This html article is produced from an uncorrected text file through optical character recognition. Prior to 1940 articles all text has been corrected, but from 1940 to the present most still remain uncorrected. Artifacts of the scans are misspellings, out-of-context footnotes and sidebars, and other inconsistencies. Adjacent to each text file is a PDF of the article, which accurately and fully conveys the content as it appeared in the issue. The uncorrected text files have been included to enhance the searchability of our content, on our site and in search engines, for our membership, the research community and media organizations. We are working now to provide clean text files for the entire collection.
Once A Legend: “Red Mike” Edson of the Marine Raiders
Maj. Jon T. Hoffman, USMCR. Novato, Presidio Press, 1994. 416 pp. Ind.
Maps. Photos. $24.95 ($22.46).
Reviewed by Lieutenant Colonel Gary D. Solis, U.S. Marine Corps (Retired)
In course of researching this biography of Brigadier General Merritt A. Edson, the author interviewed a veritable Who's Who of Marine Corps historical figures, unearthed a trove of personal documents and letters, and pored over a Wealth of official records. It all was worth •t because Major Hoffman has produced an impressive book that encompasses not °nly the man—a complex figure of almost superhuman valor and all-too- human weaknesses—but also his times— the Central American incursions of the ‘nterwar years, the memorable battles in 'he Pacific, and the Marine Corps’ postWorld War II fight for survival.
Merritt Edson was commissioned late ln 1917, and he reached France too late to see any combat. In 1922, after a series °f postwar assignments that included a contentious stint at the nascent Marine Corps Institute, Edson qualified as a naval aviator. At the time, the Marines had but 40 airplanes and he managed to destroy more than his share of them with some sPectacularly inept landings. Returned to lhe infantry in the late 1920s, he soon Was fighting Augusto Sandino’s Nicaraguan rebels. Among other exploits, Edson led the storied Coco River patrols deep into rebel territory, displaying Unusual initiative and courage as well as his hallmark knack of gaining the best from his men. As did other Marine giants like Lewis B. Puller and Herman Han- fokan, Edson gained invaluable tactical experience and jungle-warfare savvy that became crucial in the battles against the Japanese. Major Hoffman’s crisp description of those arduous patrols shows dearly the demands placed upon young lieutenants who were virtually on their °wn. As a China Marine in the 1930s, Edson served with many men who would dominate the Marine Corps over the next 40 years—e.g., Victor Krulak, Wallace Greene, Robert Hogaboom, and Clifton Cates—and formed close ties with them.
But it was during World War II that Edson made his lasting mark, and it is here that the subject matter and Major Hoffman’s seamless writing combine to make especially fascinating reading. In mid-1941, Edson took command of the 1st Battalion, 5th Marines, a unit that eventually evolved into the 1st Raider Battalion. The Raider concept survived only about two years, but while in command of the 1st Raiders, Edson proved to be a prototypical combat leader. He was dedicated to the task of molding the battalion into a skilled and aggressive fighting team—demanding of his men, but also compassionate and imperturbable.
The Raiders were first tested in combat in 1942, when they landed on Tu- lagi to support the main landing on Guadalcanal. Successful there, they moved on to Guadalcanal itself. Some readers will recognize these sections of the book from Major Hoffman’s fine Heinl Award-winning series of articles published in the Marine Corps Gazette in recent years. Not content with merely summarizing other accounts, Major Hoffman sheds new light on familiar battles. His riveting account of the stand on Edson’s Ridge made by the Raiders and elements of the 1st Parachute Battalion on 13-14 September 1942 is rich in detail and descriptive nuance. Edson received the Medal of Honor for his heroic leadership in this battle and was praised by Major General Archer Vandegrift, who wrote to Lieutenant General Thomas Holcomb, then Commandant of the Marine Corps: “This man Edson is one of the finest troop leaders I ever saw.” Author Hoffman shows clearly why both the medal and Vandegrift’s praise were richly deserved.
In December 1942, Edson and his Raiders were sent to Australia for rest and refit. The string of garrison imbroglios left behind by Edson and his Raiders give the disturbing impression that, in Brisbane and Melbourne, Edson’s attention to duty was less than exemplary. Nevertheless, in October 1943, Edson was transferred to the 2d Marine Division as chief of staff and was with the division for its assault on Tarawa.
At Tarawa, Edson remained on the division staff. It was crucial duty at which he excelled, but not the combat command he desired. However, as Major Hoffman details, Edson played a significant role in the Betio assault, especially when he relieved a wounded and worn-down David Shoup. At Tarawa, Edson displayed the same morose fatalism and almost complete disregard for his own safety that he had shown on Guadalcanal.
Beginning in this period, and through
out the landings on Saipan and Tinian in which he played important—if background—roles, Edson displayed an unseemly hunger for promotion and awards—the latter unsatiated by a Medal of Honor, two Navy Crosses, a Legion of Merit, and a Silver Star. The author adroitly details these and other darker parts of Edson’s character—such as his flagrant and lifelong womanizing—while maintaining the reader’s overall sympathy for the man.
Promoted to brigadier general before more than 100 more senior colonels, Edson became chief of staff of the fledgling Fleet Marine Force Pacific and later the first commander of Service Command, the forerunner of today’s Force Service Support Group. Although his promotion to flag rank and his staff postings distanced Edson ever further from combat—he missed the Guam and Okinawa assaults entirely—his influence on Marine Corps policy grew ever more significant. Throughout his career, Edson was an imaginative military thinker, even something of a visionary. This attribute and his close friendships with officers who achieved senior rank in wartime gave his ideas an influence within the Marine Corps far out of proportion to his rank and assignments. Showing a fine appreciation of intraservice politics, the author also brings out Edson’s pronounced disdain for Evans Carlson, the ruthless jockeying for permanent flag grade by senior officers with temporary wartime promotions, and the ineptitude of several senior Marine commanders.
The war ended before Edson could earn the second star and command of a division—which he coveted equally. He became embroiled almost immediately, however, in the long and fiercely fought conflict over unification of the armed forces. This period of Edson’s career might not interest many readers, but his contributions during this period can be considered Edson’s most significant to the Marine Corps. Perhaps the author overstates Edson’s role in the bitter interservice and political fighting somewhat, but there’s no denying that it probably ended his career. Warned by many in and out of the Corps—including the politically timid Commandant, General Archer Vandegrift—to give up the fight, Edson continued to lobby Congress openly and to assert the Marine Corps position forcefully in public.
In 1947, wanting no part of the legis-
lation he was unable to derail, Edson abruptly retired. Despite his sterling combat record and invaluable efforts during the unification battles, he received neither retirement ceremony nor parade; instead, he retired with a substandard fitness report. In the remaining years before his death in 1955, Edson served as Vermont’s first Commissioner of Public Safety and, beginning in June 1951, was the executive director of the National Rifle Association.
Some readers might wish for more clarity in the author’s essay on sources; it is not always easy to discern the sources of many of the quotations used. However, most readers probably won’t care. Overall, Once a Legend is an objective look at a truly legendary Marine; a study made invaluable by the author’s close and honest examination of Edson’s strengths and faults—and there were several of each. For the general reader looking for a good story, and for the military professional searching for significant lessons, this is a book not to be missed.
Lieutenant Colonel Solis, a former tracked vehicle officer and judge advocate, is the author of Marines and Military Law in Vietnam: Trial By Fire (U.S. Marine Corps History & Museums Division, 1989). He currently teaches law at the London School of Economics.
War and Anti-War: Survival at the Dawn of the 21st Century
Alvin and Heidi Toffler. Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1993. 252 pp. Bib. Ind. Notes. $22.95 ($20.66).
Reviewed by Mark R. Shulman
Although it hardly can be called a science, the study of trends for the purpose of predicting the future has made some progress since the days of Jules Verne and even George Orwell. Alvin and Heidi Toffler, perhaps the best-known futurists, have written earlier books on the impact of technological advances upon societies—Future Shock (Random House, 1970), The Third Wave (William Morrow, 1980), and Powershift (Bantam Books, 1990). Now, with War and AntiWar, they turn their attention to the evolution of warfare in the next century.
First, the authors bring the uninitiated up to speed by summarizing their thoughts on the “waves” of civilization presented in their earlier works. The First Wave comprised premodern or agricultural society, wherever and whenever it existed or now exists. The Second Wave created the modern societies of the Enlightenment and the Industrial Revolution. The Third Wave, only now materializing, is characterized by postmodern values as much as by informational technologies of untold power. Not surpris
ingly, the Tofflers see a world on the cusp of dramatic change—as microcomputers, robots, and advanced communications networks reshape the world as dramatically as the hoe and the internal-combustion engine did before them. Nevertheless, as during the First and Second Waves, development occurs unevenly in the world. The Third Wave is sweeping through North America, Western Europe and Japan, but has bypassed much of the First- and Second-Wave world.
Moreover, the Tofflers observe, as with the previous Waves, the Third Wave has its own distinctive way of war. Premodern societies fight with only rudimentary machines; a hallmark of modem warfare is the massing and maneuvering of gigantic formations of aircraft, armored vehicles, warships, and personnel. On land, postmodern civilizations use relatively small units of highly trained soldiers. They are guided to their targets by satellite navigation systems; they fire laser-guided weapons; and they use lightning-fast infiltration and exfiltration techniques. Third Wave naval combat features cruisers and destroyers equipped with the Aegis combat system, which can track and destroy dozens of targets simultaneously with guided missiles while firing cruise missiles at targets hundreds of miles away. Such ships have shattered conventional notions about limitations on warships’ power and accuracy.
According to the Tofflers, the Persian Gulf War was actually two wars. There was a Second-Wave war in which the U.S.-led Coalition’s armor, artillery, and infantry—backed by 30-year old bombers and World War II-era Iowa (BB-61)-class battleships—fought Iraq’s armor, artillery, and infantry. There also was a Third-Wave war in which stealth and other advanced technologies were used in a campaign of customized destruction. Fortunately, the United States and its allies were capable of winning both wars.
In the technological respect, at least, the Tofflers improve on Jules Verne by bringing together a number of plausible situations. They predict that the Third- Wave military technology used in the Persian Gulf is only the beginning. For example, soon there will be ant-sized robots that will be able to infiltrate an enemy’s defenses, nausea-stimulating broadcasts, and teflon-like sprays that will render airstrips inoperable. Unfortunately, these fantastic weapons and others like them will not be ours alone, for proliferation is bringing the newest in warfighting technology to renegade states, drug cartels, and Islamist terrorists.
The authors have not, however, improved on George Orwell, the outstanding futurologist of politics. They gener
ally limit their predictions to technolog' | ical change. Although they allude to the ■ relative decline of a nation-state system. | they do not take this theme very far. The Tofflers’ political analysis rarely extends beyond the not-so-astounding prediction that the brave new world will populated by a number of “Husseins.”
Echoing Sun Tzu, the authors point out the importance of avoiding war and offer a solution: “anti-war.” In the future, peace will not be gained and maintained by the expansion of democracy, the increase of wealth, or the use of active diplomacy- Instead, the world will avoid wars only if concerted use is made of anti-war technology—e.g., gasses that will make drug lords too groggy to fight, paint that will weaken bridges, and “clipper chips” that will immobilize aircraft in time of war.
This book has its defects. It contains more typographical errors than a responsible editor should have allowed. Nearly every page has an annoying and frequently irrelevant subtitle—e.g., “The Duck Soup Phenomenon,” “Laughing in the Info-Sphere,” and “Six Wrenches that Twist the Mind.” Finally, the research appears too often limited to reports from Defense News or interviews with military officials in charge of technological forecasting. Name-dropping frequently substitutes for data. As such, War and AntiWar often seems less serious critical commentary and more propaganda for huge research-and-development budgets.
Like most books about the extremely broad topic of world war, politics, and economics in the future, War and AntiWar comes up short in many areas. Paul Kennedy’s Preparing for the Twenty-first Century (Random House, 1993) provides a more interesting analysis of political, demographic, and economic change. Samuel Huntington’s “Clash of Civilization,” which appeared in the Summer 1993 Foreign Affairs and Daniel Patrick Moynihan’s Pandemonium: Ethnicity in International Politics (Oxford University Press, 1993) provide more useful examinations of intercultural conflict. And Martin van Creveld’s The Transformation of War (Free Press, 1991) offers more penetrating examinations of trends in warfare. However, none of these authors offer such a vivid portrayal of the growing gap in technological capability between the developed and the developing worlds as the Tofflers do. Thus, even with its shortcomings, this book provides a provocative look into the future.
Dr. Shulman taught military history at Yale for several years before joining the National Strategy Information Center in Washington, D.C., this year. His book Navalism: Politics and the Emergence of U.S. Naval Strategy is forthcoming from the Naval Institute Press.
Books of Interest
America’s Cutting Edge: U.S. Marine Corps Roles and Missions
pol. John E. Greenwood, USMC (Ret.), and t-l-Col. C. P. Neimeyer, USMC (Eds.). New York: American Heritage Custom Publishing Group,
365 pp. Notes. Photos. $30.00 ($27.00).
An anthology representing “the best of what nns been written about the historical development of the United States Marine Corps,” the essays in this collection trace the evolution °f the Marine Corps and analyze the forces which have shaped it. Beginning with Bruce Catton’s “The Marine Tradition” and ending 'dth Major Kenneth F. McKenzie’s “The Ma- r,ne Corps of Tomorrow,” the book’s 25 essays cover many different elements in the Ma- r,ne Corps’ development and include the "'riting of many well-known authors—e.g., Allan R. Millett, Victor Krulak, Edwin Simmons, Jack Shulimson, John G. Miller, R. D. HeinI, Jr., and B. H. Liddell Hart.
The Defense Policies of Nations:
A Comparative Study: Third Edition
D°uglas J. Murray and Paul R. Viotti, Editors. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1994. 635 pp. Bib. Figs. Gloss. Ind. Maps.
N°tes. Tables. $25.95 ($23.36). Paper.
This latest edition of a book that debuted in 1^82 sheds light upon the defense policies of 20 different nations and regions of the world— mcluding Korea, Germany, Latin America, SubSaharan Africa, and the former Soviet Union. Each essay is written by an expert in the field and many are supported by informative data, mbles, and maps. The last edition of this useful book was described by Military Review as authoritative, thoroughly documented, tightly vvritten, and unique in its field with respect to methodology and objectivity.”
D-Day Plus Fifty Years:
The Normandy Beaches Revisited
henry Rasmussen. Novato, CA: Top Ten Publishing, 1994. 192 pp. Photos. $39.95 ($37.96)
Nearly 400 photographs—almost half in color—capture the eerie quiet and the great cacophony of war on one of the world’s greatest battlefields. Rasmussen has combined con- lernporary photos with historic ones and the effect is powerful to say the least. One does Pot have to be a veteran of D-Day to feel the haunting quality of these images, to see today’s Peaceful scenes contrasted with the urgency of •hat great moment a half-century ago when history was being made on the grandest of scales.
A Different War: Marines in Europe and North America
bt.Col. Harry W. Edwards, USMC (Ret). Washington, DC: Marine Corps Historical Center, •994. 33 pp. Bib. Maps. Photos. $2.50 ($2.50). Paper.
Another in the ongoing Marines in World
By Lieutenant Commander Thomas J. Cutler, U.S. Navy (Retired)
War II Commemorative Series, this contribution focuses on aspects of Marine operations rarely considered. The roles of Marines in Operations Torch (North Africa) and Overlord (D-Day) are covered as is the less-glamorous but strategically essential garrisoning of Iceland. Like the others in this series, this pamphlet is loaded with photographs and sidebars that enhance the basic presentation, providing a fact-filled and revealing glimpse of a particular aspect of the Marine Corps’ contributions to victory in World War II.
Encyclopedia of the American Military: Studies of History, Traditions, Policies, Institutions, and Roles of the Armed Forces in War and Peace
John E. Jessup, Edilor in Chief. New York:
Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1994. 3 vol. 2,255 pp. Bib. Ind. Maps. Tables. $305.00 ($305.00). Order directly from publisher. Cost includes shipping.
A component of Scribner’s American Civilization series, this three-volume encyclopedia covers many aspects of the U.S. military, weapon systems, the intelligence community, and major conflicts, and weapon systems. Seventy original essays are arranged thematically into six major subject areas: War in the American Experience; Formulation of American Military Policy; The Roles of the Armed Forces; The American Military in War and Peace; Military Arts and Sciences; and Military Practices. Also included is an 80-page “Appendix of Military History.”
Evolution of Engineering in the Royal Navy: Volume 2: 1939-1992
Cdr. P. M. Rippon, RN. London, UK: The Institute of Marine Engineers, 1994. 430 pp.
Gloss. Illus. Ind. Photos. $94.00 ($94.00).
The borders between British and U.S. naval technological development are vague and often insignificant; therefore, this book—despite its focus upon the Royal Navy—will prove interesting and informative to American readers. Presenting detailed information on ship construction, main propulsion systems, fuels and lubricants, radar, carrier aviation components, submarines, ordnance, and many other topics, the book contains many excellent photographs and line drawings that take much of the mystery out of the technology described.
<X< The Last Year of the Kriegsmarine: May 1944-May 1945
V. E. Tarrant. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1994. 256 pp. Append. Bib. Illus. Ind.
Maps. Notes. Photos. Tables. $32.95 ($26.36).
For the German Navy, the Battle of the Atlantic essentially was lost by the middle of 1943, but in what would prove to be the last year of the war, a glimmer of hope was provided for German admirals by the new weapons—the Schnorkel, sea-launched mis
siles, acoustic torpedoes, and high-speed submarines—making their debut. Why those weapons failed to regain the initiative at sea and how the hopes and lives of many sailors were lost is the focus of this incisive look at the last year of the German Navy.
A League of Airmen: U.S. Air Power in the Gulf War
RAdm. James A. Winnefeld, USN (Ret.), Preston Niblack, and Dana J. Johnson. Santa Monica, CA: Rand, 1994. 360 pp. Append. Bib. Figs. Gloss.
Ind. Maps. Notes. Photos. Tables. $30.00 ($27.00) Hardcover. $15.00 ($13.50) Paper.
Both the contributions and the limitations of air power in the Persian Gulf War are carefully analyzed in this study. Vital issues are addressed—e.g., the tactical and strategic significance of airpower in a war of this nature; the degree of “jointness” in the campaign; and the roles of technology, training, and individual skills. The study is objective and the conclusions are important. None of the U.S. air components emerges untarnished from the authors’ scrutiny, but all readers should find valuable lessons—and grounds for justifiable pride—in these pages.
Misfire: The History of How America’s Small Arms Have Failed Our Military
William H. Hallahan. New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1994. 578 pp. Bib. Illus. Ind. Notes. $30.00 ($27.00).
While the subject of this book may seem to have relevance only to those who must carry small arms into battle, there is a great deal more to this account. It is a story of the paralytic influences of bureaucracies and the terrible effects that can result from professional rivalries and governmental inflexibility. It is
an often troubling, yet hopefully edifying, account of how the ineptitude of an organization prolonged the Civil War, multiplied the casualties of World War I, and caused a whirlwind of controversy in Vietnam. Although a history book, Misfire also is a stimulating “call to arms” (pun intended) for the enemies of bureaucracy and special interests. Few will fail to be stirred by the book’s final sentence: “Are we going to be caught once again in a major war with the wrong rifle?”
Book Order Service
In addition to its own books, the U.S. Naval Institute offers members and others a Special Order Book Service for books in the review sections and most other U.S., Canadian, British, German, French, Spanish, and Italian books. Members receive discounts as indicated (in parentheses); non-members may use the service to purchase books at list price.
To order Naval Institute books (marked ),
Use the U.S. Naval Institute Order Form below, left, or call (800) 233-8764 or (410) 224-3378.
To order books published by other publishers,
Use the designated Special Order Form below, right, or call (800) 223-7229.
New Challenges for Defense Planning: Rethinking How Much is Enough
Paul K. Davis (Ed.). Santa Monica, CA: Rand, 1994. 780 pp. Bib. Figs. Ind. Notes. Tables.
$35.00 ($31.50) Hardcover. $20.00 ($18.00)
Paper.
Twenty-three papers describing Rand studies of defense planning in the post-Cold War era scrutinize, predict, and postulate the various issues involved in defense planning for today and the future. Major subheadings group the essays according to their relevance to “Principles for Defense Planning,” “Planning at the Strategic Level,” “Planning at the Operational or Campaign Level,” and “Building the Defense Program.” Some of these papers have already been influential in developing defense policies while others offer valuable food-for- thought. The editor’s intention is to include those papers “that are problem-focused and interesting, that describe enough of the research and analytic reasoning to convey a sense of how the studies were conducted, and that should be useful for some years.”
To Die Gallantly: The Battle of the Atlantic
Timothy J. Runyan and Jan M. Copes (Eds.). Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1994. 375 pp. Bib. Figs. Gloss. Ind. Maps. Notes. Photos. Tables. $55.00 ($52.25) Hardcover. $17.85 ($16.96)
Paper.
Recognizing the importance of the Battle of the Atlantic to the ultimate outcome of World War II, the North American Society for
Oceanic History—with the assistance of the U.S. Naval Historical Center—devoted it*' 1992 annual meeting to a commemorative look at that pivotal campaign. This book is a collection of the papers presented at that conference and includes such topics as “Code* and Ciphers,” “The Atlantic in the Strategic Perspective of Hitler and Roosevelt,” “The U-Boat War off the Outerbanks” and “Mahan’s Principles and the Battle of the Atlantic.”
We’re in This War, Too: World War II Letters from American Women in Uniform
Judy Barrett Litoff & David C. Smith. New York: Oxford University Press, 1994. 288 pp. Bib. Illus- Ind. Photos. $25.00 ($23.75).
Library Journal says that “Litoff and Smith succeed in bringing a fresh perspective to this collection of letters from American women in uniform. All aspects of the war are covered, including the contributions women made stateside as well as in Europe and Asia.” The excerpts in this book were culled from a collection of 30,000 letters amassed by the authors, and this correspondence represents a wide variety of social, ethnic, economic, and geographic backgrounds. From the factories of the Home Front, to the battlefields of Anzio and “the Bulge,” to the remote corners of China and New Guinea, these letters are a window on the sweeping panorama of World War fl that reveal not only the U.S. role in the war but the many contributions that U.S. women made to victory.