That’s a good question and it deserves a good answer. The most intelligent choice for a heavy-lift rotor craft replacement would be a joint-design airframe compatible with all the service needs, including shipboard operations. We’re almost there—the Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force already fly specialized versions of a standard airframe—the H-53.
In fact, the U.S. Army is leading a long-range effort to identify or design a single airframe to satisfy existing service rotary-wing heavy-lift requirements: the Joint Transport Rotorcraft (JTR) program. There are other possibilities, but this one can be a winner. Compounding the problem, however, is the need to replace or refurbish aging, expensive equipment.
A little background is in order in this era when doing more with less is de rigueur.
Since their introduction to the U.S. military services in the mid-1950s, heavy-lift combat support helicopters have provided invaluable support to battlefield commanders.1 The piston-engine Sikorsky HR2S-1 Mojave could lift more than 5,000 pounds of cargo and was the first production heavy-lift helicopter to fulfill the Marine Corps requirement as a primary assault-support aircraft.2 While Sikorsky was developing the follow-on CH-53 for the Marine Corps, the Army Aviation Board was closely monitoring development of the Boeing-Vertol tandem-rotor CH-47A Chinook.3 Capable of lifting more than 10,000 pounds, in August 1962 it became the Army’s standard medium-lift transport helicopter.
Today’s heavy-lift military helicopters can carry loads up to 36,000 pounds, accommodate up to 55 passengers, and cruise at 150 knots. The unmistakable staccato of inbound rotors has, for many a battlefield commander, meant resupply of urgently required troops, artillery, or ammunition—and rapid evacuation of the wounded. While the Army and naval aviation use heavy-lift helicopters to accomplish similar tasks (high-speed, heavy-lift external loads, or maximum internal troop loads, for the most part), they rely on two entirely different aircraft—and different terms for similar capabilities: what the Army calls medium-lift, naval aviation refers to as heavy-lift.
The Army presently has more than 470 Boeing CH-47D tandem-rotor, twin engine Chinook helicopters—including the MH-47E Special Operations version—in its medium-lift fleet. The result of numerous modifications and performance enhancements, the CH-47Ds, which can carry 33 combat-equipped troops and up to 26,000 pounds of cargo on their center hooks, will reach the end of their programmed life beginning in 2002.
The Navy and Marine Corps use two slightly different variations of the Sikorsky, single-rotor, three-engine H-53E. The CH-53E was introduced in the early 1980s to fulfill the Navy’s heavy-lift vertical onboard delivery requirement and the Marine Corp’s requirement for heavy-lift support of amphibious operations. The Navy’s MH-53Es arrived in 1986 as successors to the RH-53Ds used for airborne mine countermeasures.
The Navy and the Marine Corps have more than 200 MH-53E/CH-53E helicopters on hand. Both the MH-53E and CH-53E can carry up to 55 personnel or up to 36,000 pounds of cargo on a dual-point hook system. While the helicopters are highly capable machines, the older CH-53E is more than halfway through its forecast 20-year service life.
It is reasonable to assume that the lift requirements will exist well into the future. Where do the existing programs go with respect to aging airframes vis-a-vis a rapidly developing aviation technology base and a stagnating defense budget? There are several alternatives.
Service Life Extension Program (SLEP). The ravages of constant hard use (and an occasional hard landing) contribute to the aging process, and planners tend to upgrade existing aircraft inventories until confronted by significantly better airframe technology.
Service life extension programs benefit the aviation industry (upgrade contracts) and the service (more capable existing aircraft). But such programs—and other modernization efforts—can have pernicious side effects if not adequately engineered. Suppose a helicopter gets an upgraded engine that is more powerful and more cost-effective to maintain. The helicopter now has a greater pay- load, among other improvements, and the operators take advantage of the increased performance. Cracks then become apparent in a critical area—caused by accelerated fatigue associated with excessive airframe twisting under the heavier loads. The affected aircraft are inspected and the entire fleet of modified aircraft is grounded until the problem is resolved. Things like this will happen.
Today, the Navy is preparing details for a comprehensive SLEP proposal for the Navy MH-53E and Marine Corps CH-53E helicopters. It is designed to “ . . . efficiently meet the heavy-lift requirements of the Mission Area requirements and AMCM [airborne mine countermeasures] through the year 2025 ... as the CH-53E ... is expected to exceed a 30-year service life.”4 [See “A Bird in the Hand,” Proceedings, October 1996, pages 46-50.]
In April 1994, the Army’s entire Chinook fleet completed an extensive upgrade from the CH-47C to CH-47D configuration. Improvements included new engines, an improved transmission, new-de- sign fiberglass rotor blades, improved avionics, and a new automatic flight-control system. Boeing anticipates even more improvements to the Chinook to take the helicopter well into the 21st century—the company’s improved cargo helicopter (ICH) would be the product of a 20-year SLEP to extend the Chinook’s life while keeping it on track for integration with the anticipated Army Force XXI on the digital battlefield.
These Navy and Army modernization programs are sufficient to keep the heavy-lift helicopters going for a number of years, but longer-term solutions remain to be determined.5 Three alternatives appear viable.
A SLEP might be one of the options, but consider the evidence from the Boeing CH-46E Sea Knight program. Here, even a judicious extension program has not prevented a gradual decline in performance and reliability of the aircraft—hence the V-22 Osprey replacement. I think that acquisition of a modern, replacement heavy-lift helicopter aircraft is inevitable. Here are my options: Super V-22. We could build a higher-performance or larger V-22 Osprey tiltrotor equivalent. In its present form, the V-22 tiltrotor has about half the external cargo or internal passenger capability of today’s CH-53Es. Furthermore, the V-22 cannot lift the Army or the Marine Ml98 155-mm howitzer and its 11-man crew and ammunition—much less the 24,750-pound Caterpillar DS bulldozer—both within the Chinook’s capability.
The current Marine Corps medium-lift V-22 rotor (wing) span is four feet more than that of the heavy-lift CH-53E, and it is reasonable to assume that a heavy-lift tiltrotor aircraft with performance at least equal to that of the CH-53E or CH-47D would be larger than the existing V-22. Given current tiltrotor technology, it is unlikely that a larger, higher capacity tiltrotor aircraft would be compatible with even the largest of our current amphibious assault ships unless flight deck operations were restricted to spots ahead and behind the ship’s island to provide safe rotor (wing) clearance.
Perhaps long-term amphibious ship design will obviate the need for an island, which would open the door for a fleet of larger, more powerful tiltrotor aircraft. Until that happens, however, a larger tiltrotor aircraft is not feasible as a joint service heavy-lift replacement for the CH-53E or CH-47D.
Privatize the rotary-wing heavy-lift requirements. The Secretary of Defense wants the Department of Defense to act more like commercial industry as it simultaneously seeks to do more business with commercial entities.6 He indicated, however, that this be limited to non-core activities such as “ ... commercial activities on bases around the world.” Even if we stretched the definition of “noncore” activities to include combat heavy-lift, it is unlikely that a commercial entity would sign up for the dangers or risks associated with combat support.
Granted, privatization is a viable alternative for the Navy’s vertical replenishment (VertRep) mission, presently performed by aging CH-46Es. Indeed, the Navy is evaluating a commercial VertRep alternative called KMAX—a small, single-piloted helicopter that can lift 6,000 pounds externally.7 The KMAX, however, obviously does not meet the Army-Navy heavy-lift mission requirements. Other than a possible foreign buy, there is no suitable alternative commercial heavy-lift rotor craft to replace the CH-53E or CH-47D. Overriding all these considerations, however, is the unlikelihood that commanders would want to rely on civilian pilots and aircrews for 24-hour frontline combat support missions.
Modernize for the Future. “New aircraft procurement must support long-term force structure goals and protect qualitative advantages.”8 In fact, the first part of the Joint Transport Rotorcraft program is under way with short-term requirements review to keep the existing heavy- lift fleets up and flying until JTR introduction.9
The next phase will be to coordinate joint service requirements and identify possible dual-service technical opportunities; lift-requirement and technical studies are under way, as is a sustainment analysis. Initial mission needs statements (MNS), a draft concept paper, and draft mission profiles have been submitted with fiscal year 2002 as the target date for the initial design. Planned initial operational capability (IOC) is 2015 and delivery completion is scheduled for 2025. In April 1996, Army, Air Force, and Marine Corps representatives met to formulate the ground work for an initial Joint Services Operational Requirements matrix that ultimately will identify joint service heavy-lift needs and airframe capability requirements. The Army is providing science and technology funding with a goal of demonstrating transmission, structural, and rotor-systems components by 2003.
The program is using the Technology Development Approach (TDA), a Department of Defense-driven initiative that consolidates the efforts of government agencies, private industry, and academia to avoid the high cost and wasted efforts of duplicated research and development.
A Rotary Wing Vehicle (RWV)/TDA team, headed by Donald Dix, head of the Pentagon’s advanced technology office, is examining alternatives and technological advances in the rotary-wing arena. Core team members include Army, Navy, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, McDonnell Douglas Helicopter, Boeing Helicopter, Sikorsky, Bell Helicopter Textron, Georgia Institute of Technology, the University of Maryland, and Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute. RWV/TDA draft goals include:
- 3% reduction in the ratio of structural to hover-in- ground-effect (HIGE) weight
- 25% reduction in radar cross-section
- 35% reduction in infrared signature
- 40% reduction in vibration
- 20% reduction in development time
- 25% reduction in procurement costs per pound of structural weight
If the team is successful and the TDA goals and objectives are achieved, the rotorcraft would offer these payoffs:
- 72% range increase—or 60% increase in payload
- 8% increase in cruise speed
- 30% increase in maneuverability/agility
- 20% increase in reliability and a 10% improvement in maintainability
- 20% increase in probability of survival
- 20% reduction in the rate of accidents
- 6% reduction in research, development, and testing costs
- 15% reduction in procurement costs
- 5% reduction in operational and support costs
In addition, the team established specific goals for improvement in future-generation rotorcraft including: aeromechanics, flight controls, subsystems, and structures. Future rotorcraft design may be as radically distinctive from the V-22 as the tiltrotor is when compared to conventional helicopters.
Given aviation industry economics, I suggest that the Pentagon provide the major U.S. helicopter production companies the opportunity to merge for cooperative production of the JTR. If three or more companies each produced a separate section of the rotorcraft, a common production facility for a consortium that might be called JTR Limited would contribute to a synergistic effect for instant product improvement consideration, problem resolution, and day-to-day progress sharing.
As with the V-22 Osprey, the involvement of numerous subcontractors would help spread business to many different contractors and spare-parts producers. Of course, one of the disadvantages of using a single airframe for all services would be force-wide impact should a safety-of-flight discrepancy arise that affected the whole fleet or substantial portions of it.
As a final note regarding initial design considerations, the Department of Defense should consider integrating applicable NATO mission elements into the design. NATO compatibility and interoperability will ensure one less problem to overcome during a crisis. A JTR lift commonality-compatibility matrix with pre-determined NATO cargo movement requirements is one possibility. Even small issues such as NATO ship deck-edge power and refueling compatibility must be considered and designed in; metric construction specification would enhance the rotorcraft’s commercial attractiveness for Foreign Military Sales (FMS).
The significant advantages inherent in a TDA-designed, multiservice advanced rotorcraft would go well beyond those of intelligent aircraft design alone. Common basic air crew and maintenance training—the ideal time to introduce the Army and Air Force air crews to shipboard helicopter operations—would be followed by separate advanced training for service-specific missions.
As expressed by General Henry Viccellio, Jr., U.S. Air Force, Commander of the Air Education and Training Command, “The advantages of interservice initial skills training include lowering costs as redundancies are reduced, downsizing the overall infrastructure, fostering teamwork, and nurturing jointness by exposing students to interservice dialogue early in their careers.”10
In addition, consider the advantages that will accrue when an Army or Air Force unit can obtain critically needed parts from its Marine counterpart on board a nearby Navy ship would be a significant force multiplier.
The merging of services initial flight and maintenance training, as tied to the ultimate force-wide use of a modem, joint services aircraft is the epitome of the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) as defined by analyst Paul Herman: “ [which] . . . occurs when emerging technology is applied to modern military systems, whose uses are optimized via custom-tailored operational concepts and force structures, resulting in vast increases in military effectiveness.”11
Concerning RMA, “It is important... to keep in mind four necessary criteria: effectiveness, appreciability, efficiency, and longevity. Innovation or novelty which does not lead to an ability to ‘effectively’ win battles is not utilitarian.” All the JTR elements discussed easily pass Herman’s litmus test; further, his term “win battles” may be construed as “to appreciably assist” in winning these battles.
There is a strong argument between those who advocate aggressive force modernization and those who maintain that we can afford to go slowly in the wake of the Cold War. While it is reasonable to proceed with caution, proceed we must. I advocate a practical, balanced approach that combines upgrades to existing heavy-lift aircraft with an aggressive exploitation of technology to build the JTR.
Defense planners are searching hard for RMA breakthroughs to maintain our military advantage, but barring the appearance of a miracle weapon, we must capitalize on every opportunity for RMA applications in all realms of military force planning. These include organization, training, equipment, and weapons, just to name a few. Now is the time to establish a fast track for the JTR as the successor for our joint helicopter heavy-lift force.
1 For the purposes of this article, heavy-lift—as defined by the Navy and Marine Corps—is synonymous with Army medium-lift requirements as supported by the CH-47D Chinook.
2 Phillips B. Hardy, “Heavy Helicopters: the Past, the Present, and the Future,” Marine Corps Gazette, May 1989, pp. 70-74.
3 David Anderton and Jay Miller, Boeing Helicopters CH-47 Chinook (Arlington, Texas: Aerofax, Inc. 1989), pp. 1-10.
4 U.S. Navy, Operational Requirements Document (ORD) for the H-53E Service Life Extension Program (SLEP), I DRAFT], No. AAS 34.6, (Washington: 1996), pp. 3-4.
5 For the purposes of this article: short-term is the present out to three years; near- term is three to six years; mid term is six to ten years; and long-term is ten years and beyond.
6 Secretary of Defense, Annual Report to the President and the Congress (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, March 1996), p. XVI.
7 Center for Naval Analyses, Commercial Helicopter Alternatives CAB 95-128, (Alexandria, Virginia: 1996).
8 Secretary of Defense, Annual Report, p. 178.
9 The Cargo Modernization Strategy of the JTR concept will include Army CH- 47D, Navy/Marine Corps CH/MH-53E, Air Force MH-53J & HH-60G aircraft, and associated mission requirements under one airframe.
10 Henry Viccellio, Jr., "The Joint Challenge to Training,” Joint Forces Quarterly, Spring 1995, p. 45.
11 Paul F. Herman, Jr., “The Revolution in ‘Military’ Affairs,” Strategic Review, Spring 1996, p. 27.
Lieutenant Commander Tribbie, a naval aviator, is attending the College of Naval Command and Staff, Newport, Rhode Island. A veteran H-53 pilot, he served as assistant air officer on the USS Tarawa (LHA-1) during Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm.