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Cost-effective Submarine Force
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' The goal is clear: to prevent the U.S. ' submarine force from being reduced to I i force levels below those needed to ensure an adequate national maritime de-
1 Proceedings/ June 1994
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fense. But the way to achieve this goal is anything but clear. It is now obvious that the Seawolf program will deliver no more than three submarines—a victim of both our nation’s victory in the Cold War and a price tag of $2 billion
apiece. The military necessity and the public will to build the most technologically advanced submarine possible no longer exists.
Submariners must realize that cost will be as much of a deciding factor as
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design capabilities in the construction and operation of all future submarine classes. This may be difficult to accept—akin to flying in coach after becoming accustomed to first class. The submarine force, therefore, should improve its own cost efficiency, through short- and long-term cost-reduction measures.
Short-term Measures
► Eliminate waste caused by ordering the wrong parts. Year after year, our submarines lose thousands of dollars by ordering and receiving the wrong supply parts. Inevitably, some mistakes will be made, but the number of errors can be reduced. Commanding officers and department heads need to ensure that their repair parts petty officers (RPPOs) are not only some of the more senior personnel in each division but also the best performers. Supply officers need to ensure that both RPPOs and division officers are well trained and familiar with commonly recurring errors. In addition, effective automation of the entire shipboard supply system would reduce waste.
► Take steps to reduce unintentional waste. The submarine force spends more than is necessary on numerous items, e.g., Kim-wipes, office supplies, and tools. Something as simple as an annual “pen return” day could realize vast savings, if implemented by every command. Significant savings could also be achieved through stricter tool control. The engineer officer on board one boat was so exasperated at the number of new tools that were purchased each quarter by his department that he implemented a new policy: All tool boxes were kept locked, and individual work centers signed out tools prior to use. His concern that this process might slow the pace of work was eased when he saw that it actually improved efficiency. It took only a few minutes to sign tools in and out—compared to the long delays previously encountered when key tools could not be located. In addition to reducing manhours, this policy realized a $600 savings in tool expenditures from the previous fiscal year.
► Eliminate extravagant change-of- command ceremonies. While the pomp and circumstance of a change-of-com- mand ceremony is in the Navy tradition, it is no longer appropriate in today’s fiscal climate. Virtually all productive work stops a few days before the event, and the total expense of the typical submarine change-of-command ceremony—including travel costs for
guest speakers, tents, chairs, music, and invitations (but not including lost manhours)—is around $10,000. For what? Does this ceremony improve a commanding officer’s tactical ability or a crew’s performance? Perhaps we should follow the practice of our British counterparts, in which the commanding officer is relieved in a prompt yet thorough manner, similar to our own executive officers’ relief process.
Long-term Measures
► Reduce manning by increasing onboard automation. Manning is one of the most expensive aspects of submarine operation and maintenance. Reduced on-board manning requirements would significantly reduce costs. Automation of both mechanical and administrative systems should be considered. For example, with today’s technology, the duties of diving officer
of the watch, helmsman/planesman, and stern planesman could be combined into a single watch station. The most recent classes of both British and French SSNs are constructed in this manner. An inherently safer automatic throttle-control system also could be developed, to eliminate the need for a full-time throttleman. Finally, burdensome paperwork could be either reduced or eliminated through the use of electronic position displays, automated reporting systems, and the placing of infrequently used publications on computer discs.
► Eliminate mil-spec requirements for nonessential components. For many shipboard systems, the mil-spec system is an extremely sound investment, in which the increased reliability provided by the extensive testing and exacting specifications placed on each component is worth the additional cost. But this is not true for every piece of equipment on board a submarine. Many civilian items could be substituted for mil- spec-tested items with absolutely no degradation of the ship’s capabilities or safety—and with substantial savings. Commercial Omega (navigation) systems, for example, are just as good as their military counterparts and are available at a fraction of their cost. Other items, such as batteries and binoculars.
are also used without a need for mil- spec requirements. Ultimately, however, savings must be achieved without compromising capabilities.
► Streamline the submarine training pipeline. This long-term cost-reduction measure is already well in progress, and the submarine force should strive to continue down this path. The radioman training pipeline recently was streamlined to let radiomen reach the fleet sooner. Similar changes are in progress with the fire-control technician, sonarman, and electronic technician training pipelines. Plans also call for incorporation of the interior-communication and quartermaster rates into w the electronic-technician rate. All of
this is possible because of technologi- 1 cal advances in recent decades; our sys- ^ terns now are more reliable, allowing for personnel emphasis on operational . skills instead of component-level trou- bleshooting. On the officers’ side, the Naval Submarine School, in conjunction with the submarine train- J- ing commands in Norfolk and f Pearl Harbor, recently implemented a new five-week junior officer tactics curriculum. All of the stand-alone junior officer courses were combined into a streamlined training flow path— cutting costs while simultaneously providing junior officers with a fully integrated picture, rather than a disjointed look at submarine operations. 1
► Encourage U.S. shipyards to build diesel submarines for export. Much has J been written in recent months about the need to preserve the U.S. submarine
base. One way to support industrial vendors and to retain the nation’s submarine-building skills is to provide incentives for private companies to build diesel submarines for export. U.S.-built diesel submarines would not only aid in preserving the industrial base but also drive down the projected acquisition costs for future classes of SSNs. In addition, the U.S. Navy could acquire several of the diesel boats for training purposes. More frequent training against diesel boats by our current force of SSNs would be prudent in light of today’s Third World threat.
In order to improve cost-effectiveness in the submarine force, further discussion is necessary. Only by aggressive fiscal austerity can the Silent Service ensure a continuation of its traditional role as one of the cornerstones of U.S. maritime security.
... cost will be as much of a deciding factor as design capabilities in the construction and operation of all future submarine classes.
Lieutenant Wolters is the Lead Instructor of Operations and Communications at the Naval Submarine School, Groton, Connecticut.
Proceedings/June 1994