Bring the 18,000 Okinawa-based Marines back to the United States, say Brookings Institution scholars Michael Mochizuki and Michael O’Hanlon, who contend that their presence is “not central to the U.S.-Japanese security relationship." What’s wrong with this proposal? For starters, it fails to recognize the strategic value and military contributions to our East Asia-Pacific Strategy provided by the Okinawa-based Marines.
The Japanese Constitution permits only a limited home island self-defense force and prohibits the development of a Japanese power-projection or nuclear capability. Under the terms of the U.S.-Japanese security treaty, Japan is protected by a U.S. nuclear umbrella—and U.S, forces stationed in Japan, including the Marines on Okinawa, provide:
- Expanded island defense
- A regional power-projection capability with forces afloat and ashore to control critical sea lines of communication
Okinawa’s strategic significance in support of this strategy is indisputable. Strategic hubs such as Singapore, Bangkok, Ho Chi Minh City, Manila, Taipei, Beijing, Seoul, and Tokyo are all less than 2,000 nautical miles away.
As a result, U.S. Marines on Okinawa are transportable anywhere in the East Asia-Pacific Region by in-theater, immediately available air and sealift. This is a central point. Strategic positioning on Okinawa reduces response time and saves limited strategic airlift and sealift for the important flow of additional forces and supplies from the continental United States. If the 18,000 Marines on Okinawa and their equipment were based in the United States, more than 5,000 strategic airlift sorties would be required to move them to the Pacific theater.
Little strategic airlift, already double-counted in our current two major regional contingency war plans, would be available—necessitating a 30-day ship transit.
U.S. Marines remain an important element of a balanced combined arms naval force in a maritime theater of operations. Twenty-two disputed regions are located in the Pacific; most are located along the littorals. As demonstrated by recent events between China and Taiwan, many are areas of likely conflict. General-purpose, flexible U.S. Marine forces can separate combatants or reinforce a regional ally. Maintaining a rapidly-deployable, self-sustaining force serves our best interests and poses severe problems for potential adversaries.
While U.S. Army forces in South Korea remain focused on that important major regional contingency, Okinawa-based Marines are immediately available to the theater commander for short-notice crisis-response missions—ably demonstrated during February 1995, when part of my battalion (3rd Battalion, 7th Marines), then deployed to Okinawa, assisted in the amphibious withdrawal of UNOSOM II personnel from Somalia. This force made an amphibious landing, relieved Pakistani, Bangladeshi, and Italian forces in place, and executed an amphibious withdrawal under pressure.
Furthermore, Okinawa-based Marines support our national and theater strategy of cooperative engagement by participating in more than 70 combined and bilateral exercises yearly with Japan. Russia, Thailand, the Philippines, South Korea, Australia, and many other East Asia-Pacific countries. These serve to enhance host nation capabilities and effectiveness of coalition operations, foster regional cooperation and integration, and give form and substance to our bilateral security commitments.
As an example of versatility, at the same time part of my battalion was engaged in the evacuation of Somalia, other elements were engaged in a live-fire training exercise with elements of the Japanese Self Defense Force at Camp Fuji, Japan, and in an amphibious exercise with Korean Marines at Kunsan. South Korea.
Okinawa has additional strategic value as a forward logistic base. White Beach Naval Station can load simultaneously seven amphibious ships (two large-deck and five smaller ships). More than 50 million gallons of fuel can be stored on Okinawa, and more than 5,000 pieces of individual equipment are stored in warehouses.
Okinawa’s strategic value can be realized only if general-purpose forces available for immediate use are stationed there. Permanently stationed forces maintain support and basing that are vital for receiving reinforcement, throughput, and onward movement in times of crisis and conflict.
Most experts agree that future conflicts in the Pacific region will most certainly involve the defense of sea lines of communications to guarantee the uninterrupted flow of strategic raw materials. Several of these presently fall within disputed territories; Marines positioned astride the sea lines protect them against adversaries positioned ashore.
Task organized and self-supporting general-purpose U.S. Marine forces, fighting as part of joint or combined Naval forces are especially suited for a wide variety of missions in this maritime theater. Likely missions include seizure and defense of advanced naval bases, defense of sea lines of communication, amphibious operations, conventional operations ashore, tactical recovery of aircraft-personnel, and noncombatant evacuation operations as well as humanitarian assistance and disaster-relief operations.
Redeploying the 18,000 Okinawa-based Marines to the United States may unhinge all six of our East Asia-Pacific bilateral security arrangements; it will create a strategic vacuum and signal a lessening of U.S. commitment to regional security. This too, is a central point. Minimally, regional military spending will increase, and, in the worst case, a nuclear arms race may develop. This may be marginalized by some in academic circles; thankfully, it is well understood by the countries of the Pacific Rim.
The recent United States-Japanese Tokyo summit underscored the depth of our current mutual commitment to regional security. Initiatives to return Marine Corps Air Station Futenma and additional acreage to reduce the military footprint on Okinawa—while maintaining current force levels—validates the strategic utility of Okinawa-based Marines.
Lieutenant Colonel Dobson, U.S. Marine Corps, is a Marine Fellow at the Brookings Institution. An infantry officer, he has served with all three active U.S. Murine divisions, deployed twice to the Mediterranean, and served more than two years on Okinawa.