How the Egyptian Navy Fought the October War

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More than two decades later, the former Commander-in-Chief of Egyptian Naval Forces looks at the role his navy played in the 1973 October War. The Egyptian Navy scored some spectacular successes.

The assault of the Suez Canal, the de­struction of the Bar-lev Line, and the fierce battles that took place in repulsing Israeli counterattacks constituted the most spectacular as­pects of the 1973 October War. But the other Egypt­ian armed services brought several of their own specialties to bear, as well. In fact, naval activ­ities had a profound strategic effect on the re­sults of the war. The Egyptian Navy started combat actions several days before the rest of Egypt’s armed forces and continued operations well into January 1974.

The initial victories achieved by the Egyptian Army in the assault were by no means the first round of hostilities be­tween Egypt and Israel, but this was, indeed, the first time the Egyptian side planned for an of­fensive war. It was also the first time any real co­ordination had been ac­complished between the political leadership and the military command, a situation at variance with previous rounds. For the first time, Egypt had esti­mated the capabilities of Israel realistically. It was also the first time the choice of combat missions was limited to those within the capabilities of the Egyptian armed forces. Long gone were the optimistic plans to liberate the whole of Palestine in just several days of combat. The main objective was to change the military situation by assault­ing the Suez Canal, destroying the Bar- lev Line and establishing bridgeheads on the Eastern Bank. Egyptian leaders con­sidered this sufficient to create a sub­stantial change in the military situation and hence result in a negotiated resolu­tion of the conflict. For once, the Egypt­ian military forces were able to effect sur­prise; for the first time, the Israelis had to face combat on both the Egyptian and Syrian fronts simultaneously. Further­more, Egypt achieved a marked im­provement in relations with other Arab states, a fact that resulted in the Egypt­ian Navy’s being able to extend its com­bat activities into the strategic depths of the Arab world, both in the Red Sea and in the Mediterranean.

Preparing for War

Preparations for the 1973 War stretched back a number of years. Ever since the humiliating defeat of June 1967, the Egyptian armed forces had been striv­ing hard to achieve a high standard of combat readiness. Actually, having not been subjected to the 1967 defeat, the Egyptian Navy was in a much better state than the rest of the country’s forces. In fact, the standards of combat training, military discipline, and will to fight were quite high. A comparison of forces to those in 1967 clearly favored the Egyptian Navy, which had large numbers of submarines, destroyers, and, more im­portant, several Soviet-built missile­launching boats, of which Israel had none.

The Egyptian Navy proved its effec­tiveness soon after the June War, when

on 21 October 1967, Egyptian missile boats launched a surface-to-surface mis­sile attack against the Israeli flagship, the destroyer Eilat. Two missiles sank the ship on the outer limits of Egyptian ter­ritorial waters to the northeast of Port Said. Nevertheless, the Egyptian Navy’s defense plans and security measures

needed much improvement.

The war of attrition that broke out to­ward the end of 1969 provided a useful opportunity to try out new tactical pro­cedures and to test the effectiveness of available Styx surface-to-surface missiles, especially against small targets. On the strategic level, Egypt held talks with var­ious Arab nations to ensure the possibil­ity of alternative stations in the Red Sea, positions that would enable the Egyptian Navy to carry out naval tasks at long dis­tances from home bases.

Planning for the October Offensive

Serious planning for the October op­erations started in January 1972. The ac­tual war plan—code-named “Granite”— was adjusted and altered a number of times to ensure that all combat missions assigned were within the capability of the forces. For the first time, special atten­tion was given to deception, which was recognized as an important factor for suc­cess, especially in light of the fact that Israeli forces required only from 48 to 72 hours to achieve full readiness.

A fairly accurate and unbiased esti­mate of enemy combat capabilities and distribution dictated the plan of action. All these factors were quite opposite of what had happened in 1967, when it seems that no proper planning was car­ried out.

Missions Assigned to the Navy

Nearly every possible combat mission that can be assigned to naval forces was specified in the operational directive to the Navy. This document stated in gen­eral the various combat tasks to be exe­cuted, with the details being left for the naval operations staff to work out. The only missions specified clearly were those to be carried out in support of the Army offensive, such as participating in the preparation for the assault of the Suez Canal and the provision of fire from the sea against the flanks of particular enemy ground defensive positions. Also speci­fied was assisting in some small tactical landing operations using light craft east of Port Said and across the Gulf of Suez.

During the preparatory period, naval headquarters carried out continuous stud­ies in order to determine the possible combat missions that could be carried out successfully and at the same time assist in the achievement of the general strate­gic objectives of the armed forces. The following are some of the problems that were the subject of close study.

Naval Tactical Landings

Although achieving a successful tacti­cal landing on the northern coast of Sinai behind the Bar-lev Line would have been of great value to the Second Field Army, the Navy had to insist that it was not practical without sufficient air cover and air support. Since the resources of the Egyptian Air Force were insufficient to provide this, the idea of an amphibious landing was abandoned. But Egyptian forces resumed amphibious training and demonstrative action as a deceptive tac­tic against Israel. Instead of true am­phibious operations, small, commando- type operations were to be attempted, using light craft and rubber boats.

Fire Support Missions for the Army

During the War of Attrition in No­vember 1969, Egyptian destroyers car­ried out an artillery bombardment against an Israeli logistic area east of Port Said. The attack was successful, but the de­stroyers taking part were subjected to heavy air strikes, and only luck allowed them to beat off the attack and return to harbor unscathed. The Israeli response was fairly quick and effective enough to convince naval staff that such destroyer action without air cover was going to be very risky, even at night and even though some Israeli planes had been hit. In order to provide an alternative method, some torpedo boats were equipped with un­guided surface-to-surface multiple mis­sile launchers, which proved quite effec­tive and quick in delivering fire against coastal targets. High accuracy was not re­ally required, since the idea was to attack large-area targets from seaward. Besides, the attacking boats were much more dif­ficult to locate than destroyers.

Problems with the Styx Surface-to-Surface Missile

When the Styx missiles were first used against the Eilat in 1967, they were very successful. But as the years went by, they became obsolete and thus, no longer dependable. The missile was intended to be fired against medium and large targets and was inaccurate against any­thing else. Furthermore, Egyptian forces had to assume that Israel was familiar with its capabilities and had worked out suitable countermeasures. Attempts to improve the sensitivity of the homing system were largely unsuccessful, and all that could be done was to accept the superiority of Israeli missile boats and to avoid clashes with them as much as possible. In case of Israeli penetra­tion close to naval bases, Egyptian forces depended heavily on coastal ar­tillery, with missile boats firing a larger number of missiles per salvo to allow for inaccuracy.

Lack of Air Support

The superiority of Israel in aerial war­fare was recognized at all levels. General headquarters in Cairo decided that what­ever effort the Egyptian Air Force could mount, the priority was the successful as­sault of the Suez Canal and the support of the Second and Third Field Armies in their offensive actions. Thus, the Navy had to plan its combat activities without depending on air cover or air support. The only protection would be provided within the established Air Defense Zones.

In light of this situation, much de­pended on submarine warfare, mine war­fare, and special forces action. At the same time, destroyer operations were ex­tended well outside the reach of Israeli aviation, which restricted naval activities, especially since shipbome air defense ca­pabilities were limited.

Mission Against Israeli Maritime Lines of Communication

The Egyptian Navy recognized the weakness of the Israeli Navy in the Red Sea early in the planning stages. Israel had deployed no missile boats, no minesweepers, and no antisubmarine ships there. At the same time, the con­figuration of the Gulf of Suez and the Red Sea provided an ideal stage to mount combat actions directed at disrupting enemy lines of communication. The de­pendence of Israel on oil from the Per­sian Gulf passing through the Bab-el- Mandeb, the southern entrance to the Red Sea, and oil from the Gulf of Suez, pass­ing through the Straits of Jubal at the en­trance to the Gulf of Suez, made it clear that intense pressure could be brought to bear on Israel if these sources were turned off.

On the Mediterranean side of opera­tions, Israel did not have an effective an­tisubmarine defense. Therefore, the Egyptian naval staff decided that the em­ployment of submarines in this direction would be very effective in hindering mar­itime traffic.

Operational Deployment of Forces

Since the October War was an offen­sive operation, the Navy would have suf­ficient time to deploy its forces, even though some of the operational areas lay far from the home bases. In order to ensure secrecy, deployment would be re­duced to a minimum, with the distribu­tion of forces being achieved before­hand. Consequently, deployment of forces was smooth and quiet, making full use of deceptive measures. The basic opera­tional deployment plan was to provide sufficient forces at all naval bases so that

In the Central Command Post of the Egyptian Navy in Alexandria, the author (right) briefs Vice Admiral Fouad Zikry, Commander- in-Chief of Naval Forces, and General Ahmad Ismail, Minister of War, at the height of the October War in 1973.

each base could carry out its combat mis­sions without reinforcement. As for for­mations and units in combat against mar­itime lines of transport, the concept called for having these forces placed as close as possible to their combat areas, making use of stationing facilities in Arab coun­tries such as Somalia, Sudan, and Yemen.

Concept of Naval Operations

The general concept of naval opera­tions was to employ the full force of the Navy on three levels:

>• In the tactical zone: to concentrate operations in support of the Army.

>     On an operational level: to ensure naval security in the operational zone of the naval bases by carrying out all types of defense, di­recting activities at pre­vention of enemy naval penetration, and repulsing such enemy action.

>     On a strategic level: to concentrate naval effort against enemy lines of maritime communication both in the Red Sea and in the Mediterranean. The objective was to prevent the transport of oil to the Israeli port of Eilat in the Gulf of Aqaba. This was achieved by controlling passage of ships, espe­cially tankers, through the Bab-el-Mandeb—using destroyers, with submarines deployed farther north in the Red Sea as a backup to engage ships proceeding to Eilat.

A second concept was to cut off the supply of oil from Israeli-held Egyptian oil wells inside the Gulf of Suez, mainly by using mine warfare to block the en­trance. In the Mediterranean the objec­tive was to reduce and hinder traffic to Israeli ports by using submarines south of Cyprus and by the employment of de­stroyers south of Malta. These destroy­ers were instructed to make themselves noticed by all shipping that proceeded eastward toward Israeli ports, with the idea that their activity would certainly be reported to Israel and consequently re­duce traffic, besides wasting Israeli ef­forts in a secondary direction.

Naval Actions in Support of the Army Offensive

Naval activities directed at the support of the Army offensive consisted of par­ticipating in fire preparation for the as­sault of the Suez Canal, using mainly naval coastal artillery in the direction east of Port Fouad on the Mediterranean side and in the direction of Suez-Eion Mussa on the Red Sea side. Rocket assaults were also carried out against coastal targets at the request of Army Command. Many of these raids were concentrated during critical stages, mainly to divert Israeli at­tention and especially to draw Israeli avi­ation away from the main direction of the Second and Third Field Armies’ assaults. Furthermore, naval assistance provided for small tactical raiding operations by commando forces from the Second Field Army behind enemy defensive positions east of Port Said and across the Gulf of Suez by special forces from the Red Sea Military Command.

Securing the Operational Zone

Naval activities in this respect con­sisted of carrying out defensive proce­dures against submarines, against mines, and against frogmen, using forces from the naval bases. Coastal artillery, coastal missile defense batteries, and in some cases Egyptian missile boats repelled pen­etrations by Israeli missile boats. In this type of combat the Israeli Navy had the upper hand, using more modem boats and effective support from its air force, es­pecially helicopters.

Disruption of Enemy Lines of Communication

The Egyptian Navy gave this mission major attention, because it foresaw the strategic effect it would have on Israel, especially since intelligence reports indi­cated that oil reserves were somewhat limited.

To secure results in this field, the

Egyptian Navy successfully surprised Is­rael with a new method of combat it was not accustomed to itself. The usual ar­tillery strikes on the southeastern Mediter­ranean coast were no longer the theme of action; now, operations were carried out more than 1,000 miles away from Israeli bases; in the Bab-el-Mandeb, south of Malta, etc. In fact, for once the Israelis found themselves outwitted and with no capability to retaliate. Thus, this mission achieved spectacular results. First and foremost, it proved to Israel that the oc­cupation of Sharm-el-Shiekh would not necessarily guarantee the safety of supplies to the port of Eilat. The flow of oil, which Israel needed badly, was no longer reaching Eilat. Attempts to force a passage through the Strait of Jubal resulted only in further losses caused by mines. The Egyptian Navy did suc­ceed in carrying out this mission, depending mainly on declaring areas unsafe for maritime navi­gation because of the hos­tilities, and avoided de­claring a blockade of any international straits.

These operations con­tinued long after the cease of hostilities on the Suez Canal front. The Navy continued its control of traffic in the Bab-el- Mandeb, warning all ships not to proceed northward into the area declared dan­gerous to navigation. This continued well into January 1974, and the effect of this on the negotiations that took place after the cease fire was most prominent. Lift­ing the blockade off Bab-el-Mandeb was one of the first Israeli requests, clearly indicating the effectiveness of Egyptian naval action in that area.

Operational Evaluation

Although the Egyptian Navy had to fight its battles without air support and using outdated missile boats and inef­fective missiles, it managed to achieve some spectacular successes, especially on the strategic level. Israel was caught un­aware by new and effective operational planning for combat actions miles away from Israeli bases, and thus out of Israeli missile boat or aviation range.

In closer areas, the Egyptian Navy made full use of mine warfare, which also caught the Israeli Navy in a very weak position, having not been equipped with any mine countermeasures. The strategic deployment of the Israeli Navy left the

Red Sea very poorly equipped to handle this new type of warfare. In the Mediter­ranean, it was impossible to provide mar­itime transport to carry much needed strategic supplies from western European ports, thus forcing Israel to depend on a U.S. “air bridge.”

True, the Israeli Navy managed to achieve some success in combat against Egyptian missile boats, but these actions did not secure any operational or strate­gic benefits. Israeli frogmen managed to penetrate the defenses of some forward bases and inflicted minor losses, but it cost them some lives. On many occa­sions, Israeli boats shelled Egyptian fish­ing boats and villages on the pretext that they were Egyptian naval bases.

On the whole, the Egyptian Navy man­aged to accomplish most of its missions successfully. Further missions with more ambitious offensive aims were com­menced but not completed because of technical failures. These successes can be attributed to sound operational plan­ning for employment of all available forces; even ships of World War II vin­tage participated and achieved results.

Conclusions and Lessons > The vital importance of achieving sur­prise and delivering the first blows was demonstrated amply. Surprise must be achieved on a strategic and operational level, bearing in mind that secrecy and deception can be valuable in this respect. >• A clear understanding on both politi­cal and military levels was critical.

V In missile-boat warfare, boat-versus- boat was no longer feasible, and addi­tional factors, such as helicopter support, had to be brought to bear.

>• With new, sophisticated weapons being used in naval warfare, the importance of electronic warfare cannot be overstated. >• Mines can still play an effective role in modern naval warfare.

>     Proper strategic composition and de­ployment always will have a vital bear­ing on naval warfare.

>■ Naval forces should not be limited to supporting the land theater of operations.

►  Sea power cannot be exercised effec­tively without air support.

►  The importance of proper planning, ac­cording to recognized methods of oper­ational art, and adherence to long-estab­lished principles of war still stands.

>     Taking into account Egypt’s out­standing strategic position and its lead­ing role in the Arab world—aside from its extensive coastlines on two seas—the need for an effective navy was made abundantly clear.

A veteran of four wars and 30 years’ distinguished service in the Egyptian Navy, Rear Admiral Refaat served as the Commander-in-Chief of Egyptian Naval Forces from 1976 to 1978 and as Chief of Naval Op­erations from 1969 to 1976, the time period cov­ered here. He is now retired and living in Alexan­dria, Egypt.

No Problem, Sir

The crew of a fleet tanker operating in the Formosa Strait was having the evening meal when someone on the bridge accidentally set off the general-quarters alarm.

The Officer of the Deck was stunned. He had to pass the word that sounding the alarm was a mistake.

The boatswain’s mate came to the rescue. “I know what to say, sir. He promptly went to the loud speaker and announced, “This is no drill.”

F. W. Furland