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Gulf of Tonkin, December 1972: “Gentlemen, we’re going back in. My big concern is reports of missile boats "i the outer islands. This could be a threat ,0 the carriers. I want some reconnaissance to check that out.”
“No problem, Admiral. We’ll send in some of our Vigilantes. The Air Force’s Buffalo Hunter drone will be going
in thinking and action by the Department of Defense concerning tactical reconnaissance, intelligence, and the merging of imagery with intelligence data. Much concerning reconnaissance has been written since Operation Desert Storm. Early this year, the House Armed Services Committee Authorization Account stated that members were “alarmed” by attempts
connaissance. When asked for resolution requirements for tactical reconnaissance, intelligence planners normally say: “I want the best I can get, but at least Image Interpretability Rating Scale 6 or 7.” They apparently fail to realize that in the tactical area timeliness is of the essence.
Often, what gets funded is not the most critical item, but the one with the
LORAL FAIRCHILD / PHOTO: U.S. NAVY
in over Hanoi and that should hold their attention.”
Sea of Japan, 1995: “Gentlemen, the North Koreans have displayed every intention of going south. We’ll be operating in close and I’m concerned about missile boats. I want some reconnaissance to check that out. What about it, CAG?” “All the reconnaissance-capable F-14s are dedicated to combat air patrol and force defense.”
“What about Marine assets?” “They’re fragged to Corps requirements, and in addition, they’re not equipped with data link.”
“Any unmanned air vehicles?”
“None available up here, Admiral.” “National assets?”
“Depends on the weather and passover times.”
Surprising? Yes, but unfortunately, prophetic—unless there is a turnaround
to develop a tactical level reconnaissance capability.
The Pentagon in October 1993 established the Defense Airborne Reconnaissance Office (DARO) in an attempt to resolve botched tactical reconnaissance efforts, among other problems. The office’s charter, however, is virtually the same as that for unmanned air vehicles (UAVs), which was established in 1988. The UAV program did interim planning, but was plagued by protests and indecision on vehicle type. A joint solution has yet to emerge. Only time will tell if DARO’s director will evolve into a reconnaissance- intelligence czar.
Tactical aircraft reconnaissance languishes for several reasons. Foremost, it competes for funds with other high-visibility programs; second, it lacks a sponsor; and third, it lacks support from the intelligence community, which seemingly cannot separate tactical from strategic re
The diagram indicates advanced tactical airborne reconnaissance system (ATARS) and long-range oblique photography system (LOROPS) capabilities. ATARS contains low- and medium-altitude electro-optics (LAEO/MAEO) and an infrared line-scanner (IRLS).
This Marine F/A-18D tested its nose- mounted ATARS at Patuxent River.
strongest lobby and the most sponsors. Without identified requirements, concepts are consigned to research and development projects that never become operational. An unnamed Air Force officer put it succinctly in the 17 January 1994 issue of Aviation Week & Space Technology: “Recce [reconnaissance] is fundamentally broke because the whole paradigm rotates around the inner circle in Washington . ... In spite of all the rhetoric, intelligence is still in gridlock.”
LORAL FAIRCHILD (BOTH)
A 152nd Reconnaissance Group RF-4C launches from Hill AFB, Utah, during tests of an electro-optic long- range oblique photography system (EO-LOROPS) at Salt Lake City.
advocated electro-optic (EO), infrared (IR) and synthetic aperture radar (SAR). It was inevitable that EO would overcome film because of the environmental concerns surrounding the disposal of film processing chemicals, the need for real or near real-time imagery, reduced support and maintenance costs for EO, and projected lower operational failure rate for EO. The tradeoffs essentially are quality of imagery and timeliness versus cost and flexibility.
In 1985 the Air Force became lead service for all EO sensors and the Navy assumed responsibility for UAVs. Subsequently, the Air Force introduced EO tactical sensors, replacing film, by de
veloping what became the Advanced Tactical Airborne Reconnaissance System (ATARS). Air Force RF-4Cs and F-16 reconnaissance variants were scheduled to carry it. The Navy and Marine Corps decided to place it on their F/A-18RC (Reconnaissance Capable). The ATARS program was plagued from the start by contractual and technical problems—• and its schedule slipped.
Its digital tape recorder turned out to be a critical problem—as predicted. In 1987, even before the ATARS contract was signed, a government official stated that “Development of a digital recorder that can handle the vast amount of information involved will be one of the
Traditionally, reconnaissance, surveillance, and intelligence-gathering receive much attention in time of war and crises but are otherwise given low priority. Reconnaissance efforts have been complicated by a lack of consensus on the future of sensors. One faction believed that only the smallest possible spot size and best resolution—such as provided by film-based cameras—would do. Others
workable weapon systems and tactical commanders must insist that acquisition activities provide for their tactical reconnaissance needs, rather than relying on the intelligence community. This is a generalized statement, of which the tactical reconnaissance program is a specific example. Until such operational control exists, tactical reconnaissance requirements will remain unfilled.
Admiral Stanley Arthur, a combat-experienced leader, was quoted in the 17 January 1994 issue of Aviation Week &
RECON OPTICAL (BOTH)
~CON OPTICAL (BOIn) .
A Nevada Air National Guard RF-4C flying 480 knots | picture using an electro-optical framing camera during Operation Roving 1 Sands a Joint Chiefs of Staff-sponsored exercise held in New Mexico last May. Imagery recorded in-flight on a digital tape recorder was enhanced and displayed for analysts on the ground system shown at right.
greatest challenges of the program.’’ To date, no recorder has met specifications. Unit costs kept increasing as total production quantities decreased and the Air Force Chief of Staff’s held that manned tactical air reconnaissance was not part of the Air Force mission. Hence, the Air Force, with no mission for the sensor and continuing schedule and contractual problems, opted to terminate.
The Navy already had invested heavily in ATARS, including modifications to an F/A-18 for installation, and decided to test the system on the aircraft. An industry-government team assembled at Naval Air Warfare Center, Aircraft Division, Patuxent River, installed the system in an F/A-18D and conducted test flights of the low- and medium-altitude sensors, and the infrared line scanner. The tests have been successful and the Navy plans to buy 31 ATARS kits, fit them on Marine Corps F/A-18Ds, and later procure the system for Navy F/A-18s.
Concurrent with ATARS, the Air Force acquired a long-range stand-off sensor for use in the RF-4C. Fairchild Westin Systems (now Loral Fairchild Systems) got a contract in 1988 for 12 electro-optic long-range oblique photography systems (EO-LOROPS). Specifications called for a resolution of three feet from 2 to 40 miles at high altitude. This sensor, the AN/AVD-5, after some technical problems and schedule changes, resumed testing in May. Flights to date have produced imagery that merits continued development. Because the active Air Force no longer flies RF-4Cs, the sensors and associated ground exploitation
systems are undergoing qualification testing and evaluation at Hill Air Force Base, Utah, using an RF- 4C from the Nevada Air National Guard’s 152nd Reconnaissance Group.
The Navy acquired two EO-LOROPS sensors for evaluation on an F/A-18 and in 1992 awarded a contract to Loral Fairchild Systems for development of a pod-mounted system for the F/A-18D and upgrade with an infrared capability. This program is on hold while the Navy evaluates tactical reconnaissance requirements versus budget constraints.
Senior officials are getting conflicting reports. Congress says the nation needs tactical reconnaissance, the Air Force pulls out, the Navy concentrates on ATARS, and the Pentagon’s new airborne reconnaissance office has yet to be recognized as equal with national agencies. To complicate matters, operational requirements documents are outdated and do not reflect an insight into capabilities that will soon exist, such as ATARS, EO- LOROPS, and synthetic aperture radar.
The dialogue that previously existed between the operating forces and activities tasked to provide those forces with adequate equipment has become virtually nonexistent. Drastic changes are required. The operating forces must realize that acquisition activities are just that, acquisition activities. In the 1970s and 1980s there was a push to create a cadre of acquisition specialists at the expense of operational experience—we are now reaping the rewards of that concept.
The operating forces must demand
Space Technology: “Tactical intelligence will still have a place in the future. We can’t always believe that the eye in the sky will be able to tell us everything we need to know at the precise instant we need to know it.”
Major General Kenneth Israel, U.S. Air Force, Director, DARO, wants to “significantly improve” coupling between reconnaissance and weapons such as precision-guided munitions. Thus, there are leaders who acknowledge the requirement and are concerned that it is not filled. The situation in North Korea is only the most recent of what has been a continuing story. Often forgotten is that national as- sets—read satellites—are designed to monitor relatively static problems, not to meet tactical requirements that require answers within hours or minutes.
There are answers. Airborne tactical reconnaissance sensors can be installed on virtually any platform, and sensors are either available or soon will be. What is lacking is the focal point to educate military planners and Congress on the nee for tactical reconnaissance assets. Leaders must be willing to take charge now or tactical reconnaissance will drift into a haze of memories and sea stories until the next crisis.
Commander Leygraaf, who supports the F/A-18 office at the Naval Air Systems Command, is a retired naval aviator with a background in reconnaissance.