"Don't Ask, Don't Tell"
(See J. Graham, pp. 39-42, October 1999 Proceedings)
Captain Richard S. Reade, Jr., U.S. Naval Reserve (Retired)—The mission of the military is to defend the country with minimum casualties. It is not to conduct social experimentation nor to correct societal problems. Recruiting quotas are not being met now, even with reduced standards. Dropping the ban on homosexuals would exacerbate the problem. While 70% of the population may be against discrimination, according to Lieutenant Commander Graham, nowhere near that percentage will want to share close quarters under stressful conditions with homosexuals. The military has more problems than it can handle now with two sexes. Double that and chaos will reign. Readiness will plummet. The warrior ethic, already in extremis because of double standards (gender norming), pregnancy policies, sensitivity training, and the reluctance to discuss these issues, will be but a memory. This must not be allowed to happen.
Commander Michael R. Adams, U.S. Coast Guard (Retired)—Lieutenant Commander Graham's article contains a number of errors in both legal reasoning and practical results. First, there are not just two standards ("strict scrutiny" and "rational basis") upon which courts evaluate discrimination cases. A third, intermediate standard ("heightened scrutiny") lies between rational basis and strict scrutiny. It is this standard, contrary to Commander Graham's statement, which is often used in gender-based discrimination cases. (See, for instance, Michael M. v. Superior Court of Sonoma County [1981] and Mississippi University for Women v. Hogan [1982].)
Second, lower court holdings impose no obligation on the Supreme Court. Lower courts err and that is part of the reason we have a Supreme Court. The fact that some lower courts have found some forms of discrimination against homosexuals to be unconstitutional does not mean the Supreme Court will necessarily follow suit. (See, for instance, Bowers v. Hardwick [1986].)
Third, a "steady shift in the attitudes of American citizens" and polls showing "support for Clinton's executive order prohibiting discrimination against gays" impose no obligation on the Supreme Court. One of the tenets of our constitutional system is avoiding a "tyranny of the majority" (see The Federalist, No. 10). The Supreme Court exists "to say what the law is" (Marbury v. Madison [1803]), not to acquiesce to the whims of the populace.
Finally, even if a Supreme Court review of "don't ask, don't tell" overturned the policy, it would only mean the policy was unconstitutional and therefore void. As the Supreme Court itself has pointed out repeatedly over two centuries, the Court does not legislate nor otherwise create substitutes for that which it finds unconstitutional. It simply disallows that which is unacceptable. The result, in other words, would be that the armed forces would follow the uncontested policies that existed before "don't ask, don't tell" unless or until an acceptable alternative policy was established.
"Warfare Exposition and Symposium in Virginia Beach"
Lieutenant Commanders Rob Slaven and Dave Hargan, Royal Australian Navy—We congratulate the Naval Institute on the exemplary nature of its recently completed symposium. As a professional forum, it provided the "No Blame" environment that so many of the audience appeared to be crying out for. In the context of exploring some of the issues facing modern navies, the symposium can only be seen as a particularly good avenue for development of a greater consciousness of many of the issues outside the overriding need to fight and win at sea.
In concert with the very high standards of the panels, the inspirational addresses by such luminaries as Secretary Danzig (perhaps the best speaker we have heard) and Admiral Smith were refreshing for their simplicity and honesty in a world driven excessively by perceptions of political correctness. To this end, we walked away as significantly better informed naval officers, and have returned to our instructional positions mindful of Admiral Smith's comments on coalition operations security.
P.S. In the absence of Vieques, may we suggest Tasmania as a suitable location for a new gunnery range?
"Coast Guard Helos: A Call to Arms"
(See M. Emerson, pp. 30-33, October 1999 Proceedings)
William T. Brockman—Based on recent news reports, it would appear that events have overtaken the publication of the article. A story in the local newspaper recounted the use of a .50-caliber weapon nicknamed "Diablo" by a Coast Guard helicopter to disable the motor of a drug smuggler's speed boat. Television carried footage [shown here] of warning shots that came from a door-mounted machine gun being fired across the bow of another smuggler's boat. It would seem self-evident to me that a helicopter crew employing these tactics would be justified in "adjusting" their aim should weapons be aimed at them from the boats.
"Pearl Pilot: The Future of Navy Ship Maintenance"
(See J. Conners, pp. 99-102, September 1999 Proceedings)
Lieutenant Robert W. Thomas, U.S. Navy—As the qualified ship's duty officer and engineering duty officer in the USS Greenville (SSN-772) from April 1996 until May 1999, 1 worked with the Pearl Harbor Naval Shipyard and Intermediate Maintenance Facility during three major upkeeps as well as an emergent dry-docking. While I can appreciate the monumental task that Captain Conners faced, the merger of the civilian and military work centers was far from the success portrayed in his article, and continues to be a futile exercise.
The civilians, from project managers to tradesmen, are simply not cognizant of military maintenance protocol and standards. Captain Conners states that "they tell us that the service is even better than before." Who are "they?" Certainly not the officers on the waterfront who spend an inordinate amount of time correcting and removing the conflicts from the maintenance depot schedules. On numerous occasions, my fellow officers and I were required to intervene with separate shipyard work centers that were performing incompatible maintenance. I wish I could have told Captain Conners about the civilian workers who demanded that I place their work at the top of my priority list and then proceeded to vanish from the ship when I acquiesced.
Military personnel with "at sea" experience are well-versed in the often confusing and emergent nature of upkeep periods. These workers appreciate the effort of the ship's company to comply with the requirements of their maintenance. This is simply not the case with the civilian workforce. In one instance, civilian workers, in a rush to complete their shift work, pried open our submarine's after escape hatch and proceeded to lower a heavy valve into the engine room without obtaining anyone's permission. Luckily, the chief petty officer who was standing under the hatch at the time only received a minor contusion.
Perhaps the most alarming practice is the continued use of two separate quality assurance programs. The Joint Fleet Maintenance Manual, developed to prevent future Thresher-type accidents, is foreign to the civilian workforce. In a disturbing event, two civilians removed one of my submarine's sea water pumps without complying with the Navy's regulations, which they are not required to follow. The result was an inrush of sea water that was quelled by the quick actions of an engine room watchstander.
While it may be a fiscal necessity to realign the shipyard maintenance structure, decision makers should be well advised of the real occurrences at Pearl Pilot. The safety of our sailors and our fleet's readiness are at stake.
"The 1700 Community Is Worth It"
(See K. Dilday, pp. 48-49, October 1999 Proceedings)
"Does the Navy Need the 1700 Community?"
(See J. Graham, pp. 48-50, February 1999; T. Hall, D. Diekman, p. 22, May 1999; C. Rein, p. 16, June 1999 Proceedings)
Lieutenant Commander Janice Graham, U.S. Navy (Retired)—With resigned familiarity I read Lieutenant Dilday's plea to the 1700 community leadership for some sort of response to my article. 1, too, waited for a response when my paper was first drafted for the Chief of Naval Operations Executive Panel, was forwarded to the CNO, and then passed on to the 1700 community for a response. Six months later, I decided that no response was forthcoming and I submitted the article to Proceedings for publication.
When I drafted the paper, I was unsure whether the 1700 community should be eliminated or simply restructured. A year later, I am now convinced that elimination is the fight answer and the faster the decision and process occur, the better it will be for the junior members of the community who have the most to gain or lose.
Women dominate the community, and it is politically difficult to advocate elimination. This will be the greatest impediment to the Navy leadership's ability to make the right decision—one that is the best for the Navy and ultimately for the members of the 1700 community. With the lifting of the legislative restrictions on the assignment of women in combat, there no longer exists the justification for what is still a separate woman's community.
Continual tinkering with the core competencies to match those of the current composition of 1700s is not the way to develop an officer community and career path. Core competencies and career paths must be based on the Navy's strategic vision. The 1700 community will continue in a self-justification mode until it develops a mission integral to warfighting. In spite of the assertion that a unique skill set can be found within the 1700 community, close examination will reveal that there is simply none.
Most billets in end strength and manpower are best filled by civilians who can remain in the billet long enough to provide continuity. The best recruiters are the warfighters, who can best answer questions concerning daily life on board a ship. Getting the right sealift to the right place is an expertise found more readily in the Supply Corps than the 1700 community. If an information technology community becomes a reality in the future, those very few 1700s who do possess this skill set have the best opportunity for a future in the Navy. For most 1700s, integration into the warfighting community—and the required sea duty—is the best path to a viable career.
The senior 1700 officers need to acknowledge that they have spent 20 years or more performing tasks that may no longer be relevant to the downsized and streamlined Navy of the future. This does not mean that what they have contributed to the Navy is diminished in value, but they have an obligation to recommend the right course for the 1700 officers who still have their careers in front of them.
The current plan to conduct yet another study is merely an effort to kick the can further down the road. It is past time to make the decision that is the right course for the Navy organization.
"Dark Victory"
(See M. Evans, pp. 33-40, September 1999 Proceedings)
Dr. Richard P. Hallion, The Air Force Historian—There is a difference between being provocative and being outrageous, and Dr. Evans crossed well over the line with his accusation that air power, somehow, accelerated the genocide inside Kosovo. Surely the tremendous time it would have taken to launch a ground offensive would have generated the same reaction from Milosevic, and far greater casualties to the people of Kosovo. Worse is his implication that we must reject engagement at a distance because only then can we possess a proper "military ethos," rooted in a sound "moral purpose and ethical character." We should apparently reject this tactic for the higher purpose of "honor." I guess that these ideals are endangered by reliance on air power, and are only guaranteed, it seems, by putting young men and women at risk in close combat on the battlefield. Anything else, by his implication, is dishonorable.
Reading that section of the essay, I recalled Erich Maria Remarque's All Quiet on the Western Front, with its devastating portrayal of teachers who encourage their students to sign up for the war in the name of honor and sacrifice, and critically dissect front-line strategy, even as class after class go to their deaths.
In contrast to the "fantasy of bloodless war" that Dr. Evans calls forth, there are some realities from our past and present. In World War 11, U.S. Army Air Forces deaths accounted for 21.84% of total American military deaths (other non-AAF Army fatalities accounted for 56.57%, Navy deaths were 15.52%, and Marine fatalities were 6.07%). I don't need to add that in the missile era, things are still quite risky. Marine Lieutenant Colonel Phillip Tissue's article in the same issue of Proceedings tellingly refers to "four or five missiles launched against a single division of aircraft" and that there were missions "where you were just glad to get back." Airmen, it can be argued, are at particular risk today, because unlike most other warriors, virtually every shot (especially missiles) in their direction is an aimed shot that is likely to kill if it hits.
It was Major General J. F. C. Fuller who noted that, at any point in military history, the weapon of the greatest reach proved to be the weapon that "dominates the fight," and served as "the fulcrum of combined tactics." There is no honor in deliberately seeking the close fight. Rather, this is the foolhardy "honor" of the banzai charge, a logic more about losing than about winning, more about attrition than achieving effects.
The bottom line, of course, is there is nothing smart or noble about stripping our young men and women of their technological advantage over opponents. Today, the rapid and decisive power of joint service air attack is our overwhelming national security advantage. Fuller stated in 1945 that the airplane constituted the future fulcrum of combined tactics. He was right then, and history since that time has proven it.
"A Tate of Two Cities"
(See E. Wooldridge, pp. 28-32, July 1999;
J. Pullin, J. LaPlante, pp. 10-12, August 1999; J. Nathman, B. Lemkin, pp. 19-21, September 1999; C. Laingen, pp. 10-12, October 1999 Proceedings)
Captain Albert C. Myers, U.S. Navy—As an officer who has had more than his share of Washington assignments, I commend Captain Wooldridge for his splendid accuracy in characterizing the two parallel universes which are the operational Navy and that of the largely self aggrandizing mandarins of the Chief of Naval Operations staff and their imperious counterparts on the Joint Staff. While many naval officers assigned to Washington have not forgotten their operational roots, far too many have become smitten with a sense of overweening self-importance and too smugly comfortable with the political diversions and distractions found on the E-ring.
The surface warfare community is the most egregious in this squalid game. At least the aviation community and the submarine community are known, quite justifiably, for still according operational competency and excellence their due role and indeed primacy over political promise and connections. Not so the Surface Navy, which Captain Wooldridge has adroitly dissected for what it has gradually evolved into—the last outpost of city hall style machine politics of any bureaucratic entity in the United States. Any warfighting community which routinely favors the slickness of face recognition (accrued from Washington staff duty as opposed to sea time), and political connectedness (hypocritically and euphemistically characterized as "potential for future leadership") during supremely critical selection board deliberation dooms itself to an accession of leadership in the flag ranks in the grade of captain that will be increasingly inept and less experienced operationally, even if adroit and nimble in the pantomime of Pentagon political theater.
Paradoxically, the two selection boards in which this wildly unbalanced approach occurs are those most critical to the future of the surface community and to the Navy as a whole: the administrative board which screens commanders for commanding officer assignment, and the statutory board which selects captains for promotion to rear admiral. Overwhelming evidence demonstrates that indispensable to success is a combination of being in the right billet, being known by or having worked for a board member, and, by the way, having survived with minimum "rolls" the right operational jobs. The community and the Navy signal their approbation for these lopsided, but highly successful, career tracks when they snatch the carefully anointed few out of the waterfront as discreetly as possible and transfer them to the Pentagon.
The surface major command screen administrative board causes squirming on the part of the flag officers who sit in judgment, since there is no way to evade consideration of the operational performance in command of those being considered—no matter how much the admirals try to contort the records to select the politically cunning who most closely resemble themselves. Their colleagues, however, who meet later to select captains for promotion to rear admiral, will prune away the non-political "players" no matter how well they did at sea.
As Captain Wooldridge implies, the Navy would be enormously improved if a healthy dose of waterfront-experienced senior surface warrior operators were selected to supplant the political operators who now dominate senior leadership positions. We need many more ex-regional support group commanders, many more ex-commanding officers of tactical training groups, and many more ex-chiefs of staff to group commanders wearing stars. We need less former executive assistants or legislative affairs operatives with only 11 months or so in major command.
No finer tribute to the penetrating and spot-on insights offered by Captain Wooldridge can be extended than by noting that the great majority of the howls of objection to his points in these pages have come from flag officers who are precisely those with the most equities in the current patronage system that passes for selection to initial command and to senior rank.
"The Growing Threat of Modern Piracy"
(See T. Hunter, pp. 72-74, July 1999; D. Williams, p. 12, September 1999 Proceedings)
Commodore Carlos L. Agustin, Philippine Navy (Retired)—I am familiar with some of the cases cited by Mr. Hunter, having served as Commandant of the Philippine Coast Guard in 1990, just after a three-year period when pirate syndicates took advantage of the confused state of affairs in the Philippines resulting from the "People Power Revolution," which overthrew the authoritarian rule of Marcos in 1986. Since piracy had to be dealt with internationally, we got good support in countering the threat, particularly from Indonesia. The joint border patrol agreement between our two navies and the close relationship between the Philippine Coast Guard and the Indonesian Directorate General of Sea Communication facilitated the exchange of information.
The 1993 incident involving the Danish Arctic Star was one of too many involving pirates wearing Chinese military uniforms operating particularly between the China mainland and Scarborough Shoal, west of Luzon. Hunter's statement that "at no time during the incident did law enforcement or naval forces arrive to intervene" is certainly unfair, as the geographic location and distance involved would require an almost impossible response capability with dedicated suitable air assets for the Coast Guard or the Navy to be able to react quickly enough.
Our findings indicated that the pirates in just about all of the cases were indeed from mainland China, indicating some truth in the article's hint of "state-sponsored piracy," although I personally feel that most cases involved rogue military or criminals impersonating the Chinese Marine Frontier Police.
One case in particular attracted my attention in 1992 when the President of the Philippine National Oil Company (PNOC), Mr. Manuel A. Estrella, personally called me about the hijacking of the PNOC tanker MV Karagatan off Batangas province in Luzon. Our intelligence eventually led us to conclude that the pirated vessel ended up as a Honduran flag vessel and registered in Singapore within the next month. I dispatched a team led by my chief of staff to Singapore, but in spite of the endorsement of the Singaporean Navy, the desk officer at the Singapore Ministry of Foreign Affairs did not have sufficient experience in such matters and so delayed the operation that the ship was able to escape to Indonesian waters. The response of the Indonesian Navy was swift, but the search area was too wide for our meager combined assets.
The vessel was eventually apprehended in Sumatra when, upon investigation after a fire incident, the true identity of the vessel was uncovered. PNOC was no longer interested because it had been paid by insurers, and the vessel was seized by Indonesian authorities. The incident forced us to develop more responsive links and pressure Honduras to be more prudent in administering its ship registry.
"Patrol Craft Can Maintain Littoral Sea Control"
(See R. Arthur, pp. 70-71, August 1999 Proceedings)
Senior Chief Electronic Warfare Technician (Surface Warfare/Air Warfare) Robert S. Lanham, U.S. Navy, Electronic Warfare Officer, USS John Hancock (DD-981)—Having operated in the Sea of Japan for two years on board the USS Germantown (LSD-42), I can affirm that it is a full-time job for a junior officer-of-the-deck to maneuver in and around the fleets of fishing boats and various merchant vessels, much less to achieve any success in identifying or accurately assessing possible threats that these seemingly harmless craft may present. Amphibious warfare will be the meat and potatoes of our operational commitments in the next 20 years. Any future conflicts against North Korea and China will almost certainly be decided by the effectiveness of our littoral forces, specifically our amphibious ships and their supporting cast.
As Lieutenant Arthur points out, ongoing efforts aimed at Kosovo and Iraq, featuring aircraft carriers and Tomahawk missiles as our primary weapons of submission, have proven largely ineffective and tremendously expensive. Patrol craft are the only logical option for amphibious support in the littoral, particularly when conducting an impartial risk assessment. It remains to be seen, however, whether or not our leadership will swallow their Aegis pride and admit that our cruise missile-equipped CGs and DDGs are not viable platforms for littoral support. Oliver Hazard Perry (FFG-7)-class frigates, which might fit into this role, are already overworked. This leaves our fleet of patrol craft as the platform of choice. Not only do they offer a drastic reduction in terms of personnel and material risk, as well as cost, but the Navy is in dire need of an identifiable mission. Most of the fleet looks upon these versatile craft as "neat" but there is really no sense of what they actually do. With their diverse shallow-water capabilities, the amphibious support role seems custom-made for these ships. After considering all the data, it becomes apparent that it's time to totally integrate patrol craft into our littoral support game plan, before some Third World missile turns Lieutenant Arthur's commentary into prophecy.
"The U.S. Navy in Review"
(See S. Truver, pp. 76-82, May 1999; R. Miller, pp. 27-28. September 1999 Proceedings)
Henry Streeter—Captain Miller was wrong when he stated that "for good reason no monitors have been developed since [the turn of the century] for our or any other Navy." In World War II, the Royal Navy had two monitors: the Roberts and the Abercrombie [pictured below]. I participated in the Sicilian invasion in the USS Doran (DD-634). After the initial landing, Allied forces moved west along the south shore of Sicily. Supporting them from offshore was one of these two monitors. Her hull had huge sponsons for torpedo protection but little antiaircraft defenses. The turret contained two guns which were independent of each other. They were very effective.
"Making the Case for SSGNs" (See W. Houley, pp. 47-49, July 1999; J. O'Neil, pp. 23-24, August 1999; R. Bennett, pp. 16-18, October 1999 Proceedings)
"A Submarine for All Seasons?"
(See N. Polmar, pp. 87-88, August 1999 Proceedings)
Commander Mark Gorenflo, U.S. Navy—I've served as an executive officer in the USS Georgia (SSBN-729), including strategic deterrent patrols and considerable periods in refit availabilities. Most of Captain O'Neil's objections to the use of Tridents as special operating forces (SOF) insertion platforms are either canards or straw men. Tridents will have considerable space, for a submarine, to allow embarked SOF teams to maintain their physical fitness and stamina. Will it pose a leadership challenge? Almost certainly, but I have never known such elite units (SEALs and submariners) to shrink from such a challenge before.
There is no truth to the standard myth that nuclear submarines can't operate in shallow waters. Tridents exhibit absolutely superb near-surface handling characteristics. Having driven 688s, 6881s and Tridents, the Tridents rank near the top of the list. In any scenario where the deployment of SOF units is required near the coastline, the required sea state conditions for any submerged SEAL insertion or extraction will allow a Trident to meet the military objective. Furthermore, the Special Operations Command is developing high-capacity mini-subs to allow more distant insertion of SOF units, mainly to save more of the troops' energy for action ashore. Tridents will make excellent platforms to deploy such vehicles.
Mr. Polmar's explanation of the ability of a Tomahawk Land Attack Missile (TLAM)-loaded Trident to cover most of our unified commanders-in-chief (CinC) TLAM requirements is a key point that is still not well understood. A Strike/SOF Trident, with a nominal TLAM loadout, can cover most of these requirements in a given theater, while operating covertly, in a patrol mode perfected by years of Trident operations, and still maintain connectivity. This provides significant leverage for the CinC, who can employ his other assets to meet critical roles that currently go unfilled.
The obstacles that Mr. Polmar raises are real but can be surmounted. Four Strike/SOF Tridents, operating with two crews, could maintain a considerable forward presence in two separate ocean areas using a normal Trident patrol cycle. With a surge during crisis and with forward deployed, abbreviated maintenance cycles, continuous presence could be maintained over the period of a year.
In the area of strike communications, Mr. Polmar asks if an SSGN could maintain its "clandestine" posture and still handle the communications requirements imposed by strike warfare. The simple answer is yes, because that's exactly what strike-configured attack submarines did successfully in Allied Force strikes in support of NATO's campaign in Kosovo. Allied submarines launched approximately 25% of the TLAMs expended in the campaign. They participated in the required communications networks and enjoyed tremendous success.
We should be discussing how to work together to bring this capability to the fleet, rather than attending to minor objections to what is an excellent investment for the nation.
"Radars Can Detect the Periscope"
(See P. Stevens, pp. 60-64, September 1999 Proceedings)
"Can Radar Help Defeat the Diesel-Electric Sub?"
(See P. Stevens, pp. 56-59, August 1999 Proceedings)
Lieutenant Mark B. Dargis, U.S. Navy—In the case of the automatic radar periscope detection discriminator (APRDD), it is the opinion of this deckplate-level surface warfare officer that to concentrate on advanced radar development to the detriment of other antisubmarine warfare (ASW) sensors is not the solution to the littoral ASW "problem." While it is true that the operating characteristics of conventional submarines in the littoral offer significantly greater opportunities for non-acoustic detection than in a blue-water environment, the impact of acoustic ASW sensors should by no means be discounted. Given a favorable oceanographic environment, acoustic sensors can be highly effective in providing crucial initial detection at tactically significant ranges, allowing surface forces to achieve the most desirable result of killing the enemy at long range with airborne assets.
That is not to say that ARPDD, or any other radar enhancement for ships, is a waste of time and money. ASW is best executed in a coordinated environment, where multiple sensors are employed to complement the strengths and weaknesses of each. Mr. Stevens presents a compelling set of ARPDD capabilities that should have those who sail in harm's way screaming for this arrow to add to their quivers: sea clutter elimination up to sea state-5, a false detection rate of one per day, high confidence periscopes at ten-times acoustic sensor range in a lousy ocean environment. There is also the intangible benefit of making submariners honestly fret over whether or not to expose a mast anywhere near a warship, rather than operate with smug impunity as they have so often in the past.
Mr. Stevens, however, should be more forthright in identifying the barriers to bringing such a capable sensor to the fleet as soon as possible. His careful wording appears benign at first reading but upon further reflection is quite illuminating. "The existing program management and acquisition infrastructure within the Navy lifelines is not configured to allow promotion of a system capable of offering Aegis-like capability," Mr. Stevens writes. When you distill out the Washington-speak from that sentence, you're left with a bureaucratic ailment that generations of fleet operators have long despised: rice bowls. Money talks in the wacky worlds of program management and acquisitions, and it would seem that certain codes are jealously guarding their pet projects, the better to elevate their stature in the eyes of those who control the purse strings. This predicament is simply unacceptable in light of such obvious and demonstrated capabilities. Any system that gives a real warfighting edge to operators on the "tip of the spear" should not be consigned to lobbying for recognition in the halls of the Pentagon. 71
"Steaming into the New World"
(See N. Friedman, pp. 53-59, May 1999; Z. Freivogel, p. 32, September 1999 Proceedings)
Dr. Zvonimir Freivogel, Coburg, Germany—A crucial part of my letter was omitted through the editing process. The last sentence in the second paragraph was printed as "Only NATO airstrikes in 1995 ended the aggression." This sentence was originally longer and should go as follows: "Only the Croatian offensives in 1995, at times together with the Bosnian troops and coordinated with several NATO air strikes against the command centers of the Bosnian Serbs, saved the western Muslim enclaves (namely Bihac) from the fate of Srebrenica and other fallen towns."
With all respect to NATO, their air strikes were not so decisive as the Croatian ground offensive in removing the imminent Serbian threat in Croatia and the western parts of Bosnia.
"Human-Centric Warfare"
(See A. Zimm, pp. 28-31, May 1999; S. Rowe, pp. 18-20, July 1999; R. Charles, W. Brooks, pp. 22-23, August 1999 Proceedings)
Lieutenant Commander M. Conrad Agresti, U.S. Navy (Retired)—In recent letters to Proceedings, two individuals who were not present feel that by virtue of their former ranks they can interpret what happened on board the USS Vincennes (CG-49) during her engagement on 3 July 1988 in which Iran Air 655, an A-300 Airbus, was destroyed.
For Commander Brooks to rely on three- and four-stack destroyer duty to make judgments about where the commanding officer of an Aegis cruiser should be during general quarters is simply uninformed. The bridge does not have half of the information that is available in the combat information center (CIC). The commanding officer's presence on the bridge would not have made any difference in the ship's roll because the junior officer of the deck who had the con would likely have made the same rudder angle error regardless—an angle which was immediately ordered eased by both the executive officer and myself.
Furthermore, the air contact was not visible until after it was struck by the missiles. I know this because I watched both missiles from launch until intercept and detonation. The Vincennes was on an even keel when the "take with birds" order was received and the salvo fired.
As for Lieutenant Colonel Charles challenging the veracity of Captain Rogers' book Storm Center, I can only say "Physician, heal thyself."
As co-author (with Mr. John Barry) of the 13 July 1992 Newsweek cover story about the Vincennes, Colonel Charles begins his treatise with the statement that Captain Rogers "like many peacetime officers had never been under fire, [and] longed for action." A simple review of the official biography of Rogers would reveal that he was a decorated combat veteran of Vietnam. Since Colonel Charles chooses to criticize the thoroughness of Commander Zimm's research, it is difficult to imagine that he himself would not exercise complete thoroughness in his own research.
There are issues that the Navy's reticence in rectifying could lead to a repeat of "the Vincennes incident." The first indication that the Vincennes had that the unknown air track might be hostile was an engaged "hat placed on it by another ship. Review of the Aegis war diary tapes nearly a decade later revealed that the first ship to engage the air contact was the USS Sides (FFG-14). The significance of the "engaged" Naval Tactical Data System (NTDS) symbology on the crew of the Vincennes, engaged as they were in a running gun battle with Iranian gunboats, cannot be overstated. But the coup de grace was a paucity of Link track numbers, something that Link 16—if it is ever fully deployed-should alleviate.
The USS Spruance (DD-963), operating in the North Arabian Sea, was assigned the same block of 200 track numbers as the Vincennes, operating in the Arabian Gulf. With the Vincennes in the Gulf of Oman and southern Arabian Gulf on 2-3 July 1988, she was copying both Link broadcasts. The original NTDS track number assigned by the Vincennes to the air contact was T/N 4474. In order to reserve track numbers, Aegis automatically correlated this track to Sides' engaged T/N 4131. This auto-correlation was not made known by the system to the crew of the Vincennes. Meanwhile, the Spruance duplicated T/N 4474 to report an aircraft descending in altitude and increasing speed at precisely the time when the parameters of the contact of interest were being sought.
Commander Zimm explains that the combat engagement may have influenced the decision making in the Vincennes, but the Sides was not engaged in the action. Had there been time to wrest out the track number duplication, perhaps disaster could have been averted. There was one chance and that lay squarely on the shoulders of the CO of the Sides.
Nothing has ever come of the lingering human-centric issue of why Captain Carlson of the Sides said nothing to check fire, and in failing to act, allowed a civilian airliner to be destroyed. That is the lesson to be learned—non-correlating information must be reported.
The term "Robo-cruiser," which has been used to describe the Vincennes, was not one of derision, but one of respect and awe at a sophisticated warship and her well-trained crew. Very little has been written about the fact that the Vincennes also used the least lethal weaponry in combat that day, including electronic countermeasures to soft-kill three Iranian F-4Ds, or that she allowed the first reconnaissance boat to pass within hailing distance, covered but otherwise unmolested, or that she did not fire on the Iranian P-3, LST, or military hovercraft.
Make no mistake, the death of those 290 civilians in the Airbus haunts the crew of the Vincennes to this day. But do not forget as well that this cataclysmic event helped precipitate Iran's acceptance of the U. N. Cease-Fire Resolution, thereby re-establishing freedom of the seas to the Arabian Gulf. And that, after all, was the Vincennes' mission.