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Changing requirements have given the Navy an opportunity to develop an amphibious ship for the future by upgrading the proved Whidbey Island (LSD-41) class—here, the Comstock (LSD-45)—with the capabilities listed instead of building an entirely new vessel, specifically the LPD-17.
A Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) memorandum dated 31 August 1992 addressing the LX (now the LPD-17) Amphibious Assault Ship Acquisition Program Baseline states that . . the Navy must maintain the amphibious lift capability to support both crisis response (2.5 Marine Expeditionary Brigades [MEBs]) and our forward presence requirements (12 Amphibious Ready Groups [ARGs]).”
Recent force-structure decisions by the Navy, however, have had a significant impact on the service’s ability to carry out this charge. At issue is the Navy’s ability to comply and maintain forward presence as assets dwindle and operational requirements increase amidst the reality of a changing international landscape.
The Navy is losing much of its logistics-over-the shore (LOTS) operations capability. Most of the 20 Newport (LST-1179)-class tank landing ships are being decommissioned; two will remain active in the Naval Reserve Force and four others will be “mothballed”—placed in maintenance category B, which means they can be mobilized in 180 days.
These ships are the only U.S. Navy vessels designed to carry causeways, warping tugs, and small boats to the theater of operation as part of the assault echelon. Without a LOTS capability the Navy cannot sustain a large force ashore for any significant period.
The service also is losing a significant amount of cargo-vehicle lift capacity. Two of the five Charleston (LKA-113)-class amphibious cargo ships—the Mobile (LKA-115) and the El Paso (LKA-117)—are being assigned to the Military Sealift Command and placed in a five-day readiness status. The remaining three will be mothballed.
But the 13 fast cargo ships of the Maritime Prepositioning Squadrons (MPSs) can bring a LOTS capability to the landing site either before or after D-Day. Since
World War 11, commercial shipping has been used in almost every amphibious assault, usually arriving just after D-Day. In Operation Desert Storm-Desert Shield, however, commercial ships were the first on station when MPS ships steamed into the Persian Gulf and began unloading. Commercial shipping is inherent to modern amphibious operations although, until now, ports have been required in most cases. Equipping them with a LOTS capability can change that.
Commercial ships are not vulnerable vessels. Experience with these large vessels in the Persian Gulf over the last ten years shows that they are reliable, maintainable, and are capable of absorbing significant battle damage. Including commercial shipping with a LOTS capability as a permanent part of the lift equation and as part of the assault echelon will make up for the Marine lift shortfall and solve the over-the-beach problem.
Shifting the sustainment burden from the Navy’s ’Gators to commercial ships would free increasingly scarce space in the amphibious force to carry more volatile cargo and additional combat capability. The cost of such an ideological shift is relatively inexpensive, for the ships and equipment are already prepositioned—we need only reorient our operational priorities.
Maintaining 12 ARGs within operational tempo and personnel tempo guidelines with declining assets is not feasible. We had 60 ships in the amphibious force in 1992, but only 39 remain today; by 2008, the number will drop to approximately 35. Carrier battle groups have been reduced to 11, plus a training carrier. No longer can separate and independent carrier battle groups and amphibious ready groups deploy simultaneously to three theaters full time because resources are simply no longer available.
The recent saga of the Inchon (LPH-12) ARG—deployed to the Caribbean in support of Operation Support Democracy off Haiti within days of returning from a routine six-month deployment to the Mediterranean—is an early sign of this problem. All told, this group of ships spent practically eight months at sea. This is but the latest example. In October 1993, the Guadalcanal (LPH-7) ARG, originally deployed to the Mediterranean for Adriatic operations, had to be pulled to cover Somalia operations. Such deployments are becoming routine.
The solution to these changing operational parameters may be Naval Expeditionary Task Forces (NETFs) and
IMPROVED AVIATION CAPABILITIES VERTICAL LAUNCH SYSTEM AEGIS COMBAT SYSTEM LONG-RANGE GUN
adaptive joint force packaging (AJFP), to support both crisis response and forward-presence requirements.
These concepts require bold and innovative thinking, training, and tasking. No longer would amphibious ships routinely conduct forward presence operations as independent amphibious ready groups but rather as part of an integrated task force including all warfare elements: strike, air, amphibious, submarine, mine countermeasures, defensive, and replenishment.
The rationale for sustaining the 2.5-MEB/12 ARG requirement and subsequent force structure is no longer valid—and if commercial shipping is used as part of the amphibious assault echelon equation, then the argument for building the LPD-17 is no longer valid, because the baseline requirement for this system was predicated on the 2.5-MEB/12-ARG decision.
The Navy and Marine Corps September 1992 White Paper “. . . From the Sea” signaled a change in priorities for the naval services toward power projection and the employment of naval forces to influence littoral regions
JOINT INTELLIGENCE CENTER JOINT OPERATIONS CENTER SHALLOW-WATER MINE COUNTERMEASURES
of the world in concert with national strategic objectives. “Forward . . . From the Sea,” published last month in Proceedings [pages 46-49], expands the strategic scope, while simultaneously confirming the original concept and addressing the unique contributions of naval expeditionary forces in peacetime operations, crisis response, and regional conflicts.
We have the opportunity to reexamine amphibious requirements in light of more prescriptive world scenarios and with a clearer understanding of potential threats. “Forward . . . From the Sea” validates this opportunity, nee requirement.
The Navy-Marine Corps team is increasingly called upon to carry out operations other than war—crisis response, humanitarian relief, forward presence, maritime sanctions and embargo enforcement, migrant interdiction, drug operations, peace enforcing, and peace keeping. Operations Earnest Will (Persian Gulf), Eastern Exit (Somalia), Sea Angel (Indian Ocean), Provide Comfort and Promise (Middle East), and Support Democracy
Combining the advantages of the Aegis design with those of the LSD-41 class and melding them together will give us a littoral supremacy ship for the 21st century.
(Caribbean) are just a few recent examples that confirm this intensified operational trend.
As originally conceived and designed, the LPD-17 filled valid requirements and was a good—though traditional—■ idea. Now that we have a better grasp of future requirements, the rationale behind the LPD-17 design falls short.
The world has changed—along with the need for a pure amphibious ship targeted to fill the 2.5-MEB/12-ARG requirement. We have the opportunity to take this ship and increase its capabilities.
Aegis cruisers have demonstrated the power of the integrated combat system combined with long-range, accurate missiles. The Whidbey Island (LSD-41)- and Harpers Ferry (LSD-49)-cargo variant-class amphibious ships are large vessels with proved hull, mechanical, and electrical systems. Originally designed to conduct wet-well operations, these ships have the space to be converted to other useful purposes. The large internal volume that could be obtained by converting this vessel’s design from a wet-well ship to a wet-well/dry-well ship and converting existing spaces should be sufficient to accommodate advanced integrated combat and weapon systems while maintaining the ship’s basic amphibious capabilities.
Combining the advantages of the Aegis design with those of the LSD-41 class and melding them together will give us a littoral supremacy ship for the 21st century.
As a multi-purpose, multi-mission vessel, it would be capable of performing many of the littoral warfare tasks and functions currently distributed among several different kinds of ships. Today, for example, we rely on Aegis ships to provide air and missile defense. Joint task force command-and-control, however, normally is conducted from another ship with more advanced communications facilities. Amphibious support responsibilities are assigned to yet other platforms.
The current and projected operating environment and budget restrictions dictate consolidation of some of these various activities into one ship, which we can do sequentially.
>■ Use a proved design to take advantage of reduced infrastructure support.
>• Integrate Arleigh Burke (DDG-51) Aegis combat systems and vertical launching systems (VLSs) to provide airspace dominance. Install VLS capability to capitalize on increasingly flexible strike missile capability to supplement aviation strike. Include long-range, precision gunnery to support littoral operations. Such a vessel could provide: air and theater ballistic-missile defense across the littoral, joint task force command-and-control, strike and close-air support, and direct and indirect fire support.
> Include capability to operate and support advanced aviation platforms.
► Install an integrated joint intelligence center to include onboard receipt and processing of national intelligence information supplemented by on-board devices and unmanned air vehicles (UAVs). Hunter UAVs are scheduled for big-deck ’Gators (LHAs and LHDs). This short-range
UAV will provide continuous tactical reconnaissance out to almost 300 kilometers. That’s today’s capability; by 2010 and beyond, this capability will be greatly expanded.
► Install shallow-water mine countermeasures capability. Soon there will be more than 90 air-cushion landing craft (LCACs) in the inventory. Current plans call for the conversion of 12 to MCACs (multi-purpose), one of whose missions will be mine hunting. The MCAC will be a standard LCAC with skirt modifications that will enable it to house or host the necessary mine hunting and clearing equipment used by MH-53 helicopters. This combination will provide mine-hunting/sweeping, and breaching capabilities for littoral supremacy vessels.
► Build in advanced joint operations command-and-control capability to enable service as flagship for joint task force-level operations.
This ship will provide a solution to a heretofore vexing and seemingly unsolvable problem—how to confront the emerging threat from Third World forces with long-range, stealthy cruise and theater ballistic missiles. Littoral dominance will make it safe for littoral operations.
A multipurpose surface combatant could turn out to be a cost- effective alternative on a forcewide basis, in contrast to a larger number of less capable ships. Savings would come from:
► Eliminating the designing, testing, evaluating, and building of a brand new hull class
► Avoiding duplication in training, maintenance, and technical support infrastructure
► Avoiding duplication in electronic systems that currently raise the costs of new ships so dramatically
► Reducing personnel requirements
► Using a proven hull, mechanical, and electrical design Earlier predictions are becoming more certain. Given
that 70% of the world’s population lives within 200 miles of the sea, our operational focus has shifted to the littoral battlefield—an area we do not dominate—and today’s planning does not furnish our forces with the enabling platforms to obtain and maintain littoral supremacy.
The tactical environment of the littoral battlespace dictates a dramatic change in the way we conduct business. The first part of the solution is to introduce commercial shipping in the assault echelon (and planned early use of their causeways and boats) to provide logistics- over-the-shore and the subsequent sustainment capability as well as increased lift capacity. The price for this greatly enhanced capability is negligible. The platforms exist, they are fitted out—and they are deployed around the world.
The second part of the solution affords us the chance to change direction, now, by merging the LPD-17 design into the tried and true LSD-41 platform to build the littoral-supremacy ship for the 21st century.
Captain Marshall is Special Assistant to the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. An experienced amphibious sailor, he helped land Marines in Lebanon in 1982 and Grenada in 1984, and commanded the USS Germantown (LSD-42) during Operations Desert Shield- Desert Storm.