“Forward ... to the Beach”
(See G.R. Worthington, p. 12, September 1996 Proceedings)
Lieutenant Commander Bill Hamblet, U.S. Navy—Rear Admiral Worthington declares that combatant craft can replace the Navy’s “Death Stars,” but his arguments ignore both the threat to naval forces and the missions that they are required to perform in specific areas of the world. The suggestions that “many of today’s littoral missions do not require the full-time presence of the ‘Death Star’” and that many missions “can be performed with less expensive combatant craft from the Special Boat Squadrons of Naval Special Warfare” are valid. Nevertheless, to say that the U.S. Navy is now sending costly battle groups and “Death Star” Aegis cruisers to places like the Persian Gulf to do jobs that could effectively be accomplished by a Cyclone (PC-l)-class or a combatant craft is a broad overstatement.
Yes, PCs and combatant craft are capable of conducting many missions, and are appropriate assets in the right setting. But the right setting for these special boats is the low-intensity conflict arena—where the enemy is shooting with bullets not coastal defense cruise missiles, and where the mission is to interdict small boats or insert special operations forces. In short, the right setting for PCs and combatant craft is in the littoral waters of a place like Haiti, or in near-shore and riverine environments like Colombia.
Admiral Worthington did not address the threat environment in the Persian Gulf. Unclassified sources note that Iran possesses several advanced diesel submarines, frigates, destroyers, fast attack missile patrol boats, and numerous fast gun boats. In contrast, the most lethal weapon on a PC is a 25-mm chain gun, and the most lethal weapons on a MK V special operations craft are a .50 caliber machine gun and 40-mm grenade launcher. “Forward . . .to the Beach” probably would fail to deter Iranian aggression in these situations.
Naval forces deploy to overseas theaters to fill the requirements of the unified Commanders-in-Chief. I suspect that the Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Central Command (CentCom), would balk at the idea of replacing carrier battle group deployments to the CentCom area of responsibility with a detachment of combatant craft. With what would CinCCent answer the call to project power? Where would his Tomahawk land-attack cruise missiles come from? Where would his carrier aviation come from to patrol the skies over Southern Iraq for Operation Southern Watch? How would he prosecute Iranian submarines?
Patrol boats and combatant craft have legitimate and important missions in low- threat environments, and they are currently answering the call in many places around the world. PCs are effective tools for patrolling the Caribbean for counter-drug operations. Combatant craft are perfect platforms to insert and extract SEALs, either by themselves in low-threat areas, or under the protection provided by “Death Stars” in high-threat areas. However, it serves no purpose to suggest that the boat assets of Naval Special Warfare can fill the shoes of an Aegis cruiser, a carrier battle group, or an amphibious ready group. Such an argument is a classic case of mixing apples and oranges, or maybe Death Stars and meteorites.
“Dinosaur’s Dilemma”
(See C. Ford, pp.78-80, September 1996 Proceedings)
James W. Fitzgerald, President, The Kildare Corporation—Ensign Ford’s ‘‘two- headed dinosaur” metaphorical argument for inter-service “jointness” in modern high-technology warfare makes considerable sense. However, I am under the impression that, as a result of women service personnel now serving in ships at sea, the Navy already has adopted a “two- head” policy.
“The Next 150 Years Begin”
(See C.R. Larson, pp. 65-69, September 1996; D.W. Gould, p. 18, October 1996 Proceedings)
Lieutenant Barry Gittleman, U.S. Navy, Human Relations Education Center (Character Development Division), U.S. Naval Academy—Admiral Larson highlights many of the positive changes taking place at the Naval Academy. Admiral Larson’s changes definitely are moving the Naval Academy in the right direction. There is a renewed emphasis on ethics, integrity, honor, human dignity, dealing with people, and, most important, leadership.
My training as a midshipman in the late 1980s was comprehensive and detailed, and prepared me well for the technical challenges in the fleet. But the Naval Academy could have done a better job to help me handle the person-to-person leadership challenges that I would face. Those are the critical skills that I really needed as an officer. In the fleet, I encountered many tough personal leadership challenges for which my Naval Academy experience did not prepare me: unauthorized absence; suicide threats; marital problems; unwanted pregnancies among unmarried sailors; and even a mental breakdown. Beyond a brief, but valuable period as a plebe summer platoon commander, hands-on leadership training was limited. We had naval leadership classes, but they consisted of long readings and multiple choice tests.
I must say that leadership training at Annapolis is much better today than it was less than ten years ago. I am impressed with what is now being taught in the renamed Department of Leadership, Ethics, and Law. The newly rewritten Plebe Leadership course (NL 102) discusses citizenship, patriotism, and what it means to be a naval officer. Ethics and Moral Reasoning for the Naval Officer (NE 203) has been added for all third class midshipmen, and has received positive feedback from most of them. Naval Leadership (NL 302) for second class midshipmen now includes many case studies of leadership, ethical, and personal dilemmas. A Capstone Course has been added for the seniors during the spring semester to prepare them for the specific warfare community they are about to enter.
I am pleased with the changes at the U.S. Naval Academy that I have seen, and even more so with the changes I see coming in the near future.
Lieutenant Colonel Dick Seamon, U.S. Marine Corps Reserve (Retired), former assistant managing editor of Time magazine—As Superintendent of the U.S. Naval Academy, Admiral Larson is understandably proud that his command received renewal of its accreditation by the Commission on Higher Education of the Middle States Association. Surely no one on the faculty will be politically incorrect enough to ask: When was the last time an educational institution of the Naval Academy’s quality failed to be accredited?
There is another question, though, that anyone interested in the Naval Academy might like to have answered: What were those few problems that the visiting evaluation team of distinguished scholars found? Admiral Larson does not say. We are left to guess, and, inevitably, to infer that the Academy’s most serious problems involve the teaching and practice of ethics and leadership. Otherwise, why all the attention? A new Ethics Course, a new endowed Ethics Chair, an Honor Concepts Review Group, Integrity Development Seminars—something must have been lacking. But what? Young men and women who can see and think for themselves know that ethics and morals are also learned outside the classroom. When the mishandling of minor transgressions and major misdemeanors leads to public relations debacles and only midshipmen are said to be at fault; when word gets around that punishments have been applied unevenly, that some midshipmen have been favored with leniency when caught breaking a rule, midshipmen can become understandably cynical, convinced that whatever may be wrong at the Academy, the fault is not theirs alone.
Despite too many problems in the past few years, and despite much unfortunate publicity, Admiral Larson is quite correct in pointing out that the Naval Academy remains a fine institution. Its midshipmen are, with very few exceptions, decent, intelligent individuals. Whatever their backgrounds, they may feel just a bit insulted to be told that they need such an astonishing amount of schooling in morals and ethics. When they hear of all those study groups worrying about how to turn them into upright citizens, to say nothing of capable officers, they may get the impression the staff and faculty think they are dealing with refugees from reform schools rather than carefully selected candidates for commissions in the U.S. Navy.
Midshipmen are not likely to have any argument with Admiral Larson’s ten guidelines for life in the Yard and later as naval officers. It is critical, however, that those guidelines always be honored by the midshipmen’s superiors.
Kevin M. Kennedy—Admiral Larson’s article lists many great events and accolades of the last year, as though all is well in the Yard. Well, everything definitely is not all right at the Naval Academy today—and the sooner we come to terms with this verity, the sooner we will be able to amend the problems that undercut the Naval Academy’s many true successes. Whatever is causing the many newsworthy—and disturbing—indiscretions by otherwise honorable midshipmen, they are problems that will not be wished away or overlooked, especially by the press. All of these things merely are symptoms of a larger cloud over our society for which I cannot claim to have a solution—but for which the Naval Academy must realize that it still has no solution either. The pedagogical process of developing “midshipmen morally, mentally, and physically” is a difficult one, which needs to be examined realistically if it is going to be improved. I look forward to Admiral Larson’s state of the Academy report next year and hope he has more to recount than a successful review of the Naval Academy’s academic accreditation and receiving NCAA certification for athletics. It seems as though the midshipmen are capable of so much more.
Bringing Aviation to Maneuver Warfare
Lieutenant Commander Chris Fedyschyn, U.S. Navy—Commander Joe Gattuso put a twist on the panel “Bringing Aviation to Maneuver Warfare” at the Naval Warfare Symposium in Virginia Beach. The moderator. Vice Admiral Robert Dunn, U.S. Navy (Retired), seemed to point the panel in the direction of debating how to bring Naval Aviation into the new ways of war fighting—or was it there all along? Commander Gattuso started by veering off to a more basic debate of culture in the aviation community. His hypothesis is that there are two types of aviators in the service, those who love to fly, and those who fly to fight. He alleges that the Naval Service seems to have too many of the love-to-fly types and not enough of the fly-to-fight types.
Almost all the audience disagreed with Commander Gattuso. Aviators gave many examples of how—when the time came—their peers had met the challenge. There is no problem, they alleged. But the one question not answered was why are today’s aviators in the service? Is it to fly, or to fly to fight? Furthermore, what are leaders of today doing to foster the fly-to-fight attitude?
Naval Aviation always has met its challenges. I believe it always will. Commander Gattuso points out a potentially serious problem. If today’s young aviators are in the service primarily because they love to fly, they still may be able to meet the challenges that face them. But what will this do to the Naval Service in the future? It can lead to a downward spiral for Naval Aviation.
How do we solve the problem? Not many young aviators join the service with set feelings one way or the other. They form their attitudes as they progress in their careers. The one most significant input to the attitudes is leadership. Strong leadership drives their attitudes one way or the other. It is up to the leaders in the Navy today, from Chief of Naval Operations down to the department heads in a squadron, to ensure that the attitude in the aviation community is one of fly to fight. This is the issue Commander Gattuso brought to the table. If we can foster a culture of fly-to-fight aviators, bringing aviation to maneuver warfare will be an easy task.
“We Don’t Need Jaeger Air”
(See T.C. Moore, pp. 32-36, September 1996; C.R. McGrail, p. 12, October 1996 Proceedings)
Captain Jon Wright, U.S. Navy—Major Moore says that “We do not need regiments of flying SEALs, piloting modified Pucaras, roaming the battlefield and targeting at will.” While the vision of having enough well-trained and motivated combat swimmers in the Naval Special Warfare (NSW) community to form one or more regimental-sized units has appeal (although that’s currently not our manning end game), along with the idea of reintroducing OV-IO type aircraft as part of NSW force packages (similar to what we enjoyed in Vietnam with the Black Ponies of VAL-4), the real intent of Major Moore’s analogy is clear.
For the sake of accuracy, neither “roaming the battlefield” nor “targeting at will” has ever been required operational capabilities or mission-essential tasks of SEAL combat swimmers, or any other component of the NSW command.
On the contrary, during any phase of hostilities the majority of NSW operations involves relatively focused tactical movement by SEAL units around any offshore, inshore, or onshore battlespace, and any “targeting” is usually planned to be surgical in nature.
“What Price Leadership?”
(See D. Howard, pp. 9-10, July 1996; H. Goetch, D. Winters, p. 26, August 1996; S. Rye, R.R. Hardy, R. Seamon, pp. 20-24, September 1996; N. Hogan, D. Meredith, p. 90, October 1996 Proceedings)
Commander Mariner G. Cox, U.S. Navy (Retired)—I spent the last decade of my 26 years of active duty in Washington, D.C., working for the most senior military and civilian leaders in the country. During that time, I came to notice one very important difference between the two; Every civilian leader for whom I worked, from the Secretary of Defense to the Director of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, knew and understood the concept of the “sanity check.” Consequently, I spent a good portion of my time listening to these very senior individuals explain an issue; list the alternative actions; indicate their preferred option; and ask for my opinion (give them a “sanity check,” as they called it). As time passed, I found myself tagged as a “quick study” who gave sound advice. More to the point, I discovered that I was automatically sorting through the issues, assigning an urgency to each, advising the boss about which ones rated movement to “general quarters” (and perhaps more important, those that did not). I had become a “trusted adviser” who could help diffuse the stress of the job with a well-prepared point paper and a few deadly serious words (delivered with a smile) about going home early tonight and addressing “small stuff’ in the morning. And, as I looked around, I saw that every civilian leader that I knew used the concept of the “sanity check” with his or her “trusted advisers.”
No military leader for whom I worked used the concept of the “sanity check”— not one! “Just give me the information that I need to make a decision and carry out my orders after the decision is made,” was the way the senior military officers worked. To them, consultation in decision making was a sign of weakness or bad leadership, and God forbid that someone should find out that they ever checked the validity of their decisions with anyone—much less a junior! And, as I looked around, I saw that every military leader I knew had been unable to use the concept of the sanity check because they had no “trusted advisers”— only “loyal subordinates.”
Senior military officers need to use the sanity check. They should test the logic and validity of their decisions on someone they trust before they commit to immovable positions. They should pick a peer, if their years of military training preclude the selection of a subordinate.
Dan Howard is absolutely right when he counsels for supportive public opinion from those who love the services. He’s right when he says that our leaders need all of the help and support we can give them. And I’m here to tell you that there is no substitute for a trusted adviser at the end of the day, when the sun sets and the boss is silent and sullen in the front office, feeling lost, alone, and helpless, anticipating horrors of the coming day, most of which are groundless. □
“Remove the Warfare Devices”
(See G. Miller, p. 31, September 1996 Proceedings)
Captain Charles D. Fox, US. Naval Reserve (Retired)—My first encounter with Vice Admiral Miller was in the Office of the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Air Warfare, where he had the task of educating a group of reservists on why Naval Aviation should get more than its traditional one-third share of the Navy’s budget. Instead of propaganda, he told us exactly what the Russian threat was and what the entire Navy needed to meet that threat. This was indicative of the way Admiral Miller approaches things—from a broad perspective rather than the all- too-narrow view of many Navy senior leaders.
I later became a founder and general counsel of the Association of Naval Aviation (ANA). Admiral Miller was the only senior officer of that group who understood and supported the very narrow line that ANA had to walk between industry and the naval establishment, where he was being challenged constantly. His non-parochial view of the Navy and its role and the role of all services should be a model for all flag officers to follow.
Commander Charles F. Clark, Jr., US. Navy (Retired)—The notion that officers should divest themselves of all warfare designation devices upon promotion to flag rank is specious. All of us who rate warfare devices and personal decorations should be proud to display them on our uniforms, especially in the presence of juniors, joint or combined staff organizations, and in the presence of the media. Td suggest that one can achieve a higher level of leadership and unbiased decision making by removing the accoutrements of military achievement tells me that priorities need a bit more ballast in some quarters. The fact that Admiral Miller could perform the many duties of his high office—including entertaining and media appearances—without displaying wings or medals and without receiving any comments reminds me of the story about “The Emperor’s New Clothes.” At the very least, people were probably either too respectful of his position, or thought him simply absent- minded. Varying the ribbons seems a novel idea; sort of like my mother choosing a hat for church [“Maybe my Marksmanship ribbon today; perhaps my China Service Medal for a splash of color”].
I hope our flag officers have more positive and creative things to offer than sartorial pronouncements. If wearing a warfare device among peers challenges one’s ability to make unbiased decisions, or if removing the recognition of service to our country to avoid the scorn of anti-military cartoonists contributes one iota to the professional ability and stature of flag officers, I recommend we all appear in mufti from now on. □
“Reflections on a Naval Career”
(See L. Di Rita, pp. 8-10, August 1995; D.S. Gemes, A. Vittek, pp. 13-14, September 1995; B. Carleton, P. Swartz, M. White, W. Hannon, W. Porter, pp.16-21, November 1995; F. Carment, L. Melling Tanner, J.W. Crawford, D.K. Wilson, S. Geissler Bowles, J.D. Alden, J.D. Render, A.M. Smith, J. Miller, Editor’s Note, pp. 14-19, January 1996; R.N. Adrian. T. Fredricks, G.M. Cousins, p. 30, March 1996; D.H. Frahler, pp. 25-26 April 1996; Jose Benedito Gama Dore, p. 90 July 1996 Proceedings)
“Naval Institute Board Clarifies Editorial Procedures”
(See Membership News, p. 4, November 1995; J. Miller, p. 19, January 1996; R. N. Adrian, Editor’s Note, T. Fredricks, G. M. Cousins, p. 30, March 1996 Proceedings)
Lawrence T. Di Rita—Little more than a year ago. Proceedings published a short commentary of mine entitled “Reflections on a Naval Career.” Some of you may remember it. I was overwhelmed by the response to the article, and the ensuing events in the Navy have only served to confirm my central thesis that ours is a service in some distress.
I could not respond to all of the letters and phone calls the piece generated; I still hear from colleagues on this issue. At the risk of abusing the Naval Institute’s indulgence by asking for the final word in my own defense, let me take this opportunity to thank all those who responded, whether you agreed with me or whether you think—as many did—that I am a racist, a misogynist, a militia member, or (worse) a conservative.
Let me first comment on one unfortunate genre of response implicating Senator Phil Gramm of Texas, for whom I worked when the piece was published. I wrote it before I worked for Senator Gramm. In any event, my article was not about him or any political agenda, as some readers inferred rather foolishly.
Nor indeed was my piece a diatribe on women in the military, as many charged. Were that my intent, I might have included a passage about some of the recent true-life situations widely reported in the press, though who would have believed them in a piece of satire?
My commentary was instead about an institution we all cherish, which is undergoing profound change not by design but because of social, political, and fiscal expedience. In her excellent response in dissent. Senior Chief Bobbie Carlson—with whom I would gladly serve, anytime, anywhere—chalks up to despair the reaction to this change. Perhaps. Would that her “flaming chauvinist” triumph over officers of “no heart and all resentment” in leading our Navy into the future. For his part, Captain Peter Swartz’s clever attempt to prove that we are just witnessing our segment of the chronological continuum unfold is ultimately unsatisfying. To the degree Captain Swartz’s piece may reflect the views of senior uniformed leaders, the Navy is sliding into an institutional solipsism that is even worse than my piece implied.
Responding directly to the so-called equal opportunity issue, I would only note that our Navy until recently had managed to avoid the kinds of social engineering that have proved to be such a failure elsewhere. It has been a more or less pure meritocracy, along with professional sports one of the few such institutions left in American society. In the Navy, individuality has been subordinated to the goals of the service, but only through individual merit can one truly succeed. We should be concerned that this is beginning to change, in the name of diversity or equal opportunity. We may not learn just how far we’ve deviated from merit as the only predictor of success until too many young lives are lost in battle, where to want for merit is to flirt with defeat. When that happens, Americans are going to wonder why. They won’t be pleased with the answer.
My commentary also raised questions about the use of our military forces in missions for which they were never intended and in which they ultimately will fail. We were witness to this in Somalia, Haiti, and elsewhere. Otherwise responsible politicians have of late proposed that we militarize our border to defend against drug runners and that the military assume responsibility for public safety in some of our more crime-ridden cities. Better that we disband the services than see them assume responsibilities for which they are so ill-suited. By so having their missions redefined, our armed services will lose their identities and begin to question their own worth. We saw this in Vietnam, and we will see it again if we are not careful. Nothing is more certain to cause a rapid decline in the popularity the services now enjoy.
I used satire and humor to broach these subjects, which we are uncomfortable addressing head on. But if we are not to discuss these matters within our professional forum where shall we? Ex scientia tridens. (From knowledge, sea power.)
“F-14D Exploits Passive Sensors”
(See J. Wood, pp. 48-49, September 1996 Proceedings)
Captain C.F. Ward, U.S. Naval Reserve (Retired)—The potential of the F-14 has never remotely been reached and the measures addressed by Commander Wood will go a long way to extend the value of this airplane. However, I take some issue with the hand-held lasers. They indeed were used with “mixed results” before. It isn’t that easy to hold anything steady in your hands while twisted sideways in an ejection seat, even a camcorder. Furthermore, while the radar intercept officer is engaged in this process, the F-14 effectively becomes single seat, with the pilot trying to imitate an AC-130 aircraft commander aiming a 40-mm cannon mounted on a very flexible mount. Situational awareness will be practically impossible to maintain. Perhaps this enhancement better belongs to a remotely piloted vehicle.
“Bomber Debates”
(See G. Myers, pp. 34-36, August 1996; S. Davis, R.K. Weaver, p. 14, September 1996; T. Kramer, G.E. Picket, pp. 12-18, October 1996 Proceedings)
Lieutenant (junior grade) Frank Watanabe, U.S. Naval Reserve—One would have thought that someone who touts himself as a “doctrine analyst” would be more precise in his use of doctrinal terminology. At the outset of his article. Colonel Myers admits the Air Force is claiming that its bombers can exert presence, and yet the remainder of his article demonstrates only the ability of bombers to project power—not provide presence. This is a critical distinction, for it points up the fallacy of the Air Force’s claim.
At no point has anyone contended that bombers are incapable of projecting power. Rather, the issue is forward presence, the only really effective means to “influence the behavior of errant nations and their leaders” short of military force. Despite Colonel Myers’ claims, bombers are not “the other answer” to the forward presence requirement. Does anyone believe that the mere existence of B-2s located nowhere near an errant nation actually influences that nation and its leaders? If so, why wouldn’t the mere existence of aircraft carriers, or Marine expeditionary forces, or Army airborne troops also influence those actors?
It is not just the existence, but the visible presence of U.S. military power just off a nation’s shores that influences errant actors. And with the unfortunate but probably irreversible loss of many overseas U.S. bases, only Navy aircraft carriers and the Marine air-ground task forces are well suited to such forward presence missions. In contrast, the very features of the B-2 and other long-range stealth bombers that make them tactically useful—their virtual invisibility—make them useless for forward presence. How does an “invisible” bomber project visible presence? Bombers only really make their presence felt when they put bombs on target, dramatically reducing the range of options available to our nation’s leaders. Even then, they are unable to exert influence for extended periods. Naval forces, on the other hand, are able to exert influence without resorting to military force, and can remain on station for extended periods of time.
In addition, Colonel Myers’ arguments regarding the utility of bombers “at the strategic and operational levels of war” do not accurately reflect the nature of security challenges facing the United States today. For the foreseeable future, the U.S. military will be principally engaged in lower-intensity conflicts and military operations other than war, not major regional conflicts like the Gulf War. In these conditions. Colonel Myers’ arguments in favor of the B-2 based on its stealth and payload do little to justify the aircraft. Where were the bombers in Somalia, Rwanda, during the recent tensions in the Taiwan Strait—for that matter, the former Yugoslavia? Even in the recent strikes against Iraq, B-52—not B-2—bombers had to fly thousands of miles and nearly 36 hours to fire their missiles. Naval forces were already in place; executing their portion of the strike required little or no change in their deployment.
As Colonel Myers correctly points out, “the problem is that carrier battle groups are not always where they are needed most.” The reason for this is that too much of the defense budget is being spent on weapon systems of questionable utility-like the Air Force’s B-2 bomber and the F-22 fighter—which has led to a reduction in the number of carriers from 15 to 11, plus one operational reserve. Clearly, then, in facing the inevitable trade-offs in bomber and carrier acquisition, the real bottom line should not be to expand the bomber force, but to return the carrier force to its full strength, so it can continue to provide forward presence.
“A Sea Story Not Easily Told”
(See T. Cutler, pp. 8-10, August 1996 Proceedings)
Lieutenant Commander P.K. Parker, U.S. Naval Reserve (Retired)—Of all the recent commentaries on morals, ethics, and the tragic death of Admiral Boorda, Tom Cutler’s ranks as one of the most perceptive. I would guess that everyone who has served as a junior officer at sea has a story something like his. Naval officers are people, and people make mistakes. They make operational, technical, and administrative mistakes. They make mistakes in their dealings with superiors, subordinates, and peers. Occasionally, they make moral and ethical mistakes. I made all types during my tour at sea. They cannot be eliminated and the best that you can hope for is that your mistakes are isolated and small ones.
Tom Cutler should have ascertained his contact’s intentions more clearly before maneuvering. He should not have destroyed the signal from the other ship’s commanding officer. His own commanding officer should not have created an unforgiving and hostile climate where one shiphandling mistake, serious though it was, leads to fear of disqualification. The commanding officer should not have blamed a faulty hawser for his own shiphandling error, compounding his own mistake with a moral fault.
The consequences of mistakes in the naval service, of course, tend to be more severe than those in everyday life. I have felt anger, frustration, and disappointment over the mistakes I’ve made as a civilian, but hardly ever guilt. Because of the importance of their jobs and the high expectations placed on them, feelings of guilt often accompany a mistake made by an officer. In fact, the word “mistake” is often replaced by “failure” when thinking about it, with all the psychological consequences of that term. Only God knows why Admiral Boorda took his own life, but I don’t think it was just the issue of his ribbons. It could have been the accumulated weight of guilt that comes from more than 30 years of intensive service that caused it. The more service and higher rank that an officer obtains, the more opportunity for errors of increasing consequence and deeper feelings of failure.
The U.S. Navy must create a climate that demands the best from its people without unduly punishing them for their imperfections. A happier story would have been that the young officer of the deck passed the message to the captain of his ship, who chewed him out and directed that the senior watch officer conduct a short retraining course in the Rules of the Road for all bridge watchstanders. If the officer of the deck continued to demonstrate poor judgment, then he should have been disqualified. I think that’s what my commanding officer would have done, but I have heard about many others who would not have handled it that way.
“Ink—and Vision—Can Save 16-Inch Tubes”
(See W.L. Stearman, p. 82, September 1996 Proceedings)
John R. Pfeiffer, Base Closure Officer and Executive Staff Officer, Long Beach Naval Shipyard—Dr. William Lloyd Stearman has given me a lesson about the perils of openness, when dealing with those who follow personal agendas. What I perceived as a friendly conversation with a knowledgeable retiree, reminiscing about past glories, was in fact a fishing expedition by Dr. Stearman for information to support his cause. Responding to him was a tactical error on my part. He did not (technically) misquote me, but I am stunned that he chose to cite me as an authority on this process—and to edit my part of our discussion to make it appear that 1 agree with his objectives.
The most important omission was in not mentioning that our shipyard closure objectives make it imperative to dispose of the 16-inch gun barrels—no matter how—as soon as practicable. If we had decades to decide, then leaving the barrels in a storage lot awaiting the decision would be relatively innocuous action. But we needed to close this shipyard on an accelerated schedule; these barrels had been declared excess to the Navy’s needs; and we were required to demilitarize these excess assets effectively in order to transfer them to a non-military taker. We cannot simply leave them lying on the pavement when we reach operational closure in September 1997. Nor can we wait beyond the point where we no longer have sufficient industrial capacity to perform the operations needed to dispose of them. It has been expensive to cut them up, there have been few identified takers who have been able or willing to fund the transportation costs. The Naval Air Warfare Center, Weapons Division, China Lake, has received two barrels, and one barrel is now pending delivery to the Los Angeles Maritime Museum in San Pedro, California.
The most egregious distortion of our conversation, however, was the statement that I had advised Dr. Stearman that equipment for moving the barrels is readily available in the Long Beach area. Frankly, at the time of our conversation, I had no idea where the trailer would come from to move the barrels that we had agreed to transfer—and I said as much to Dr. Stearman. Transportation is the responsibility of the recipients. The rig that was used for the transfer of the two barrels to China Lake came from the San Francisco area. In a 15 August 1996 letter to Vice Admiral George Sterner, Commander, Naval Sea Systems Command, Dr. Stearman cited a cost of $14,000 per barrel for shipping. The same transportation firm that provided him that estimate responded to a later request for quotation by asking $26,266 for movement of one barrel from the shipyard to San Pedro—a distance of less than five miles. Two other bidders offered $23,860 and $23,500 for the same job. None of these bidders is located in either Long Beach or San Pedro.
At present, we are abrasive blasting the separated muzzle ends and the shipping cradles of the other six barrels in order to remove lead-based paint, which we are constrained from introducing into commerce by Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). The abrasive blasting is being done in dry dock #1 because we are permitted under South Coast Air Quality Management District (SCAQMD) particulate matter emissions rules to use that facility and it has adequate environmental protection containment. We steam cleaned all nine barrels to remove cosmoline preservative from their bores, and laboratory results of residue analyses showed that the materials used were not regulated at their existing concentrations. The cutting operation that separated the six muzzle ends from their breech ends used an oxygen lance process, which required an environmental containment and forced-air filtration system to preclude violation of SCAQMD air emissions smoke opacity regulations. When we complete abrasive blasting, the muzzle ends, breech ends, and cradles will be available for disposal as scrap metal through the Defense Reutilization Marketing Office (DRMO) as required by the Base Reuse Implementation Manual (BRM, DoD 4165.66M). As anyone can see, there are some stringent—one might even say bureaucratic—rules that we have had to follow in this process. Each addition to the straightforward procedure of cut and sell has cost additional time and money, but has enabled us to conduct the disposal of these barrels responsibly.
“What Is Information Warfare?”
(See W.E. Rohde, pp. 34-38, February 1996; C.H. Johnson, p. 12, April 1996; D. Shanower, pp. 20-21, July 1996 Proceedings)
Captain Martin V. Sherrard, U.S. Navy, Deputy Director, Information Warfare Division, OpNav staff—I understand Commander Shanower’s concerns with what information warfare (IW) can do for the Navy, as well as the pace at which the overall implementation is taking.
From the point of view of what it can do for the Navy, offensive IW operations are becoming central to the Navy’s 2010 Vision. Forward presence and continuous operations in the littorals provide significant opportunity for IW exploitation of the battlespace. This same familiarity with targets also provides that unique access for offensive IW weapons that is not available to garrisoned stateside forces.
The IW weapons that Commander Shanower implies may be on the Navy’s drawing boards could—in the hands of a savvy Joint Force Commander—be used in those hours and days leading up to hostilities to target precisely the adversary’s capability to command his forces. IW weapons, whatever form they may take, can be extremely lethal but not physically destructive, do not leave “fingerprints,” and have an inexhaustible magazine.
In response to the concern that we are falling behind the other services, I would describe our approach as measured and pragmatic. We have decided to integrate IW capabilities within our existing force structure, and to educate our operational leaders. We have a single point of contact on the OpNav staff—the Director of Information Warfare (N64)—to oversee the implementation of Navy IW; we have an executive agent—Commander, Naval Security Group—to perform limited type-commander functions; we have the Information and Electronic Warfare Directorate within SpaWar, IW Defense (PMW-161), IW Attack (PMW- 162), and IW Exploit (PMW-163).
Naval IW commands include the Naval Information Warfare Activity (NIWA), and the Fleet Information Warfare Center (FIWC). NIWA is the Navy’s technical agent for developing IW capabilities and performing vulnerability assessments for U.S. C4l and weapon systems. It looks at future technologies and design prototype systems in response to stated requirements. If procurement of more than a few prototype systems is required, the design is turned over to SpaWar for large- scale acquisition.
These systems, once developed, are assigned to the Fleet Information Warfare Center for operational employment. It is the fleet’s operational arm for IW and it is located at the Naval Amphibious Base, Little Creek, Virginia—close to the fleet, the Navy and Joint Doctrine Centers, the training facilities at Dam Neck, the Joint Warfighting Center, the Joint Training and Simulation Center, and the U.S. Air Force’s Air Combat Command. A FIWC Detachment is located in San Diego, and its Electronic Warfare Reprogramming Facilities are located in Chesapeake, Virginia and Honolulu. The FIWC has many missions assigned, some of which include developing IW tactics and doctrine; team training IW staffs, fielding realistic IW opposition forces, augmenting battle group staffs, and operating a defensive IW computer protection laboratory.
It is this last area that has set the Fleet Information Warfare Center apart from other organizations. With the advent of the Internet and the capability to go online while at sea, a significant problem is being presented to our system designers. Hackers—whether high-school students, terrorists, or nation-states—find the penetration of DoD systems both challenging and lucrative. The FIWC conducts on-line surveys of Navy’s fielded classified and unclassified systems, to determine vulnerabilities. They provide expertise and guidance to local area network (LAN) administrators, to help secure their networks. FIWC also monitors deployed LANs on a continuous basis to detect if intruders have been attempting to gain unauthorized access. Other forms of monitoring include looking for the traditional essential elements of friendly information previously attributed to radio or telephone circuits but which now apply to networks. Finally, when monitoring detects possible criminal activity, the Naval Criminal Investigative Service and its federal counterparts are contacted.
Our battle groups and numbered fleets have C2W commanders and staffs assigned to provide the planning and execution of those operational- and tactical- level IW operations. These staffs have evolved from the electronic warfare coordinator of the 70/80s, the space and electronic warfare commander of the early 1990s, to the C2W commander of today. The fleets have determined the importance of this warfare commander and have agreed to elevate the C2W commander to a captain’s billet, giving him equal footing with the other warfare commanders. This, raises the question of where the Navy will get these scarce captains with suitable backgrounds and expertise in this new warfare area.
What hasn’t been mentioned, and what Commander Shanower alludes to, is the critical role Naval Intelligence plays in IW. Entire new data bases will need to be developed and filled with intelligence data that are current and accurate, and have a degree of specificity not now required to drop a 500-pound bomb. From a defensive IW posture, detailed intelligence collection will be focused on indications and warnings of IW attacks on our own information. As information flows faster to the warfighter, our way to make sense of it will be through colored symbols or enhanced images of enemy forces displayed on high-definition television screens. As we rely more and more on these computer-generated displays, our adversary can attack with ones and zeros, resulting in incorrect or enemy-generated false symbols. Will we have the means to detect and neutralize an IW attack? In the past, our Naval Intelligence community ferreted out the chaff from the wheat. In information warfare, this challenge becomes even more important.
I cannot speak for other services of the Joint Staff, but current Navy IW policy neither supports nor contemplates any reorganization or takeover of joint operations and intelligence functions. IW is an operational warfare area and, as such, falls under operations.
“Okinawa: Location, Location, Location”
(See R.K. Dobson, p. 14, June 1996 Proceedings)
Yoya Kawamura, Naval Institute Silver Life Member, Tokyo, Japan—Colonel Dobson is wrong to say that “The Japanese Constitution . . . prohibits the development of . . . nuclear capability.”
The gist of Article 9 of the Constitution is—in short—that Japan forever renounces war as the means of settling an international dispute, no Army, Navy or Air Force will be maintained for that purpose. But there is no explicit allusion to nuclear weapons in the Constitution.
As I understand it, the official interpretation of this article—and the Constitution in general—does not prohibit the ownership of nuclear weapons if they are strictly for the purpose of self-defense.
Each successive Japanese government has pledged to the so-called three-point non-nuclear principle, that is, not to own, not to produce, and not to bring in nuclear weapons. But this is a matter of policy, and not because of any legal constraint imposed by the Constitution.