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Drawing from more than 40 years’ experience bringing together disparate forces with widely differing capabilities to operate efficiently and effectively—here, HMS Ark Royal, the USS Saratoga (CV-60), and Spain’s Principe de Asturius participate in Dynamic Impact—NATO can serve as the core and model for future coalition operations.
Since the end of the Cold War, Western navies have been struggling with two seemingly contradictory requirements: coping with declining resources while assigning more and more ships and personnel to the numerous crises that plague the world. From the Adriatic to the Caribbean, naval forces are in great demand as one of the prime tools of crisis management. Faced with such a situation, it is not surprising that nations are once again looking toward international cooperation as a way of using scarce resources more efficiently and effectively.
But despite real progress in the past 50 years, many problems still need to be resolved. An analysis of NATO, the most obvious example of cooperation in the recent past, can illustrate certain elements of successful cooperation, which include overcoming difficulties with communications and a lack of a common language, differences in doctrine, and disputes over command-and-control arrangements.
NATO and Multinational Cooperation
During the 45 years since the alliance was established, NATO’s maritime forces have achieved an enviable record of maintaining freedom of the seas, demonstrating NATO solidarity, and sustaining forward presence in strategically important areas. NATO forces also have developed unique skills that allow disparate forces with widely differing capabilities to operate together efficiently throughout the alliance area of responsibility and beyond. For these and other reasons, NATO forces can serve as the core and the model for coalition operations, whether NATO-led, U.N.- led, or conducted under the auspices of one nation.
NATO’s naval capabilities were very much in evidence
during Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm, even though the alliance was not directly involved. Of some 22 nations contributing ships to the Coalition, the majority were from NATO. Non-NATO countries, such as Argentina and Australia, were successfully integrated into the Coalition because NATO procedures were used and because NATO experience provided an organizational model for maritime operations in the Gulf. To be effective, coalitions need a core of nations that are accustomed to working together; that share a common body of procedures, tactics, and doctrine and a similar approach to logistics support; and that have developed methods to promote and encourage interoperability—especially in C3I. Currently, NATO is the only organization that can provide the operational infrastructure that makes such a high level of integration possible.
Similar conclusions can be drawn from the very successful multinational minesweeping operations conducted in the Persian Gulf after the Iran-Iraq War and at the end of Desert Storm. Although the first of these was conducted under the direction of the Western European Union (WEU), all participants were NATO nations operating under NATO procedures. During more than 40 years of combined exercises, bilateral visits, and training together in each other’s schools, these navies developed a respect for and knowledge of each other and an awareness of each
other’s capabilities. These habits are invaluable to effective coalition operations. Other nations can be integrated, as demonstrated by Desert Storm, because they adopt the methods already worked out by NATO nations. Without this extensive body of procedures, tactics, and doctrine, it would have taken years to achieve the desired level of efficiency.
The defeat of the Allied flotilla at the Battle of the Java Sea in 1942 is a reminder of what can happen when navies try to cooperate without the benefit of extensive mutual training and common procedures worked out before actual hostilities commence.1
Another benefit of using NATO as the core of coalition operations is the existence of a single recognized chain of command. While that chain of command may be quite complex—as is the case in NATO’s southern region—it is clear to all involved who is running the operation. The situation was not quite as clear when the original U.N. monitoring operation began with both WEU and NATO forces working in the area under two separate operating authorities. Once the embargo commenced, it became obvious that two separate chains of command could not exist without serious risk to the integrity of the mission.
Now, both the WEU and NATO provide forces to the operation but under one operational commander, with tasks and operating locations determined by each nation’s capabilities, training, and political limitations. For example, Germany—which assigns ships to both Standing Naval Force Mediterranean and Standing Naval Force Atlantic— will not allow its ships to be stationed in the area close to the coast of Montenegro. Now that the Cold War has ended, more such restrictions on the employment of national forces can be anticipated, even from committed NATO nations.
Interoperability
One of the keys to NATO’s success in forging powerful maritime forces has been its long-standing commitment to interoperability. Since its first large-scale maritime exercise in 1952, NATO has worked to develop mechanisms to encourage standardization. These include the Allied Naval Communications Agency, which was one of the first organizations established by NATO to standardize communications procedures; the Military Agency for Standardization, which is largely responsible for tactical procedures; NATO Communications and Information Systems Agency, which manages communications and information systems; and the NATO Standardization Group, which develops policy and coordinates NATO’s wide-ranging standardization activities.2 The accomplishments of these organizations have enabled NATO maritime forces to achieve a very high level of interoperability, which has increased their overall effectiveness.
Unfortunately, NATO has not been as successful in encouraging equipment standardization and interoperability, because many alliance nations more or less have reserved their equipment purchases for domestic manufacturers. In many cases, this has resulted in short production runs and associated high unit costs and a lack of interoperability with other NATO equipment. Reductions in defense budgets and the merging of many defense companies ultimately may result in fewer weapon systems on the market and thus more standardization, but such an outcome cannot be guaranteed as long as nations equate domestic procurement with security of supply.
Another major factor in improving interoperability has been the role played by NATO’s standing forces as laboratories for the development of new tactics and procedures. Each year they are assigned experimental tactics and procedures to evaluate and refine for eventual integration into tactical publications. The standing forces encourage interoperability because their operational effectiveness depends on the level of standardization they achieve.
In the early years of Standing Naval Force Atlantic, for example, intership communications and data exchange were difficult because of equipment incompatibilities and the differing formats used for data exchange. As recently as ten years ago, two incompatible formats—LINK 10 and LINK 11—were used to exchange computer-to-computer tactical data, requiring elaborate and complicated procedures. The difficulties were amply documented by the standing forces during numerous exercises and trials. Similar observations during large NATO exercises and the increasing demand for rapid and accurate information exchange encouraged all NATO navies to adopt LINK 11 as the standard for at-sea data exchange. By the time of Desert Storm, all navies were outfitted with equipment that allowed for total integration into the Gulf-wide LINK 11 net.
Effective cooperation also depends on the habits developed by navies that work together on a regular basis. Exercises and shared training facilities, such as the Ecole de Guerre des Mines in Zeebrugge, contribute a great deal to this, but not all personnel benefit from them. The standing forces provide additional opportunities to develop the habits of cooperation, particularly in the smaller navies, where personnel can expect to have several tours in a standing force during their careers. It could be argued that the standing force experience has been so positive that it should be extended to other operational areas, such as amphibious forces and maritime patrol aircraft. Indeed, a NATO on-call amphibious force is under consideration for the Mediterranean.
NATO is the only international body to form standing naval forces, but the demand for multinational forces to support U.N. resolutions suggests that the time may be ripe for others. Despite the difficulties in implementing such a force—funding and the lack of a U.N. Military Staff Committee—the idea deserves discussion and probably would be easier to establish than comparable land forces.3
Another major factor in standardization efforts has been the NATO exercise program. Since 1952, NATO’s Atlantic Command has conducted an extensive exercise program to develop those capabilities needed to maintain the sea lines of communication to Europe and to support NATO’s maritime flanks. Its European Command has conducted a similar program, but lately a more cooperative approach has been taken. The goal of these exercises has not changed significantly from the early days of the alliance, when NATO commanders began to meld navies of widely differing size and capabilities into an effective fighting force. Then as now, the exercises help refine command and control, develop tactics, ensure that communications work as planned, and train commanders at all levels in the more complicated aspects of multinational naval operations.
With the end of the Cold War, exercises have been reduced in frequency and are more likely to be planned by both major NATO commanders together and to be joint. They will be further influenced by the two major initiatives of the January NATO summit: the Partnership for Peace and the combined joint task force (CJTF) concept. NATO procedures have been exported to a few nations with which some NATO countries have bilateral defense arrangements, such as Australia and Japan, but they were not widely available. Until now, it has not been possible to develop or share existing procedures and tactics—especially in the areas of C3I—without compromising security. Both NATO and the U.S. Navy are working on some basic tactical publications that can be made available to a variety of nations, but this will not be enough to ensure the necessary degree of interoperability. Several ideas have been suggested to overcome these limitations:
► The U.S. Navy has operated very successfully with most South American navies during the UNITAS exercises through the use of specially developed publications based on earlier editions of NATO publications. These could be applied to other Partnership for Peace or CJTF operations in support of U.N. resolutions or a coalition.
> Because the biggest impediment to efficient coalition operations is the lack of interoperable C3I equipment, NATO or the United Nations should consider acquiring pools of command-and-control equipment with associated portable satellite communications terminals. These could be stored at strategic locations until required. NATO already is working on such a pool system for its own forces, but it could be extended to other potential partners and exercised on a regular basis. If funding difficulties can be overcome, this idea offers considerable promise.
> Special procedures based on existing NATO procedures could be developed for use in coalition operations involving Partnership for Peace and other non-NATO nations. These could cover such areas as communications, simple tactical procedures, and security systems to protect data transmission and voice communications. In this latter area, commercial off-the-shelf equipment offers great promise and considerable savings.
Rules of Engagement
In any coalition formed to provide an international response to a serious crisis, unity of purpose is as important as unity of command. One measure of commitment could be acceptance of common rules of engagement (ROEs) developed specifically for a particular operation or that had been agreed on beforehand. Given the differing interests of nations, obtaining prior agreement will be difficult. It has taken NATO many years to obtain consensus on maritime ROEs, and the process of developing similar ROEs for land and air operations has only just begun.
NATO experience suggests that the more definitive the rules of engagement, the more difficult it is to obtain willing partners. Yet, more general ROEs that leave room for interpretation could lead to delays as field commanders seek additional guidance, which could place their units at risk. Despite these difficulties, the United Nations should attempt to establish ROEs—perhaps by using existing NATO rules as a starting point—that would apply to various levels of U.N. peacekeeping or peace-making operations. Once the ROEs are agreed upon, nations would subscribe to them just as they do within NATO. Different national units operating under national ROEs still could be a problem, but common rules of engagement would help the commander in his mission planning.4
Conclusion
In a conference on the use of maritime forces in crisis response held at Dalhousie University in Halifax in June 1993, the Assistant Chief of Staff for Operations at Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic, Rear Admiral Bruce Johnston, CAN, stated that “The capability to respond in an interventionist mode depends on three things. It depends on political will, military capability, and a capable command infrastructure under which the mission would be executed.”5 NATO has both the military capability and the command infrastructure, but, until recently, the political will appeared to be lacking. Since the Summit in January 1994, however, NATO nations appear to have changed their minds about the future direction of NATO, with many more now seeming to be willing to contemplate intervention.
The apparent success of active NATO involvement in lifting the siege of Sarajevo a year ago strengthened the views of those nations seeking an expanded role for NATO in crisis response. This is encouraging for those nations that are frustrated with the problems experienced by the United Nations in commanding increasingly complex operations without the appropriate infrastructure and staff. Under certain circumstances, NATO could assign its forces and infrastructure to assist the United Nations in enforcing resolutions, as long as the appropriate command- and-control relationships can be worked out.
Only NATO has the command and control, force structures, interoperability, and history of working together needed for effective cooperation. With the evolution of the Partnership for Peace, more nations will be able to integrate with existing NATO forces as they begin to work and train together on a regular basis. The CJTF concept also offers the opportunity for non-NATO nations to integrate their forces into future cooperative efforts. These two initiatives, coupled with NATO’s extensive history of working together, offer some very real options for nations all over the world to join in coalitions to resolve serious crises collectively.
‘J. H. Belote and W. H. Belote, Titans of the Sea (New York: Harper and Row, 1975), pp. 58-59.
2See “NATO Facts and Figures,” NATO Information Service 1989, for an extensive discussion of NATO standardization activities, especially chapters 12-17. This idea has been proposed on many occasions, most recently in a paper prepared by the Center for Naval Analyses. See Jeffrey I. Sands, “Blue Hulls: Multinational Cooperation and the United Nations,” Center for Naval Analyses, Washington, D.C., 1993. See especially pages 27-45, in which standing and on-call forces and the problems of command and control and funding are discussed.
4See Maritime Security and Conflict Resolution at Sea in the Post-Cold War Era, Peter T. Haydon and Ann L. Griffiths, eds. (Halifax, Nova Scotia: Centre for Foreign Policy Studies, Dalhousie University, 1994) for a discussion of the evolution of Canadian ROEs during Operation Desert Storm, especially pages 246247. This record of proceedings of a colloquium that took place in June 1993 also includes several papers on the role of maritime forces in crisis management. 5See Maritime Security and Conflict Resolution, p. 191.
Captain Goode is the Canadian Forces Naval Attache at the Canadian Embassy in Washington, D.C. He has served on the staff of the Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic and has commanded the minesweeper HMCS Chignecto, the frigate HMCS Saguenay, the destroyer HMCS Algonquin, and the Fourth Destroyer Squadron.
Night Vision
At a 1958 reunion of the U.S. Naval Academy class of 1941 in San Diego, I was surprised to see my classmate, a destroyer skipper, wearing thick glasses. Because good eyesight is a prerequisite for service in the line of the Navy, particularly when operating at high speed at night, we asked him whether he had any trouble.
“Oh no,” he said. “We have an unwritten rule in my division: Nobody crosses my bow at night!”
Waldron M. McLellon