Last year, a unique concept was introduced to the AV-8B Harrier community: the weapons department. Modeled after the U.S. Air Force's weapons and tactics shop—found in many F-16 squadrons—this new department was created as a focal point for tactical issues. Many weapons and tactics instructors had been overwhelmed with collateral duties or billets unrelated to tactical issues, and the weapons-department concept seemed to be an ideal way to deal with the problem.
What does this have to do with the intelligence community? The creators of this new department concluded that the Air Force had developed a novel approach to tactics training by consolidating their weapons and tactics experts with their intelligence personnel; the Marine Corps weapons department advocates decided to do the same.
The weapons department proposal, however, goes further than simply consolidating intelligence (S-2) personnel with weapons and tactics (S-3) instructors. The introduction to the document that proposes establishing a Marine aviation weapons department states that, “[the weapons department] has taken on the responsibility of the S-2, and in a way absorbed the S-2, vice being absorbed by it.”
Nowhere in the inch-and-a-half thick document do the department’s creators provide valid justifications for absorbing the S-2. The primary reason they offer is “the task loading of the squadron before the weapons department inception. The majority of squadron departments, most notably the S-3, were overtasked. It appeared that the S-2 was undertasked and a void could be filled by relieving some of the workload of operations.”
After studying this proposal, it is easy to understand why Marine Corps intelligence historically has been singled out for various shortfalls. This document highlights widespread ignorance of an S-2 section’s primary functions. Because of this, commanders and operators continue either to ignore or misuse their intelligence personnel. A Department of Defense Inspector General’s report in September of 1993 found that, during Desert Shield/Desert Storm, Marine Corps intelligence personnel were “not sufficiently organized and trained to provide the support required. Personnel were not properly trained in the intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB) process, air intelligence, or targeting, and the quality of the analysis they performed suffered accordingly.”
The lack of aviation intelligence training noted in the Inspector General’s report should not be surprising. Aviation intelligence has never been given sufficient emphasis in formal schools. In fact, a course of instruction which was created at the Navy/Marine Corps Intelligence Training Center to teach collateral duty intelligence officers about the many aspects of air intelligence was terminated by Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps. In addition, a coordinating draft for a Fleet Marine Force Manual on Aviation Intelligence (FMFM 3-27) released in July 1992, now has been canceled with no plans for its resurrection.
Aviation intelligence alone is an all- encompassing occupation that requires an extensive knowledge of the intelligence community, international threats, and blue air assets and capabilities. The Air Force considers “estimating enemy capabilities for possible courses of action perhaps the most complex, comprehensive, and demanding combat intelligence function performed in support of tactical air employment.” As specialized as aviation intelligence may be, however. Marine Corps intelligence personnel can expect to serve in intelligence billets with ground, joint, and national level commands and agencies— each requiring specialized intelligence support tailored to that organization’s mission. Therefore, the idea of assigning intelligence personnel additional duties that are unrelated to intelligence is not only a disservice to individual Marines, but also to their units and the entire Marine Corps.
What needs to be addressed at this point is; will absorbing S-2 personnel into a weapons department facilitate the aviation community’s desire to place tactics issues in the forefront? Will this occur at the expense of dedicated intelligence support? Is it appropriate to assign intelligence personnel job functions normally performed by operations personnel, simply because there is a perception that operations departments are overtasked? Is the Marine Corps willing to live with the future consequences of not heeding lessons of the Gulf War?
While the idea of creating a weapons department may prove beneficial for dealing with tactical issues, it should not be staffed with intelligence personnel. Nowhere is it written that intelligence personnel are responsible for plotting and tracking friendly forces or performing any other operations-type functions, for which they never were formally trained. Intelligence personnel are responsible for plotting and not tracking friendly forces, nor should they any other functions for which they were never formally trained. Commanders must use their intelligence personnel as unique and vital resources.
The weapons department should not be in the future for Marine aviation intelligence. Commander must use their intelligence staffs as vital resources, appreciating what properly trained intelligence personnel can provide. Because, as Major David E. Mock said in King of Battle: Why S-2s Must Hold Court With FSOs, “The sound of freedom is silent without intelligence first, intelligence second, and intelligence third.”
Staff Sergeant Cartwright is a Marine Aviation Intelligence Specialist assigned to 2d Low Altitude Air Defense Battalion, Marine Air Group-28, at Cherry Point. North Carolina.