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The Waterways Are Ours to Watch
By Lieutenant Commander Thomas P. Marian, U. S. Coast Guard
United States Coast Guard missions
;di- have waxed and waned over the
decades. Rum runners have been replaced n ( by sophisticated drug smugglers, ocean
i, ! station duty has been eclipsed by Alien
e : Migration Interdiction Operations, and
i as thankfully, Maritime Defense Zone Op- as j Rations have been given a proper prior- lbat 'ty. Now, in the aftermath of the Exxon re- ; Valdez oil spill, the nation’s lifesavers i must recognize that waterways manage-
ir ment, particularly Vessel Traffic Services,
i needs attention.
i- A Vessel Traffic Service (VTS) em
- Ploys a variety of sensors to track water- d- borne traffic and communicates with
The remote radar site near Valdez, Alaska, and the Coast Guardsman at a radar screen in New York are part of a system that can be of significant aid to mariners in congested waters.
ticipating vessels via VHF radio. Its primary goal is to manage the limited space in which large numbers of vessels are moving. Whether that space is the narrow confines of the Houston ship channel or the entire breadth of the Strait of Juan de Fuca, a Vessel Traffic Center (VTC) religiously tracks tugs, tankers, and freighters in its area of responsibility. It may get the job done with closed-circuit television cameras, an array of radar and communication sites, or a good old-fashioned plotting board. Regardless of the equipment, the goal of the eight operational VTSs throughout the United States is to prevent collisions and groundings.
It is hardly a glamorous mission; no dramatic rescues of beleaguered crews in the teeth of a gale or boardings of vessels loaded with illicit cargoes. Yet, safeguarding vessels and the marine environment subject to U.S jurisdiction from destruction, damage, or loss resulting from vessel mishaps has important benefits for all.
As the heart and soul of waterways management, a Vessel Traffic Service works closely with adjacent Captains of the Port and Coast Guard Groups in reporting hazards to navigation, vessel ca- sualties/deficiencies, safety zone violations, and mariners in distress. A VTS also provides a service to the public when it issues routine traffic advisories, passes aids-to-navigation discrepancy information, reports weather warnings, manages federal anchorages, assists disoriented vessels (particularly during conditions of reduced visibility), and polices VHF use.
Other state and federal government agencies have benefited from VTS capabilities. The Army Corps of Engineers and State Departments of Natural Resources have established dump site monitoring programs with the Coast Guard in ports equipped with a VTS. Law enforcement agencies, particularly U.S. Customs, have worked with several VTSs in tracking suspicious vessels. The concept and the equipment lend themselves to a new way of managing waterways for the Coast Guard.
Unfortunately, with all these services at a VTS’s fingertips, waterways management remains a Coast Guard stepchild, shuffled from department to department, a prime candidate for budget cutting—as
t
when New York and New Orleans lost their Vessel Traffic Services during a round of fiscal paring in 1987. Today, the tide has turned and Vessel Traffic Services are enjoying a period of unprecedented attention. Yet the resource battle has just begun. How did we get here?
In the early morning hours of 18 January 1971, the Arizona Standard and the Oregon Standard collided near the Golden Gate Bridge in San Francisco. More than 800,000 gallons of oil wreaked havoc with San Francisco’s fragile marine ecosystem and shut down the port for days. The ensuing public uproar over this catastrophe resulted in the 1972 Ports and Waterways Safety Act, which granted the Coast Guard far-reaching powers to prevent damage to vessels, bridges, and other structures, and to protect navigable U.S. waters from environmental harm. Further guidance was provided when the act was amended in 1978 by the Port and Tanker Safety Act, which enabled the Coast Guard to establish and operate Vessel Traffic Services, traffic separation schemes and fairways, and regulated navigation areas and safety zones.
A revamped San Francisco VTS was brought on line as the Coast Guard’s first system; Puget Sound and others soon followed. By 1974, VTS Puget Sound had become a mandatory system. Failure to abide by applicable Code of Federal Regulations could result in civil penalties and it was up to the respective VTS to report violators, which forged a relationship between the Captain of the Port and the VTS.
Waterways management and accompanying VTSs were placed under the aegis of the Coast Guard’s Marine Safety Branch. In itself, this was a logical decision when one considered that VTSs closely monitored vessel movements and could quickly relay vessel equipment deficiencies to the Captain of the Port. As the program matured and VTS capabilities grew, however, it became evident that waterways management should be linked with a more operationally oriented entity. This happened in June 1988, when the Office of Aids to Navigation assumed responsibility for VTSs. This bureaucratic shuffle garnered little attention, but was significant in that waterways management had gained operational stature.
It was a bit of a shotgun wedding at first. It took time for the black-hull sailors to understand fully the intricacies of waterways management—and that VTSs were a critical element of this newly acquired responsibility. The status quo continued until the fully loaded tanker Exxon Valdez ripped herself open on Bligh Reef.
The resulting spill has produced congressional and Coast Guard soul searching. The 1990 Oil Pollution Act addressed
several waterways management issues and laid the foundation for the 1991 Port Needs Study, which weighed the need for installing Vessel Traffic Services at 23 U.S. ports. Seven ports met the criteria and efforts are under way to determine the feasibility of equipping Mobile, Boston, Corpus Christi, and Port Arthur with a 21st-century VTS. VTS New Orleans, decommissioned in 1987, may get an automated system, and the port of Los Angeles-Long Beach also is slated to receive an installation in the next two years.
Existing VTSs are being upgraded. Laying the groundwork for VTS 2000, VTS San Francisco, Puget Sound, and New York will get tracking devices employing a full range of digitized signals— radar, video, and VHF communications. This, coupled with effective software, promises major efficiencies in managing vessel traffic. The archaic system of filing vessel data cards manually, relying on grease-pen dead-reckoning plots on overhead charts, and moving model ships across table tops will disappear. Operators would have immediate access to extensive geographic areas.
In addition, the computers would store vessel transit history, traffic volume, and almost any facet of waterways management—eliminating the mundane and tedious task of retrieving records manually. Compact disc-read only memory (CD- ROM) technology would also compress huge volumes of communications and radar information and permit investigators rapid access to facts surrounding incidents on the waterways.
The technology can be expanded as more sophisticated sensors become available. Input from tide, current, and weather sensors could be fed into the Vessel Traffic Center. Shipboard differential global positioning system (GPS) equipment would transmit signals to the VTC’s computerized tracking display, providing accurate real-time position information and eliminating the need for computerized dead-reckoning plots. Tracking alarms would alert watch standers to vessels that stray from Traffic Separation Schemes or experience significant speed changes.
Establishing data links between Vessel Traffic Centers and other Coast Guard commands would enhance capabilities across the board. In the event of an oil spill, for example, the local Marine Safety Office could monitor the integrity of its safety zone from its computer console simply by tapping into the VTS’s system. The possibilities and potential of this emerging system are endless. Not too many years from now, such networking could improve considerably the Coast Guard’s ability to manage the waterways.
Seasoned sailors may be slow to ac
cept this high-technology management 1 tool. After all, mariners have navigated from port to port for centuries with relatively little assistance from outside agen- , cies. The Coast Guard should embark upon a concerted effort to sell VTSs to 1 the seagoing public. Specific user groups should be targeted and introduced to what the system has to offer.
Some may see this as stealing the thunder from other Coast Guard boating safety programs, but too much education is not a bad thing. Tactically speaking, the more the mariner understands about the local VTS, the more the Coast Guard stands to gain. Without an aggressive education campaign, the public will be slow 1 to grasp the advantages modern technology has to offer and the program will lack grass-roots support.
With all this on the horizon, however, an important issue remains. Who is to be responsible for this mission? The Vessel Traffic Center of the future is poised to become a very powerful management and information gathering tool. Ultimately, the VTS will be the Coast Guard’s first line of defense in detecting and responding to emergencies. Marine Safety, Search and Rescue, and Aids to Navigation units could all benefit from VTS real-time information. Placing waterways management under the aegis of Operations and perhaps scaling back the roles of other Operational Centers whose areas overlap would be a good idea. Expanding the role of a VTS to coordinate safety zone management or search and rescue operations will require additional personnel, but these resources could be drawn from down sized Operational Centers. In any event, the VTSs are slated to receive major capital investments; the Coast Guard will be faced with some difficult restructuring choices.
Events have moved the waterways- management mission from a position of obscurity into the limelight. Congress seems prepared to support substantial capital investment and resource commitment. It is quite possible that within the next decade the number of VTSs will double and the Traffic Centers could become the Operational Centers of the future.
In light of this, the Coast Guard must develop effective VTSs and establish waterways management as an operational mission. Protecting the ports is a mission we cannot ignore.
Lieutenant Commander Marian is attending graduate school atTulane University, New Orleans, Louisiana. He served most recently as Operations Officer at Puget Sound Vessel Traffic Service, Seattle, Washington. Afloat tours include USCGC Sagebrush (WLB-399) and USCGC Mallow (WLB-396).
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Adriatic Combat Search and Rescue
By Lieutenant Commander M. J. McCartin, U.S. Navy
High over Sarajevo, a British Sea Harrier develops engine problems. Tum- 'ng toward the coast, he informs a NATO airborne warning and control system (AWACS) aircraft of his predicament and eiects, landing in the hills short of the Croatian border. He quickly moves to the jpP of a hill, takes cover, and reestab- lshes contact with the AWACS, which Vectors a French Super-Entendard, on combat air patrol near Sarajevo, to confirm visually the Brit’s position.
The AWACS becomes the airborne ITl|ssion coordinator for the effort to resCUe the downed aviator. The En- jendard visually identifies the Sea Barrier wreckage and spots a mir- r°r flash from a hill top about ^*ree miles east of the border. The Trench pilot, relieved by a flight U.S. Air Force F-16s, heads for home advised by the AWACS to switch to the combat search-and- j^scue (CSAR) net for debrief. Checking in, he is surprised at the number of units working the CSAR net, particularly since the "icident occurred only moments aSo. Unknown to him, all CSAR Ur,its were notified of the impending mission when the Sea Barrier first developed engine Problems. Alerted by the NATO AWACS, the Combined Air Uperations Center turned over lhe mission to the Combined ResCUe Coordination Center. This Agency’s multinational staff CRCC in turn informed all CSAR Urnts via satellite communications and flash message and directed hem to switch to a discrete CSAR net for coordination.
With the F-16s overhead, the °Wned pilot digs in for the night—planing to check -in on a separate discrete U-SAR frequency at predetermined intervals throughout the night. As he tries stay warm, three CSAR units begin Planning three separate rescue missions, yhth crews on a two-hour CSAR alert, ne U.S. aircraft carrier on station begins [Reiving intelligence data from agencies 'oughout the Mediterranean theater.
intelligence specialists brief them.
Almost two hours have elapsed since the British pilot ejected. On board a U.S. aircraft carrier, rescue escort and rescue combat air patrol crews are standing by and the HS squadron skipper has just finished briefing the air wing commander. Fifteen minutes later, they are briefing the battle group commander, who is concerned about the accuracy of the intelligence assessment of the threat along the rescue force route of Eight and around the survivor. Assured by his staff that the force will be exposed to a medium threat,
U.S. NAVY (A. RENKEL)
thn
Pi ■ .
lanning begins in earnest.
A French aircraft carrier to the south, er crews on a three-hour alert, heads for a more suitable launch point.
A U.S. Air Force officer standing the . uty in Brindisi, Italy, has been following the evolution on the satellite net and as contacted his three-hour alert crews, when the C-130 and H-53 crews arrive.
This HS-I5 helicopter and the SEALs from Charlie platoon, SEAL Team 8 on board the USS Saratoga (CV-60) were part of a carrier air wing that was ready for the combat search-and-rescue mission.
he advises the Commander, Sixth Fleet, and the Combined Air Operations Center of his intentions. Waiting for the signal to launch, the helicopter crews and the SEAL platoon attached to the carrier run through a drill they have gone through numerous times already.
The aviators and the SEALs check out their weapons and blood chits. All members of the rescue task force review their isolated personnel report and develop an evasion plan. For this particular mission, the plan is simply for all players to move west toward the Croatian border during periods of darkness. They get the latest update and board their two HH-60H aircraft.
In Vicenza, Italy, the Commander of the Fifth Allied Tactical Air Force re
views three separate CSAR mission plans submitted by the U.S. naval component, the U.S air component, and the French Navy. Driven by time, he chooses the U.S. naval option. Just off the coast and set at Alert 120, the carrier can launch her helicopters and have them on station almost two hours before any other rescue force. The order to launch goes out.
On board the U.S. carrier, the HH-60s are almost ready to launch when the execute order is received. Copilots finish entering the mission’s way points into the computer. The crew chief ensures the head count for the rescue element is correct and that the patrol leader is on board the lead aircraft. As the HH-60 crews arm chaff and flare pods, the survivor’s isolated personnel report data are passed to the helicopters over a secure net. Navigation lights out, the HH-60s launch and head toward their ingress point.
Tracking the helicopters’ progress toward the coast, the AWACS passes progress reports to the Combined Rescue Coordination Center. The helicopters maintain radio silence but continue to squawk assigned identification friend-or-foe codes. Twenty miles from the coast, the helicopters have completed their checklist: M-60 machine guns have been test fired and all selfdefense systems are up; infrared countermeasures, chaff, flares, and radar warning gear are on or armed. The radar warning system draws much more of their attention as they close on the coast. Even at 50 feet above ground level, the radar coverage around the coast appears significant.
The helicopters rely on global positioning system navigation to lead them to their objective. Tactical navigation charts provide threat assessment rings and terrain features for masking. As they approach within five miles of the British pilot, the AWACS breaks radio silence, and asks the downed aviator to authenticate; he responds correctly and is told to prepare a signaling device. On board the helicopters, the crews have switched their downed aircrew locator system system to HOME—the system acquires the survivor and provides range and steering information. At one mile, the helicopters spot an infrared beacon activated by the downed pilot. Proceeding directly to his position, the lead aircraft lands quickly
while his wingman moves into a defensive position, in case hostile forces arrive at the survivor’s location.
SEALs deploy from the aircraft and take up defensive positions on the perimeter. The survivor authenticates yet again and climbs aboard the helicopter. A corpsman checks him out as the SEALs board. The helicopter lifts off to begin the second part its mission as the wing- man quickly falls into tactical trail. The mission commander passes a single word on the CSAR net signifying that the survivor is on board the helicopter and switches his IFF to a prearranged code backing up the transmission.
High above the pick-up point, two air wing F/A-18s monitor the CSAR net; they are prepared to provide armed support to the rescue task force at any point. Pinpointing the helos with forward-looking infrared systems, they have been monitoring the mission’s progress since the helicopters crossed the coast line.
As the rescue force crosses the coast line outbound, the NATO AWACS continues to pass mission updates to the rescue center and units monitoring the net. The AWACS crew passes the British carrier’s position to the helicopters and, turning south, they begin the last leg of their mission to return the British pilot to his ship.
Tom Clancy’s latest? No, but it is a realistic and attainable framework for current joint and combined CSAR operations in the Adriatic theater today. In the past, the need for CSAR assets in the U.S. Navy was a hotly debated issue up and
Getting Navy on i
By Commander T. D. Goodall, U.S. Navy
The information superhighway—the proposed National Information Infrastructure—is under construction and the Navy had better build some on-ramps. Information can be more valuable than money; already, when it comes to combat, safety of flight, or linking remote medical facilities with experts around the world, some information has become priceless.
Although the United States has a telecommunications system that is the envy of most of the developed world, many Americans will have difficulty gaining access to the superhighway unless they adapt. The Navy is only one of many institutions that must do so.
People talk about the information superhighway—but what is it? It is today’s InterNet transformed into a quasi-commercial entity called the National Research and Education Network—to which
down the chain of command. All too often, a requirement for CSAR/Naval Special Warfare assets necessitated the use of untrained aircrews flying aircraft designed for antisubmarine warfare missions. In today’s Navy, we have made tremendous advances in this area. Tactics, training and equipment all have evolved to the point where the Navy now has a bonafide on board capability that it brings to any theater of operations.
Efforts to develop and maintain such a capability in the Adriatic have been successful in part because of the willingness of participating nations to share lessons learned, standard operating procedures, and specific tactics. Recently, a battle group deployed in the Adriatic hosted two separate CSAR conferences. Attendees included a British Sea Harrier pilot and three helicopter pilots, one of whom was a U.S. Navy exchange pilot; the French sent fighter pilots, helicopter pilots, and SEALs. The Dutch supplied an AWACS pilot, as did the Italians. U.S. forces included Marines, an Air Force A-10 pilot and a C-130 mission commander, plus representatives of the CSAR/special operations forces available in Brindisi, Italy. The U.S. Army brought special operations personnel. U.S. Navy representatives included battle group and carrier air wing planners as well as helicopter squadron and carrier-based SEAL team representatives.
The U.S. Navy’s CSAR capabilities today meet or exceed those of any force on station. Our tactics mirror those of the French. The quality of our equipment is
surpassed only by that of the Air Force. « Our training is as good as any service’s. \ c The experience level of our pilots and l
their SEAL counterparts equals that of p
any nation. What our naval forces do bet- li
ter than anyone else is to integrate an en- n
tire carrier air wing into our concept of s
operations. We can put more aircraft on t
station than anyone in theater, if the mis- , F sion requires. We are almost always the e
closest unit to the scene of action. We '
train for this specific mission and can ex- s
ecute it against virtually any threat. We 1
do, however, need to be able to operate in the joint and the combined arenas if 1
we are going to be successful in future I
conflicts.
Joint may be the buzz word today, f but combined is undoubtedly the way of i the future. Geopolitical situations that de- 5 mand a united front from the international 1 community requires smooth, integrated coordination among the forces of many ' nations. ;
Operations in the Adriatic in support of Operations Deny Flight and Provide 1 Promise have been yet another opportu- ‘ nity for U.S. naval forces to work in concert with other armed forces. We have the capability to succeed at any mission, 1 regardless of who is on our wing.
The future is here. Get joint—get combined.
Lieutenant Commander McCartin is the Operations I Officer for HS-15. He wrote this article while deployed to the Mediterranean with Carrier Air Wing : 17, on board the USS Saratoga (CV-60) for her final cruise.
he Information Highway
the federal government has committed about $3 billion. In conjunction with the InterNet, existing telephone networks will form the vast majority of the infrastructure required to access the superhighway. While high-speed satellite and fiber-optic backbones will play a vital role in moving voice, video, and data across the country and around the world, the existing network of telephone and cable television systems will provide the entrance and exit ramps for most Americans simply because building a new system of exit and entrance ramps would be prohibitive in terms of both time and money for most users.
Analog transmissions have dominated the telecommunications industry, but the information superhighway will use a digital transmission path with the following important advantages over the analog method:
>■ Very low error rates at dramatically re- ! duced costs
► Significantly increased transmission speeds
The importance of low error rates grows geometrically when the data to be transferred includes large-scale files characteristic of medical images or i weather data bases. For analog operators, the toll to enter the superhighway will in- | elude the time and expense of converting back and forth to digital data. To operate a fully digital network, digital end-user instruments (telephones, along with the entire realm of related equipment) and the central office or telephone switches operated by the telephone service provider must be digital. Today, only > Chile, Hong Kong, and New Zealand have fully digital telephone networks.
Even so, telephone systems in other nations serve as a transmission medium
for voice, data, and video sources. The civilian public telephone system in the United States has been under increasing Pressure from cable television and cellular telephone networks to provide dig- Pal service to all users. These alternate service providers have the technology, but not all the legal and regulatory approval, to provide telephone service over existing cable television or cellular networks, although providing cable television service over traditional telephone bnes is on the horizon.
There also is a financial incentive for telephone providers to be fully digital, digital services allow them to sell profile features such as call waiting, call forwarding, number identification, and a host of other services. As yet, however, such competitive pressures have not sig-
uificantly affected the U.S. ____
Navy base infrastructure, which operates telephone systems at 274 locations.
This involves 316 telephone switches organized under 135 Activities Providing Telephone Service (APTS).
They historically have reported to a number of resource sponsors who are responsible for their manpower and funding.
The U. S. Navy’s base telephone system is far from being fully digital. In fact, it ls a patchwork of systems installed by some 17 major linns since World War II.
Several mechanical analog base telephone switches remain in use at naval sites in
lhe continental United States. _
Last year, Vice Admiral ferry O. Tuttle, then-Director of Space and Electronic Warfare, directed that ull APTS consolidate under his sponsorship not later than January 1994. Unfortunately, it did not happen. In general. Internal Navy funding and responsibility *ssues have stalled the consolidation of aU Navy base communications infrastructure assets under one sponsor for both resources and standardization. Nevertheless, Admiral Tuttle's concept regains valid. In fact, the consolidation should be enlarged to include cable tele- V|sion service and the separate data transmission systems—local and wide area networks—that dot the U.S. Navy landScape. A single unified advocate with one consolidated standard for the base telecommunications infrastructure—and With the requisite clout—should step forward and take command.
The Navy’s infrastructure, for the most Purt, lags far behind its civilian counterparts in terms of central switching capa
bilities. Cable plant equipment—fiber optic, copper wire, and related hardware, both above and below ground—supporting these switches often is in worse condition than the switching equipment. There has been little financial incentive to upgrade telephone such equipment at most bases and the Navy does not have an advocate such as the Army’s Signal Corps.
Further complicating the base cable plant issue is the confusion of the last decade following the breakup of American Telephone and Telegraph (AT&T). Following the 1984 deregulation of the telecommunications industry, AT&T divested itself of the 23 Bell Operating Companies (Baby Bells); seven Regional Operating Companies emerged and these, along with about 1,500 local carriers,
The information superhighway has begun to criss-cross the nation and the world using hair- thin libers of ultrapure glass to transmit \oice. data, and \ideo communications.
formed the Local Exchange Carriers (LECs)—the company that almost every user interfaces with. It provides the connection from the user to the local telephone system, sometimes referred to as “the last mile,” and is the only organization authorized to install wire or fiber under the streets or overhead in a specific geographic region.
Divestiture freed the LECs from providing and maintaining the connectivity required on military installations to access the local telephone system. Today, an LEC usually provides the connectivity to a demarcation point at or near the boundary of a military installation—from that point on, it is up to the base to connect with the LEC.
Consider an upgraded base weather- prediction system for a Navy base that requires greater bandwidth, i.e., transmission capacity, than its predecessor. If a modern fiber-optic backbone base cable plant is in place along with a high
speed digital central office switch, the new system will easily traverse the superhighway and, once on the base, weather information can be routed at minimal cost to any location with a telephone.
On a base without a modem information infrastructure, the weather data will hit a dead end as soon as it leaves the superhighway. Getting around this requires investment in direct connections, commonly referred to as tail circuits, which incur 24-hour charges that could have been avoided for the cost of a phone call, and may result in running additional cable on the Navy base. The associated delays and costs associated with this act alone may make the system too expensive for the end user to afford. Lack of a central high-speed digital switch may limit ac
cess to a small number of base locations; people who need the information may not get it.
The Navy contracts for thousands ot tail circuits in any given year; many could be eliminated if the infrastructure were in place. The challenge facing the U.S Navy is to create access routes—not only the superhighway, but also for the many high-speed data and video links required by the joint and allied warfighters of the next century.
The challenge is twofold—financial and physical—but, at least for the physical aspects, a road map has been designed: the Base Information Transfer System (BITS) concept. Approved, but not funded, BITS is an all-encompassing base information transfer architecture managed from one central information management center on an installation, or in some cases, from one point in a regional configuration. Its backbone is a modern fiber optic backbone, which ter
minates in a state-of-the-art or near state- of-the-art base telecommunications switching system.
While the technical aspects of moving the U.S. Navy into the age of the information superhighway should not be dismissed lightly, the real challenge lies in developing a true advocacy for U.S. Navy telecommunications base infrastructure as a whole.
Admiral Tuttle undoubtedly had the
concept correct, if not the fiscal clout to make it happen, when he decided to centralize all activities providing telephone service under the Director of Space and Electronic Warfare. Without the inherent advantages provided by the Army Signal Corps, the U.S. Navy needs a strong advocate for the base communications infrastructure.
Continuing the current piecemeal approach will only increase costs. The time
to build the on-ramps for the superhighway is now. Failure to do so will leave the U.S. Navy stuck on the back roads; unable to meet commitments, respond to future challenges, or exploit the true | value of information.
Commander Goodall is the Business Area Manage' for Base Level Communications at the Naval Com* J puter and Telecommunications Command, Wash-j ington, D.C.
What Does Surface Fire Support Cost?
By Lieutenant Commander Clarence T. Morgan, U.S. Navy
The U.S. Navy lacks an effective Naval Surface Fire Support (NSFS) capability, but identifying any possible near-, mid-, and long-term solutions is only part of the answer. The cost of each proposal is increasingly important.
Affordability drives much of the acquisition process. The cost of an individual round is particularly important for fire support systems because considerable quantities are required for the expeditionary mission. High costs killed the
Deadeye 5-inch semiactive laser-guided projectile program in 1988 when projections showed a cost of $55,000 each for a 15,000-round production run. Other contemporary ammunition programs, such as Hellfire laser-guided air-to-ground missiles and Copperhead laser-guided artillery rounds, showed that high initial production costs of technologically similar weapons could be reduced significantly by competitive contracting and improved manufacturing. The price of a
This artist’s concept depicts a 155-mm gun, a type used extensively by U.S. Army and Marine Corps artillery units, adapted for naval use. The Mk 71 8-inch/55 (opposite), tested on board the USS Hull (DD-945) in the 1970s, has been upgraded to the Mk 71 8-inch/60 configuration. (See Table 1.)
redesigned Deadeye would include additional research, development, testing, and evaluation (RDT&E) costs. Resurrecting the program would require careful evaluation to determine if its cost-per-round could be similarly reduced. [See the author’s “Fire Support Fills the Gap” in September 1993 Proceedings, pages 53-
58, for a discussion of weapon systems capable of providing effective support.]
Large-caliber guns represent a potentially significant financial investment in the Navy’s future force structure. The Mk 71 8-inch/60-caliber gun offers a state of the art upgrade based upon new manufacturing techniques, materials, and lessons learned from the Mk 71 8-inch/5f | prototype’s construction and operational testing in 1976. Table 1, using data provided by the Naval Surface Warfare Center, Dahlgren, Virginia, shows estimated costs to produce 22 Mk 71 8-inch/60 guns.
Putting the prototype 8-inch/55 into production would cost approximately the same amount but give the fleet a less ] capable mount. The upgrades in the j 8-inch/60 MK 71 gun represent mature j technology with little risk.
Incorporating electrothermal chemical (ETC) technology into a new design 8- inch/60 gun, however, would increase I costs dramatically, as shown in Table 2-
Table 3 compares the price to produce 22 ETC 5-inch gun systems similar to the current 5-inch/54 gun. Varying annual production rates and the total number ot systems produced could reduce the ultimate cost.
Missile system candidates all share relatively expensive per-round costs. The Fire Support Standard Missile (FSSM) alternative—formerly referred to as the Standard Missile Autonomous Strike Homing Round (SMASHR)—provides two cost options.
► Using existing Navy SM-1 Mk 56 booster stocks, individual FSSMs with global positioning system (GPS) guidance and a submunition payload would cost an estimated $150,000 each in fiscal year 1989 dollars.
>■ FSSMs with the SM-2 Mk 104 booster, which requires manufacturing, increases costs to $250,000 per round in fiscal year 1989 dollars.
The Sea Bear, another missile proposal, has projected costs of $142,000
can reach targets far inland.
Use of existing weapons such as the Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS) would provide commonality between services with joint procurement allowing some economies of scale, but cost of a naval version is highly dependent on launcher hardware and shipboard integration. The fiscal year 1994 budget requested $23 million for the system, which is scheduled to be demonstrated at sea this winter. Current procurement cost for one round is $400,000 in fiscal year 1993 dollars. The system delivers a very large submunition payload accurately against targets distant from the beach, but depending upon the operational concept selected, its sustainability at sea is questionable.
A prudent balance between NSFS combat effectiveness, system flexibility, sustainability, use of existing hardware and technology, and affordability must be achieved. Fielding the complementary strengths of missile and gun systems is a desirable goal:
► Among the near-term proposals, SMASHR should be pursued as it provides large amounts of accurate firepower compatible with numerous fleet platforms for a reasonable cost.
>• The mid-term period candidates that offer excellent combat effectiveness, flexibility, and sustainability at sea for their price are the Mk 71 8-inch/60 gun and the 5-inch and 8-inch ANSR ammunition. These weapons should be developed, but they require careful management to meet budgetary constraints and provide lethal capability on schedule.
► Finally, long-term solutions should concentrate on developing the 5- and 8-inch ETC guns. The combination of these weapon systems procured over time would spread a capability the U.S. Navy desperately needs among many different surface combatants.
Commander Morgan is assigned to the Analysis and Simulation Division of the J-7 Directorate on the staff of the Commander in Chief, U.S. Atlantic Command. A distinguished graduate of the U.S. Marine Corps Command and Staff college with a Masters Degree in operations analysis from the U.S. Naval Postgraduate School, he has served as ordnance officer on the USS Paul F. Foster (DD-964) and combat systems officer on the USS Gallery (FFG-26).
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low
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each that increase to $241,000 per round (in fiscal year 1993 dollars) when a fiber- °Ptic data link is installed. While FSSM and Sea Bear are more expensive than a §un round, they can deliver large submunition payloads or unitary warheads accurately against distant targets.
The battleship’s potential return raises numerous concerns. Since the ships were e*tensively modernized during the i980’s recommissionings, today’s price to reactivate a battleship might not be Prohibitive. Any significant equipment upgrades for NSFS or other missions could be expensive. Operating, maintenance, and manpower costs require re- Vlew since those funds could be otherwise spent to field different NSFS Weapon systems. A trade-off between one °r two battleships and numerous surface ships equipped with NSFS weapons should be examined.
The 5-inch and 8-inch autonomous naval strike round (ANSR) improved ammunition provides very capable fire support for relatively reasonable costs when compared to other options. The rounds are guided and fused by GPS and use a faction jet control package to maneuVer to their target carrying a submunition Payloads. Naval Surface Warfare Center Projected costs for a 5-inch and 8-inch ANSR are $25,000 and $35,000 respec- hvely (both in fiscal year 1991 dollars and both figured on 15,000-round production runs).
These systems will require between $50 and $100 million for RDT&E, in fiscal year 1991 dollars, although engineering experience gained in the Dead- aye program could keep actual costs at •he lower estimate. Overall, the system Provides large numbers of accurate Weapons, easily replenished at sea, that
Table 2
8-inch/60 Electro-thermal Chemical Gun | |
Total Production | Cost Estimate in |
and Deployment | FY 1993 dollars |
RDT&E | $339 million |
Production tooling | $56 million |
Production | $1,980 million* |
Shipboard installation | $10 million |
Total | $2,385 billion |
‘Average unit production cost of $90 million including the ETC power system at a production | |
rate of 2 units per year. |
|
■ Table 1 | |
8-inch/60 Mk 71 Gun Total Production | Cost Estimate in |
and Deployment | FY 1993 dollars |
RDT&E | $40 million |
Production tooling | $39 million |
Production | $539 million* |
Shipboard installation | $10 million |
Total | $628 million |
‘Average unit production cost of $24.5 million at a cost-constrained low production rate of two units per year.
Table 3 | |
5-inch/54 Electro-thermal Chemical Gun | |
Total Production | Cost Estimate in |
and Deployment | FY 1993 dollars |
RDT&E | $238 million |
Production tooling | $10 million |
Production | $550 million* |
Total | $798 million |
‘Average unit production cost of $25 million including the ETC power system, installation, and initial spares at a production rate of two units per year.