Liberia's long and bloody civil war of the 1990s saw conflict on land and at sea. From dealing with refugees fleeing the fighting (at right), to escorting peacekeeping forces, a coalition of West African navies demonstrated a level of cooperation that may be a portent of things to come for war-torn Africa.
When the sound of war and cries of death in Liberia reached an intolerable level, the Heads of State summit of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) in Banjul, the Gambia, had no other option but to authorize the establishment of an intervention force—the ECOWAS Peace Monitoring Group (ECOMOG)—in June 1990. The chief role of ECOMOG was to stop the factional fighting and create an atmosphere conducive for a political solution.
Consequently, on 24 August 1990, the navies of Ghana and Nigeria successfully inserted the ECOMOG troops into Freeport of Monrovia to commence a long, drawn-out peacekeeping operation. Since then, the ECOMOG Naval Task Force (ENTF) has engaged in both conventional and non-conventional naval tasks in support of the troops ashore. All Africans should be proud of this mission's accomplishments, for two reasons. First, it provided the first contemporary example of popular humanitarian intervention that derived its legal bases from customary international law and not the U.N. Charter. Second, the operations of ENTF represent the longest continuous naval cooperation in crisis management involving African nations.
Operation Exodus
Code-named Operation Exodus, the liberation of Liberia began with a coalition of multinational forces from Ghana, Nigeria, Guinea, the Gambia, and Sierra Leone. Two Ghanaian naval ships, the Achimota and Yogaga, escorted the Ghanaian contingent (embarked on the MV Tano) and joined their counterparts in Sierra Leone—from where the force commander, General Arnold Quainoo of Ghana, had intended to launch his operation across the Sierra Leone/Liberia border. The task force was made up of three Nigerian Navy ships, a Nigerian Navy tug, two Ghanaian Navy ships, two merchant ships and more than 5,000 soldiers from the coalition countries. The two navies undertook not only all the resupply and reinforcement duties of their respective countries, but also provided naval gunfire support to land operations whenever required. The navies of Sierra Leone and Guinea, although not organic to ENTF, also performed resupply duties for their own land forces.
The initial plan of intervention was abandoned in favor of a sea lift, as intelligence reports warned of imminent ambush attacks en route to Monrovia by the main rebel group, the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL), led by Charles Taylor. Taylor, with over 90% of the country under his control, declared himself President in the midst of lawlessness and continuous atrocities being committed both by his rebels and the loyal soldiers of the besieged President, the late Samuel Doe. A breakaway faction of the main rebel group led by Prince Yomi Johnson—the Independent National Patriotic Front of Liberia (INPFL)—favored international intervention, so naval planners set out for Freeport of Monrovia, which then was under Johnson's control. In a desperate attempt to stop the ECOMOG intervention, the Taylor invaded Monrovia and overran the INPFL. The timely arrival of ENTF, however, prevented the annihilation of Prince Johnson's group and assisted the ground troops in gaining a strategic foothold for their operation. After securing the harbor, the entire military accoutrement was discharged, the first ECOMOG headquarters established, and the enforcement action spread out from the harbor toward strategic locations in Monrovia.
Some Naval Tasks in Liberia
Logistics Support. The naval ships were used frequently for the resupply of fuel, food, and ammunition, and reinforcement of land troops. For major sealift operations and bulk logistics support, however, the two navies relied on chartered merchant ships. This became a major task, for there were several thousand people fleeing the carnage. The cost involved in chartering foreign merchant vessels to the conflict area is astronomical for developing nations, and imposes serious budgetary constraints. It would be prudent for governments to support the existence of national shipping lines.
Communications. Owing to the damage caused by the civil war, telecommunications were nonexistent in Liberia. Communication between force commanders and national authorities was possible only through respective diplomatic missions in Sierra Leone until the naval forces came to the rescue with their unique, long-range communications facilities. Consequently, ENTF provided the only operational communication between the ECOMOG force and their respective national authorities.
Sea Blockade. On 19 November 1992, the U.N. Security Council unanimously imposed an arms embargo on Liberia to be enforced by ENTF. Prior to this, the MV Sea Rose had been arrested with a large cache of arms allegedly belonging to the NPFL. This seizure incapacitated the insurgent force; subsequently it was unable to sustain Operation Octopus (a large-scale NPFL offensive operation to force ECOMOG out of Liberia). The Yogaga played a significant role in the implementation of the U.N. sanctions.
Naval Gunfire Support. During the advance to Kakata (a strategic town in Liberia then under NPFL control) and during Operation Octopus, gunfire support played a major role by cooperating with the air assets of Nigeria and Ghana to "level" the ground. When coastal areas of Sierra Leone were falling to Charles Taylor's group, naval ships were very effective in flushing out the rebels. Taylor's alleged retaliatory act was to punish Sierra Leone for allowing its territory to be used by ECOMOG.
Other Duties
Search and Rescue. Most of the merchant ships willing to assist in the distribution of food items along Liberia's coast during the war were "rust buckets" or "ships of shame." As a result, search-and-rescue operations assumed a high profile status on ENTF's operational itinerary. On 29 June 1994, the MV Sea Friends experienced severe flooding on a food-delivery mission to a rebel stronghold at the port city of Greenville. Upon arriving at the scene, technical personnel from the Yogaga observed that the situation was near hopeless and that the only way to save the vessel was to go alongside the sinking ship and use the Yogaga's portable pump. This operation lasted for over 72 hours in a hostile environment before the perforation was discovered and remedial action taken.
Supply of Relief Food Items in Rebel Strongholds. ENTF either carried relief food items on naval ships or escorted merchant ships carrying these items to major distribution points along the coast. This was a duty some in the area of operations dreaded, because at times it took the peacekeepers into the strongholds of the hostile rebel group. In mid-1994, the rebels threatened to hold the captain of the Achimota hostage, after the ship had landed logistical support for the U.N. observer group in the port city of Harper. Several rebels were observed wielding RPGs and the latest model of AK-47s by the ship's side while the captain was detained on the jetty by the rebel leaders. This rare hostility toward the ship prompted the executive officer to order the ship to action stations while naval diplomacy was ongoing to secure the captain's release. After a lengthy diplomatic intercourse with the rebels, the captain was allowed on board his ship to cast off without any shore assistance. This was a real hair-raiser for all the ship's crew—including the author, who was then the navigating officer of the Achimota.
Naval Casualty
In September 1990, the Yogaga became the first and only naval casualty in Operation Exodus. The ship was incapacitated after being damaged by a rebel mortar attack. To date it remains uncertain as to which rebel group was responsible for this attack. First, the NPFL had been pushed too far away from the harbor for such an accurate and timely shot. Second, the INPFL was also at this time out of favor with ECOMOG because the peacekeeping force would not work according to its dictates. Incidentally, a Ghanaian government delegation, led by the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, also was on an official visit to Monrovia, and in fact on board the Yogaga when the shell landed on the ship. It is probable that the government delegation was the target of the attack. The attack was cleverly planned to coincide with a BBC radio program, Focus on Africa, at 1700 GMT—then the only credible source of news in Liberia.
The Necessity of Naval Cooperation
The successful democratic elections conducted in Liberia in late 1997 signaled the successful completion of ECOMOG's peacekeeping duties in Liberia. The election of the former rebel leader, Charles Taylor, as the country's President under the auspices of the UN and ECOWAS epitomized a unique achievement for the participating countries in particular and the sub-region in general. There is therefore no doubt that the "ECOMOG way" of naval peacekeeping has lent weight to the contemporary international view on conflict resolution through regional/sub-regional initiatives. But is there a future for the ECOMOG way of doing things after Liberia?
The U.S. Navy—A Reluctant Ally. The reluctance of the United States to intervene militarily in an internal conflict in Africa after Somalia is a factor worth considering. Before the insertion of the ECOMOG force into Liberia in 1990, a U.S. naval force was operating off the coast of Monrovia, rendering only necessary assistance to its own citizens. This fleet may have had the capacity to abate the conflict due to its timely presence in the area, but this may not have been in the U.S. national interest. This was in spite of desperate and persistent calls from the late President Doe and high-profile Liberian politicians for direct U.S. military intervention. If the atrocities the U.S. fleet witnessed in Liberia were not enough to convince U.S. policy makers to intervene militarily, it is highly improbable there will be a future U.S. military role in an intra-state conflict in Africa.
Geographic Propinquity. Out of the 16 nations in the sub-region, 13 are littoral—suggesting that there is a high probability that future multilateral operations in the sub-region will feature a substantial naval component. This puts a high premium on naval forces that are suited for littoral warfare and can be brought to bear on a distant crisis in reasonable time, without much damage to the tenuous political relationships in the sub-region.
Importance of Seaborne Trade. The sub-region's dependence on the sea is quite high by African standards. West Africa is made up of developing countries whose import and export trade with the outside world far exceeds the intra-ECOWAS trade. These countries export mainly raw agricultural products and import finished products by sea. It is estimated that more than 90% of the external trade of the sub-region is by sea. It is therefore imperative that the sea lines of communication be rendered safe at all times against threats—such as piracy—by reliable surveillance and enforcement systems. Presently, it is clear that none of the countries in the sub-region has the maritime capability to act unilaterally.
Post-ECOMOG Strategy
Sub-Saharan Africa is acutely deficient in multilateral security arrangements. There are five multilateral defense arrangements and eight bilateral ones.1 The ECOWAS Defense Pact, which was contracted between 16 West Africa states in May 1981, did not become operational until it was subsumed under the ECOMOG initiative. The two basic elements of the pact—non-aggression against each other, and a mutual defense agreement against armed aggression—remain relevant, however. Perhaps the main obstacle to an African multilateral defense arrangement is the presence of strong defense partnerships with foreign powers, particularly France. There is a feeling of impregnability and complacency amongst francophone countries. Any credible security arrangement for the sub-region must first seek to achieve harmony between the anglophones and francophones.
The grim security situation in the subregion calls for the pooling together of naval resources among the 13 littoral states. Assuming that support from the francophones becomes dependable, each of these states can contribute at least one gunboat to a nominal, ad hoe ECOWAS Maritime Force (EMF). Designated gunboats would remain part of their national fleet and only come together for joint maneuvers and exercises, at least once biennially, with successive command of EMF rotating among participating states. Due to serious budgetary, political, and resource constraints in the sub-region, it will be overly optimistic, ambitious, and premature to contemplate such a standing naval force. An ongoing exchange program between the Ghanaian and Nigerian militaries, however, promises to serve as a building block for future naval cooperation.
Apart from cooperating to respond to crises, there are mutual benefits to be gained in such areas as ocean surveillance, pooling of resources in ship design, joint acquisition programs, search-and-rescue activities, marine salvage, equipment and logistical standardization, and anti-piracy and anti-smuggling activities. Other non-naval benefits such as joint marine environmental protection, marine safety, and fishery research and management could easily emanate from such cooperation among member nations.
Clearly, some of the tasks performed by ENTF in Liberia and the emerging roles of navies envisioned above are beyond the capabilities of patrol boats. Future acquisitions by sub-regional navies must therefore include multi-purpose ships, such as corvettes with long endurance and at least a helicopter landing pad and amphibious platforms. Ambitious navies may go in for frigates, if national budgets can afford them—because help from external maritime powers should not be expected.
Conclusion
The Liberian crisis offered a rare opportunity for African naval forces to demonstrate beyond a doubt that given the resources, they can contribute immensely to global peace by keeping their own backyards in order. Particularly admirable were the unique contributions of the Ghanaian and Nigerian naval forces. But to be able to sustain future maritime contingency operations of such magnitude, the navies must add to their inventory appropriate multi-purpose vessels with the right mix of weaponry and endurance. In order to prevent the subregion from being "Liberianised," it is imperative for the naval forces to embark on security-building measures through cooperation in joint acquisition programs and exercises. "The land divides, the sea unites," are the enduring words of an old Norwegian saying. Let us hope this can become a truism in maritime Africa.
The five defense pacts are the Organisation Africaine et Malagache de Cooperation Economique (OAMCE), the Burundi-Rwanda-Zaire Tripartite Pact, the Montanza Pact, the Angola-Zaire-Zambia Tripartite Pact; and the ECOWAS Defense Pact.
Lieutenant Commander Appiah-Mensah currently is completing a Masters degree in Maritime Policy at the University of Wollogong, Australia.