Colin L. Powell Joint Warfighting Essay Contest, 2nd Honorable Mention
In the spring of 1999, the Second Korean War taught a hard lesson in joint antisubmarine warfare to all the U.S. armed services. If sealift is disrupted, everyone loses.
Monterey Defense Institute, Monterey, California September, 2002
“Bull! . . . Bull! . . . Bull! ...”
From my position at the lectern, the last thing I wanted to hear was divisive, self-serving bickering in my classroom. I raised an eyebrow in response to the brash and unexpected outburst from a young Navy lieutenant commander at the back of the class.
The discussions in this course always came to this: the sudden rancor; the abrupt emergence of service rivalries. I would have thought the crucible of “jointness” would have amalgamated a finer specimen by now.
“It was not the Navy’s fault!” the young naval officer emphasized. “We told the Joint Force Commander we couldn’t guarantee sealift resupply until D-Day +30. We needed time to flush the subs, organize the escort, and sanitize the approach routes.”
“Hey, we had a war to run,” an Army major replied. “We didn’t have 30 days to sit on our hands waiting for the Navy to scare away a few clunky old submarines.1 The North Koreans were pouring south in corps strength. We had already airlifted two divisions from the States. The troops had to have their equipment. We didn’t have any 30 days! It was up to the Navy to protect—”
“How would you eliminate the Korean and Chinese submarine threat? Just wave a magic wand? It’s not like that in antisubmarine warfare, buddy.”
“Everything depended on resupply—everything.”
“You Army guys never could understand ASW!” “Your own admirals said it was the Navy’s role in a major regional conflict to assist the buildup of Army power.”2
“Gentlemen, please.” I finally had to say something to get the class back on track. “Remember, our goal is to review all the strategies and tactical imperatives of the recently completed Second Korean War. We must improve everyone’s understanding of the factors that drove the unified commander’s decisions.”
I looked slowly, methodically, around the room and waited. The class of 11 was calming down; some had even picked up pencil and paper to scribble down a thought or note.
“As you remember, the North Korean and Chinese submarines were the single biggest surprise of the Coalition campaign—the greatest unplanned factor. This course is intended to provide a case study of Korean antisubmarine warfare and the first-ever use of joint ASW doctrine.”
Okay, now to jump into the lesson before I lose them again. It was always a balancing act: keep their interest while pressing the bounds of their intellect. With a stab at a button on my lectern, the lights dimmed and a large-screen computer projection of my first slide sparkled to life on the front wall.
The Second Korean War: The Background
I threw myself into the lecture. It came easily. The recently completed Korean campaign was a classic, an ideal canvas for academic analysis. The war plans for the Second Korean War had been developed in excruciating detail by the best minds at JCS and the unified commands —only to unravel totally in a series of disastrous surprises.
Ah, the fools—the planners had forgotten their Clausewitz; forgotten that war is the province of chance, and that chance turns war from a deterministic science to a nonlinear art.3 Their worship at the altar of American technology blinded them to the unexpected, the unforeseen—the element of chance.
"The Second Korean War surprised no one," I began comfortably. "North Korea's belligerence had been a mainstay of Northeast Asian diplomacy for a generation, and a renewed Korean saber rattling in the spring of 1999 barely caused a ripple of concern. The well-polished CinCPac Concept of Operations for Korea astutely included every lesson from the successful Desert Storm campaign eight years previous."
"To most, North Korea simply represented a colder Iraq. Its army was large but cumbersome and technologically inferior; its air force was defenseless against stealthy aircraft and precision-guided cruise missiles; its navy was better suited to near-shore mischief than offensive operations. The conclusions were clear: The United States would have no problem subduing the North Korean military, probably in even less time than it took to smash Saddam Hussein.”
I looked up. Dead silence, but it had been dry fare so far. Give them time.
“All was well until the North Koreans stormed across the 38th Parallel. Tactical surprise was total. South Korean and American resistance evaporated in the face of both a North Korean blitzkrieg and a surprisingly effective use of battlefield chemical weapons. North Korean theater ballistic missiles rained down on distant airfields. The smoking remnants of our proud tactical air forces resembled those at Clark Air Field in the Philippines in 1941. Within a week, Seoul had fallen, and North Korean forces were 50 miles south of the Parallel. Then, incredibly, the Koreans halted and consolidated their gains behind a new defensive perimeter as they sued for peace.”
“We all thought it was going to be another Kuwait,” injected an outspoken Marine major from his seat. “We’d demand a return of captured land, threaten consequences, build up a response force, and then roll ’em back. Everyone was sure that the North Koreans would wilt.”
“Exactly,” I continued, secretly gratified that the major was sparking a classroom dialogue. “Our logistics planners swung into high gear. The reserves were called up. Extra commercial aircraft and shipping were reached. Contingency plans were activated. It was a tight timetable—”
“—and the Secret Protocol threw a wrench in the whole works.” This time, it was that young, brash Navy lieutenant commander who completed my thought.
“Yes, of course. Our planners were not prepared for the Secret Protocol between China and North Korea. The Chinese rose at the United Nations Security Council to declare that the Korean invasion was nothing more than a civil war. As it was only an internal conflict, the Chinese announced that they would deny any further introduction of ‘outside’ military force onto the Korean Peninsula, in an effort to contain hostilities. Our planners halted in their collective tracks.”
Eleven sets of eyes were now wide with interest. Even three years after the end of Korean Peninsula operations, it still made for a spellbinding tale. I pressed the advance arrow on my computer, and a new slide jumped into view on the front screen.
Planning for Major Regional Conflicts: Logistics Vital
“It always boils down to logistics, to supplies, to the movement of men and materiel to the front.” I shifted gears, the class looked up as one. "It's been the same in all wars, from Napoleon's 'An army travels on its stomach' to Schwarzkopf s 'The fighting dog is wagged by the logistics tail.'4 Raw logistics is the undisputed foundation stone of all modern combat."
"A second truism of modern U.S. warfare is that the lion's share of resupply always goes by sea. Always! The bigger the conflict or the longer the campaign, the greater the impact of sealift. Ships carried more than 95% of Gulf War logistics.5 Even the relatively brief 1973 Arab-Israeli War saw 74% of the total resupply of Israel accomplished by sealift.6 Any sustained ground or air offensive in a major regional conflict requires substantial resupply from the sea and therefore requires undeniable control of the sea lines of communication."
"The third—and most important—truism affecting any successful modern U.S. campaign is that any losses in the logistics pipeline are devastating. The United States no longer commands the huge stocks of war supplies or the ability to surge defense production lines immediately. After years of declining Defense budgets, our warfighting stocks number only what the CinCs need to fight—nothing more.”
“The end of the Cold War ushered in a new revolution in the way we fight. Our armed forces now are geared to participate in precise campaigns, not global or attrition warfare. We are smaller, more specialized. Rather than sizing our armed forces and our available supplies to overwhelm enemies through a steady buildup of massive quantities of men and materiel—as we had done for a century—the United States subtly has shifted its policy toward precision warfare along the Gulf War model. It’s a policy that is less expensive and less resource intensive, and it promises fewer casualties.”7
“So, Major,” I said, looking toward another Army officer in the back of the classroom—had he been drowsing? “Using your logistics experience, match these three truisms of modern U.S. warfare with the Korean campaign. What were the problems?”
The blank expression that met my question confirmed all speculation. “Do you mean with the submarines, sir?”
A new slide appeared in front of the class as if invoked by a magical conjuration of his spoken words.
The Impact of the Submarine
I folded my arms but punctuated my reply. “You’re exactly right, Major. Please continue.”
The Army major plowed ahead, gaining confidence with each word: “The enemy’s unforeseen use of the diesel submarine threw the campaign into a tailspin. A Chinese submarine force joined a dozen North Korean diesel submarines in patrol areas in the shallow waters off the Korean coast. They proved to be a formidable obstacle, especially their modem, quiet Kilo diesel submarines.8 No other single weapon available to the world’s regional powers today can derail a modern military campaign so totally and rapidly as a submarine. Nations have learned and relearned this lesson with regularity throughout the twentieth century.”
“And the United States recalled this axiom once more on a fiery evening at the very start of the war,” I injected quickly as I grabbed again for the spotlight of student attention. “We lost four ships from a maritime prepositioning squadron within sight of Pusan harbor. The lost equipment from just these ships would have been enough to equip the better part of a mechanized brigade.”
“The carefully crafted Time-Phased Force Deployment List and unified war plan collapsed—as did the entire Army theater logistics infrastructure. Resupply and reinforcement by sealift froze. Without a guarantee of the arrival of their heavy-lift equipment by sealift, Army troops began piling up at their transshipment airheads in the United States.”
“Other examples of mass disruption quickly followed. The Navy ordered three aircraft carrier battle groups out of the Sea of Japan until their safety could be assured; Air Force tactical aircraft stayed at distant rear bases in Japan and Okinawa until sufficient aviation fuel and ordnance at their Korean air bases could be stockpiled. Maritime commerce, so very vital to Japan’s economy, steered clear of the southern Japanese islands. Worldwide inflation skyrocketed as the expense of commercial shipping delays—and suddenly, higher maritime insurance rates were passed on to the customer.”
Initial ASW Response
"Most pundits and commentators were confused by the effectiveness of this overt Korean and Chinese submarine blockade. No credible regional submarine threat had been mounted in more than 50 years, and most thought the U.S. Navy could easily squash a force of antiquated diesel submarines."
"But the U.S. Navy—well into a decade of deemphasizing ASW in its training and equipping procurements—had few forces to commit. Because of a widespread belief at the end of the Cold War that enemy submarine opposition had evaporated, only a single ASW frigate had been built since the mid-1980s, and newly constructed destroyers lacked either the capability for ASW helicopters or a long-range towed-array sonar. Carrier-based ASW aircraft had been reconfigured for other missions. The numbers of long-range maritime patrol aircraft and nuclear attack submarines that could engage in ASW missions had been slashed.”
“Under mounting Coalition pressure to push Korean resupply into high gear, the Navy deployed its meager ASW assets: A few nuclear submarines deployed to patrol areas off the Korean coast; land-based aircraft launched from Japanese bases; and precious escort ships sailed to barrier patrols and with convoys.”
“U.S. Navy forces began to score submarine kills, but Coalition shipping loses continued to mount. Two Army prepositioning afloat (APA) ships, three chartered tankers, and two scarce amphibious transports fell victim to enemy torpedoes or submarine-laid mines within a week’s time. Irreplaceable supplies, expensive high-tech equipment, and the bodies of brave Soldiers and Marines littered the sea floor. As important, serious suggestions began to pepper the media questioning the strength of U.S. commitment to the struggle.”9
The Dawn of Joint ASW
"To increase enemy submarine attrition, the Joint Force Commander demanded even more Navy ASW forces—but there were none to tap. Naval surface combatants were stretched to the limit, filling other missions of the Coalition plan that competed with ASW assignments: traditional gunfire support, Tomahawk cruise missile strikes, or the new task of protecting against enemy theater ballistic missiles.10 At CinCPac headquarters in Pearl Harbor, an emergency ASW planning cell was established."
"I remember hearing the stories," a major in Air Force blue interrupted. "It started as a brainstorming session—no rules, no boundaries, no sacred cows. Their goal was to analyze ASW from the joint warfighting perspective. Everyone considered it revolutionary; no traditional mission was seen as less joint or more service-unique than antisubmarine warfare."
"Right!" I thumped the podium for emphasis. "One of the group's starting points was an analysis of RAF data from World War II," the Air Force major continued, "where British bombers were integrated into the anti-U-boat patrols in the Atlantic. Long-range RAF Sutherland, Liberator, and Catalina aircraft and shorter-range Wellington, Whitley, Marauder, and Hudson aircraft accounted for 247 of the reported 781 U-boat loses in the Atlantic.11 Ships and aircraft working in tandem destroyed another 32 submarines."12
"The data showed that breakthroughs in air-deployed depth charges and the development of new coordinated tactics for airborne radar proved to be the difference. That's where the Joint ASW Cell concentrated. Very few roles and missions in modern warfare cannot benefit from the application of unified planning or resources. Gone are the days when a single service has the resources to go it alone. In spite of all the naysayers to the contrary, the Joint ASW Cell found antisubmarine warfare to be no different.”
“It was a dramatic change in mind set. It became crystal clear to the Army and Air Force that they no longer could ignore the consequences of an enemy’s submarine blockade. The Navy had kept ASW so much to itself that it wasn’t until Korea that we all realized the magnitude of ASW’s enabling mission. Just as a tactical air campaign precedes the primary ground offensive, so too must the sea lanes be secured to an uninterrupted flow of war materiel before even the air campaign can begin. This realization was the first concrete step in the ‘jointization’ of antisubmarine warfare.”
“Perfect!” I pulled my lectern’s computer keyboard closer. With the flick of a finger, a blank page appeared on the projection screen. “Now, let’s do a little brainstorming of our own. Let’s list the key elements of Korean planning that brought us this new emphasis on Joint antisubmarine warfare.13
“Air Force aircraft provided radar flooding of suspected enemy submarine operating areas,” the Air Force major began.
“Deep strikes were planned against specific North Korean submarine operating bases, naval command-and-control nodes, and POL distribution points,” another Air Force officer added.
I tapped on the keyboard to add this point to the screen.
“B-52 aircraft mined the waters outside Korean submarine bases.”
“Air Force airborne tankers replaced Navy S-3 aircraft in the battle group aerial tanker role to free the Navy aircraft for ASW tasking.”
"Marine Harriers flew visual and radar patrols to sanitize potential amphibious objective areas.”
“Air Force and Marine helicopters replaced Navy helicopters in combat SAR assignments to release these assets for ASW.”
“Coast Guard cutters were readied for Korean service with Navy sonarmen integrated into their crews.”
“In a mission intended as much for its political signal as for the damage it caused, three Air Force F-117 stealth fighters attacked the submarine piers at a Chinese fleet base, damaging two Chinese diesel submarines.”
“Satellite systems were targeted toward submarine operating sites and support services. The Joint Worldwide Intelligence Communications System (JWICS) was prioritized for submarine data and antisubmarine warfare tactical briefings.”
“Joint tactical deception plans were developed to reduce submarine encounters and to force subs to expose themselves while searching.”
“Long-endurance unmanned air vehicles orbited submarine operating bases.”
“Army field units emphasized the collection of communications intercepts and other electronic emissions that could aid the ASW effort.”
Excellent! The discussion had evolved toward something even better than I had hoped.
"The Joint ASW results were dramatic,” I began in wrap-up, pointing to the lengthy list of joint ASW taskings. “These examples clearly show the strengths inherent in unified warfighting. Theater priorities were resequenced to win the ASW campaign first. Newly committed ASW assets saturated submarine patrol areas and sanitized a new main supply corridor across the Tsushima Strait. Coalition losses dropped to near zero while North Korean and Chinese submarine attrition continued to mount.”
“After ten days of intensive ASW operations, the Joint Force Maritime Component Commander declared the ASW situation sufficiently stable to commence limited sealift resupply. One week later, with no further shipping losses, the logistics spigot was turned fully open, and supplies poured into South Korean ports. Shortly after that, the full brunt of coalition air power was unleashed in a 40-day campaign as spectacular and effective as the world had witnessed during the Gulf War.”
I slipped a new slide onto the screen.
Modem Unified ASW: The Realities
"Now class, what were the most important lessons from the ASW experience in the Second Korean War?"
The Air Force major was the first to speak. "First and foremost: antisubmarine warfare impacts all services. Effective ASW enables follow-on warfighting actions. The United States is an island nation. It uses the oceans as a barrier for its defense, as a broad avenue for commerce, and as a springboard for the use of military power. An unquestionable overseas power-projection capability is a critical element of our post-Cold War national military strategy.13 All conceivable future scenarios involving the projection of U.S. military power will involve substantial levels of sealift. Airlift simply cannot carry the tonnage of war materiel necessary for today's modern high-intensity warfare. Sealift must be assured at all costs."
"Excellent!" I agreed. "The cardinal lesson should be clear: all services lose if sealift is disrupted."
"The next most important point must be that a specific ASW campaign be planned and executed in those regional conflicts where the enemy could mount a submarine threat. This ASW campaign must contain and defeat any submarine threat before the commitment of heavy air and land forces."
"Correct," I concluded. "A third lesson learned?"
"It must be that ASW is not yet 'solved'—there's no cheap solution or panacea when it comes to the submarine threat." This time it was the only Coast Guard officer in the class who spoke. "ASW remains force-intensive and has been called the 'most challenging single task in naval warfare today."4 Although the Navy must always take the lead in planning and executing the ASW campaign, due to its specialized equipment and training, significant advantages are realized if the full power and resources of a unified command are brought to bear."
"This was clearly the biggest break with traditional thinking," the Navy lieutenant commander added astutely.
"No more so than the synergy that was realized in the Gulf War air campaign when the strengths of both naval and Air Force aircraft were blended into a common Air Tasking Order." That obvious point from a member of the Air Force contingent caused the class to nod as one.
"The future gentlemen, the future. What's next?"
“As we quoted here in class: ‘Combined arms is not about integration but about orchestration.’ In ASW, the most service-unique of all missions, we learned that joint forces offer warfighting efficiencies if used as synergistic building blocks to accomplish the mission.”
The Army major had summarized my theme perfectly!
“So many people thought that ASW was ‘solved’ once the Soviets disappeared,” the Navy lieutenant commander added a quick addendum. “It was easy to latch onto those photos of derelict Russian submarines rusting at their moorings in the cold snows of Vladivostok. It was a tonic—we had so many other Defense priorities—it was easy to look away from the submarine threat.”
“But, the submarines were there all the time,” I added for emphasis. “The world’s regional navies have methodically shopped for the best of European, American, and Russian technology. They have secretly and subtly amassed submarine fleets of significant size and capability. No longer does the United States face a noisy, outdated foe with technology well into eclipse.”
“That, of course, is the irony of the modern antisubmarine struggle. Potential foes can field submarines today as far advanced over their brethren of ten years earlier as the first dreadnought was advanced over the thin-hulled capital ship of the day. And yet few appreciate the evolving threat, recognize its deadly potential, and advocate expensive defensive counters.
“When the United States or its coalitions next do battle against this most insidious of foes, they must be ready to employ all their forces, all their resources—even if they be non-traditional or non-Navy. The ASW campaign of the future may decide the ultimate contest, long before the main battle tanks, the laser-guided bombs, and the cruise missiles have had their due. These are the real lessons of this conflict; these are the real harbingers of the future unified ASW campaign.”
1 See discussion of Army logistic time lines for a major regional conflict in “The Army’s Strategic Mobility Plan,” by P. E. Elam and M. Henderson in the May/June 1992 issue of Army Logistician, p.5.
2 William A. Owens, “Living Jointness,” Joint Force Quarterly, Winter 1993, p.10.
3 Carl von Clausewitz, On War (Penguin Books, London, reprinted 1986), p.140.
4 Gary Mears and Ted Kim, “Logistics: The Way Ahead,” Joint Force Quarterly, Spring 1994, p.44.
5 Interview with VAdm. P. M. Quast, Sea Power, February 1995, p.12.
6 Global Reach—Global Power, A White Paper, June 1990, Department of the Air Force, Washington, D. C., p.14.
7 Trevor J. Bender, “High-Low Mix Must Go,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, February 1995, p.54.
8 Barbara Starr "USA keeps an eye on Now MLO to China,” Jane’s Defence Weekly, 25 February 1995, p.3.
9 John Shilling, “Is the Navy capable of protecting our sealift from enemy submarines?”, Washington Times, 25 February 1995, p. 14.
10 Eric Rosenlof, “Contingency Blues,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, January 1995, p.55.
11 Incredibly, one submarine—U-570—even surrendered to a Hudson bomber from the RAF’s 269 Squadron.
12 Norman MacMillan, The RAF in the World War, Vol. IV (Harrap & Co., London, 1950), p.71.
13 The National Military Strategy of the United States (U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., January 1992), p.10.
14 James Fitzgerald and John Benedict, “There Is a Sub Threat,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, August 1990, p.63.
15 Steven L. Carby, "Roles, Missions and JTF’S: Unintended Consequences,” Joint Forces Quarterly, Autumn 1994, p.72.
Captain Linder, a surface warfare officer, currently commands the Navy’s Antisubmarine Warfare Training Center in San Diego, California.