfare, and recreation (MWR), or other assets, can be pooled for better use throughout the region. And priorities can be established based on available funds across a wide spectrum; everything from new construction to MWR assets to maintenance of property. In addition, the commanding officers and program managers (PM) in the region all work together, which was not easily facilitated in the old system.
Is there confusion about who is responsible and accountable? No. Every installation commander (IC) in this area will tell you he is the "go to" officer if it happens/occurs on his respective base. The commanding officers I liaison with in the Southeast and Northeast Regions feel the same way. Not one of us has ever said, "Well, it's not my program, go talk to that guy." From the Commander-in-Chief of the Atlantic Fleet on down, everyone knows who to call if there is an issue on that base. There is no question in anybody's mind.
We, in the Navy, have all worked in a matrix organization. By that I mean an organization with more than one person you have to answer to. A squadron commander knows his boss, the commander carrier air wing (CAG) writes his fitness report, but he also knows that he had better respond to the wing commander, his other "boss," or he might not get timely administrative or maintenance support.
That wing commander can pool the assets he controls when it's time to get that squadron ready for deployment. Or look at a battle group. Does the antiair warfare boss "own" any assets besides the Aegis ship he's riding? No, he has to get his other assets from the CAG and his squadrons on the carrier. But doesn't the CAG work for the battle group commander? You bet he does, but he also has to respond to the antiair warfare commander. Hopefully, this clears things up a bit.
Regionalization is here to stay. It has had its growing pains and still is being refined in certain areas, but it works. As the commanding officer, you make it a point to get involved in everything on your base whether it's your program or not. Why? Because it's on your base. It has facilitated the ability for all ICs and PMs to work together for the improvement of the Navy and their respective region as a whole. Change is tough and hard to swallow and those that don't take time to understand how the change is effective can develop a biased view.
Commanding an installation is about leadership and with that comes accountability and responsibility. We who have been brought up in the Navy want it no other way. We wear the badge and know who's in command.
"Deadly Force Is Authorized"
(See W. Parks, pp. 33-37, January 2001 Proceedings)
Major P. C. Skuta, U.S. Marine Corps-Colonel Parks's article should be clipped and saved by commanders at all levels. Here's a positive example of commanders understanding and supporting rules of engagement (ROEs) that are "mission and threat-driven," proving not only that it can be done, but that with commander and staff involvement, appropriate ROEs are being put in use to protect personnel.
At the beginning of Operation Allied Force, the U.S. Sixth Fleet USMC Fleet Antiterrorism Security Team (FAST) platoon and Nassau (LHA-4) Amphibious Ready Group SEAL platoon deployed to Skopje, Macedonia, to stabilize the security situation and protect the U.S. ambassador. On the first day of Allied Force, the embassy was attacked by a violent mob, vehicles were burned, and forced entry was attempted-the ambassador and staff were forced into a safe room in the basement until the situation could be stabilized.
The Marines and SEALs deployed with appropriate ROEs that were mission- and threat-driven; the fleet commander, joint task force commander, and commander-in-chief approved the ROEs with an eye on accomplishing the mission to protect this frontline ambassador and the security force. The ROEs needed to address a range of threats including surveillance, rocket launchers, hand grenades in baggage, and demonstrations. They did all that and more. We were even able to get approval for use of crowd control chemical agents, which requires supplemental approval under current JCS ROE. The ROEs also were tested-and more important, the commanders' support for individual actions was tested.
The security force established a restricted area in which vehicle traffic was prohibited. It was understood by the State Department, Macedonian police, and other agencies involved in the security effort that if anyone entered this cordoned-off area (especially vehicles) individual Marines were authorized to use deadly force consistent with the ROEs.
One night a vehicle ran through the barricades and a Marine on post fired his weapon, disabling the vehicle. In a split second the Marine had to make a decision. He made the right one. The vehicle was heading toward the embassy at a high rate of speed, had crashed through a police barrier, and the Macedonian police had failed to stop the vehicle. We only discovered after the action that the driver was lost, drunk, and speeding out of control where he should not have been. The ambassador, fleet commander, and Macedonians all supported the action-it was the right thing to do consistent with the ROEs. Perhaps more important is the message it sent to an area that understands only force-Marines are on duty here, and this is what will happen if you don't ask to come in.
Later, when the Marines entered Kosovo after the cease-fire, the NATO ROEs and U.S. ROEs were looked at carefully to ensure that the force would be able to defend itself, which it did on several occasions-another topic for continuing ROEs discussions.
"Not In Our Submarines"
(See C. Trost, p. 2, September 2000; L.
Manning, p. 28 October 2000; J. Nugent, p. 26, December 2000; K. Wieschhoff, p. 28, January 2001 Proceedings)
Master Chief Petty Officer James T. McLain, U.S. Navy-I am a master chief petty officer with more than 23 year of service, 19 of those in the submarine force on three SSBNs and two SSNs. I've read numerous articles in various forums concerning the proposal of women serving on board submarines. Reading the commentary by Admiral Trost prompted me to finally air my thoughts on this hotly debated topic. Admiral Trost makes some extremely good arguments, pointing out that women can and do serve capably and productively in every branch of the military forces, that the physical stature and strength mind-set is an old and outdated cop out, and that the varied leadership issues pose a challenge. I agree with him on each mark.
As a command master chief of a shore station, I work alongside female sailors daily, and I would gladly put them against most of the male sailors I have come across. Their level of dedication is at least equal to that of the men and their professional knowledge sometimes exceeds that of their male counterparts.
A couple of things he mentioned, however, I do take issue with, such as the point of view of the submariner's wife. I would not go so far as to call their position irrelevant, but I would submit that most wives realize that we shoot for professionalism in our workplace and would not consider it a place "to pick up chicks" when we're away on deployment. Based on that statement, I don't feel that what my wife thinks of my serving on submarines with women should have much bearing on their placement. Admiral Trost goes on to discuss the combat readiness in an environment sometimes referred to as an "all-male bastion." I think the U.S. military and our society as a whole have effectively grown out of that mind-set.
I feel that the greatest deterrent to the placement of women on submarines is the physical design itself. Each of the submarines I served on were of older classes (none were Trident SSBNs or Los Angeles [SSN-688]-class SSNs). I think I can say with a degree of certainty that once the submarine is constructed, or even designed, major structural modifications are extremely rare, especially those involved with improving habitability. Usually there is but one community head and shower facility for use by all but the more senior enlisted personnel, and with the exception of "Officer's Country," staterooms are nonexistent. To think that the Navy, or Congress for that matter, would authorize millions of dollars per unit to launch a redesign study and then modify each submarine for a "social experiment" is beyond ludicrous.
As for the argument that other nations already have integrated women into their submarine force and have experienced few problems, I challenge proponents to consider the viewpoint of the deck plate sailor or the chief petty officer on those submarines. I have no doubt that the impression they would walk away with would be drastically different from the one they would see in the local paper or magazine, which usually comes from a bureaucratic beancounter locked away in a office trying to please some special interest group.
If the U.S. Navy is hard set on assigning females to submarines, then the only answer is to design the platform from the keel up with that premise in mind. Of course, this will make the platform much larger, harder to maneuver, and could even result in limiting its littoral capabilities to some small degree. With the Virginia (SSN-774)-class SSN already in production, and with her lifeexpectancy of close to 30 years, I don't expect to see it any time soon.
"The Submarine Census"
(See A. D. Baker III, Combat Fleets, pp. 90, 92, December 2000 Proceedings)
A.D. Baker Ill-Inadvertently omitted from the "Census" was the Italian submarine fleet, which at the present consists of two Primo Longobardo, two Salvatore Pelosi, and three Nazario Sauro-class diesel attack boats (SSs), with two German-designed Type 212A SSs on order. The Nazario Sauro was decommissioned in December 2000.
Also overlooked, Sweden currently operates five submarines: three Gotland class and two Vastergotland, with two more Vastergotland class being reconstructed with air-independent auxiliary propulsion.
Another boat that slipped through the cracks is the Russian Yankee Notch-class SSGN Orenburg, K-395, which still was in use as of August 2000.
A recent Russian press article revealed that the first Sierra II-class nuclear-powered attack submarine, the Nizhniy Novgorod (K-534, ex-Zabatka), has been laid up at her operating base since returning from a patrol in June 1997. Although completed in 1990, the titanium-hulled boat is said to be in need of a recoring that cannot be afforded by a Russian Navy that received only 2.5% of the funds requested for fleet maintenance in the most recent defense budget.
The former Royal Netherlands Navy diesel attack submarines Zwaardvis and Tijgerhaai arrived in Malaysia in mid-December (see "Combat Fleets," pp. 9192), but an agreement for Malaya to order two new Moray-class submarines from the boats' previous owner, RDM of Rotterdam, had not yet been consummated.
Portugal retired the Daphne-class SS Albacora during 2000, and the Turkish Navy's Guppy-IIA-class diesel attack submarine Cerbe also has been retired, reducing the total in both classes to two in each navy.
"Not In Our Submarines"
(See C. Trost, p. 2, September 2000; L. Manning, p. 28 October 2000; J. Nugent, p. 26, December 2000; K. Wieschhoff, p. 28, January 2001 Proceedings)
Master Chief Petty Officer James T. McLain, U.S. Navy-I am a master chief petty officer with more than 23 year of service, 19 of those in the submarine force on three SSBNs and two SSNs. I've read numerous articles in various forums concerning the proposal of women serving on board submarines. Reading the commentary by Admiral Trost prompted me to finally air my thoughts on this hotly debated topic. Admiral Trost makes some extremely good arguments, pointing out that women can and do serve capably and productively in every branch of the military forces, that the physical stature and strength mind-set is an old and outdated cop out, and that the varied leadership issues pose a challenge. I agree with him on each mark.
As a command master chief of a shore station, I work alongside female sailors daily, and I would gladly put them against most of the male sailors I have come across. Their level of dedication is at least equal to that of the men and their professional knowledge sometimes exceeds that of their male counterparts.
A couple of things he mentioned, however, I do take issue with, such as the point of view of the submariner's wife. I would not go so far as to call their position irrelevant, but I would submit that most wives realize that we shoot for professionalism in our workplace and would not consider it a place "to pick up chicks" when we're away on deployment. Based on that statement, I don't feel that what my wife thinks of my serving on submarines with women should have much bearing on their placement. Admiral Trost goes on to discuss the combat readiness in an environment sometimes referred to as an "all-male bastion." I think the U.S. military and our society as a whole have effectively grown out of that mind-set.
I feel that the greatest deterrent to the placement of women on submarines is the physical design itself. Each of the submarines I served on were of older classes (none were Trident SSBNs or Los Angeles [SSN-688]-class SSNs). I think I can say with a degree of certainty that once the submarine is constructed, or even designed, major structural modifications are extremely rare, especially those involved with improving habitability. Usually there is but one community head and shower facility for use by all but the more senior enlisted personnel, and with the exception of "Officer's Country," staterooms are nonexistent. To think that the Navy, or Congress for that matter, would authorize millions of dollars per unit to launch a redesign study and then modify each submarine for a "social experiment" is beyond ludicrous.
As for the argument that other nations already have integrated women into their submarine force and have experienced few problems, I challenge proponents to consider the viewpoint of the deck plate sailor or the chief petty officer on those submarines. I have no doubt that the impression they would walk away with would be drastically different from the one they would see in the local paper or magazine, which usually comes from a bureaucratic bean-counter locked away in a office trying to please some special interest group.
If the U.S. Navy is hard set on assigning females to submarines, then the only answer is to design the platform from the keel up with that premise in mind. Of course, this will make the platform much larger, harder to maneuver, and could even result in limiting its littoral capabilities to some small degree. With the Virginia (SSN-774)-class SSN already in production, and with her life expectancy of close to 30 years, I don't expect to see it any time soon.
"The Submarine Census"
(See A. D. Baker 111, Combat Fleets, pp. 90, 92, December 2000 Proceedings)
A.D. Baker III-Inadvertently omitted from the "Census" was the Italian submarine fleet, which at the present consists of two Primo Longobardo, two Salvatore Pelosi, and three Nazario Sauro-class diesel attack boats (SSs), with two German-designed Type 212A SSs on order. The Nazario Sauro was decommissioned in December 2000.
Also overlooked, Sweden currently operates five submarines: three Gotland class and two Vastergotland, with two more Vastergotland class being reconstructed with air-independent auxiliary propulsion.
Another boat that slipped through the cracks is the Russian Yankee Notch-class SSGN Orenburg, K-395, which still was in use as of August 2000.
A recent Russian press article revealed that the first Sierra II-class nuclear-powered attack submarine, the Nizhniy Novgorod (K-534, ex-Zabatka), has been laid up at her operating base since returning from a patrol in June 1997. Although completed in 1990, the titanium-hulled boat is said to be in need of a recoring that cannot be afforded by a Russian Navy that received only 2.5% of the funds requested for fleet maintenance in the most recent defense budget.
The former Royal Netherlands Navy diesel attack submarines Zwaardvis and Tijgerhaai arrived in Malaysia in mid-December (see "Combat Fleets," pp. 9192), but an agreement for Malaya to order two new Moray-class submarines from the boats' previous owner, RDM of Rotterdam, had not yet been consummated.
Portugal retired the Daphne-class SS Albacora during 2000, and the Turkish Navy's Guppy-IIA-class diesel attack submarine Cerbe also has been retired, reducing the total in both classes to two in each navy.