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Title 10, U.S. Code, Chapter 503, states that “The Navy shall be organized, trained, and equipped primarily for prompt and sustained combat incident to operations at sea.”
Why, then, does the Surface Navy have such a difficult time institutionalizing a solid training ethic? It is because we get distracted and stay distracted until it often is too late. To improve, we must admit first that surface warfare tactical training is not as good as it could be and change our attitude toward bona fide training.
Consider the following scenario: With the ship’s deployment eight months away, the commanding officer meets with his executive officer and line department heads to stress shipwide training. All department heads report on their preparation for predeployment inspections, assist visits, and other areas of outside help. They describe their ongoing training programs, and the executive officer gives his status of the command administrative programs. The captain ends the meeting with an articulate discourse about battle readiness training and pinpoints the need for tactical and damage-control proficiency. The department heads leave confident that they have the support necessary to foster sound training programs in their departments.
The commanding officer and the executive officer then discuss other matters affecting the ship. The commanding officer inquires about the status of preparations for the admiral’s visit next week. The executive officer responds that he feels confident the ship is on track for the visit, although he is not sure of what the supply officer has in mind for the wardroom lunch menu. The commanding officer asks for the supply officer to visit after lunch to talk about the menu for the admiral’s luncheon.
The executive officer departs and decides to check on shipboard cleanliness and the status of topside preservation. When the executive officer returns to his stateroom, the command master chief stops by and asks to talk over a few items. Among other things, he says the same divisions have been delinquent on certain monthly reports to the ship’s office, and some of the chiefs have been grumbling about those four seaman who have been on the ship’s preservation team for the past five months and have hardly seen their parent divisions in the combat systems and operations departments.
That afternoon, the supply officer lays out his plan with the captain for the admiral’s visit. The captain tells the supply officer to exempt three of the mess management specialists and four of the messcooks from fire-fighting training next week so they will be on board for the admiral’s luncheon.
The captain decides to walk the tour route with the executive officer and the supply officer, and as they proceed, he becomes distraught about the lack of detailed cleaning and the need for better preservation. After the tour, the commanding officer heatedly tells the executive officer to “get the word out to the ship” that cleanliness and shipboard preservation are unsatisfactory and better be straightened out. The executive officer, in turn, assembles his subordinates to reprioritize each of their to-do lists, and throws in a few administrative reminders of his own.
Later, the commanding officer and executive officer go home satisfied they have provided leadership and direction for the betterment of the ship.
But have they? How is “strong and meaningful shipwide training” going to happen in this work environment? Certainly, the department heads in this scenario do not have training issues at the top of their lists. In addition, it is not difficult to imagine the climate of training among the crew members. But this scenario is played out weekly—if not daily—up and down the waterfront and throughout a ship’s cycle.
To “conduct prompt and sustained combat operations at sea” successfully, we must practice—again and again. To practice and excel at combat operations at sea, every officer and crew member in every ship of our Navy must share an ethic so strong that our chiefs and officers will know when they are getting distracted with peripheral activities
that should be discontinued.
Surface warriors who have been in combat say that they threw the book over the side and developed new tactics and shipboard damage-control procedures. They were forced to innovate, because their lives depended on it. These new tactics and damage-control procedures first become the new unofficial way of doing things; then they are written into law. Why can’t we be innovative and develop new ways to accomplish things while not engaged in combat? It is because it is easier to go about our administrative tasks involved with activities that produce an immediate result.
If we acknowledge that non-warfighting issues fill up most of our days, then why not reserve time—in port and at sea—for shipboard training? All of the khaki must participate. This will be difficult, since we are not accustomed to doing it, but the point is: Just do it!
First, decide what cannot be done. Look at the plan of the week and see what is scheduled from 0900-1100 every Monday, Wednesday, and Friday. While in port, notify the squadron commander, the group commander, and the base commander of this new requirement. More important, inform all of the parent organizations that your ship will need her full combat capability during these training periods, and interruptions will not be tolerated. The message will get out after the first supply or ammunition truck (each requiring large working parties) shows up at the wrong time and is turned away. Certainly, we cannot disregard our administrative duties and just train all of time. The necessary and mandated people programs must continue, and our people must be provided for through caring leadership and established personnel policies.
To change the Surface Navy ethic and to become true surface warriors, we must change our way of doing business on the ship. If we can’t decide between competing priorities, err on the side of battle training. Just do it!
Lieutenant Commander Lind is Executive Officer in the USS Caron (DD-970).
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Proceedings / January 1995