If the Marine Corps wants real Starship Troopers—warriors who can think and act independently, with self-discipline and the will to complete missions—it will have to restructure training and deployments to achieve unit cohesion.
As we move toward the 21st century, the prospect that technology will alter the shape of our Corps is becoming more evident. Some call it part of the revolution in military affairs, but it is part of the natural evolution of the military. Things are going to change from a technological perspective— always have, always will. And while significant, this will not be the most relevant change for the Marine Corps in the future, because technology only provides tools for the warrior to use.
A requirement for highly cohesive units has marked all ages of warfare. It is especially critical today in harnessing the full potential of the new technology. In this area, the Marine Corps can achieve a revolutionary increase in combat efficiency by changing the way it staffs, trains, and deploys its infantry battalions.
The present training and deployment cycle produces two types of infantry battalions in the Fleet Marine Force: Marine expeditionary unit (special-operations capable) (MEU[SOC]) battalions and unit deployment program (UDP) battalions. Which one a Marine is assigned to significantly affects the types of training and resources that are used to prepare him for combat. Training and deployment cycles also have different lengths—24 months for MEU(SOC) and 18 months for UDP.
This system puts infantrymen preparing for combat through two different sets of experiences—MEU(SOC) battalions focus on special-operations skills; UDP battalions focus on infantry skills—and neither does an optimum job. Neither type of battalion has the opportunity to develop the cohesion and skills needed to perform like Rommel’s “jaeger” infantry did in Italy during World War I.1 The operational concepts envisioned in the Sea Dragon paradigm require that level of performance. So how do we get there from here?
Maximum cohesion cannot be developed in an 18- or 24- month training and deployment cycle, no matter how good the leadership is. The Infantry Officer Course and the School of Infantry for enlisted Marines are only the start in creating a real “Starship Trooper.”2 One of Robert Heinlein’s futuristic warriors, a Starship Trooper is someone who can think and act independently, with self-discipline and the will to complete missions without coercion. He masters information technology to apply its combat efficiencies at the tactical level, while still appreciating the operational art of war and understanding his contributions at that level.
Within our current system, creating a unit of Starship Troopers is impossible. And tinkering with training and deployment will not solve the problem. Technological innovations (such as virtual reality training) are not the complete answer, either. The most important element in making units truly cohesive is time.
How do you create the needed time when operational tempo is increasing and resources to meet commitments are shrinking? The solution is to find a better way to structure training and deployments to achieve the fundamental goal of unit cohesion and still maintain the Corps’ commitments to the nation as a force in readiness.
The manning of infantry battalions should be based on a four-year cycle, tied to the initial service commitments of junior officers and enlisted Marines entering the Corps. With 24 battalions and a system broken into six-month increments, there always would be 3 battalions available for service at sea. These Marines would deploy with amphibious ready groups for six months, filling the unified commanders-in-chief’s current requirements for three MEU(SOC)s. The pipeline behind these deployable battalions would be filled with others at various levels of readiness, completing a standard cycle.
Every four years a battalion would be created anew. Experienced officers, staff noncommissioned officers, and noncommissioned officers would act as an initial cadre for six months. After that, the troops (including new second lieutenants) would arrive and begin training in fundamentals for six months. Six months of combined arms training would follow, along with a basic combat readiness evaluation.
Following that would be 12 months of special environment training, based partially on meeting joint and combined exercise commitments and partially on available resources—for example, mountain training in the Sierra Nevadas, desert training at Twentynine Palms, and jungle training on Okinawa. Such diverse training can be tailored over time to meet emerging global threats, to include operations other than war, if necessary.
An eight-month workup in MEU(SOC) skills would be next, culminating in a comprehensive combat readiness evaluation before deployment. After six months at sea with the fleet, the unit would return to its home base and have four months in which to disband.
This proposed system rests on several assumptions, some of which would be unpopular or difficult to accomplish and all of which challenge current manpower wisdom:
► A cohesive unit must have experienced leaders. From the battalion commander down to the squad leaders, a four- year manpower commitment must be made. This would enable maximum cohesion to develop both horizontally and vertically.3 The core leadership could be developed from the top, down through the squad leader level. Subsequently, the troops would receive follow-on training from their primary group leaders. Based on the judgment of the chain of command, the best and brightest Marines in the platoons could then be made fire team leaders. Marines always will be challenged, because there is no repetitive training of basic skills (except for perishable ones).
The most obvious concern in such a system is that an officer command an infantry battalion for four years. Limited command opportunities have brought about the current command screening process; this system might indeed create a “chosen few.” Using the idea of a second-in-command rather than an executive officer (which can be screened for, as well) will ease this problem. It also will deliver roughly the same number of capable, qualified infantry officers to continue in service to the Corps.
- Billets in the Fleet Marine Force must be filled according to the tables of organization. Experienced sergeants would be required as squad leaders and section leaders. Properly trained logistics personnel, communicators, and administrators are critical in filling billets within their specialties. This is not a “make do” system; it requires a certain degree of specialization within the battalion. For example, pulling personnel out of a battalion for fleet assistance program (FAP) duty is anathema to unit cohesion. These and other measures, while necessary at present to accomplish garrison duties, degrade unit cohesion.
- Units must be manned as they will fight, not with staffing goals based on juggling personnel to meet readiness equations. Cohesion is difficult to maintain in a unit that does not retain its personnel over the long term.
The harsh solution is to start at 110% of desired end strength. By the time the shipboard deployment arrives, regular attrition—losing Marines to injury, humanitarian discharges, courts-martial, etc.—will have brought numbers in line with desired manning levels.
One very important aspect of this natural attrition process will have to occur in the second six months of a battalion’s existence. Some Marines will not be able to adapt to the rigors of infantry service. These troops must be reassigned or discharged before their terms of service are complete. This lack of adaptability generally becomes noticeable in the first six months after boot camp, when that all-important coercive but formative pressure eases.
A critical evaluation process needs to be applied at all levels of training, to screen out those who cannot be Starship Troopers. This does not mean that these Marines need to be discharged; rather, they should be sent to another occupational specialty school for retraining and continued service. At no point should an attrition quota be applied.
As a result of these changes, the individual battalion will become and remain stable, with a clear mission and a common vision of both the immediate and the long-term future. With an acceptable loss of non-effective personnel, the battalion can focus intensely on training. Technical proficiency across a broad range of skill sets can be “pushed down” to the lowest unit level and allow the use of more complex tactics (and the systems that support them.) These skill sets—more than any one particular enabling technology—are what is needed to implement the Sea Dragon operational paradigm.
The Marine infantryman of the 21st century will have to combine the fighting skills of his predecessors with the ability to use complex information systems under the harsh conditions of combat. This will allow him to operate as part of small, isolated groups on a dispersed and dangerous battlefield. Simply making these information systems user friendly does not eliminate the requirement for the infantryman to be able to understand how the overall architecture works, because he will be more than a technician who just mans systems. He will be what he has always been—a warrior who has deliberately become a sophisticated user of such systems.
What technology promises is greater combat efficiency on a man-for-man basis. This makes each infantryman even more valuable, hence the focus on cohesion and the time investment necessary to create units that can live up to the standards of the Starship Troopers.
By focusing on the battalion, the Marine Corps will be able to meet its commitments to the unified commanders-in-chief. It also will be building better units for the combat conditions envisioned in Sea Dragon. Perhaps most important, it will be growing good Marines for the future at the junior officer and noncommissioned officer levels. With no obvious, large-scale threat in sight, a four-year training and deployment cycle for a battalion makes future sense. Rather than making readiness an issue by having to complete repetitive tasks in short deployment cycles, the focus can be on training and making Marines for the out years.
This will aid wartime expansion significantly, for two reasons. First, the officers and noncommissioned officers who do not stay for more than one tour will take these improved skill sets and operational attitudes to the Marine Corps Reserve. Second, the abilities of individual Marines to form new units will be enhanced.
A four-year tour also is consistent with current directives to keep personnel in place for longer periods. These battalions might not spend any less time deployed away from their loved ones, but only once will it be for six months. Operational tempo will not decrease, but it will be better managed.
An important area that will have to be addressed is the loss of permanently stationed infantry battalions on Okinawa. Perhaps instead of flying or sailing from Okinawa to a contingency, plans could be made to source these battalions by theater (or globally, if necessary). This will reduce the Marine Corps presence on Okinawa and make the limits on training opportunities there irrelevant (except perhaps for some jungle training).
As it now stands, neither the UDP cycle nor the MEU (SOC) cycle develops close ties between the battalion and its higher headquarters, whether it is a regiment or a MEU command element. This is an acceptable arrangement, because for the primary group, unit cohesion is a function of influences at battalion level and below.5 And while regrettable, this arrangement will be more representative of the dispersed battlefield of the future.
Altering the training and deployment cycle to create a standard battalion is a positive step toward increasing unit cohesion. It also is in line with the current level of resources. As a “new model Marine Corps,” this system is an investment vehicle, while at the same time providing the immediate dividends of maintaining the Corps' position as America’s force in readiness.
1 Erwin Rommel, Attacks (Provo. UT: Athena Press, 1979). The measurable, overall performance turned in by the mountain infantry was outstanding. The level of cohesion and skill demonstrated serves as a standard of excellence.
2 Robert A. Heinlein, Starship Troopers (New York: Ace Books, 1959), p. 160.
3 Ralph E. McDonald, Cohesion: The Key to Special Operations Teamwork (Maxwell Air Force Base: Air University Press, 1994), pp. 3-4.
4 The Joint Staff, Unified Action Armed Forces (Washington: GPO, 1994). pp. 11-16-11-17.
5 William Darryl Henderson, Cohesion: The Human Element In Combat (Washington: NDU Press, 1985.), p. 162.
Captain Smullen, a 1990 graduate of The Citadel and a graduate student in National Security Studies at Georgetown University, has served as a rifle platoon commander, weapons platoon commander, and company executive officer with Lima Company, 3d Battalion, 3d Marines. He currently is Funeral Director of the Marine Corps, Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps.