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Contents:
Where’s the Chief?—14
“Where’s the Chief?”
(See C. H. Johnson, pp. 64-66, February 1995; C. Haggard, p. 13, April 1995 Proceedings)
March 1995 Cover—14
Who Needs the Space Command?—14
Forward Naval Presence?—IS
Military Pay Problems: More Myth than Reality?—21
There Are Alternatives to the Third
Seawolf—22
December 1994 Cover—22
Maritime Strategy in Asia-Pacific—24
Submarine Engines for the Future—24
Fast Attack Craft in Littoral Warfare—27
Where Air Power Fails—28
Reopen the Kimmel Case—31
Too Old for Health Care—32
The Tank Is Dead: But the Cavalry Lives On—34
High-Low Must Go—21
Virtual Presence—22
What Does Surface Fire Support Cost?—34
ENTER THE FORUM
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Robert J. Frey—Captain Johnson’s rhetorical question is a good one. In the past, as he described, chief petty officers were acknowledged as the last word in technical and procedural matters by superiors and subordinates alike. In recent years, however, this respect has been eroded by a number of factors—probably the greatest of which has been the rise to preeminence of the nuclear power- trained submarine officers.
The U.S. Navy’s nuclear power-trained officers have had a drift toward micromanagement that dates back to the late fifties. When every procedure in the engineering spaces is supervised by at least one (and sometimes two) commissioned officers, the chief becomes superfluous. This situation has become prevalent throughout the Navy—at least the seagoing part.
Navy-wide micromanagement stems from Admiral Hyman Rickover’s proclivities in that direction. Admiral Rick- over was prone to punish mistakes in an arbitrary and summary fashion. Consequently, the nuclear power-trained officers adopted an approach that required a lot of hands-on supervision.
All of this has eroded respect for the chiefs on the part of their superiors. From the vantage point of my two hitches with the Navy—which were separated by 23 years: 1958-1964 in the Navy and 19871992 in the Naval Reserve—this erosion was quite apparent. Someone in continuous service might be less likely to notice the erosion—it certainly was a gradual process. At any rate, the prestige formerly held by the chief petty officers has dropped to a new low, and with the current downsizing and automation of formerly labor-intensive tasks, I don’t think it will ever recover. □
March 1995 Cover
Editor’s Note: Noting the incongruity between the name emblazoned on the ship in the cover photograph and the caption on page 2, some of our readers have questioned the literacy—or visual acuity—of the Proceedings staff. Not to worry, the photograph was captioned correctly. The name of the ship is indeed the Sea Tern; “Sea Team ” is the name of the shipping line to which she belongs. □
“Who Needs the Space
Command?”
(See W. J. Toti, pp. 38-41, April 1995
Proceedings)
Major General Robert S. Dickman, U.S. Air Force; Director of Space Programs, Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force (Acquisition), Headquarters, U.S. Air Force—In response to Commander Toti’s article, I could point out that the Navy’s Vanguard rocket blew up on the launch pad or mention that it was the Air Force that developed and procured the Navy’s Fleet Satellite Communications Systems (FLTSATCOM) satellites while fielding the Air Force Satellite Communications System for Air Force, Army, and joint use at the same time.
In the 1960s—a decade Commander Toti claims was spent working on “experimental programs yielding little practical value”—the Air Force developed and deployed many of the systems still flying today: the Defense Meteorological Satellite Program, the Defense Support Program (for missile warning), the Defense Satellite Communications Systems (for super-high-frequency communications), the Tactical Satellite Communications system (FLTSATCOM’s predecessor), LES 8 and 9 (forerunners of the Military Strategic and Tactical Relay [MILSTAR] system), and numerous classified programs. The Air Force also deployed the satellite control system that has supported hundreds of national security satellites over the past three decades and the space surveillance system that has maintained the catalog of objects in geosynchronous orbit and beyond. With NASA, the Air Force modified intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) into space launch systems and built the launch complexes and ranges still used today.
The Shuttle facilities on the West Coast that Commander Toti mentions were built to ensure access to polar as well as equatorial orbit after the unfortunate decision was made that all satellites would be launched on the Shuttle (this was changed after the Challenger accident), and space flight engineers were trained to deploy specific military satellites. As Commander Toti knows full well, since he was nominated for a slot, these individuals were chosen from all four services.
It would be easy, maybe even fun, to burst the balloon of service parochialism behind this article. It seems fashionable
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now to complain about the Air Force’s stewardship, program management, and expertise in space. The reality is that building good hardware and operating it in space is just as tough as building good hardware and operating it on or under the sea, in the air, across the beach, and on land. As with the sea and the air, space is an unforgiving medium. People who have spent their careers in the space business understand that minor flaws cause catastrophic failures; unknowns still appear with alarming frequency; systems that operate continuously on the edge of the performance envelope are unforgiving of sloppy engineering, sub-par fabrication, and human error.
The service that has pressed the technological edge, committed the budget dollars, provided the manpower to field the world’s finest space capabilities, year after year, decade after decade, is the Air Force. Not including the classified programs, we have spent more than $85 billion (in then-year dollars) since our first efforts in the 1940s. Today, we have employ many tens of thousands of military personnel, civilians and contractors to develop, deploy, and support these systems.
Admittedly, the Army and Navy lead the Air Force in the integration of space into our weapon systems and tactics. We are getting better, but we have a long way to go. That may reflect poorly on our doctrine, but not on our stewardship. The systems we have fielded have never been focused on our own forces; they are joint systems—and always will be. Spending on space segments for others’ use exceeds Air Force user terminal costs by factors of ten or more—exactly the opposite from the Navy’s and the Army’s investment. In light of our role as the principal acquirer that is as it should be.
Commander Toti is right that debate about priorities continues within the Air Force. I expect that much the same goes on in the other services. However, our vision statement: "Air Force people building the world’s most respected air and space force” reminds those of us in light blue that the stewardship of U.S. military space capabilities is an integral part of our mission.
The technological success of many of the systems we have fielded is slowly coming to light. Acquisitions take longer and cost more than they might, or should, but that problem certainly is not unique to space. MILSTAR is an incredibly advanced communication system, more capable than anything else in the world. It was built that way because its joint users demanded the capability to support land and sea operations. The Air Force offered several options to provide “70% of the capability for 50% of the cost,” but the decisions always were to proceed with
MILSTAR I and then MILSTAR II. Now in orbit for a year, MILSTAR I, the most complex satellite of its kind ever built, has been amazingly successful—probably the best performance ever for a new satellite design.
Undoubtedly, every service has personnel well-qualified in space technology, acquisition, and operations. Commander Toti is probably one of them, based on his experiences over the past decade. I have been involved in the Air Force space effort since I began my career in 1966; our Vice Chief of Staff has spent decades in the business; several generals and countless colonels in the Air Force have more than 20 years experience in space operations. Little would be gained by comparing relative expertise across the services, but I think the facts speak for themselves.
The carping and infighting that has been pervasive in the space business since the early 1980s—and reached a peak in the past year—does a disservice to the Department of Defense and the nation. While couched in such polite terms as “the role of the unified command,” the issue comes down to Commander Toti’s proposal that most space systems should be reassigned to the Navy (because the Navy depends so much on space systems), missile warning should be assigned to the Air Force, and the services should compete for theater missile defense. Perhaps because the C-17 is designed around carrying Army forces and equipment, airlift acquisition should be assigned to the Army. Because amphibious ships carry Marines, perhaps then we should assign that portion of the shipbuilding mission to them. The logic is the same.
As hard as it may be for some to acknowledge, the Air Force has been the lead service in space for decades; it is now and will continue to be in the future. Could it do things better? Would things improve if we had a better working relationship with our customers? Definitely. And, we’ve got a number of changes underway to make both happen. The Space Warfare Center is just one of many.
More involvement by members of the other services in our planning, acquisition, and operational organizations certainly would help, too. We need them to help guide the programs, build the architectures, develop the concepts of operation, refine the requirements, design and acquire the hardware, and field and operate the equipment. The Air Force would not design a transport aircraft without the other services’ participation; it is crazy to suggest that we would want to do that for space systems.
So let’s put the backstabbing, innuendo, false claims, posturing, and so on behind us—and get on with our job. Tell
us how you want to participate. We can make it happen, if we approach the challenge as members of a joint team. Our service chiefs are committed to that path. Our civilian leadership is committed to that path. Let’s all get on board and start rowing together. □
Captain John L. Byron, U.S. Navy (Retired), former Commander, Naval Ordnance Test Unit, Cape Canaveral, Florida, 1990-1993—Commander Toti’s rambling attack on Air Force space management was misguided and tedious, clearly demonstrating why the Navy’s space efforts amount to piffle. Nevertheless, he raises an important topic: Should the Navy agree to Air Force primacy in space design, acquisition, management, and operations?
1 emphatically answer yes, for three reasons:
^ The Air Force will do a splendid job. The Air Force is firmly dedicated to space and backs its commitment with the proper resources, infrastructure, and programs. The Air Force’s self-described “space geeks” are experts nonpareil, true believers with genuine vision of our space future, vast space experience, and profound knowledge of every aspect of space affairs. And they have been forged in fire, having pushed the Air Force into building things that fly without wings or a pilot. That its current Vice Chief of Staff is a space professional demonstrates the degree to which the Air Force has embraced space.
► The Navy cannot do even an adequate job. To the Navy, space is an unwanted stepchild. In the Feet’s two most important space needs—communications and remote sensing (signals and scouting is more how the Navy sees it)—its efforts are paltry. If I seem a bit strong on this, readers should be aware that for four years from 1990 through 1993 I was in charge of launching Trident missiles at Cape Canaveral. We got 52 off, but on nearly every launch the critical Navy satellite channels essential for communications and data were a disaster. Most of the shots went on channels routinely provided as backups by the Air Force Space Command—the Navy could not support its most important strategic program with reliable space communications in peacetime. When it comes to space, the Navy lacks vision, expertise, and commitment. When it comes to space experts, the Air Force perhaps has 100 of the genuine article for every Navy claimant. The Navy will never be good at this line of work;
it should hand its space requirements over to the sister service that is.
>An Air Force with a strong space program is vital to all elements of our national space program: military, civil, and commercial. This transcends narrow service benefit. Alone among the services, the Air Force makes essential contributions to this nation’s space potential—operating our major space bases and ranges; designing and operating our most important national-security satellite systems; offering Air Force launch vehicles for civil, military, and commercial payloads; and including both NASA and the U.S. commercial space industry as full partners in its planning. The United States must be strong in space if we are to retain world leadership. The Air Force has an indispensable role in developing and maintaining that strength.
Scattering our military space program among the services detracts from its future potential. Neither Army nor Navy has the talent, dedication, and resources necessary to do a good job, even for themselves. Air Force does, and it has demonstrated readiness to share these— and invest further in them—for the national good. The Navy should stop fighting the Air Force on this and get on board. Everyone will win. □
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“Forward Naval Presence?”
(See G. Crowder, pp. 43-45, April 1995
Proceedings)
Lieutenant Commander Edmund O’Callaghan, U.S. Navy—Major Crowder’s analysis of Admiral Dur’s convincing and articulate article and the Navy’s “Forward Naval Presence” Study is well-written, but ignores some of the admiral’s more salient points. These omissions are significant enough to raise questions about his conclusions.
Major Crowder states that the “Navy has recently concluded that it is possible to substitute, to some degree, the use of an Amphibious Ready Group [(ARG)] with an amphibious assault ship for an aircraft carrier to provide forward presence and crisis response.” Not only is this statement wrong from a policy standpoint, it also demonstrates a limited understanding of the methodology used in the Navy’s Forward Presence Study. In the study, force packages were developed to meet specific military objectives. Based on the specific military tasks at hand, in some cases, an aircraft carrier battle group was required; in others, it was an ARG or surface combatants alone. When the problem is analyzed in this manner, blanket substitutions of the types suggested are, in fact, not possible.
Major Crowder’s second key point tellingly demonstrates his failure to understand the full scope of the arguments for naval presence. He states that the study ignores “the ongoing and potential contributions of the other services to forward presence missions.” First, this statement is inaccurate—as the author himself concedes later “the study acknowledges that other forces could substitute for forward deployed naval forces.” Second, and perhaps even more troubling, is that the key point concerning possible substitutions of alternative combat capable force packages—that U.S. warships are sovereign U.S. territory, and as such are relatively independent of fixed foreign bases and the conditions governing their use—is never addressed in “Forward Naval Presence?” Admiral Dur forthrightly wrote:
[W]hen deploying land-based or ground units forward, host countries may attach conditions to the employment of these forces that could effectively limit their value. There is an obvious political advantage in not having to negotiate the conditions under which you use military force every time the objectives change.
Why is this aspect of forward naval presence glossed over? I cannot be certain, but clearly the case for the alternative—i.e., land-based force packages—is much easier to make if one discounts the potential problems inherent in operating from the sovereign territory of another nation.
According to Major Crowder, another related "questionable assumption” is that “[t]he absence of the carrier air wing would mean that certain military tasks... could not be met for long periods.” He goes on to argue once again that “the vast majority of the military tasks requiring the capabilities of an aircraft carrier in both the European and Central Commands have been more than adequately covered by forward-deployed, land-based coalition air power for more than three years.” Clearly, when base access is guaranteed and geopgraphy permits land- based air power will play a vital role. Nevertheless, it is folly to assume that base access always will be guaranteed and that U.S. forces operating from foreign soil will never be restricted. The lessons of history—indeed of very recent history—teach us this.
Major Crowder’s next complaint revolves around the study’s premise that forces for presence be shaped for combat as well. Again, he examines an aspect of the study in isolation, and thus fails to capture the entire essence of Admiral
Dur’s argument. Specifically, he states that “. . . the analysis calls for forward- deployed naval forces to be able to unilaterally deal with the most demanding short-notice crisis possible, in every major theater of the world—simultaneously!” Actually, the strategies-to-tasks methodology used in the Navy’s Forward Presence Study resulted in the development of specific force packages designed to fulfill specific sets of military tasks— some very demanding, others less so. In addition—despite Major’s Crowder’s arguments to the contrary—the study was not conducted in a fiscal vacuum and the results do not call for naval forces to be everywhere simultaneously. Indeed, Admiral Dur acknowledges the need for “tethers”—which allow for the sharing of forces across adjacent forward theaters— in order to satisfy theater commanders’ demands for naval forces. By explicitly factoring their use into the analysis, the Forward Presence Study recognized that the Navy could not afford to be everywhere simultaneously. Thus, Major Crowder’s statement is hyperbole.
According to Major Crowder, the Navy’s Forward Presence Study “could significantly impede long-term naval force structure planning [because] .... [b]y overstating the need for aircraft carriers and excluding joint force contributions, it locks the Navy into a carrier- heavy force structure.” Let us be clear on this: First, the Forward Presence Study was conducted as part of the Navy’s ongoing assessment process, and is only one of many areas that the Navy and Marine Corps take under review as the Department of the Navy’s program is developed. Second, the study did not exclude joint force contributions; rather, it recognized that joint forces could substitute or complement naval forces for certain military tasks—given access to bases within the tactical reach of our military objectives, as well as prior understandings about the conditions governing the employment of forces operating from foreign bases. □
more complex than Mr. Bender seems to think. Given the right conditions, World War II-era PT boats still could damage or sink our best ships. Part of the reason is that in the littoral, ships can practice cover and concealment—tactics that are virtually foreign to a blue-water fleet.
Discriminating ships and boats from clutter, then sorting friend from foe among scores of surface contacts is especially challenging in coastal regions. To deal with it, surface ships can have a variety of sensors and weapons, none of which is unique to any particular size or shape of ship. For example; second-generation forward-looking infrared equipment can be mounted on almost any ship
“Military Pay Problems: More
Myth than Reality?”
(See T. Philpott, p. 90, December 1994; A. A.
Thomas, p. 10, March 1995 Proceedings)
Karen A. Smith—As a 16-year case worker with the Navy-Marine Corps Relief Society (NMCRS), I think that Mr. Philpott’s perspective on the use of food stamps in the Navy community is limited by statistics that are not necessarily representative. A more accurate picture of the need of junior enlisted families to supplement their food budgets might include the number of families headed by E-4- or-below Sailors and Marines that receive assistance under the Women, Infants, and Children Program. The Department of Agriculture—upon whose statistics Mr. Philpot relies—also supplies the NMCRS with its estimates of food costs, which we use when preparing our preassistance budgets.
These figures state that a “low- average” family of four should be spending approximately $475 a month for food. That is about $15.00 less than 50% of the base pay of an E-3 with fewer than two years of service. Mr. Philpott should look at the numbers of military children who qualify for free or reduced-cost school lunches, the number of Sailors and Marines who receive help from local food banks or churches during the holidays, or how many commands’ family-support groups must provide food baskets. The bottom line is that all of these avenues of assistance are being used every day by Navy men and women, in their ongoing attempt to feed their families. □
or aircraft; because Harpoon missiles are fire-and-forget weapons, they are equally effective if launched from a patrol boat or a cruiser; and aircraft—such as the armed-helicopter modification of the LAMPS III—could be brought to the area by any air-capable combatant. Basically, ships in a wide range of sizes, shapes, and design complexities could be equally successful in littoral ASUW.
Choosing between a “high” option and a “low” option, then, should not be the issue. The issue should be how to best define the requirements of the mission, identify appropriate weapon systems or other resources, and then adopt a method of delivery that provides maximum self
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“High-Low Must Go”
(See T. J. Bender, pp. 54-57,
February 1995 Proceedings)
Captain Dan Busch, U.S. Navy; former commanding officer, the CSS Rentz (FFG-46), and member of the SC-21 SES/O-6 Steering Group—Mr. Bender assumes that the Surface Combatant of the 21st Century (SC-21) must follow either classic destroyer or frigate design, with price constraints. The range °t alternatives under consideration may lead to a design that does not fit either description.
Consider antisurface warfare (ASUW) in the littoral; it is
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protection in the process. That could be one ship with modular capabilities or many, with a number of ship types devoted to single mission—e.g., tactical ballistic missile defense or surface fire support. Once the best solutions to the missions are obtained, cost and force-size- and-mix trade-off analyses must be completed to validate the force structure.
The Cost and Operational Effectiveness Analysis Process now planned for SC-21 will explore these complex issues in detail, examining ship concepts, cost, and capability to identify the ships that are the best match for the missions expected in the 21st century. □
“There Are Alternatives to the
Third Seawolf'
{See N. Polmar, pp. 121-122, March 1995
Proceedings)
Karen M. Knipling, Naval Sea Systems Command—Norman Polmar asserts that the reason for building the third Seawolf (SSN-21)-class submarine is to keep Electric Boat open. The construction of the third Seawolf in 1996 serves a far greater purpose, however. The third Seawolf is essential to maintain the entire submarine industrial base—not only Electric Boat, but even more important, the 2,000 nonnuclear-component vendors, as well.
Mr. Polmar’s proposed alternative to new construction—the conversion of existing Los Angeles (SSN-688)-class boats into special-mission submarines—is not acceptable for several reasons. First, as the submarine force is reduced, the Navy will benefit most from multimission-capable submarines like the Seawolf. Adding three special-mission submarines to the fleet will not help satisfy the military requirement established by the Joint Chiefs of Staff for 10-12 attack submarines, as quiet as the Seawolf by 2012. Second, a conversion effort would not employ the many industries that depend on new construction. Finally, there is not enough time for a conversion effort to
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bridge the construction gap. The trailing off of the construction effort on the Connecticut (SSN-22), coupled with a lack of new construction, means that Electric Boat and the other vendors need the SSN-23 in fiscal year 1996. Any effort after that point may be too late to keep them from shutting down completely. Furthermore, by the time the designs for Mr. Polmar’s alternative could be completed, the lead New Attack Submarine (NSSN) already would have been authorized and, possibly, might have started construction.
Mr. Polmar concedes that it “pays” to build submarines to advance the technology base, but maintains that the two Seawolf-class submarines now under construction have not added significantly to the submarine-technology base. To the contrary, the design and construction of the Seawolf-class have had a major impact on the submarine technology base. Two examples are the Seawolf s “stealthy” characteristics and its computer-assisted torpedo reloading system. The best way to maintain these and other technological advances—and to reap their benefits when the NSSN is built—is to build a third Seawolf. Failing to maintain the technology and skills developed during the building of the Seawolf certainly would increase the cost of the NSSN and could make it unaffordable.
Mr. Polmar claims that retiring at least 35 submarines represents a tremendous loss in capital investment. Flowever, only 11 of those submarines will be retired early; the rest will be decommissioned at the end of their 30-year operating cycle. The early retirement of 11 boats is driven by the reduction of the Navy’s force structure. But there is a silver lining to this cloud. By decommissioning these boats before their scheduled refueling overhaul, the Navy saves approximately $300 million per boat, a total of $3.3 billion. A portion of these funds can be used to recapitalize the submarine force by using them to build a multimission, technologically advanced submarine: the third Seawolf. □
December 1994 Cover
{See December 1994; M. J. O’Donnell, p. 17,
February 1995 Proceedings)
Commander M. S. Kern, U.S. Coast Guard—As the executive officer of the USCGC Chase (WHEC-718)—at present and during the “intense tempo of Haitian operations”—I can assure all who proudly serve in our military services that the Union Jack was displayed properly at the Chase's bow whenever required by regulations while the she was in Port-au- Prince harbor. Perhaps former chief quartermasters are unaware that the Jack goes up at 0800, according to Chapter 14 of the U.S. Coast Guard Regulations. Our days in Haiti routinely started much earlier than 0800, including the day we sent out one of our small boats with the public affairs specialist who took the cover photograph, at approximately 0700. The Chase is a proud ship with a hard-charging crew, and she consistently takes care of those devilish details. □
Virtual Presence
Commander William J. Toti, U.S. Navy— The September 1992 Proceedings carried an article of mine in which I introduced— having possibly created—the concept of “virtual presence,” to explain the effect of a single British nuclear submarine on the Argentine Navy during the Falklands Conflict. Recently, it appears that the U.S. Air Force has adopted the term to explain how it might replace the Navy as a deterrent force. The Air Force has got it wrong.
Deterrence is a mind game. To deter a belligerent who otherwise would remain undeterred, you have to establish two facts in his mind:
► If he misbehaves, you will strike him hard.
► Such a strike not only would be easy— it also would be imminent.
An aircraft carrier battle group, for example, deters in this fashion. It is visible; therefore, the adversary knows it is within striking distance. It can strike hard. And any strike would be imminent because the carrier battle group enables the United States to act unilaterally.
This ability to act unilaterally carries profound consequences. Increasingly, organizations like NATO and the United Nations are becoming obstacles to the effective response to aggression. Belligerents have become adept at playing upon multinational tensions to hinder action. Many of our allies, frustrated by the resulting inaction, have wished—publicly at times—that the United States would set aside diplomatic protocol and just do the right thing.
To carry the argument further: If presence requires an in-your-face posture, then why do submarines deter? (And there is ample evidence that they do.) The reasons are subtle; essentially, a submarine meets the same test as the carrier battle group in that submarines carry the same kind of wallop. Similarly, submarines are visible to the aggressor, but in a different way. The aggressor knows the submarine is there, right in front of him—he just doesn’t know where. This is the true concept of virtual presence. The submarine doesn’t have to be there for the United States to take advantage of its virtual presence. The aggressor simply can never be sure when the submarine is there and when it is away. Such uncertainty carries a critical deterrent effect.
How does the unseen submarine differ from a B-2 bomber based in the Continental United States? There is a profound difference: The submarine is present but invisible; the bomber is not present at all—it is thousands of miles away. And for the bomber to be used, a number of check points must be cleared:
> The President must decide to use it.
► The mission must be planned.
► Permission must be obtained to use our foreign bases for tanker support.
> Electronic warfare support must moved into the region—probably even for B-2s.
> An air-tasking order must be executed
> Tankers and bombers must take off and refuel.
> Bombers must get to the target area— a flight that could last more than 18 hours.
> The weather over the target must be favorable.
> Bombers must find the target.
Each of the above points constitutes a potential single-fault failure that could stop the entire operation. The enemy knows this and, undoubtedly, he will have a strategy for dealing with each one. That is why U.S.-based forces do not constitute presence—virtual or otherwise. □
“Maritime Strategy in Asia- Pacific”
(See S. Bateman, pp. 46-50, March 1995 Proceedings)
James W. Hulme—I think that Commodore Bateman’s focus on Alfred Thayer Mahan to provide a conceptual framework for maritime strategy in the Asia-Pacific region may be misplaced. He should include the writings of Sir Julian Corbett as well. Sir Julian emphasized the importance of keeping the sea lanes of communication open for commerce. As Commodore Bateman noted, this region is particularly dependent upon seaborne trade—as evidenced by the congestion in Hong Kong’s harbor and the construction of new container terminals. This dependence on trade and the existence of geographic chokepoints lessens the likelihood of a Mahanian decisive battle of capital ships. Instead, maritime strategy here should focus on defending merchant ships from a modem version of guerre de course. Similarly, investment in submarines and other systems intended to deny an opponent access to the sea lanes would seem logical.
By developing the means to wage— and counter—a modem guerre de course, the fleets of the Asia-Pacific region will not only guard their national maritime interests, but also will be able to complement other regional naval powers in coalition naval actions. □
“Submarine Engines for the Future”
(See R. M. Adams, pp. 61-65, June 1994 Proceedings)
1. D. Spassky and V. P. Semyonov, Central Design Bureau for Marine Engineering “Rubin, ” St. Petersburg, Russia—One may give a number of scientific and technical arguments in favor of de-
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veloping nuclear-heated, gas-turbine power plants for submarines, as Mr. Adams suggests. But a final decision should be based not on evaluation results of the power plant itself, but on final characteristics of the submarine in which it is to be placed.
Consider two Soviet nuclear-powered submarine projects—Project 627 A and Project 645, both codenamed “November” by NATO. A power plant with a water-water vapor heating medium was used in the Project 627A submarine and a liquid metal heating medium was used in the Project 645 submarine’s power plant.
The research carried out for the power plant with a gas heat-exchange medium led us to believe that if a gas-turbine power plant were installed in a November-class boat, the submarine’s exterior appearance would change little. Mr. Adams correctly states that the gas turbine plant has grown up; however, the power plant with a water-water vapor heating (pressurized-water) medium also has been substantially improved. Most important, it has proved to be highly reliable and simple to maintain and has demonstrated considerable advantages in its supply infrastructure.
Operating the power plant with a liquid-metal heating medium demands considerably more sophisticated technical skills because the first heating loop is always in a “hot” condition. This fact presents not only more complicated operation and maintenance, but also involves more serious implications in case of accident. Practical experience of operation of submarines equipped with power plants with a liquid-metal heating medium confirms this. Furthermore, the life cycles of these boats turned out to be much shorter than those of the submarines equipped with a power plant with water- vapor—or, as it is called in Russia, a water-water heating medium.
Nuclear-propulsion plants with a gas heating medium were never used in Soviet submarines. However, the following suppositions should be stated in this respect: Even having the most intensive characteristics of a gas-turbine plant, gain in weight is not likely to exceed limits of 3-5% and gain in volume will exceed slightly the value mentioned.
At the same time, using a gas heating medium presents numerous technological difficulties. For instance, high fluidity of helium will require incredibly thorough sealing of the heating loop, an considerably complicated process that increases in price of the turbines, compressors, and other components of the plant. Of course, other gases besides helium can be used as a gas heating medium; however, the problem remains the same: even a small leakage of gases from the system can make the boat uninhabitable.
Based on our experience, we are certain about the considerable difficulties in submarine air- independent plants (AIPs) using liquid oxygen—i.e., an increased fire hazard and the problems with the long-duration storage of liquid oxygen. The AIP systems with thermal-electric generators now being developed in many countries are less efficient and have inferior weight- and-dimensional characteristics than conventional diesel-electric plants—at least for now.
In brief, all of our experience confirms the sagacity of Admiral Hyman G. Rick- over and of our teachers—Academicians A. P. Alexandrov and N. A. Dollezhal— in choosing pressurized-water reactors for submarines. □
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“Fast Attack Craft in Littoral
Warfare”
(See A. W. Melton, K. R. Crawford, and M. T.
Hatton, pp. 87-89, April 1995 Proceedings)
Captain Wayne P. Hughes, Jr., U.S. Navy (Retired), Department of Operations Research, Naval Postgraduate School and author of Fleet Tactics: Theory and Practice (Naval Institute Press, 1986)—The article by Andy Melton. Keith Crawford, and Mary Hatton is based on a three-week analysis they did at the Naval Postgraduate School.
As they said, their task was to explore the potential of a “two-stage system” for littoral operations. The classic two- stage system is an aircraft carrier. Using her great mobility, the carrier is positioned where she is unlikely to be attacked and can deliver air strikes effectively. The second stage is her aircraft, which do the actual fighting.
In this article, however, fast attack craft (FAC) are the fighting stage supported by a first stage, a mother ship. Although the mother-ship concept has attracted the most attention so far, the second stage is where more uncertainty lies—probably because until now the second stage has been fixed- and rotarywing aircraft. The question posed by the authors and Rear Admiral George R. Worthington in his August 1994 Proceedings commentary, “Combat Craft Have a Role in Naval Warfare,” is whether there are tasks better performed in littoral operations by surface craft—or by a team of FAC and aircraft—than by aircraft alone. It seems that the answer is yes. Blockade and inspection, mine warfare, intelligence collection, special-operations missions, and inshore convoy escort are examples.
The mother-ship concept is relatively radical. A less radical idea envisages combatants of 1,000 to 3,000 tons arriving on scene under their own power and supported forward by a tender. I don’t know what the second stage should look like, but the discussion should begin, focusing on likely missions and accompanied by prototype designs. The reason to start the discussion has much to do with the advantage of numbers. Evidently, the argument over size vs. numbers reduces to two competing advantages. When survivability is not an issue, economy of scale always wins and the analytical conclusion is: The bigger, the better. When survivability is at stake, analysis shows: The fewer eggs per basket, the better. There are peripheral advantages which can best be summed up: A large multipurpose ship can do all things, but it can only do them in one place at a time.
But the decisive tradeoff is economy °f scale vs. survivability. The Navy preferred large warships that enjoy economy of scale for the blue-water Navy because we believed defense-in-depth ensured survivability against the potent Soviet open- ocean threat. Enemies along the littorals can get inside of our defense-in-depth, however. They may not be so numerous, but they can spring very suddenly out of the clutter of a fishing fleet or a forest, attacking with air-, surface-, or land-launched antiship missiles, mines, torpedoes, or gunfire.
In Chapter 10 of Fleet Tactics. I used “salvo equations” to portray the evolution of naval firepower from the age of fighting sail to the age of missile warfare. Essentially, the situation represented can be reduced to a pair of equations representing the crucial elements: offensive power (missiles, torpedoes, or guns), defensive power (surface-to-air missiles, point defense, or soft kill), scouting power (the ability to detect, track, and target the enemy), staying power (the ability to fight hurt), and the number of warships on each side. After some eight years of further experiments and many student theses, there is every reason to trust the phenomena they describe. To the extent that the equations hold, I can prove (in the mathematical sense) that if A has, say, three times as many warships as B, then each of B’s ships must have three times the offensive power, three times the defensive power, and three times the staying power to maintain parity with A. This is the shocking advantage of numbers— and a difficult one for economy of scale to overcome.
Another way to see the advantage of numbers is to note that a hit on destroyer B usually will degrade its offensive power, defensive power, and staying power. That is also true of FAC A, but there are three of A, only one of which suffers damage. Consider the equal-cost forces used by the authors: two Arleigh Burke (DDG-5 l)-class destroyers or 15 FAC and their mother ship. One ship is hit and out of action. The destroyer force is cut in half; the FAC force by 7%. The
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U.S. Navy customarily emphasizes a multipurpose ship’s advantages. But, a blue- water battle group has little or no redundancy; remove even one ship and its viability is jeopardized. In littoral waters, it would be wise to risk only ships and aircraft that we can afford to lose.
As I explain in Chapter 10 of Fleet Tactics, the U.S. Navy’s structure made sense when it could exploit defense-indepth on the high seas. To take advantage of superior numbers. Side A must achieve an exchange of missiles. In blue water. Side B (that’s us) generally had a scouting advantage so it could attack Side A effectively first and win without being attacked. In green water, there will be times when a wily enemy will be able to exchange missile fire or even strike first.
The authors probably should have been clearer that a U.S. green-water FAC fleet, in any numbers whatsoever, cannot replace the blue-water navy. There are places where a FAC flotilla ought to be able to substitute for a carrier battle group. But the FAC flotilla has only tactical mobility, not strategic mobility. Therefore, it cannot cycle but must remain forward while the FAC/mother-ship crew is rotated.
For joint littoral operations, the U.S. Navy should be a blue-green navy. In a sense, the blue-water navy is the first stage, covering the second-stage FAC that go about the risky business of clearing away the underbrush of coastal traffic, fishing boats, enemy FAC, coastal submarines, and mines. The fast attack craft would draw enemy fire, while the blue- water navy asserts its firepower in a safe posture. The green-water navy—including the cost of the mother ship—should consume no more than 15% of the Navy’s resources, including manpower.
Those discussing this concept will profit from the study of littoral warfare in the past—e.g.. the Solomon Islands campaign (the venue of PT-109) and the battles for the “narrow seas” (the English Channel, the Baltic Sea and the North Sea) during World Wars I and II. □
[T]he United States—and any potential enemy—should consider the destruction of the modern aspects of an enemy's capital as simply an ante, the price to be paid to play in the big leagues.
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“Where Air Power Fails”
(See S. T. Ganyard, pp. 36-39, January 1995;
M. A. Kirtland, pp. 12-14, February 1995;
J. S. Clark, H. L. Elman, pp. 19-20, March
1995 Proceedings)
Lieutenant Colonel Robert P. Pellegrini, U.S. Army—In many ways, air power’s staunchest advocates have been its worst enemies. As Major Ganyard pointed out, air advocates—from the writers of Air War Plans Division-1 to the creators of instant Thunder—have devised strategies in which sorties, targets, and desired effects are calculated with almost mathematical certainty. When these strategies have failed to live up to their (almost always) optimistic goals, air-power critics have seen them as complete failures and examples of the futility of the application of strategic air power. Air power zealots then have compounded the problem by finding reasons, after the fact, as to why the outcome did not closely match their predictions—e.g., faulty execution, bad weather, and other unforeseen circumstances. In the end, they become even easier targets for criticism.
But just because the loudest voices for air power are not always correct in the details doesn’t mean that they are wrong in the main. Strategic air power does have important, even decisive effects. In modem air campaigns, the true targets of attack range from a complex industrial network to the anxieties of the enemy leadership. Therefore, debating the effectiveness of strategic air power in terms of production figures or time-lines of bombing targets versus enemy actions misses the whole point in that doing so seeks to establish a cause-effect mechanism that is inadequate to describe the whole effect. Simply put, the goals of a strategic air campaign can’t be described in algebraic notation.
The use of chaos theory and quantum mechanics by the latest generation air power advocates to describe the nonlinear effects of strategic air power is an attempt to restore the aura of scientific proof to air power’s image. To many, the terms used are so complicated and complex that they sound more like incantations over a witch’s cauldron than anything else. But at the heart of these new sciences is the philosophical concept that some things have to be derived intuitively because in the end you just aren’t sure— although, of course, you can have a pretty good guess. Contrary to Major Ganyard’s accusation that “the Air Force fails to understand the very nature of war itself,” it has latched on to the new face of warfare in which cause-effect relationships have been replaced by planning that establishes probabilities and trends.
It doesn’t take a large intuitive leap to understand that a strategic air campaign’s effects on the enemy are—to put it simply—bad. For some time to come, we will have the ability to conduct campaigns similar to Operation Instant Thunder with minimal loss of aircraft or personnel. Therefore, to punish the enemy for his transgressions—and for forcing us to go through the bother of deploying forces to his part of the globe—his power grids, water supply, transportation systems, and communications networks can be destroyed or reduced to minimal capacity. Thus, we turn his modern 20th- century capital into an antiquated 19th- century capital—without having to destroy the city or its population. We know that these things have negative— perhaps even decisive—effects, but we can’t be sure what they will be because the enemy is reactive and exercises free will. The strategic air campaign might affect the people’s will: it might affect the will and decisions of the government; it might paralyze the enemy’s war machine. Then again, it might not. If not, then the United States—and any potential enemy—should consider the destruction of the modem aspects of an enemy’s capital as simply an ante, the price to be paid to play in the big leagues. Those concerned with maintaining our “precious moral capital” should consider the effects of long-term economic blockades—e.g., the current one against Iraq—which create more civilian suffering, but fewer photo opportunities, than modern air campaigns.
Another difficulty in evaluating the effectiveness of strategic air campaigns is that they never take place in a vacuum. Other actions—e.g., ground and naval campaigns or political initiatives—usually have taken place as well. Therefore, air power critics and advocates can place blame or success freely on whatever action supports their arguments. Did the Japanese surrender because of the destruction of their cities and industries by strategic bombing, the strangulation of their economy by naval blockade, the shock of the atomic bomb, or the threat of Soviet intervention? The advocates for each of these positions use tonnage-sunk, bomb-tonnage, production figures, and the time-lines of key decisions to support each of these arguments. But how do you describe the simultaneous—and possibly synergistic—process in which all of these actions combined to produce the end result? The short answer: You can’t.
Also, air power’s effects do not fit neatly into the traditional battlefield frameworks. Does the destruction of a military telecommunications center produce operational or strategic effects? Does the rapid destruction of tank divi-
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sions by air attack have only an operational effect or does it have a significant impact on the thinking of the enemy leaders? Any attempt to describe these attacks in the current “grammar of war,” as Major Ganyard puts it, forces them to be put in either the strategic or operational category. Actually, they belong in both.
The theory of strategic air power is far from a “failed myth.” It has evolved from the old arguments—“The bomber will always get through”—that are easy to dismiss to a much more sophisticated description. Some zealots will claim that air power alone will win future wars, but most air power advocates see strategic air power as part of a wide spectrum of operations—in Major Ganyard’s words, the “proper synthesis of air, ground, and sea power”—by which we can defeat our enemies. Strategic air campaigns may be the winning element in future conflicts or they may improve the effectiveness of land and sea operations, but to forsake strategic air power at the time when technology and our understanding of warfare makes it more effective than ever would be a serious mistake. □
“Reopen the Kimmel Case”
(See M. Gannon, pp. 51-56, December 1994;
E. P. Calouro, p. 13, January 1995; R. H. Spector, p. 25, February 1995; W. R. Pauly, p. 24, March 1995; H. F. Rommel, E. L. Beach, pp. 26-28, April 1995 Proceedings)
Michael Gannon—Surely, stating that I have identified the “real culprits” of Pearl Harbor to be Gordon W. Prange and Ronald H. Spector brings new meaning to “hyperbole.” But this is what Professor Spector writes in his letter about my article—a letter that was notable also for its omission of any response to, acknowledgement of, or even hint of my core point: that Gordon Prange had misrepresented the content of the Martin- Bellinger Report, and that, in 1988 Dr. Spector, in his official capacity as Director of Naval History, had passed on that damaging misrepresentation (I wrote “inadvertently”) to Secretary of the Navy James H. Webb, Jr. via the Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Carlisle A. H. Trost. 1 had fully expected that Dr. Spec- tor would want to associate himself with a correction of the historical record, and Wrote him to that effect prior to publication. Naturally, I am disappointed that he has chosen not to do so.
Dr. Spector writes that, “In an aside, Gannon mentions that there are a few other ‘alleged omissions or negligences for which either [Admiral] Kintmel or General Short, or both, have been blamed.’” First, 1 did not say “few.” Furthermore, the passage in which I acknowledged “all the charges made against
Kimmel and Short” amounted to 149 words. In fact, I included, in quotes, the entire passage from Gordon Prange summarizing those charges that Dr. Spector himself used to summarize them in his memorandum to Admiral Trost and Secretary Webb. This is an aside? Following that passage I stated clearly: “No attempt has been made in this brief analysis to answer all the charges made against Kimmel and Short. The attempt here is focused more narrowly on distant reconnaissance.” I was confident that no one would misunderstand my simple words and intent. But Dr. Spector said that the other charges “Gannon apparently felt were too unimportant to address.” To explain again: I attacked the air-search question alone since, as I wrote, it seemed to be the single most important issue on which Admiral Ernest J. King reversed the findings of the 1944 Navy Court of Inquiry and thus branded Kimmel anew with the judgment “dereliction of duty,” with which his name subsequently has been stained unfairly for the past 50 years. Given time and the indulgence of Proceedings, I may take on still other charges cited by Dr. Spector. In the meantime, I recommend Ned Beach’s new book. Scapegoats: A Defense of Kimmel and Short at Pearl Harbor (Naval Institute Press, 1995) in which they are treated.
I never stated or suggested, in any form whatever, that the lengthy passage Dr. Spector quotes from his book Eagle Against the Sun made Admiral Kimmel look like “something of a dolt.” Why does he try to make it appear that I did? Nor did I argue that the material Dr. Spector forwarded to Admiral Trost and Secretary Webb “was all that stood between Kimmel and the vindication he deserved.” The Secretary of Defense and the President also must act. I did suggest, however, that what he forwarded stood between Admiral Kimmel and the thorough study of primary sources that he deserved. For some years now, I have argued that the Secretary of the Navy should appoint an impartial study committee, composed of both active-duty and retired officers and professional historians, to make a searching, thorough, and objective inquiry into the actual documents of the Kimmel case.
This, after all, is what Dr. Spector was charged with doing in 1988. As the chief historian of the Navy, with the full resources of the Operational Archives and the Department’s library at his elbow, he was asked to research the entire Kimmel case. He states that he was asked to provide “a summary of what historians, including Gordon Prange, have said about Pearl Harbor.” What, in fact, he was asked to do was much more than book summaries. Under the date 13 November
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1987, Secretary Webb asked Spector himself to “review Rear Admiral Kimmel’s entire performance of duty as Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet (C1NC- PACFLT) with particular attention to the specifics of his performance of duty as CINCPACFLT on and immediately preceding 7 December 1941.” In a letter to Senator Strom Thurmond (R-SC), dated 22 December 1987, Secretary Webb explained that he had asked, in addition, that Spector "provide me with an analysis of that performance so that I may recommend to the President and the Secretary of Defense an appropriate course of action concerning the request of Rear Admiral Kimmel’s sons.”
Eight weeks after receiving his charge, Professor Spector presented Secretary
Webb and Admiral Trost with a 2.25- page memorandum, a 2.5-page appendix, a copy of his review of Pearl Harbor: The Verdict of History which appeared in The New York Times, and eight pages from Eagle Against the Sun. On the basis of that thin porridge of secondary sources, the Kimmel sons’ request was turned down—an action that Admiral Trost would now like to have reconsidered.
The Kimmel sons’ request was—and continues to be—that their father be extended the same privilege as that granted every other officer who held admiral or vice admiral rank on active duty during the war—i.e., to have his name recorded on the retired list at the highest grade held. Among those eligible, only Admiral Kimmel was denied the privilege. That
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he be restored to his wartime rank of admiral is not only the earnest desire of his two surviving sons; it is the petition by unanimous resolution of both the Pearl Harbor Survivors Association (1990) and the Officers and Trustees of the U.S. Naval Academy Alumni Association (1990). As Captain Beach related last month, those initiatives also have the support of 39 retired flag officers—including two former Chiefs of Naval Operations and two former Chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
It is time to face the justice question squarely. To his great credit, Admiral Trost has done so. Perhaps now others will follow suit. Justice is not, as Dr. Spector defines it, a “grotesque demand for government endorsement of one historical interpretation.” It is a finding of fact, truth, and fairness, as far as evidence and human mind allow. Let the case be reopened and studied afresh. □
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“Too Old For Health Care”
(See T. Philpott, p. 90, February 1995
Proceedings)
Colonel Frank M. Schnekser, U.S. Air Force (Retired)—I am heartened that Proceedings has taken notice of the disturbing trends in military health care.
The present situation is good for no one—neither active-duty, retired, nor their dependents—and it places an undue burden on the providers, who are trying desperately to cope with personnel shortages and ever-changing rules. It is impossible to make much sense of the proposals and systems—e.g., CHAMPUS and Tricare Prime—beyond a sensing that it means reduced service at a higher cost to the individual.
No matter what is said now about health care never being guaranteed, there was never any question in the past about medical care being provided to career military personnel for life. In fact, the Army made that very promise publicly until a few years ago. Any denial of medical care, therefore, must be considered a breach of faith.
This policy is extremely short-sighted. It is bad enough to emasculate the defense industrial base, to forgo development. and to reduce training. Still worse, however, is walking away from the long- held understanding that an individual who endures the hardships and risks of military service does so with confidence, as part of an organization that recognizes its reciprocal responsibilities and always will honor them. If left uncorrected, these myopic changes in personnel policies will drive otherwise career-minded people out of the military service and deter well- qualified recruits. □
Helicopters have better mobility, tanks have better protection and staying power, but both have a place in the world's armies.
“What Does Surface Fire
Support Cost?”
(See C. T. Morgan, pp. 94-95, November 1994;
S. Surko, p. 18, January 1995 Proceedings)
James Canary, Project Engineer, Naval Surface Warfare Center, Crane Division, Louisville, Kentucky—Lieutenant Commander Morgan deserves praise for bringing attention to naval surface fire support (NSFS). All of the systems he mentioned are possible options, but they are not the most cost-effective ones. Although it was not included in the body of the article, the 155-mm gun system—like the one pictured on page 94—is the most cost effective. It was determined to be so by the two-year, $4 million NSFS Cost and Operational Effectiveness Analysis (COEA). The final report lists the top eight NSFS system configurations in terms of cost and operational effectiveness. The top five consists of a 155-mm gun with different missile systems. The other three involve an 8-inch gun with three different missile systems.
Commander Morgan correctly points out that “[t]he cost of an individual round is particularly important for fire support systems because considerable quantities are required for the expeditionary mission.” This is the primary reason that a 5-inch gun is never a cost-effective NSFS weapon. For example, a 155-mm precision guided munition (PGM) can carry approximately four times the payload of a 5-inch PGM with the same range. This greatly increases the lethality of the round. In a typical scenario, the 5-inch gun must fire about 150% more rounds than a 155-mm gun to provide the same level of effectiveness. Thus, fewer 155mm rounds—which mean lower peacetime and wartime costs—are required to accomplish the mission. Compared to the cost of the ammunition, the cost of the gun is relatively insignificant.
Commander Morgan made another good point—that interservice commonality allows for some economies of scale. Since munitions are a primary cost of the NSFS mission, jointness is especially beneficial. Such is the case with the 155-mm gun. At present, the Army and Marine Corps have more than 2,000 155-mm guns and have developed a wide range of munitions for them. These include smart munitions—e.g., Copperhead—which were very costly to develop. With minimal investment, these munitions could be “navalized” to provide near-term NSFS capabilities with longer range, higher accuracy, and more lethality than the current 5-inch gun. This commonality with the Army—along with limited space on the Arleigh Burke (DDG-51)-class destroyers—makes the 155-mm more cost-effective than the 8- inch gun.
The commonality among the Army, Navy, and Marine Corps could be extended even further by integrating the fire-control systems between naval guns and artillery ashore. Let’s face it—commonality among the services is the best deal for the taxpayers. □
“The Tank Is Dead: But the Cavalry Lives On”
{See W. V. Kennedy, pp. 50-53, November 1994; D. R. Watson, pp. 16-18, January 1995;
D. E. Campbell, pp. 18-19, February 1995; T. Fredricks, pp. 17-19, March 1995 Proceedings)
Lieutenant Colonel M. K. Snyder, U.S. Marine Corps—I cannot argue with Chief Warrant Officer Watson’s points on modern cavalry, but I do question one of his “great cavalry moments” from the Persian Gulf War. The island of Faylaykak (or Faylaka) was not captured by an
Army cavalry squadron, but by the 13th Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) supported by Amphibious Squadron 5. Mr. Watson may be referring to an incident that happened earlier in the war when two Army OH-58Ds embarked in the USS Curts (FFG-38) and a squad of Navy SEALs captured A1 Qurah Island and about a dozen Iraqi soldiers.
A landing force made up of Company D, Battalion Landing Team 1st Battal- ion/4th Marines, and a command group from Command Element, 13th MEU, landed on Faylaka Island at 0800 on 4 March 1991. The MEU would have been on Faylaka a week earlier to conduct a raid, but that operation was canceled just before execution when it was compromised over the Cable News Network.
Shortly thereafter, Colonel John E. Rhodes received the surrender of the Iraqi 440th Marine Brigade from Brigadier General Abbud Gambar Hasem Almliki. Over the next eight hours, the MEU screened and evacuated 1,413 Iraqi prisoners-of-war (POWs) to the USS Ogden (LPD-9). The Ogden's well deck was turned into a POW compound, where the Iraqis were kept until they were turned over to the Saudi Arabian military several days later.
Faylaka Island had been designated a free-fire zone for aircraft during the air campaign and had been bombed extensively by coalition air forces—to include an attack by the U.S. Air Force with a 15,000-pound BLU-82 bomb. It is interesting to note, therefore, that although there were craters, bomb damage, and unexploded bomblets everywhere, the Iraqi troops that I saw were a bit scruffy, but also organized, well-fed, and had no wounded or dead. □
Lee Wetherhorn—As in other cases before, the crux of Colonel Kennedy’s case against heavy armor forces is the ability of attack helicopters to cripple enemy formations—demonstrated to great effect in the Gulf War. I do not wish to take away any of the enormous credit due to the men of XVIII Airborne Corps and their accomplishments during the war. However, the XVIII Airborne Corps made its spectacular advances against an enemy who had virtually no intelligence or air support and was incapable of organizing a coherent air defense.
Had the Iraqis been able to employ any kind of reasonable battlefield air defense, the Coalition’s helicopters would have been greatly imperiled. Certainly, an AH-64 may move 20 times faster than a 70-ton monster M1 tanks, but 30-mm antiaircraft projectiles and short-range antiair missiles— e.g., the Stinger, Rapier, Blowpipe, or Roland—all have a similar speed advantage over the helicopter—and, in the case of the missiles, the ability to home in on targets. The AH-64 has less armor than the M-l, and carries it carries much less ammunition.
The example of the 1973 Arab-Israeli War is instructive on this point. Egyptian forces were able to gain and consolidate a solid bridgehead across the Suez Canal, under the cover of a dense air-defense network, but they were defeated when the Israelis crossed the Suez Canal and destroyed the antiaircraft umbrella. In 22 years since then, technology has given us not only deadly attack helicopters—and they are indeed deadly— but also formidable close-range antiaircraft systems under which heavy forces can move.
In the 19th century, the cavalry included light (lancers and hussars) and heavy (curassiers) units. Perhaps the helicopter and the tank might be considered as complementary extentions of these two ideas. Because they are inherently different weapon systems, a detailed comparison is not really useful. Helicopters have better mobility, tanks have better protection and staying power, but both have a place in the world’s armies. □
about three miles ahead. They are turning southward, which will put the wind 30°-40° off their starboard bow. We’ll take on about eight tons of Navy standard fuel, exchange mail, pick up frozen fruit and vegetables, and new movies. I’ll do that prior to refueling so that when I depart we will have full tanks. The force is cruising at 15 knots so we will be indicating about 32 knots while replenishing—a very comfortable control speed for this behemoth.
Closing on the force, I see a blinking white identification signal from the Anzio, now two miles ahead at one o’clock, I have set the axis of the port and starboard vectored-thrust fans, powered by diesel marine engines, at 78° degrees up so as to provide a slow descent or climb rate in response to my power control levers, which adjust the fan blade angles for positive or negative thrust. I am controlling forward speed with the centerline pusher turbo-prop mounted in the gondola’s stem; it too has forward-and reverse-pitch capability. The combination of the two vectored-thrust fans, the turbo-prop (also used to sprint at higher speed), and a bow-thruster yield a combination of slow-speed control and top speed never before experienced by airship commanders.
The airship is controlled through fiber-optic arteries extending from our ergonomically designed flight deck, with its color liquid crystal displays and a direct video view of the airship’s vertical-replenishment bay. It turns a task that would have challenged the crew of a 1950s blimp into a piece of cake—even in poor visibility and turbulence. I am especially impressed; only two years ago, I was a junior watch officer on the bridge of the ship from which we are about to refuel. The tempo and nature of my current activity is similar to my previous sea experience, except that we are “sailing” faster and more comfortably and have the benefits of an elevated view.
Prior to its introduction, many viewed the proposed Battle Surveillance Airship as a grotesque, sluggish, and uninteresting flying machine. Others, however, saw it as the world’s fastest, most maneuverable ship, which is turning out to be the case. Considering its lack of susceptibility to mines and torpedoes, it also may be the safest of all ships,
The unprecedented level of situational awareness we produce permits our admiral to operate nearer to the Chinese coast than he had thought practical. This puts more targets within range of our strike aircraft than heretofore possible. Further, having Aegis airborne continually above the force has permitted operations planners to conserve E-2C sorties for offensive surveillance in direct support of air superiority and strike missions. This also translates into relief for flight crews from hours of grinding about the sky in the vibrating sardine can-like environment of their turbo-prop Hawkeyes. It also gives the maintenance crew an opportunity to keep their aircraft in a high state of readiness for a heavy sortie surge, when needed.
I descend to 100 feet as we ease up the wake of the Anzio, closing at four knots. Now, slowing to co-speed with the vertrep bay directly over the flight deck, our winch operator lowers the cargo transfer basket. I have shifted to auto-altitude and speed control, and the system is making small adjustments to the engines to maintain target speed and altitude. Throughout, I view the area below through a video camera mounted amidships.
The transfer basket, now loaded, is on the way up.
We lower the line again to pick up the refueling hose, winch it up, and connect it to our fueling receptacle. I reduce power and slide aft above the wake while decreasing altitude to 80 feet, where we ride comfortably clear of the wake turbulence created by the Anzio's superstructure. We take on fuel while discharging the ballast water accumulated during the past three days by the engines’ exhaust water-recovery system. Vertrep and refueling complete, I unplug and begin the climb to station.
We will have been gone about 90 minutes. In an emergency, we could be back on station in less than five minutes—airships have a potential for very high rate of climb. During our absence, we have been monitoring the force using information data-linked to us by our on-station partner via the joint information sharing system installed in all surveillance aircraft, airships, and most of the combatants. Thus, even when refueling we maintain a capability to participate in any operational emergency or air-defense action that might threaten the fleet.
The global consequence of this venture are unpredictable, but the possibilities for success are enhanced by the presence of our two airships, which clearly reduce opportunities for enemy intrusion and mischief— or friendly fire. There will be no surprises on our watch.
Author’s note: This bit of fiction was stimulated by a virtual-reality experience in the six-degrees-of-freedom Navy Airship simulator at NASA’s Ames Aeronautical Laboratory in California. It incorporated the performance parameters from a proposed Navy Airship as designed by Westinghouse Airships, Inc., the Navy-Advanced Research Projects Agency contractor.
The simulator permitted me to learn to fly-drive-sail the airship during vertical refueling-replenishment exercises. After 30 minutes, I was convinced that I was at sea with—and above—a naval force, controlling a giant airborne creature with the responsiveness and momentum of a ship—very different from any airplane that / had ever flown..
Part of the Navy’s cultural problem relative to accepting airships is that that they have been viewed as mediocre flying machines when, in reality, they are high-performance ships. And, / have come to believe, they probablv should be engineered and flown by people from the surface community rather than the aviation community.
Mr. Myers is the president of Aerocounsel, Inc., and has written and lectured extensively about fighting in the littorals where distances are short and time is compressed. During World War II, he flew low- level attack B-25s with the Fifth Air Force; later, he transferred to the Navy and flew F9F-2s from the Bon Homme Richard (CV-31) during the Korean War. A graduate of the Naval Test Pilot School and former president of the Society of Experimental Test Pilots, he served as Director, Air Warfare in the Pentagon from 1973-1977.
ganization of Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). This decision-by-default will guard their sovereign privileges and spheres of influence. No matter how well this system may work in a “civilized” region of the world, however, there still are densely populated regions of the world excluded from this arrangement. These regions will contribute to mounting tensions in the world that cannot help but drag down the global economy. The interdependence of the global economy and the globalization of numerous problems—e.g., pollution, ozone depletion, demographics, and the finite limits of the biosphere—will confront mankind in a devastating way if a true international effort is not made in all areas, especially in the area of violent conflicts, which will place a hidden tax on the global economy. The United States cannot conclude that a void in the international community serves its national interest—although it has not yet proposed an alternative. The sheriffs role seems to be the only realistic option acceptable to the P5 and the U.N. Security Council—a choice that could recall imperialist desires of the past and preclude (the unlikely) reform of the United Nations.
U.S. forces will stretch to cover national interests, wherever and whenever threatened. Nevertheless, isolationist trends and lack of a support for a unified international community threaten a division in such organizations as NATO, which could have long-term effects at home and abroad. U.S. national interests in the present geopolitical and economic environment must include international stability, which requires some degree of cohesion in the international organizations.
As idealistic as it may sound, the cost of not taking a leading role will be more expensive than will ignoring so- called Third World or African problems. It is probably no coincidence that two of these new types of conflicts were the most recent command assignments of the Chief of Naval Operations and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff: Bosnia and Kurdistan. Their personal experiences say clearly that the U.S. military can no longer be joint only; it must be international.
'“Commission de Bretton Woods: le G7 ne peut assurer la stabilite monetaire,” Le Journal de Geneve, 21 June 1994, p. 7 (translated by author).
2United Nations Peacekeeping, U.N. Department of Public Information, August
1993, p. 10.
iU.N.S.C. resolution 770, 14 August 1992.
■•President George Bush, “Address to the Nation, 4 December 1992,” U.S. Department of State Dispatch, vol. 3, no. 49, 7 December 1992, p. 865.
5M. Klen, “L’enfer Somalien,” Defense Nationale, February 1993, p. 143 (translated by author).
6A. Aust, ‘The Procedure and Practice of the Security Council Today,” in R. J. Dupuy (ed.), The Development of the Role of the Security Council: Peace-keeping and Peace-building, workshop of 21-23 July 1992 (Martinus Nijhoff: London, 1993), pp. 365-374.
7A. Bassir Pour, “Un rapport de 1 ’ONU etablit des responsabilites partagees dans la guerre entre casques bleus et partisans du General Aidid,” Le Monde, 17 May
1994, p. 5 (translated by author).
"A. Bassir Pour, “Le Conseil de securite de l’ONU preconise le deploiement de 5500 ‘casques bleus’ au Ruwanda,” Le Monde, 18 May 1994, p. 4 (translated by author).
9E. Sciolino, “New U.S. Peacekeeping Policy De-emphasizes Role of U.N.,” New York Times, 6 May 1994, p. 1.
Tbid.
“A. Frachon, “La nouvelle doctrine Clinton,” Le Monde, 6 May 1994, p. 1 (translated by author).
12Gen. J. Shalikashvili, USA, “Two In-Boxes,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, May 1994, p. 44.
Lieutenant Olmsted is a surface warfare officer studying International Relations as an Olmsted Scholar at the University of Lausanne, Switzerland.
INTERNATIONAL NAVIES PHOTO CONTEST
Rules:
1. Images must pertain to naval or maritime subjects of countries other than the United States.
2. There is a limit of five (5) entries per person. Eligible entries include black-and-white prints, color prints, or 35-mm mounted color transparencies (glass-mounted transparencies are not eligible). The minimum print size accepted is 8" x 10".
3. The Naval Institute will award cash prizes of $200 to the winner, two first honorable mention awards of $100 each, and two second honorable mention awards of $50 each. Winning entries will appear in the 1996 International Navies issue of Proceedings. The Naval Institute will consider all other entries for purchase (at our standard rates) for use in U.S. Naval Institute publications. Any entry not accompanied by a self-addressed, stamped envelope or international postal coupon will become the property of the U.S.
Naval Institute without the necessity of purchase.
4. On a separate sheet of paper and attached to the back of each print or on the transparency mount, print or type full captions and the photographer's name, address, social security number (if applicable), and date the photo was taken. Entries are not limited to photos taken in the calendar year of the contest. (Please do not write directly on the back of a print and do not use staples.)