In a deep fog, with roles and missions and money and politics and other big ships plowing headlong, intent on running us down, we need to navigate smartly, to think, to articulate, and finally to realize this Navy’s proper course in our nation’s defense. We must recognize some fundamentals if we are to avoid the crash. Five short blasts are in order.
We have great expectations: a Navy forward, ready, and supporting not just national security objectives, but political and increasingly economic concerns as well; carrier battle groups poised to move and strike at a moment’s notice; Marines and material strategically positioned around the globe; tens of thousands of young Americans working hard every day to support the pointy end of a very long spear. And today’s Navy is getting it done, day in and day out, around the corner and around the globe.
Of course, such a force doesn’t just happen, nor does it of necessity just continue. What we are is what we always have been: the traditions of honor, courage, and commitment and the hard work of young Sailors and Marines far away, keeping ships at sea and a nation free. What we are is the product of planning—the real and difficult matter of anticipating requirements, of planned capabilities, of meeting expectations with a forward deployed naval force. It is possible, however, that our current plan—our way ahead—has us on a collision course with reality: constant bearing, decreasing range.
If we are to avoid the crash, we must recognize some fundamentals.
- Fundamental number one: The Navy is not the Air Force, which is not the Army, which is not the Navy—and none of them is anything remotely like the Marine Corps. Just as ready aircraft on a flight line a continent or two away never will replace a carrier battle group on station, so too a wing of aircraft on board a ready carrier will not perform the work of a force of deep strike, interdiction, and bomber Air Force aircraft on an expeditionary flight line.
The Navy cannot afford carrier-deck aircraft that cost more than $50 million a copy. The follow-on fighter-attack aircraft are nice, but do we need them or would we just like to have them? Instead of paying all that money for a single aircraft, perhaps we should use it for two or three aircraft, planes that can support Marines on the ground, take out critical near-shore facilities and defense sites, protect ships at sea, and fall out of the sky—as they sometimes do—without breaking the bank.
Let’s leave deep strike to the Air Force. The taxpayers spend in excess of $50 billion a year for their bombers, interdiction fighters, and electronic warfare packages. It’s what those guys are paid to do. They must be made responsible for the lion’s share of the real work in crushing a nation from above.
My Navy needs to get serious about synergy. Our part in this nation’s defense is to keep the peace and, should that fail, to enable the introduction of the Army and the Air Force. Wars cannot be fought and won solely by ships at sea. If we are hard over on convincing our civilian leaders that they can be, we are wrong. If we are buying airplanes, ships, or billets that don’t support international peace, that don’t enable the introduction of our service partners, we need to stop.
What the nation (and hence what our Navy) does need is more carriers and enough aircraft to get the job done. Twelve carriers are not enough. Effective and efficient operations require a minimum of three—four, really—decks to sustain each carrier deployed into a combat theater. A Navy that is dedicated to enabling requires more deck space and aircraft. Twelve or fewer carriers with far too few expensive F/A-18E/Fs is the wrong solution.
- Fundamental number two: We have enough money to do what is expected of us. What we do not have is a clear understanding of just where all that money goes. We absolutely have to crack this nut. We must figure out the true cost of remaining present, of being where we need to be, and of getting the job done.
For example, how much does it cost to get necessary data to the battle group commander? Seem simple? Maybe not. First, what do we mean by necessary? It is possible that we have no idea what is necessary today. We know we have a lot; we think we’d like even more, but is it necessary? Who knows for certain?
Then there’s the cost of actually transmitting the data. There are the equipment costs, of course. The satellite, the radio, the fax, the antenna sites, and other things must be figured in. But what about real estate, buildings, vehicles, power plants, and everything else required to support our enormous intelligence institution?
What are the real costs of sea service careers spent divided between shore and sea command, with perhaps only half the latter actually being spent at sea? On the one hand, increasing time at sea will lead to higher turnover, to morale and personnel problems. On the other hand, if we were able to increase the sailing part of being a sailor even a little, billets and money could be saved. Serious consideration should be given to what this life is all about, before fiscal pressures and unrelenting commitments force us into solutions we’re not ready to ship over for.
Next, let’s look at our support infrastructure. The Navy of 1996 employs nearly as many civilians as it does servicemen and women. They are able-bodied, good people, but how many are of any real help to the skipper? Our Navy is a place where thousands of academics ply arcane trades whose connection to the real world of ships at sea seems at best remote. More and more often, our Navy finds itself saddled with overhead costs that defy accounting. How much does it really cost to maintain an independent intelligence agency dedicated to the particular problem of naval affairs?
As it relates to ships at sea, to the defense of our nation, let’s find out just what it is we’re paying people to do for us. Put the response of one of my third-class petty officers beside that of a $100,000-per-year contractor and there’s little doubt as to who would make my first team.
While trying to understand costs, our Navy must work every bit as hard to control them. Senior Navy leaders, both military and civilian, need to remain honest brokers, faithful stewards of the nation’s tax dollars. The urge to defend bad programs for all the “right” reasons and the sense that unqualified service support is a requirement of successful programs, no matter what the cost, must be squelched. Just the opposite should be the case: It should be the Navy that argues in the court of public opinion that this program is too expensive, or that that contractor is not living up to his obligations. The lessons of the A-12 must be manifest in everything we do. There is high ground here, and that’s where the Navy should be.
- Fundamental number three: Real presence will define U.S. military might well into the future. The siren song that says we can influence events with longer and longer tethers, that we could just sail should something come up, must be resisted. Our Navy is foremost a force for peace and stability. Any sense that we might pull back quickly leads to saber rattling round the globe.
Declining force levels and unrelenting commitments receive the most attention when we talk about presence, but less obvious and every bit as dangerous is the maintenance of our warfighting assets. We currently are riding the leading edge of a crisis in readiness. If you don’t think so, ask yourself who, exactly, is responsible for ship and aircraft maintenance. Who is responsible for keeping a smaller number of ships at sea for greater periods of time to meet current commitments?
The Regional Maintenance Group, a sort of all-things- to-all-people organization, will prove of little merit. A central bureaucracy that will find itself undermanned and unable, a team of good people that will of necessity force difficult repairs onto the backs of forces afloat, who have neither the time nor the training for such work, will soon cripple the fleet. There are some clear gains possible through maintenance consolidation, but there is much to lose in going too far, which is where we’re headed.
Each community makes very special demands on its own cadre of repair experts. Today’s warfighting equipment demands the very best airplane mechanics, reactor technicians, and radar engineers. It requires the artistry of particular specialists, not the work of a collection of generalists. A clear imperative for the Navy of tomorrow is increased material readiness. We won't get there through the efforts of a collective.
Key to avoiding the coming collision between expectations and realities is early, aggressive action. We must decide now what it is we will provide four years down the road—an honest assessment of where we will be and what we will be able to do. We must educate the customer on our deliverable strengths. We must harden the force to accommodate more time at sea. We must figure out where the money is going and become true stewards of the public trust. If it’s not being spent on our people, on smart weapon systems, or on keeping our ships and airplanes fully combat ready, then don’t spend the money.
In the end, of course, it is about people. What do we really gain, in terms of national security, by sending our young officers out of their warfighting communities and into the joint arena before command? We do not get a better fighter squadron commander. Aegis commander, or submarine skipper. Resources are too precious to risk in the hands of folks expert only in the ways of joint staffs. We should focus first on producing warriors skilled in using the instruments of modern naval combat. Then and only then should the finest of those officers move on to the broader defense issues handled by the joint staffs.
Commander Peppe is commanding officer of the Atlanta (SSN-712).