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Today’s strategic security environment is a product of pivotal changes in regional security, global economics, and domestic and international politics. Conflict between nations occurs on both an economic and military level—where dominance on the “battlefield” can be gauged in terms of gross domestic product, the renewal of most-favored-nation status, currency devaluations, and missile payload and throw weight. This transformed relationship is exacerbated by emerging ethnic, ideological, and cultural diversity—where political uncertainty and economic stability coexist collectively. In addition, an acrimonious bipolar relationship involving the former Soviet Union has been supplanted by a multipolarity of rogue powers, which threatens the stability of a global security framework centered around the United States.
The stability of Northeast Asia is being shaken by these rogue powers. Emerging conflicts could lead to a heightening of hostilities, which eventually could involve either a conventional or nuclear exchange through ballistic missile attacks. As a result of its defensive treaty commitments to South Korea and Japan, the United States has a leading role in providing for the secu-
Sea-based theater missile defense capabilities—such as the use of Standard missiles, fired here by the Aegis cruiser Bunker Hill (CG-52)—would justify continued U.S. presence in the Northeast Asia regional theater.
rity of its allies in Northeast Asia. In the 1994 Defense Authorization Act, the U.S. Congress established theater missile defense as “a national security priority of the United States to develop and deploy a highly effective [system] capable of countering the existing and expanding threats posed by modern theater ballistic missiles. . .
To understand the utility of TMD in the context of U.S. defense commitments in Northeast Asia, we must examine a number of issues:
► The foundations of the Northeast Asia threat
>■ The potential Asian missile threat and its effect on U.S. relationships with other Northeast Asian countries
► How these conflicts may result in hostilities initiated by North Korea and the subsequent role of a TMD system
What are the foundations of the current-day crisis in Northeast Asia?
Many feel that over the long term, stable economic competition will replace military posturing in the Northeast Asia of the 21st century. In the near term, however, the stability of the region is dependent largely upon an ad hoc framework of bilateral security and trade relationships with the United States. The North Korean nuclear missile threat represents a potential obstacle to continued growth within the Asian economies. It also represents a security challenge to a region that has relied heavily upon a now-receding U.S. military presence.
Finally, it threatens the manner in which both the Japanese and South Korean leadership view the credibility of U.S. commitment to the protection of their homelands.
The United States has responded with diplomatic negotiations, warnings of economic sanctions, the on-again- off-again threat of military exercises, and the declared incremental deployment of Patriot defensive missile systems. A recent agreement between North Korea and the United States lays the foundation for the elimination of North Korea’s weapon-oriented nuclear program. In exchange for two South Korean light-water nuclear reactors, the North has promised to shut down their graphite-style reactors and dismantle them within a decade. International opinion appears to be uncertain about the veracity of such an agreement, in view of further U.S. military reductions and the continued North Korean intransigence concerning the acceptability of the South Korean replacement reactors. In addition, the historical vacillation that North Korea has exhibited over demands by the International Atomic Energy Association concerning implied compliance with the Nonproliferation Treaty further exacerbates the issue. Against this backdrop, a review of North Korea’s nuclear and missile capabilities will provide a foundation for assessing the relevance of the perceived threat.
Globally, the United States is confronted with the proliferation of theater ballistic missiles. More than 28 countries have been confirmed as possessing TBMs, with 13 additional "possessors” projected by the year 2000-2005.2 In the Third World alone, 700 missile launchers are available to launch a stockpile of 2,300-3,200 missiles. Most of these missiles are capable of delivering high-explosive warheads at ranges anywhere from a few kilometers to several thousand miles, in time spans varying from a few seconds to a few minutes. A smaller percentage of these missiles also can deliver weapons of mass destruction. In Northeast Asia alone, the regional missile threat represented by North Korea consists of:
>• The North Korean Frog 7 is a 70-kilometer-range missile with a 435-kilogram warhead that is the shortest range surface- to-surface missile within the North Korean arsenal.
► The North Korean Scud B is a 1,000-kilogram warhead that extends the range of vulnerability to 300 kilometers, endangering the whole of South Korea except for the southern port of Pusan.
> The North Korean Scud C is a 500- kilometer missile with a 700-800-kilogram warhead that can reach any target within South Korea, as well as the southern Japanese island of Tsushima to the south.
> The North Korean NoDong-1 (Ro-Dong, Scud D) is an 800-kilogram warhead with a reported maximum range of 1,000 kilometers. Two missiles were tested successfully in May 1993 on a flight path into the Sea of Japan, one missile traveling 100 kilometers, the second traveling 500 kilometers.3
> North Korean development of the TaepoDong (TD1 and TD2) (NoDong 11, Scud E) represents a potential breakthrough in North Korean missile technology with respect to multistage capability. This missile carries a 1,000-kilogram warhead with a reported range for TD-1 of 1,500-2,000 kilometers and 2,000-3,500 kilometers for the TD-2. This missile is capable of reaching beyond Okinawa.4
From a policy perspective, the long- range missile threat of tomorrow must be addressed today. As R. James Woolsey, Jr., former Director of Central Intelligence, stated: “Of great concern is North Korea’s continued efforts to sell the missile [NoDong-1 and 2] abroad, particularly to dangerous and potentially hostile countries such as Iran. With this missile, North Korea could reach Japan; Iran could reach Israel; and Libya could reach U.S. bases and allied capitals in the Mediterranean region.”5 In addition to the NoDong-1 and 2, the development of the TaepoDong-1 and 2 missiles (ranges of 2,000 kilometers and 3,500 kilometers respectively, with a potential range of 9,600 kilometers based on the energy levels in the volume of liquid fuel)6 further threatens the stability of Northeast Asia, while extending the window of missile vulnerability even beyond Japan to the southern regions of Southeast Asia.
Because of dissimilarities in the ethnic and historical backgrounds of China, Korea, and Japan, the actual threat percep-
tion is viewed differently by each; therefore, they roust be assessed independently.
South Korea can be described best in terms °f the contradictions and ambiguities that have shaped its growth as a burgeoning Asian economic power—from the ashes of the 1950s to the massive economic and industrial expansion of the 1980s and 1990s. Perhaps it is easy to understand why this country should develop a modicum of threat denial, given the continuous threat of hostilities from its northern nemesis over the past 41 years. It is natural for the South Koreans to play down today’s security problems, in view of the stark contrast in economies between the two Koreas. Hoping for eventual reunification, many Koreans feel that appropriating additional money for extensive defense allocations is unnecessary—especially in view of the significant outlay of funds that will be needed to rebuild the northern intrastructure of a unified Korea. In addition. South Korea feels that it can continue to rely on the U.S. nuclear security promise to deter the North Koreans from crossing the Demilitarized Zone. Until quite recently, South Korea’s strategic political and mil- ttary agenda was neither focused upon nor preparing for another War on the Korean Peninsula.
North Korea is the oldest Stalinist dictatorship in existence—a combination of nuclear nemesis and economic nonentity. With the death of Kim II Sung, Kim Jong II has consolidated his father’s dynasty, outlasting a number of shadowy contenders bent on undermining the 40-year Kim dynasty. However, this dynasty is in trouble—both politically and economically. North Korea has been and continues to be politically •solated because of: its domestic adherence to communism; the ongoing Chinese rapprochement with the West; and its bellicose rhetoric and actions toward the outside world. The North Korean economy continues to decline annually by a rate of 37% because of a lack of Russian and Chinese subsidization and a Weakening indigenous consumer-goods industry.7 These inef- Hciencies have stemmed from collectivization, the continued emphasis on a heavy industrial base, and the cost of maintain- mg a large, conventional military establishment.
Kim Jong IPs answer to his political and economic problems ls to develop a nuclear deterrent. There is a divergence of thought about the way Kim Jong II plans to exploit a nuclear Weapon if and when he acquires one. On one hand is a conviction that North Korea is driven by a desire to gain political recognition, international stature, credibility, economic assistance, and regime survivability. Moreover, the country desires to establish a permanent international dialogue with the rest of the Western world, including the United States. On the other hand, North Korea’s interest lies not only in nuclear blackmail but also in the maintenance of a missile industry that will provide foreign capital as well as advanced missile technology. No matter what the North Korean mind-set, Kim Jong II is betting the survivability of the Pyongyang regime upon the acquisition of a nuclear weapon capability—which he already may have attained.
Through political activity, China has been able to undermine troy U.N. efforts to apply tangible sanctions on North Korea. The current flow of oil, food, and military technology that crosses the 850-mile mountainous border between China and North Korea will undoubtedly continue, despite any retaliatory response that the United Nations or the United States may consider. China supplies more than 25% of North Korea’s oil, which, in 1993, equated to $899.6 million in total bilateral trade.* Even if Beijing reversed its current policy and chose to support U.N. economic sanctions, the ability of the central government to curtail all trade between its northeastern provinces
Continuing his father’s dictatorship in North Korea, Kim Jong II has proved himself to be a potentially volatile threat to stability in Northeast Asia.
and North Korea would be highly questionable.
The defense of Japan during the past 40 years was guaranteed by the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty, a bilateral relationship built upon the Cold War Soviet threat. The treaty is still viewed as the cornerstone of U.S.-Japanese relations, but the demise of the Soviet threat; the ever-changing political, economic, and military realignments between Japan and its Asian neighbors; and the growing economic schism between the United States and Japan have brought into question the relevance of the treaty as it exists within today’s security environment. For Northeast Asia, the U.S.-Japan Security Tieaty has evolved into an implicit guarantee that not only precludes the growth of an offensive Japanese military but also serves to inhibit the development of an independent Japanese nuclear weapon capability. For the United States, the treaty represents an ideal military cost-sharing relationship that provides the opportunity to maintain U.S. military forces forward deployed. In addition, it provides both the justification and venue for the United States to have a voice in a regionally oriented Asian security framework. For Japan, it represents a 40-year security commitment that now is being questioned in view of the steady reduction in overseas U.S. military presence and the current inability by either the Japanese Self-Defense Forces or the U.S. military to provide a leak-proof defense against a projected North Korean missile threat.
Theater missile defense should be within the mix of forces that the United States and South Korea have to counter this threat. TMD is a system that provides both deterrence as well as warfighting capabilities against accidental, unauthorized, or deliberate limited ballistic missile strikes. TMD has become a top priority within our National Military Strategy. The Gulf War lessons learned, the Missile Defense Act of 1991, and the National Defense Authorization Acts for 1992-1994 all support the underlying premise about the importance of a credible regional TMD architecture.
In the world of deterrence, the deployment of a regional TMD architecture could alter a threat nation’s perceptions concerning the cost-benefit ratio of striking with weapons of mass destruction. If a TMD system could reduce the probability of a missile-borne offensive nuclear first strike by a factor of 95%, its effect may undermine North Korea’s confidence in the efficacy of such an attack. If North Korea cannot be deterred, however, then an enhanced warfighting defense must be developed to protect the military and civilian forces of the United States and its allies from a missile attack.
Geographically, a TMD architecture in Northeast Asia might consist of both land-based and sea-based assets, because of the proximity of ocean areas to all vital political, military, and population centers. A recent TMD study provided documentation in which an Aegis ship operating 50 kilometers off the coast of Japan doubled the theoretical effective engagement range of a land-based Patriot asset operating 25 kilometers inland.10 In addition, sea-based units can be repositioned quickly along coasts to support emergent contingency requirements. Sea-based TMD units in the Sea of Japan would be especially relevant to the defense of Japan, because incoming missiles would be engaged over water—thereby minimizing the collateral damage caused by potentially lethal intercept debris, which could include chemical and biological agents. Land-based assets are more apt to engage the target missile over land, thus placing
destruction.
>• The stability that a TMD system brings to the theater could prove to be an enhancement for peace and cooperation, a foundation for coalition building, and a guarantee of the freedom of countries to facilitate trade and secure the economic growth that is essential to U.S. and global economic well-being- Many arguments can be made to illustrate the excessive cost of such a defensive system, but the destructive cost of a North Korean nuclear missile strike would be much greater than what is required today to develop a TMD architecture. It may even be more cost-effective to make a preemptive strike against a rogue nation; however, the political, diplomatic, and military implications may preclude such action. It is imperative that we invest in an integrated missile defense today for the emerging threat contingency of tomorrow.
the affected population at risk from falling missile debris—a contentious Japanese issue.
Fundamentally, there are two significant political benefits provided by a TMD system:
► It discourages or dampens the ambitions of a nuclear “have not” country from acquiring a nuclear weapon.
► It deters a nuclear “have” country from threatening U.S. forces or U.S. allies with a nuclear-capable ballistic missile.
Beyond this, the deployment of a TMD system in the Northeast Asian regional theater provides the permanent justification of continued U.S. military presence" in Japan and Korea that enhances both the U.S. Japan Security Treaty and the U.S.-South Korean Combined Forces Command relationship. The development, acquisition, and deployment of a regional TMD architecture consisting of U.S., Japanese, and South Korean assets could become an operational reality by the turn of the century. The Japanese and South Koreans already have begun to establish land-based and future sea-based capabilities that would become the initial indigenous components of an regional TMD architecture.
The political cost of developing a multitiered TMD system with space-based cuing capability can be measured in the impact that it would have on the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty of 1972. As amended, the treaty permits a single ground-based ballistic missile defense site with 100 antiballistic-missile launchers and 100 antiballistic missiles at launch sites in the deployment area. This effectively undermines the testing and deployment of the Theater High Altitude Area (THAAD) missile, since its technical specification would not comply with the 1972 treaty. Treaty-compliance requirements define the future design specifications for a TMD system and, more important, will determine the leakage rate that a TMD system will allow in interdicting incoming nuclear-, conventional-, or biological- capable missiles.
The political cost of not developing a TMD system can be measured in the impact that this decision would have on the global crisis concerning proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. A country such as North Korea—with a theoretical capacity to couple nuclear weapons with an already burgeoning ballistic-missile industry-— places the world’s population, economic, and political centers at risk. With the marketing of North Korean Scud Cs and the NoDong missiles to such recipients as Iran, Syria, and Libya, the window of missile vulnerability will be extended to our allies in Israel. Turkey, and Saudi Arabia, as well as Southern Europe.
The benefits of a stable Northeast Asian region are tangible but difficult to quantify. The continued funding for the deployment of a multiplatform theater-missile-defense system will provide for a future missile defense capability that will directly support the National Military Strategy in the following ways.
► It protects our overseas allies and friends from a ballistic missile attack, which fulfill our collective defense responsibilities.
► It signifies to the rest of the world that the United States has the political will t0 take action against rogue powers who have acquired proliferated weapons of mass ■P.L. 103-160, Section 234(a)(8).
2Naval Research Advisory Committee 1991.
3“North Korea seen successful in test of NoDong 1 missile,” Aerospace Daily, Volume 166, No. 63, 29 June 1993, p. 539.
4Barbara Starr, “North Korea casts a longer shadow with TD-2,” Jane’s Defence Weekly, Vol. 21, No. 10, 12 March 1994, p. 1.
5“North Korea’s Ballistic Missile Programme,” Jane’s Intelligence Review, Special Report, No. 2, p. 11.
6“North Korea grasps at the stage beyond NoDong,” Jane’s Defence Weekly, 19 March 1994, p. 18.
7Jeff Taylor and James Kuhnhenn, “North Korea: Isolated and Belligerent,” The Washington Times, 25 March 1994, p. A16, col 2.
"Lena H. Sun, “North Korea Presents China with Dilemma,” The Washington Post, 17 June 1994, p. A20, col 3.
9With a hypothetical limited North Korean nuclear capability, it would be tactically feasible for the United States to assign two Patriot multimode missiles to each incoming NoDong, thereby providing a probability of kill of 0.8 per Patriot missile, resulting in an overall two-missile 95% kill capability. The two missile shots are statistically dependent on the assumption that the North Koreans are unable to saturate Patriot defenses as a result of having only a limited amount of NoDongs.
10“Summary Report of Pacific Theater Missile Defense Workshop,” National Security Planning Associates, p. 22.
"Tactically, theater missile defense assets will need to be prepositioned prior to the onset of a crisis, colocated with other forward overseas presence forces.
Commander Sears is commanding officer of the USS Michigan (SSBN-727) (Gold). He served earlier as a Federal Executive Fellow at Center for Strategic and International Studies.