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Revolt of the Admirals: The Fight For Naval Aviation, 1945-1950
Jeffrey G. Barlow. Washington, D.C.:
Naval Historical Center, 1994. 420 pp. Bib. Notes. Photos. $30.00 ($28.50).
Reviewed by Vice Admiral Gerald E. Miller, U.S. Navy (Retired)
Although debates about the efficacy of military aviation started immediately after World War I, it was World War II that firmly established aviation as a major player in war. Air power reached paramount importance, however, when—soon after the War—the United States decided Jo base its national security strategy almost exclusively on air-delivered atomic weapons.
Differences over the wisdom °f this strategy began almost uninediately, as did arguments
about assigning this strategic mission to the Air Force, the Navy, or both services. For their part, the civil authorities Played a major role by approving the accelerated production of the B-36 strategic bomber and canceling the Navy’s first supercarrier, after her keel had been laid.
The recounting of the air-power debate between the Air Force and the Navy during 1945-1950—a time which naval officers fought for the very existence of naval aviation and, in some ways, the Navy itself—is an emotional tale. Actions taken by the significant players in the story are fascinating. Their dedication and willingness to sacrifice their own careers, in order to modify a strategy they considered detrimental to national security, are examples worth of study. Principles prevailed over political expediency. Key in the action were Admiral Arthur Radford, backed by then-Captain Arleigh Burke and a host of others, all under the cautious eye of the Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Louis Denfeld. The eventual outcome of the debate was decided by the Congress, most specifically Representative Carl Vinson (D-GA), the Chairman of the House Armed Services Committee. But swaying Mr. Vinson and his committee colleagues was no easy task and those who sacrificed their careers were not only naval officers.
Jeffrey Barlow, a historian with the Naval Historical Center, has produced a scholarly work that is easy reading and often suspenseful—as the reader wonders who will be next to enter the fray and how that player will participate. The research is impressive with copious notes and a bibliography accounting for about 100 pages.
This book will interest older members of the military profession who were on duty at the time. The many stories of what transpired are substantiated by much recently declassified material. Dr. Barlow makes it obvious that the term “revolt” was a creation of the press that gave the impression that senior naval officers were disobeying orders—not at all a fair depiction of what happened. What really occurred was a series of actions (some not so smart) by dedicated professionals who were concerned about the trend ot our national security policies and the support that trend was
1 he battle over the Navy’s postwar role was fought at the highest political and military levels. Some of the players after a 1949 congressional hearing: left to right, Representative Carl Vinson, Chairman of the House Armed Services Committee; Navy Secretary Francis Matthews; Admiral Louis Denfeld; and Admiral Arthur Radford. Central to the battle was carrier aviation’s future, here, an artist’s concept of the supercarrier United States (CVA-58), canceled in 1949.
afforded by civil authority, some of which was of questionable competence, at least in the Department of Defense.
Current and prospective leaders of our armed services—as well as members of the civil authority—will do well to read this book, if only to be reminded of what the term “service” may entail. Dr. Barlow’s narration highlights the men who chose to take actions to uphold principles in which they believed passionately, regardless of the consequences. In that regard, it is ironic that two of the major participants in the “revolt” fared well later on. Admiral Radford became the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and Admiral Burke served as the Chief of Naval Operations for six years.
Service roles and missions always have figured in discussions concerning national security. But the debate over the use of air power always has been particularly spirited, especially in the United States and Great Britain, and seems to pop up periodically. In 1960, Admiral Burke had to fight over the control of submarine-launched ballistic missiles and aircraft carriers that were capable of delivering nuclear weapons. Now, in 1995, another roles-and-mission debate is under way. Participants in this new set of discussions will do well to study this book. History remains the best teacher of all.
One Hundred Years of Sea Power: The U.S. Navy,
1890-1990
George W. Baer. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1994. 553 pp. Ind. Notes. $49.50 ($44.55).
Reviewed by Dr. Michael A. Palmer
This book is a well-written, well-argued, one-volume survey of U.S. naval power during the past century. George Baer’s approach is sound, his judgments are objective, and his grasp of the history of the U.S. Navy is first class.
Dr. Baer’s work benefited from two
What’s in a name? In this case, a sense of how the Navy changed from 1890 to 1990. The protected cruiser Boston represented the Navy’s emergence from its post-Civil War doldrums. As an all-gun heavy cruiser, the Boston (CA-69) was designed for the climatic battle in the Pacific. The same ship was reconfigured into a guided-missile cruiser (CAG-1) in order to fit into the early Cold War fleet. The most recent Boston, SSN-703, represents the need to counter the Soviet undersea threat of the late Cold War.
critical decisions: first, he decided to focus not on the entire two-century history of the U.S. Navy, but only on its second 100 years, from the point when the service “transformed itself according to a role and structure expressed by the protean concept of sea power as an offensive battle fleet employed by a competitive maritime nation, elaborated . . . in The Influence of Sea Power upon History, 1660-1783 by Captain Alfred Thayer Mahan.” As a result, Dr. Baer does not try to squeeze the entire tale of the U.S. Navy within the bounds of a single, overarching thesis. Second, Baer chose to focus on policy and strategy and to eschew any attempt to write a comprehensive study of the U. S. Navy’s last hundred years, thus freeing the author from having to discuss those myriad aspects of the Navy’s record that so often dilute single volume—and even multivolume—histories of the service. The consequence is a longish, critical narrative that is well-focused on the Navy’s role as the nation’s “main instrument of maritime force.”
Freed from the need to be all things to
all readers, Dr. Baer has written an excellent account of the U.S. Navy’s changing roles and missions and, especially, the link (or often lack thereof) between national policy and naval strategy. He divides his history into two major parts: “On the Sea” (1890-1945) and “From the Sea” (1945-1990). The first covers the Navy’s labors to contest and, ultimately, gain control of the seas, an effort that concluded successfully with the defeat of the Axis powers in 1945. The second surveys the U.S. Navy’s long postwar struggle to develop a strategy that would allow it to apply power “from the sea” against the shore, a struggle evident both in its plans for war against the Soviet Union as well as in actual operations against minor land powers such as North Korea, North Vietnam, Libya, Iran, and Iraq.
Throughout the book, Dr. Baer’s discussions are pointed and balanced. Certainly, no reader will agree—or should be expected to agree—with every point made. But the author’s judgments, even at their most critical, are far from iconoclastic. His is a measured assessment of the debates, historiographical and other-
THE PEABODY MUSEUM OF SALEM
wise, concerning the U.S. Navy’s history.
Dr. Baer is at his best when he moves from the narrative to the analytic, a jump not always taken in the book’s 18 chapters. For example, the sections on the era °f Mahan are heavy on the narrative and somewhat light on interpretation. But as the decades pass, the author seems more comfortable—perhaps with his grasp of the literature, perhaps with his own assessments—and is more willing to voice his conclusions. It is in Dr. Baer’s recounting of the Navy’s Cold War history that he is the most judgmental—e.g., in his discussion of the sea power concepts of Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Elmo Zumwalt and many other high- ranking naval officers of the 1970s. Apparently, Dr. Baer is that rare historian who is much more comfortable criticizing the living than the dead.
My major disappointment was that this level of critical analysis did not carry
over into a concluding section. The final segment, labeled "Conclusions, is misnamed; it is an epilogue. I wish that the author had retraced his steps and drawn overall conclusions from the perceptive analysis that makes up so much of this book, because what struck me most was that for many of the Navy’s last 100 years, there has been such a marked disconnect between the service’s strategy and national policy. Dr. Baer shows that Navy planners often have worked in a vacuum, uncertain about the ways their efforts fit into the larger scheme of national policy. That fact says a great deal about the chaotic nature of U.S. policymaking, and something as well as about the quality of the Navy’s leadership. That theme very well could have been the thesis of this work: that the uniformed heads of the Navy must be prepared to develop strategy and shape their service in the absence of clear direction from their civil-
Military Readiness: Concepts, Choices, Consequences
Richard K. Betts. Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1995. 322 pp. Notes. Index. $16.95 ($16.10). Paper.
Reviewed by Rear Admiral Ned Hogan, U.S. Navy (Retired)
Richard Betts has done a masterful job in portraying the details, definitions, and dichotomies of military readiness in all its forms and nuances. He could have added another descriptor to his subtitle— "Confusion"—for he articulates clearly the muddled criteria and the conflicts that arose over defining readiness during the Cold War.
The opening chapter of Part I “Understanding Readiness” lays out the historical perspective and defines the traditional uses of the term “readiness” or unreadiness”—with emphasis on the latter in the first half of the 20th century and the two World Wars, and, on the former, during the Cold War and the transition to the present multipolar construct. The themes and definitions of “for when” (operational readiness), “of what” (structural readiness), and “for what” (strategic objectives and related military balance) are developed and put in play.
In the next two chapters, Dr. Betts assesses the disparate images of readiness as expounded by the professionals—military and civilian—and the critics. In particular, the alternative views of readiness—as a linear function in the form of a stairway or as a cyclical function with ebbs and flows in response to deployment and crises—are developed. Also explored are the author’s concepts of operational, structural, and mobilization readiness and their interactions. Furthermore, Dr. Betts draws an analogy between the official nomenclature of military preparedness debate—force structure, modernization, sustainability, and readiness—and his definitions of what he considers to be the actual ingredients of readiness: speed, effectiveness, mass, and efficiency.
Part II details the debates of the Cold War years and how the issues were politicized by the military. Congress, defense industries, and critics. Particular attention is paid to assessing the vagaries of different reporting systems and criteria as well as the effect of the lack of clarity in defining the "for when,” “for what,” and “of what" of the readiness argument. The interaction and interrelationship between operational and structural readiness and the impacts of favoring one over the other are highlighted. Dr. Betts recognizes that often the budgetary solution is to “rob Peter to pay Paul” mainly because structural and operational readiness are not mutually exclusive and the trade-offs often are manipulated to meet political exigencies. He argues that for most of the Cold War the United States stressed immediate operational readiness which resulted in a smaller, more responsive force structure that relied on technological quality over structural quantity. The Soviet Union, on the other hand, stressed larger numbers of less technologically advanced systems. A net assessment of both sides’ performance is made, discussed in terms of training, logistics, modernization, reserve capability, and industrial capacity. Dr. Betts contends that as the Cold War lingered both sides moved toward a more balanced structural- operational equation. The United States expanded and modernized its structure; the Soviets stretched to improve its technology. The collapse of the Soviet Union seems a de facto indication that U.S. expenditures for military capability and readiness during the Cold War allowed us to deter and prevail. But Dr. Betts does not conclude that our readiness priorities were a factor in the outcome.
In the final chapters, the author presents a detailed analysis of the mobilization and deployment of U.S. forces in the Persian Gulf War. He notes that the demise of the Soviet Union—and the concomitant existence of a force structure, combat capability, and readiness to counter a major global adversary—provided military power significantly in excess of that needed to defeat Iraq. What is implied is that had the force structure been tailored to handle two major regional contingencies, the overwhelming superiority would have been lacking. He also points out that future readiness priorities and structures will have to deal with significant uncertainties related to the “for what” component of readiness. An interesting observation is that by themselves, strategy-driven requirements cannot determine the readiness balance but must reflect the force structure in being—and it takes a long time to change that structure.
The author has accomplished a most worthy mission in weaving the analysis of this complex issue into a cogent and comprehensive treatise. The only area slighted is in what could be categorized as “with what”: those concepts essential to define the technological base, research- and-development linkage, and modernization and inventory replacement decisions needed to determine the “of what’ component of structural readiness. Such an examination also would allow for a broader look at the crucial strategy and requirements-generation issue in today’s fuzzy threat environment as contained in the “for what” consideration. These concerns aside, I think this book is a “must read” for anyone involved or interested in the defense policy debate.
Admiral Hogan is the former head of the Navy’s Office of Legislative Affairs.
Was President Truman right in dropping the dome
AND WHAT WERE THE CONSEQUENCES?
July 25,1995, 9:00am - 5:00pm
Naval Heritage Center, 701 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW Washington, DC 20004
On July 25, the entire Naval Heritage Center at the U.S. Navy Memorial will be the scene of scholarly discussion and serious reflection of President Truman's decision to use atomic weapons ... events in August 1945 that forever changed our world. Join Ambassador Paul Nitze and leading authorities in their fields for a day-long program of seminars and panel discussions. Share this extraordinary
Tickets are $95 for the entire program. Seating limited. Please make your reservation by July 10. Mail your check (payable to "USNMF"), along with your name, address and telephone number.
To reserve by phone or for more information, call (202) 737-2300, x722. The U.S. Navy Memorial and Naval Heritage Center are right on Metro's Yellow and Green lines at the Archives-
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a shipmate or family member. Navy Memorial station.
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Presented by The United States Navy Memorial Foundation
Books of Interest
By Lieutenant Comander Thomas J. Cutler, U.S. Navy (Retired)
Assault from the Sea: The Amphibious Landing at Inchon
Curtis A. Utz. Washington, DC: Naval Historical Center, 1994. 55 pp. Bib. Maps. Photos. $6.00 ($6.00). Paper.
The second in the new series of monographs Produced by the Naval Historical Center in Washington, D.C.—The U.S. Navy in the Modern World—this latest edition focuses on the incredible amphibious victory at Inchon dur- lng the early days of the Korean War. Considered to be one of the great moments in military history and the operation that changed the course of the war, Inchon is nonetheless not without controversy and certainly was earned out at considerable risk. The story of this daring counterstroke and the consequent recapture of Seoul, South Korea, is recounted briefly but effectively in this concise and informative publication.
T Battleships: United States Battleships, 1935-1992: Revised and Updated Edition
William H. Garzke, Jr., and Robert O. Dulin, Jr. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1995. 396 PP- Bib. Illus. Ind. Photos. Tables. $75.00 ($60.00).
Originally published in 1976 with the subtitle “U.S. Battleships in World War II,” this revised edition includes new information °n the World War II years as well as an update that covers the postwar years when the Iowa
(B B-61 )-
class battleships made their curtain-calls on the naval stage, including service in Korea, Vietnam, and the Persian Gulf. Complete plans are included as well as individual ship information on design, building, operational service, and demise. The triumphant reactivation of the battleships ts reviewed as well as the controversy surrounding the tragic turret explosion in the Iowa in 1989. Franklin D. Roosevelt’s influence on the design and construction of these behemoths is revealed along with some eye-opening details of some of the plans that never came to Pass. The authors’ two other volumes—Battleships: Allied Battleships of World War II and Battleships: Axis and Neutral Battleships of World War I!—complete the set which will prove to be an authoritative account of these controversial and yet highly revered ships that once ruled the seas.
Be Workwise: Retooling Your Work for the 21st Century
Mildred L. Culp, Ph.D. Seattle, WA: Executive Directions International, 1994. 90 pp. $8.95 ($8.95). Paper.
“How to guide your career through a shifting workplace” is the theme of this book. Doctor Culp provides useful information on finding a new job or reshaping your present one in order to meet new demands and to achieve job satisfaction. Some provocative ideas are presented in chapters such as “Improving Your Effectiveness,” “Swimming When You’re Out of Your Depth,” “Seizing Opportunities,” and “Coping with Victories.”
Closing In: Marines in the Seizure of Iwo Jima
Col. Joseph H. Alexander, USMC (Ret.). Washington, DC: Marine Corps Historical Center, 1995. 55 pp. Bib. Illus. Maps. Photos. $3.50 ($3.50). Paper.
Another in the Marines in World War II Commemorative Series celebrating the 50th anniversaries of these momentous events, this volume focuses on one of the final assaults of the Pacific War. Most Americans recognize the words “Iwo Jima” and many properly associate them with one of the great pictorial moments of American history. But few of us remember the details of the sacrifices, heroism, and dogged determination of the Marines who fought, died, and triumphed there. Colonel Alexander reminds us of what is behind the statue in Washington D.C., why it was built, and why it symbolizes much of what is good about the United States and the Marines who have long defended this worthwhile nation.
Courage at Sea: Canada’s Military Heritage
Arthur Bishop. Toronto: McGraw-Hill Ryerson, 1995. 191 pp. Append. Bib. Gloss. Illus. Ind.
Notes. Photos. $29.99 ($26.99).
Americans tend to forget the contributions of our allies to our victories. This book corrects that oversight by profiling Canadian naval heroes and their exploits in Korea and the two World Wars. Destroyers, submarines, and motor torpedo boats engage the enemy in places like Inchon, the Bay of Biscay, Dunkirk, and the Murmansk Run.
A History of Medicine in the Early U.S. Navy
Harold D. Langley. Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1991. 455 pp. Bib.
Gloss. Illus. Ind. Maps. Notes. $49.95 ($44.95).
Dr. Langley, curator of naval history at the Smithsonian Institute’s National Museum of American History, provides a detailed history of the development of medicine in the early days of the U.S. Navy. His eye-opening account is a study in 19th-century politics and administration as well as a fascinating but frightening description of the relatively primitive medical practices of the era. The period covered begins with the building of the first frigates and ends with the establishment of the Bureau of Medicine and Surgery in 1842. Also included is a statistical study of the diseases and death rates in the Navy that reveals much about the times.
Inside the Arab World
Michael Field. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1995. 450 pp. Ind. $27.50 ($24.75).
Shedding light on the traditionally inscrutable Middle East, a recognized expert and longtime reporter on the Arab states shares his insights in this worthwhile book. Despite its abundance of oil, the Arab World has no successful economies. Dr. Field contends that the causes for this failure lie in the fragmentation of Arab society, the people’s tolerance of ineffective government, and the restrictive effects of Arab socialism. Retrospective while at the same time forward-looking, this book is both informative and thought-provoking and should be read by anyone who wants a better understanding of an important and dynamic region of the world.
Pirates and Privateers of the Americas
David F. Marley. Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-CLIO, 1995. 475 pp. Bib. Illus. Ind. $60.00 ($57.00).
If you did not know that “Hispaniola” is the older name for the island now divided between the Dominican Republic and Haiti, or that “apostles” is a 17th-century slang term for the charges carried in a bandolier or cartridge belt, this book may serve you well. More than 350 alphabetically arranged entries describe the people, places, events, weapons, ships, and ports relevant to the age of piracy in the New World. Included are such infamous names as Sir Henry Morgan and William Kidd and the origins of such familiar terms as “doubloons” and “the Spanish Main.”
Prodigal Soldiers: How the Generation of Officers, Born of Vietnam, Revolutionized the American Style of War
James Kitfield. New York: Simon & Schuster,
1995. 480 pp. Ind. Notes. $25.00 ($22.50).
An award-winning journalist tells the informative and inspiring story of how the U.S. military, demoralized by the Vietnam debacle, restored its honor and its potency in the years that followed. Men like Colin Powell and Norman Schwarzkopf emerged from the tragedy of Vietnam, virtually reinvented the U.S. military, and ultimately lead it to impressive victory in the Persian Gulf War. This is not a revisionist history. It is a candid look
at how lessons were truly learned, how disaster was used as a catalyst to improvement, how a formidable phoenix rose from the ashes of disaster. Mr. Kitfield explores this process in detail, recounting how nearly every major element of the armed services was revitalized— from tactics and strategy, to the qualifications of individual service members, to the command structure. Although largely an uplifting account of lessons properly learned and applied, this work has its provocations and should be read by those who truly care about the future of the U.S. military.
4 U.S Coast Guard and Revenue Cutters, 1790-1935
Donald L. Canney. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1995. 140 pp. Append. Bib. Gloss, lllus. Ind. Photos. $49.95 ($39.36).
More than 1,000 cutters from the Age of Sail to the mid-1930s are profiled in this compre-
h en s i v e reference work. Data provided for each includes dimensions, rig, p r o p u 1 - sion, complement, service dates, and
a brief history. There is a wide variety of Coast Guard history covered here in—including combat operations in the Quasi War with France and World War I, rescue operations— e.g., during the burning of the Morro Castle in 1934 and the San Francisco earthquake of 1906—and law enforcement duties during Prohibition.
Somalia Operations: Lessons Learned
Col. Kenneth Allard, USA. Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1995. 135 pp. Bib. Figs. Illus. Maps. Photos. $4.25 ($4.25). Paper.
In his foreword to the book, president of the National Defense University, Lieutenant General Ervin J. Rokke, U.S. Air Force, asserts that “lessons are only truly learned when we incorporate them into our planning, doctrine, tactics, and planning.” Colonel Allard has taken the first step in that important process by writing this thought-provoking book. Providing a balanced analysis, Colonel Allard does not shrink from the painful, yet he welcomes the positive in assessing this difficult and costly operation.
The United States, Japan, and the Future of Nuclear Weapons
Report of the U.S.-Japan Study Group. Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1995. 190 pp. Append. Notes. $12.95 ($12.30). Paper.
In 1994, a 26-member study group met in Tokyo and Washington to deepen understanding between the United States and Japan on sensitive arms control and non
proliferation issues. Some of the many recommendations offered by this study group at the end of their discussions include the need for START III negotiations between Russia and the United States, the establishment of a formal negotiating forum for the world’s nuclear powers, and cooperation between the United States and Japan in strengthening the nuclear non-proliferation regime to ensure its continuation. This book provides not only the results of those talks but a number of relevant background documents as well.
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