On Killing: The Psychological Cost of Learning to Kill in War and Society
LtCol. Dave Grossman, USA (Ret.). Boston, MA: Little, Brown and Company, 1996. 367 pp. Ind. Notes. $24.95 ($22.45); hardcover $13.95 ($12.55) paper.
Reviewed by John Allen Williams
Those of us who have not had to take the life of another person in combat can never fully understand the psychological consequences of this act on the survivor. A former Army Ranger—trained as a psychologist—Lieutenant Colonel Dave Grossman explores the mechanisms that permit otherwise peaceable people to kill in combat and live with the consequences. In his book, Colonel Gross- man examines the strong unwillingness among normal people to kill, the ways in which the military must train them to fight effectively, the process of rationalization necessary for a successful return to a peacetime environment, and some disturbing trends in a society that is desensitizing its citizens to violence.
Colonel Grossman’s thesis is that it is very difficult to persuade a soldier to kill, even in the heat of combat. Based on studies of World War II and the Korean War by Brigadier General S.L.A. Marshall, which cited high percentages of soldiers who either would not fire their weapons or would fire them over the heads of the enemy. Colonel Grossman concludes that traditional methods of training were inadequate to overcome the natural aversion to killing that most people have. Although Marshall’s methods and conclusions remain highly controversial, there is sufficient empirical and anecdotal evidence to support Colonel Grossman’s main point: There is a profound reluctance to take human life that must be overcome—primarily by more sophisticated training and forceful leadership—if a military force is to prevail.
Increasingly effective training techniques since World War II involve three components: desensitization, conditioning, and denial defense mechanisms. Desensitization is accomplished by increasing the distance between a soldier and the enemy, sometimes by denigrating the latter’s humanity. Conditioning puts the soldiers in training situations that are as realistic as possible, so that responses in combat will be almost automatic. And, as an example of a denial mechanism, “bull’s eye” marksmanship training has been replaced by “quick shoot” training with human-shaped targets that fall backward when hit; denial is easier when the enemy is thought of as a training target, instead of another human being.
Authoritative leadership is also crucial for combat effectiveness. Psychological tests conducted by Stanley Milgram and others show that most people will perform acts of great cruelty if they are urged to do so by an authority figure whom they regard as legitimate. So it is not surprising that the basically “unnatural” behavior required on the battlefield is more easily induced by strong leaders. But, the responsibility for combat effectiveness does not fall exclusively on the shoulders of combat leaders. Colonel Grossman shows how military effectiveness in Vietnam was vitiated by personnel policies that ignored the psychological effects of combat. Colonel Grossman explains that the failure of society to support returning veterans denied them the opportunity to rationalize and accept what had happened to them during the war.
The wonder is that there are not more veterans suffering from post traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). My primary concern, though, is that Colonel Grossman greatly understates the willingness of human beings to injure and kill one another. The startling fact in not that so few people are willing to harm others, but that there are so many. We do not need to look too far into history to see this; stories from Bosnia, Chechnya, and America’s own cities offer more than sufficient testimony.
The book concludes with an interesting review of some disturbing parallels between violence in the media (including the Internet and computer games) and the kind of desensitization training that so effectively prepared soldiers for combat. Other points of interest include the chapter notes, grouped at the end of the book, and Colonel Grossman’s decidedly non-scholarly prose, which will prove either a relief or a distraction depending on the reader.
The ultimate value of this book is that it clearly shows that not enough is known about combat effectiveness and what contributes to it. If this is true, both proponents and opponents of the integration of military personnel, without regard to gender or sexual orientation, should be, after reading this book, much less certain of the correctness of their arguments.
Dr. Williams (jwillia@luc.edu) is an Associate Professor of Political Science at Loyola University in Chicago, and Vice Chairman and Executive Director of the Inter-University Seminar on Armed Forces and Society at Northwestern University. He is a captain in the U.S. Naval Reserve and a prior contributor to Proceedings.
Prodigal Soldiers
James Kitfield. New York, NY: Simon and Shuster, 1995. 435 pp. Ind. Notes. Photos. $25.00 ($22.50).
Reviewed by Major General Perry M. Smith, U.S. Air Force (Retired)
In the last five years, a fascination with the U.S. military has developed as a result of the extraordinary success of all the services in the Gulf War, Haiti, and Bosnia. It is a marvelous story. In the 1970s, the services attacked the serious problems of racism, drug use, morale, recruitment, and retention. In addition, they developed innovative new technologies, tactics, doctrines, and training techniques.
James Kitfield outlines, with considerable skill, the military renaissance that took place in the late 1970s and throughout the 1980s. Many corporations in the United States that have suffered recent setbacks are carefully examining the specific steps that were taken by the military, so they can learn the secrets of this resurgence. If you are interested in a journey of renewal and revival, which highlights the achievements of some hardworking and visionary people in uniform, this is the book to read.
In his book, Kitfield highlights many of the individuals who have contributed to the military’s newfound popularity. From the Army: Generals Barry McCaffrey, Colin Powell, Norman Schwarzkopf, Jack Galvin, Max Thurman, and Shy Meyer. From the Marines: Generals Al Gray, Walt Boomer, and Tom Draude. From the Navy: Admirals Tom Hayward and Stan Arthur. From the Air Force: John Warden, Moody Suter (the inventor of Red Flag), and Bill Creech. I would be remiss, however, if I failed to point out a number of areas where Prodigal Soldiers falls short of telling this story completely and accurately.
For instance, Kitfield fails to mention Army General Don Morelli. whose work on Air Land Battle 2000 was essential to the doctrinal shift of the Army. There is no mention of Army General Dick Lawrence and his initiatives at both the Army War College and the National Defense University in getting all the military services to examine seriously the operational level of war. He barely touches on the work of Marine Commandant A1 Gray and all that he did to emphasize combat skills, develop new doctrine, and encourage innovation and self-development among officers and enlisted personnel alike. Other Marines who should have been highlighted include the highly creative Major John Schmitt as well as Commandants Wilson and Barrow, who purged the Marine Corps of substandard people and practices.
When he discusses the Navy, Kitfield fails to highlight Rear Admiral Wayne Meyer, father of the Aegis, or Admirals Carl Trost and Bud Edney, who helped the Navy recover from the damage caused by some of the dysfunctional activities of John Lehman and Mel Paisley. Also missing from Prodigal Soldiers are the major contributions of Air Force leaders like Colonel John Boyd, who invented energy maneuverability analysis and decision cycles; Paul Albritton and Al Gropman, who designed the exquisite Air Force strategic planning system; Spike Momeyer, who initiated and implemented the TAC 85 study; Jerry O’Malley and Lee Butler, who pulled the tactical and strategic barons together; and Tom Stafford and Bobby Bonds, who spearheaded major technological breakthroughs such as the stealth fighter.
Since Prodigal Soldiers has no bibliography, it is hard to tell how deeply Kitfield researched this book. For instance, he doesn’t seem to have plumbed such fine books as Four Stars, by Mark Perry, The Heart of the Storm, by Rich Reynolds, or War and Anti-War, by the Tofflers. Also, the title is misleading. Kitfield does write about soldiers, but he also writes about Marines, Airmen, and Sailors. Better titles might include Prodigal Heroes, or The Prodigal Military, or A Prodigal Story, or The Military Renaissance.
In recent years, it has been my great privilege and pleasure to highlight and explain, on television and radio and on the lecture circuit, the extraordinary accomplishments of the U.S. military services. James Kitfield, who writes so well, deserves great credit for telling this magnificent story with dignity, warmth, and grace. Long before I reached the last page of Prodigal Soldiers, I felt uplifted.
General Smith is CNN’s military analyst and President of Visionary Leadership. His published works include Taking Charge, Assignment Pentagon, and How CNN Fought the War.
Warfighting: Maneuver Warfare in the U.S. Marine Corps
LtCol. H.T. Hayden, USMC. Mechanicsburg, PA: Stackpole Books, 1995: 196 pp. Bib. Maps. App. Notes. $29.95 ($26.95).
Reviewed by Commander Paul Zambito, Medical Service Corps, U.S. Navy
The U.S. Marine Corps has used the term “maneuver warfare” in its discussions and writings on the Marine Corps doctrine of warfare for some years now. Until now. I have never really understood what the discussion was all about.
In Warfighting, Colonel Hayden has taken a unique approach to explain this vital subject by taking Fleet Marine Force Manual (FMFM) 1, Warfighting; FMFM 1-1, Campaigning; and FMFM 1-3, Tactics; adding an introduction and conclusion, to make the concepts and terminology easily understandable.
The Introduction is the best concise history on the development of military doctrine in the U.S. military in general— and the Marine Corps in particular— that I have ever seen in print. In addition, Colonel Hayden has provided examples of warfighting in Vietnam and the Gulf War. His writing style is smooth and methodical—everything falls into place.
A major contribution of this book is a presentation of “Hayden’s 11 Maxims of Maneuver Warfare.” Not since 1 studied the Nine Principles of War at the Marine Corps Command & Staff College, have I seen original thought being given to the principals of war.
This book explains the difference between the U.S. Army’s philosophy of synchronization and the Marine Corps’ philosophy of maneuver warfare. It explains the U.S. Army’s warfighting doctrine (mass fires and then maneuver—attrition warfare) and the Marine Corps’ warfighting doctrine (mass fires with maneuver—maneuver warfare).
As a naval officer, I can see the application of Hayden’s 11 Maxims of Maneuver Warfare not only in land warfare but also in sea power and air power. This book is a quiet masterpiece. It belongs in your library with Clausewitz, Jomini, and Mahan.
Commander Zambito is the Medical Programs manager for the Marine Corps Systems Command, Quantico, Virginia.
My Father’s War—A Son’s Journey
Peter Richmond. New York, NY: Simon & Schuster, 1996. 263 pp. $23.00 ($20.70).
Reviewed by Captain W.B. Hayler, U.S. Navy (Retired)
In 1960, when he was only seven years old, Peter Richmond lost his father, a well-decorated World War II Marine. Major Tom Richmond was a very unassuming, quiet, and modest individual, and the only knowledge Peter had of his wartime experience was derived from artifacts he discovered in his father’s foot- locker. Those artifacts kindled his interest and began a journey of discovery. The result is this carefully researched and beautifully written book.
Tom Richmond graduated from Dartmouth in 1938 and was commissioned through the Platoon Leaders Class program. He became a member of the 1st Marine Division and fought at Guadalcanal, New Britain, and Peleliu, in the vanguard of the war in the South Pacific. Along the way, he was awarded two Silver Stars and one Bronze Star. After the war, he took over a manufacturing company in New York and had a highly successful career until his life was cut short by the crash of a commercial airliner. It is trite to say that after he had beaten the odds for so long, it is difficult to believe that his luck could run out in his mid-forties, but it did. And the author was cheated out of knowing his father as an adult, and knew nothing about his time in the Marine Corps.
The author is a product of the 1960s and a journalist who has been a reporter for The Washington Post, the San Diego Union, and the Miami Herald. Before he started working on this book, he knew very little about the military, and even less about the Marine Corps. Now, he knows a lot more.
He requested copies of his father’s service records, visited the Marine Corps Historical Center, contacted Marines who had served with his father, and, most impressively, journeyed to all the places where his father had fought: Tulagi, Guadalcanal, New Britain, and Peleliu. He was welcomed at a reunion of the 1st Marine Division, where he learned that his father was held in high regard by his fellow officers, and almost worshiped by his men.
Among the strengths of this book are the accounts of Tom Richmond’s actions that his son pieced together. The stories are always told from the foxholes, the jungle, and the landing craft and amtracs on the way to the beachhead. The feelings of the officers and men at platoon, company, and battalion levels are recorded in brutally frank terms.
Would the author have learned much more about this war if his father had survived long enough to share his stories? Probably not—by all accounts. Major Richmond never discussed the war except with his own officers and men. My father lived until he was 89, but we never refought the war together. Several years ago, at his ship’s reunion, I frequently heard, “If it weren’t for your old man, I wouldn’t be here.” Peter Richmond has heard the same thing, many times.
The author has done an outstanding job of completing a difficult task. He remarks that in 1936, when his father enlisted, there were fewer political issues attached to the military than from the Vietnam War on. He may have oversimplified the matter, but he’s right. He quotes one of his father’s men: “There’s now a lack of commitment, somehow.”
It certainly seems that way today, but I have enough faith to believe that “Semper Fidelis” still has meaning. I hope my children—along with Peter Richmond’s generation—and their children will read this book. Perhaps then, the overworked fable that World War II was “the Last Good War” would fade away—just like old soldiers were supposed to do.
Captain Hayler graduated from the U.S. Naval Academy in 1944, and was serving on board the aircraft carrier Franklin (CV-13) when she was heavily damaged off Japan. Subsequently, he had five commands. He is the author or editor of several maritime textbooks.
Books of Interest
By Lieutenant Commander Thomas J. Cutler, U.S. Navy (Retired)
A Century of U. S. Naval Intelligence
Captain Wyman H. Packard USN (Ret). Washington, DC: Office of Naval Intelligence and the Naval Historical Center, 1996. 498 pp. Append. Bib. Ind. Gloss. Notes. Photos. Tables. $42.00 ($39.90).
Intended “for use as a reference work, a topical chronology,” Captain Packard’s chronicle of the Navy’s intelligence service is meticulously researched and comprehensive in its intended treatment. This is not a “cloak-and-dagger” account focusing on operations, but instead is a history of the origins, development, and organization of naval intelligence in the century beginning with the end of the Civil War and ending in the 1960s. As such, it provides scholars and researchers with an excellent baseline document, while providing for posterity a lasting written monument to the contributions that the intelligence service has made to the success of fleet operations.
The Striker: A Warship for the 21st Century
Rene Loire. Houston, TX: A. Ghosh, 1996. 208 pp. Ulus. $19.00 paper. Apply directly to publisher, 713-778-0960.
Inspired by an article by Vice Admiral Joseph Metcalf III, “Revolution at Sea Initiative,” (pp. 34-39, January 1988 Proceedings), Loire proposes a new design of warship that is most thought-provoking. His “Striker” design (See “Toward A Disposable Striker,” pp. 83-84, September 1996 Proceedings) combines simplicity and cost-effectiveness with increased survivability and delivering maximum ordnance on target. Among his guiding principles, Loire writes, “Make and keep the ship simple and sturdy. Leave ‘sophistication’ to the missiles.” He goes well beyond mere platitudes and pie-in-the sky ideas by providing an actual design that appears to accomplish the lofty goals he has proposed. Admiral Metcalf, in his foreword to the book, observes that this is a “brilliant study” but warns that it will generate “both heat and light.” The ideas presented deserve careful consideration.
Strategic Exposure: Proliferation Around the Mediterranean
Ian O. Lesser and Ashley J. Tellis. Santa Monica, CA: Rand, 1996. 125 pp. Bib. Gloss. Notes. Tables. $15.00 ($13.50) paper.
The proliferation of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons—a major concern for decades, especially since the end of the Cold War—is most keenly felt in the Mediterranean theater. The authors explore the proliferation trends in this region and consider the implications for European security and, most significantly, in terms of U.S. and NATO policy. Among their conclusions: “Within ten years, it is possible that every southern European capital will be within range of ballistic missiles based in North Africa.”
Modern Marine Salvage
William I. Milwee, Jr. Centreville, MD: Cornell Maritime Press, 1996. 790 pp. Append. Bib. Fig. Illus. Ind. Gloss. Notes. Photos. $65.00 ($61.75).
A virtual “bible” of marine salvage techniques, this comprehensive treatment explains both basic and advanced techniques, effectively employing clearly presented illustrations, mathematical formulae, and a well-written text. Chapters include detailed discussions of rigging, lifting, tools, cargo handling, hazardous substances, naval architecture, and standings.
As They Say on the River: A Dictionary of Western Rivers Towing
Captain Jack Ross, Editor. Monroeville. PA: Captain Jack Ross & Associates, 1996. 95 pp. $9.95 paper.
For those who think that a “hunky” is something other than a riverman from Pittsburgh, or for those who did not realize that a “square wheel” is a propeller whose pitch is equal to its diameter, this book will prove enlightening. The members of nearly all specialized professions have a language of their own, and those who work on the western rivers of America are no exception. This book explains those terms, some technical, some colorful, some politically incorrect; but together they reflect the work, the knowledge, the humor, and the regional culture of these brown-water mariners.
Quarterdeck and Bridge: Two Centuries of American Naval Leaders
James C. Bradford, Editor. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1996. 512 pp. Bib. Ind. Notes. Photos. $42.50 ($34.00) hardcover, $22.95 ($18.36) paper.
An excellent collection of biographical essays by leading naval historians, these studies record and evaluate the impact of the individuals selected. There are warriors (such as John Paul Jones, Raphael Semmes, George Dewey, and William F. Halsey), thinkers (Alfred Thayer Mahan and Stephen B. Luce), commanders (Esek Hopkins and Ernest J. King), reformers (Matthew C. Perry and William S. Simms), and technical innovators (William A. Moffett and Hyman Rickover). This pantheon of naval personalities is a tour through the establishment, perpetuation, and changing of naval tradition that sheds light on the individuals themselves and upon the U.S. Navy as a whole.
Decisive Force: The New American Way of War
F. G.Hoffman. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1996. 160 pp. Bib. Ind. Gloss. Notes. Tables. $52.95 ($50.30).
These magnificent rings are in a totally different league from ordinary, school-style military rings. Made by one of America’s leading goldsmiths, they’re incredibly detailed and solid as a rock. You’ll be proud to wear one.
(Vietnam, Beirut, Panama, and Desert Storm), Hoffman traces the development and evaluates this concept as a “new American way of war.”
American Admiralty Bureau’s Guide to the Enduring Principles of Maritime Law
Raymond F. Bollinger. Houma, LA: Marine Education Textbooks, 1996. 83 pp. Bib. Ind. $15.95 ($14.35) paper.
Designed as a “practical starting point” in the realm of international maritime law, this study guide will prove useful to naval, merchant marine, and Coast Guard officers, lawyers and paralegals, and insurance professionals who deal with international shipping. Treatments on maritime sovereignty, territorial concerns, the law of armed conflict, research considerations, the electronic spectrum, and many other related topics are covered.
The Unknown Soldiers: African- American Troops in World War I
Arthur E. Barbeau & Florette Henri. New York, NY: Da Capo Press, 1996. 303 pp. Bib. Ind. Notes. Photos. $14.95 ($13.45) paper.
370,000 African-Americans served during World War I, laboring, fighting, and dying to “make the world safe for democracy.” Despite the prejudice they suffered at home and in the U.S. military itself, these Americans performed their duties well. This detailed study chronicles their contributions to the war effort and the abuses they suffered in return. It is not a proud time in American history, but there are redeeming moments and much to think about in these pages.
Voices: A Collection of Readings from the TQLeader 1991-1995
Bobby Ryan, Denise Wells, Cathryn Goff, Editors. Washington, DC: Department of the Navy Total Quality Leadership Office, 1996. 114 pp. Photos. Free. Paper. 703-602-8990; InterNet at http://tql-navy.org.
A compilation of TQLeader newsletters issued by the Total Quality Leadership Office since publication of the first issue in 1991, this book serves as a repository of expert thinking on TQL. With its key elements of training and strategic planning, TQL has revolutionized some aspects of the Navy’s traditional methods and modernized thinking in a number of areas. Included in this book is information about the TQL electronic bulletin board that serves to keep TQL alive and well in this age of information.
Alien Wars: The Soviet Union’s Aggressions Against the World, 1919 to 1989
General Oleg Sarin and Colonel Lev Dvoretsky. Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1996. 257 pp. Ind. Notes. Photos. $24.95 ($22.45).
Based upon research into previously secret Soviet archives, this book fills in many of the blanks regarding the Soviet Union’s aggressive policies in the seven decades of its existence. Stalin’s decision to participate in the Spanish Civil War, the Finland debacle, the pact with Hitler, the instigation of the Korean invasion, Middle Eastern adventurism, Vietnam involvement, the arming of Cuba, suppression of Hungary and Czechoslovakia, and the intervention in Afghanistan are all detailed in this fascinating investigation conducted by two former insiders.