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Perfectly in tune with the emerging requirements of the new world order, carriers We, conducting flight operations during Operation Southern Watch—are critical to coalition-building, demonstrating resolve, fegional deterrence, and peace. With career presence already stretched thin, we cratch one flattop at our peril.
Tlhe resignation of Secretary of Defense Les Aspin and the $31 billion to $50 billion shortfall in fiscal year 1995-1999 Defense budget funding projections bring into question the Clinton administration s ability to stay the course outlined last year in the Bottom- Up Review. Despite President Bill Clinton s State ol the Union address, which indicated his future budgets wil "draw the line against further defense cuts,” the services— particularly the Navy—should brace for more turbulent times. The plan to build the ninth Nimitz CVN-68)- class carrier, the CVN-76, is likely to be challenged . . . for all the wrong reasons.
For the Navy, recapitalization of the fleet a program intended to ensure readiness and the ability to meet today s commitments while addressing critical issues into the next century—is the vision of the future. Key to that vision Was a minimum essential force of 12 active aircraft carriers (including one operational reserve carrier to locus
on aircrew training) and a tether policy that would stretch the Navy’s traditional carrier presence in important world regions. As laid out in the Bottom-Up Review, forward presence requirements drove a carrier force at least two ships greater than the war-fighting needs of the benchmark two major regional conflicts and clearly was an im portant consideration in the decision to sustain 12 active aircraft carriers and to continue with the planned con
struction of CVN-76. ,
Notwithstanding Secretary of Defense William Perry s commitment to a strong military and defense industrial base, the future of the nation’s carrier force and naval aviation may yet be thrown into disarray, if for no other reason than the cost of its recapitalization. This is not a new phenomenon. During debate in the House of Representatives in March 1794 about the lack of naval forces to send to the Mediterranean to counter the Barbary Pirates, the anti-Navy forces won the day—albeit temporarily-arguing that “a Navy is the most expensive ot all means of defense, and the tyranny of Governments consist in the expensiveness of their machinery.’
Still, naval forces have been indispensable—and the center of congressional attention—for the protection of U.S. citizens, property, and interests since the earliest days of the Republic. In the modern era, naval expeditionary forces have been critical components of U.S. military power, complementing other important elements of the U.S. force structure. Since the end of World War II, every President has relied upon the Navy and Marine Corps to safeguard important U.S. interests around the globe, with more than four of every five international incidents and
Aircraft carriers’ global presence equates to effective elobal reach and response—here, the America (CV-66) transits the Suez Canal and carrier aviation arrives from the sea during Operation Desert Storm. Called upon by 40 of the 42 Presidents, naval forces have been involved in more than 280 international crises since 1945. Opposite the Roosevelt (CVN-71) answers the call bperSon
Provide Comfort.
crises requiring the use of naval expeditionary forces The Navy’s aircraft carriers, far from being in the twi light of their operational lives, are perfectly in tune with the emerging requirements of the new world disorder The need for these highly flexible, effective, and powerful military forces has been dramatically and repeatedly under scored over the past few years in operations such as El Dorado Canyon (Libya 1986), Desert Shield and Desert Storm (Iraq 1990-1991), Sharp Edge (Liberia 1990) East ern Exit (Somalia 1991), Sea Angel (Bangladesh 1991) Provide Comfort (Iraqi Kurds 1991), Provide Promise (Bosma-Herzegovina 1992-1994), Southern Watch (Iraq 1992-1994), and Restore/Sustain Hope (Somalia 19921994). Aircraft carriers and naval aviation will remain key elements of U.S. responses to such crises and conflicts „ The Navy-Marine Corps strategic vision, articulated in . . . From the Sea, posits U.S. naval forces as full participants in the new national strategy for the post-Cold War era. No longer focused primarily on blue-water operations, as postulated in the Reagan administration’s Maritime Strategy, the naval service’s new emphasis is clearly placed on operations from the sea to influence events in the littoral regions of the earth. Forward-deployed, selfsustaining, combat-ready carrier and amphibious forces will continue to respond to crises and contingencies—as they did many times throughout the Cold War—to provide the initial force elements for joint combat operations,
D. PARSONS |
and to support continued participation in any sustained conflict.
Aircraft carriers support a full range of military actions. Because of the geographic advantage that sea-basing confers, carrier aviation operates unhindered by the need for transit or overflight rights or basing privileges ashore. Carriers operating in international waters near a crisis area I can monitor the situation and, if required, launch multiple strikes without having to retire from the area to replenish ordnance, fuel, or supplies. These highly mobile and survivable airfields transport, maintain, and sustain Navy and Marine Corps aircraft during high-tempo operations such as Desert Storm. Forward-deployed aircraft carriers can be joined by other carriers surging from their home ports in the United States and Japan and can generate large numbers of sorties as part of an air campaign or support the introduction of Marines and other U.S. forces. Amphibious assault ships will be able to place landing forces ashore rapidly. Large-deck carriers embarking special Marine air-ground task forces will provide the flexibility of an integrated Marine and naval aviation force to theater commanders, as well. They can respond to short, sharp actions in a more limited setting, such as the clashes with Iranian forces in the Persian Gulf in 1988 and strikes into Libya in 1986.
Carriers also can support many other nonmilitary and humanitarian missions, such as the evacuation of U.S. personnel from the Subic Bay Naval Base in the Philippines after the eruption of Mount Pinatubo in 1991, in Operation Fiery Vigil. The immediate availability of the Ranger (CV-61) was a key factor in the President’s decision to send U.S. forces to Somalia in December 1992 in Operation Restore Hope. The Ranger soon was relieved on- i station by the Kitty Hawk (CV-63); within less than a month, her aircraft were principal players in the multinational response to Iraqi violations of the Operation South-
-
^ ern Watch no-fly zone. These timely responses would not have been possible without the carrier force and its air '• Wings.
' Finally, forward-deployed carriers and air wings are a r critical component of the nation’s military posture, im- ■ portant for maintaining a meaningful forward presence 1 I and for crisis response. Current commitments, defined by I the Joint Chiefs of Staff based upon the inputs of the com- nianders-in-chief of U.S. regional commands, include the regular deployments of carrier forces to the Indian Ocean and Persian Gulf, the Mediterranean and Northeast Atlantic, and the Western Pacific. These requirements are not established by the Navy, but the Navy must maintain the capability to satisfy them.
Combatant commanders continually examine the world situation with an eye toward reducing the tempo of forward deployments, but this policy must be tempered by a realistic perspective of the prospects for peace or crisis. The National Command Authority and the commanders-in-chief historically have preferred that a forward- deployed carrier battle group be able to be repositioned on short notice to address regional contingencies. As General Colin Powell noted in the wake of the June 1993 strikes against Iraqi intelligence facilities, . . it’s also the benefit of carrier-based aircraft. One of the reasons we want to make sure that we keep strong naval forces is because they’re on the high seas and they violate no . one’s sovereignty, nor do you have to consult with anybody in their use.”
The global presence of U.S. naval forces, especially aircraft carriers, equates to effective global reach and response, an assertion supported by the weight of our na- I tional experience:
' > 40 of the 42 U.S. Presidents relied upon naval forces j to influence world events and protect U.S. interests at I some time during their administrations.
>• U.S. naval forces have been involved in more than 280 international crises since 1945—80% of all post-war incidents—and 76 since 1976.
► Of these incidents, only the Cuban Missile Crisis directly involved the forces of the Soviet Union. All others occurred in littoral scenarios against regional and local powers.
It was in this light that former Secretary of Defense Les Aspin acknowledged that the presence mission—not war fighting—drives the size of the force structure. Speaking to an Air Force symposium in late June 1993, Secretary Aspin noted, “We need our carrier battle groups to maintain a U.S. presence and to ‘show the flag’ in troubled areas such as Bosnia and Somalia, and lots of other areas. But if we base our carrier needs solely on the regional threats, we could end up with fewer than we need to maintain a strong carrier battle group presence around the world.”
That statement begs two important questions: How many are enough? How much are we willing to spend?
Two significant operational factors are the time and distance to deployment areas. Other elements, including personnel tempo and operational tempo, are taken into consideration to prevent a dramatic deterioration in personnel readiness and the material condition of the ships and aircraft themselves. To this end, the Navy attempts to set limits on the length (currently six months) and the frequency (one overseas deployment every 20 months) of extended carrier deployments and the time individual carriers spend at sea, whether in home port areas or overseas.
During the height of the Cold War, the United States maintained a minimum essential force of 15 large-deck carriers—although more than 20 carrier battle groups were required to execute the global operational plans at low- risk levels. These numbers were based on the Cold War political-military environment and national military and
Carriers |
Table 1: Carrier Presence With Central Command Focus Mediterranean Western Pacific |
Persian Gulf |
12 |
81% (2.3 mo. gap) 80% (2.4 mo. gap) |
100% |
10 |
67% (4.0 mo. gap) 65% (4.2 mo. gap) |
100% |
|
With Mediterranean Focus |
|
Carriers |
Mediterranean Western Pacific |
Persian Gulf |
12 |
100% 87% (1.6 mo.gap) 79% (2.5 mo. qap) |
|
10 |
100% 70% (3.6 mo.gap) 73% (3.2 mo. gap) |
maritime strategies that called for the United States to confront and contain the Soviet Union with its massive submarine fleet and rapidly improving surface forces in
cluding aircraft carriers. Since then, force levels for all elements of the U.S. military have been reassessed, taking into account the dramatically changed international environment, the potential for regional crises, and U.S. budgetary constraints. The United States now has a force of 12 active aircraft carriers, including one dedicated to flight-training requirements.
Today’s scheduling permits carriers to rotate periodically between forward operating areas and home ports in the United States. This rotation policy is especially important during a prolonged crisis. National leaders rely upon a timely response by carriers and amphibious forces early in a crisis to stabilize the situation; if Marines are committed ashore longer-term, carrier support is required. Should the carrier force decline below 12, the normal six- month deployment would expand to eight to nine months. This would allow the Navy to satisfy the commander-inchiefs presence and crisis-response requirements, but it would violate personnel tempo guidelines, thereby jeopardizing the retention of the Navy’s most valuable resource—its highly skilled people—and reducing the material readiness of its ships and aircraft.
It is important that the administration and Congress understand that 12 carriers cannot meet the Cold War continuous-presence goal in three world regions, a requirement that drove the previous 15-carrier force level objective. For this reason, General Colin Powell, then- Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in March 1993 implemented a global naval presence policy of flexible presence that recognizes the inevitability of carrier gaps and the need for other naval expeditionary forces to complement the carriers. By permitting forces to be within a week or so of a potential crisis spot—a tether policy— the Navy already has reduced the number of carrier battle groups from 15 to 12. We further reduce this force at our peril.
For example, a reduced force will not meet the commander-in-chief s presence, crisis-response, and war-fighting needs and would result in a significant decrease in continuous or flexible presence in the three main areas of responsibility (see Table 1).
The still-evolving Regional Defense Strategy and Defense Planning Guidance, which include requirements for forward presence as the foundation for effective crisis response, mandate that the United States have the capabil
ity to react simultaneously to two mil1' tary contingencies in different world regions—a requirement certain to be readdressed as the budget battles heat up. A 12-carrier force would satisfy this warfighting requirement. A reduction to fewer than 12 carriers would impair the Navy’s ability to surge carrier battle groups to meet national taskings in such contingencies. This force also would be capable of maintaining a continuous presence in only one area of responsibility* while significantly widening the carrier gaps of the flexible-presence policy. Another consideration is the need to maintain operational competence and readiness to meet the war-fight
ing requirements at any potential flash-point. Integrated training in the geographical and physical environments ot potential contingencies provides irreplaceable experience for our ship and air crews, affords us the opportunity to work with friendly naval and air forces, and can act as a deterrent to possible adversaries. The Navy cannot accomplish any of these important objectives in the Virginia Capes or Southern California naval operating areas.
Nondeployed, surge carriers cannot respond effectively to a short-duration crisis or early on in a prolonged crisis, particularly if the crisis is in the Persian Gulf area- For instance, the Achille Lauro incident erupted and was terminated by carrier aircraft from the Saratoga (CV-60) in three days. Power-projection aircraft from the Dwight D. Eisenhower (CVN-69) and Independence (CV-62) were within range of Iraqi targets less than 48 hours after the President gave the order in August 1990. In less than 30 days, they were joined by two additional carriers, a response that compelled General H. Norman Schwarzkopf to note: “The Navy was the first military force to respond to the invasion, establishing immediate sea superiority. And the Navy was also the first air power on the scene. Both of these first deterred—indeed, I believe stopped— Iraq from marching into Saudi Arabia.” As most U.S. forces were returning home at the conclusion of Operation Desert Storm, the carrier Theodore Roosevelt (CVN-71) was able to provide immediate support to Operation Provide Comfort, placing a protective umbrella above allied forces and displaced Kurds in northern Iraq. The carriers were the first to arrive, and they are still on station in the Gulf today.
The ability to maintain carriers on station before, during, and after hostilities is as important as being able to surge a large number of carriers for a short period of time. The initial Cold War example of this was the Korean War and its aftermath. The first post-Cold War example of this was the Persian Gulf War and continuing instability. The Bosnia-Herzegovina crisis, where a carrier has been an important element in Operation Provide Promise in the Adriatic and in supporting U.N. forces on the ground, is the most recent example of the need to maintain carriers in crisis regions for extended periods.
But what about alternatives to aircraft carriers? The Navy, responding to dramatically changed international and domestic situations, already has developed innovative ways to employ and deploy its forces to maintain a flex
ible [ force: ■iron °us t: fomi & car! fonce Men Briti: In tier i only to w Sion Nav; tatir the i carr coni and esc; crit pen ing star and pro
'^e presence throughout the world. Such alternative naval f°rces, however, are not well suited for all operational environments. For example, the ability of a future amphibi- °us task forces or similar adaptive naval force package to dominate the battlespace is significantly less than that of J carrier battle group. The absence of airborne surveil- tance assets can increase the risks to the force and friendly/neutral aircraft and ships in the area, as the British learned at great cost during the Falklands Conflict.
In fact, there are no immediate replacements for the career in modern naval warfare,
°nly complements. The degree [o which lower risks and regional threats will permit the 'iavy to rely upon such alternative forces in no way lowers !he requirement for 12 aircraft carriers. The ability to deter conflict, to respond to crises, and to ensure that they do not escalate to actual combat is critically dependent upon a Perceived and actual war-fight- >ng ability that in some instances only an aircraft carrier and its embarked air wing can Provide.
Still, there are other imperatives that affect the nation’s future course for its carrier force besides war-fighting and presence requirements or the need to reallocate already tight defense resources.
For example, force reconstitution is still an important element of U.S. national security and military strategies. We must sustain if not rebuild the nation’s aircraft carrier and naval aviation forces, surface warships, submarines, and support vessels to meet future threats and situations not well comprehended today. Strategic surprise always remains a possibility against which we should continue to plan.
Building aircraft carriers and the aircraft that operate from them is a highly complex process. It takes some nine years from the time a new nuclear carrier is funded by Congress until she enters service. New carriers cannot be turned out quickly in the event of a national emergency; the required carrier force must be built and maintained in peacetime. Nor is a cold carrier production line likely to be revived quickly, in either peace or war.
If carrier or naval aircraft construction is delayed or halted, skilled workers and critical component suppliers will disperse to other industries, if they survive at all. This force could be reassembled, but only after a long delay and at the cost of millions of dollars in retraining, seriously undermining the nation’s security strategies.
Currently, two carriers—the John C. Stennis (CVN-74) and the United States (CVN-75)—are being built by Newport News Shipbuilding in Newport News, Virginia, the only U.S. shipyard capable of building nuclear-pow-
Always easier to maintain than revive, carrier production lines ensure a diverse U.S. industrial and technological base for upkeep of the existing force and potential reconstitution.
ered carriers. Carrier construction maintains a diverse U.S. industrial and technological base required for upkeep of the existing force and for reconstitution of a larger force. The future of the domestic U.S. nuclear power industry, for instance, is almost entirely dependent upon the Navy’s nuclear-powered warship programs.
The Navy requested and Congress approved funding in the President’s fiscal year 1993 budget to begin construction of long-lead time items for CVN-76 at a total cost of about $4.5 billion. Authorization for construction
of the ship will be requested in fiscal year 1995, and will translate into a 2003 delivery date and a 50-year lifespan. Acquisition of CVN-76 will ensure that the work force and infrastructure needed to construct nuclear-powered carriers is preserved through the turn of the century.
Today’s and tomorrow’s naval aircraft also demand a highly sophisticated, experienced, and skilled work force, not to mention an industrial and research and development base capable of preserving the U.S. military’s technological edge. For example, it may require as many as 12 or more years to take a concept for an advanced aircraft to fleet introduction, and the aircraft may have to meet diverse threats during its 20-year service life.
The most fundamental goal of restructuring and rightsizing the United States’ modem warfighting organizations is to provide the means to continuously tailor these forces in anticipation and support of national—not individual service—requirements. The aircraft carrier battle group unquestionably possesses a more formidable capability than any alternative naval force that could be devised. On-scene carrier forces are important to ensuring political commitments to allies and friends, to demonstrating resolve, to coalitionbuilding, and to regional conventional deterrence and peace. Nevertheless, achieving these objectives is predicated upon preserving a carrier force of sufficient size and capability to meet the daunting requirements of a still-dangerous world. CVN-76 and 12 active carriers will provide the foundation for the future.
NEWPORT NEWS SHIPBUILDING
We scratch one flattop at our peril.
Mr. Courter, a former congressman, is chairman of the Committee for the Common Defense. Mr. Kemp, a former congressman and Secretary of Housing and Urban Development, is co-chairman of the Alexis de Tocqueville Institution. Senator Lott (R-MS) is a member of the Armed Services Committee and the former House Minority Whip. Congressman Torricelli (D-NJ) is on the Foreign Affairs Committee and is a member of the Senior Advisory Board of the Committee for the Common Defense.