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In 1992, the Navy-Marine Corps paper “. . . From the Sea " defined the strategic concept intended to carry the naval service—the Navy and Marine Corps—beyond the Cold War and into the 21st century. It signaled a change in focus and, therefore, in priorities for the naval service away from operations on the sea toward power projection and the employment of naval forces from the sea to influence events in the littoral regions of the world—those areas adjacent to the oceans and seas that are within direct control of and vulnerable to the striking power of sea-based forces.
The purpose of U.S. naval forces remains to project the power and influence of the nation across the seas to foreign waters and shores in both peace and war. “Forward . . . From the Sea ” updates and expands the strategic concept articulated in our 1992 paper to address specifically the unique contributions of naval expeditionary forces in peacetime operations, in responding to crises, and in regional conflicts. “Forward . . . From the Sea" amplifies the scope of our strategic concept while confirming the course and speed for the naval service as defined in the original document.
jectives through our enduring contributions in strategic detef' rence, sea control and maritime supremacy, and strategic sealift “Forward . . . From the Sea” addresses these naval contr>" butions to our national security. Most fundamentally, our nava forces are designed to fight and win wars. Our most recent experiences, however, underscore the premise that the most u" portant role of naval forces in situations short of war is to ft engaged in forward areas, with the objectives of preventing c°n flicts and controlling crises. ,
Naval forces thus are the foundation of peacetime forwaf presence operations and overseas response to crisis. They con tribute heavily during the transitions from crisis to confhc and to ensuring compliance with terms of peace. At the satne time, the unique capabilities inherent in naval expeditionaO forces have never been in higher demand from U.S. theater coin manders—the regional commanders-in-chief—as evidence by operations in Somalia, Haiti, Cuba, and Bosnia, as well our continuing contribution to the enforcement of United tions sanctions against Iraq.
The Strategic Imperative _______
With the publication of “. . . From the Sea” in September 1992, the Navy and Marine Corps announced a landmark shift in operational focus and a reordering of coordinated priorities of the naval service.' This fundamental shift was a direct result of the changing strategic landscape—away from having to deal with a global maritime threat and toward projecting power and influence across the seas in response to regional challenges.
In the two years since “. . . From the Sea” became our strategic concept, the administration has provided expanded guidance on the role of the military in national defense. A major review of strategy and force requirements resulted in a shift in the Department of Defense’s focus to new dangers—chief amon- which is aggression by regional powers—and the necessity for our military forces to be able to rapidly project decisive military
The vital economic, political, and military interests of ^ United States are truly global in nature and scope. In many re" spects, these interests are located across broad oceans, and 10 a great extent they intersect those of current and emergent regional powers. It is in the world’s littorals where the nava service, operating from sea bases in international waters, cal1 influence events ashore in support of our interests.
Because we are a maritime nation, our security strategy lS necessarily a transoceanic one. Our vital interests—those in terests for which the United States is willing to fight—are J the endpoint of “highways of the seas” or lines of strategic ap proach that stretch from the United States to the farthest poifl on the globe. Not surprisingly, these strategic lines and the'r
Figure I: A Continuum of Forward Operations
power to protect vital U.S. interests and defend friends and allies. In defining our national strategy for responding to these new dangers, the review emphasized the importance of maintaining forward-deployed naval forces and recognized the impact of peacetime operational tempo on the size of Navy and Marine Corps force structure. In addition to recognizing the unique contributions of the Navy and Marine Corps in the areas of power projection and forward presence, it restated the need for the Navy to support the national strategic ob-
Naval Forces
endpoints coincide with the places to which we routinely dePloy naval expeditionary forces: the Atlantic, Mediterranean, acific, Indian Ocean, Red Sea, Persian Gulf, and Caribbean ea- Reductions in fiscal resources, however, dictate that we re
focus
the
our more limited naval assets on the highest priorities and most immediate challenges, even within these areas of historic and vital interest to the United States. .
Naval forces are particularly well-suited to the entire range 1 military operations in support of our national strategy. They ‘•ontinue the historic role of naval forces engaged in preventive ■Plomacy and otherwise supporting our policies overseas. More- “Vei\ forward-deployed naval forces—manned, equipped, and mined for combat—play a significant role in demonstrating °m the intention and the capability to join our NATO and other u lles, as well as other friendly powers, in defending shared lnterests. Finally, if deterrence fails during a crisis and conflict etopts, naval forces provide the means for immediate sea-based faction. This could include forcible entry and providing the Protective cover essential to enabling the flow of follow-on orces which will be deployed, supported, and sustained from e continental United States.
fn short, forward-deployed naval forces will provide the Critical operational link between peacetime operations and the lri|tial requirements of a developing crisis or major regional contingency.
p * l
J^etime Forward Presence Operations
^ Naval forces are an indispensable and exceptional instrument U.S. foreign policy. From conducting routine port visits to at|ons and regions that are of special interest, to sustaining rger demonstrations of support to long-standing regional se- . nty interests, such as with UNITAS exercises in South Amer- Ca> U.S. naval forces underscore U.S. diplomatic initiatives erseas. Indeed, the critical importance of a credible overseas . ence is emphasized in the President’s 1994 National Secu- r"y Strategy:
Presence demonstrates our commitment to allies and friends, Underwrites regional stability, gains U.S. familiarity with °verseas operating environments, promotes combined train- lng among the forces of friendly countries, and provides rirnely initial response capabilities.
In peacetime, U.S. naval forces build interoperability—the
ability
to operate in concert with friendly and allied forces-
that in the future we can easily participate fully as part of a ^riT|al multinational response or as part of “ad hoc” coalitions
l r8ed to react to short-notice crisis situations. Participation in °th NATO Standing Naval Forces and in a variety of exercises ® the navies, air forces, and land forces of coalition partners tound the Pacific rim, Norwegian Sea, Arabian Gulf, and j ec*iterranean basin provide solid foundations for sustaining toroperability with our friends and allies.
. 1° addition, the outreach to the former Warsaw Pact coun- , les in the NATO Partnership for Peace program will further ud solidarity and interoperability. We already have made solid ' 0gress in expanding and intensifying our cooperation with the uvies in Eastern Europe with exercises such as BaltOps ’94 jUri Breeze ’94, which included units from Bulgaria, Estonia, atvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Russia, and Ukraine. t Iri.S. forward-deployed naval forces also have contributed .? humanitarian assistance and disaster-relief efforts—from e Philippines to Bangladesh to Rwanda—with similar, very Pos'tive, results.
^Although naval presence includes a wide range of forward- cloyed Navy and Marine Corps units afloat and ashore in
friendly nations, our basic presence “building blocks” remain aircraft carrier battle groups—with versatile, multipurpose, naval tactical aviation wings—and amphibious ready groups—with special-operations-capable Marine expeditionary units. These highly flexible naval formations are valued by the theater commanders precisely because they provide the necessary capabilities forward. They are ready and positioned to respond to the wide range of contingencies and are available to participate in allied exercises, which are the bedrock of interoperability.
We also have turned our attention to examining the naval capabilities that could contribute to extending conventional deterrence. In this regard, forward-deployed surface warships— cruisers and destroyers—with theater ballistic missile defense capabilities will play an increasingly important role in discouraging the proliferation of ballistic missiles by extending credible defenses to friendly and allied countries. By maintaining the means to enhance their security and safety, we may reduce the likelihood that some of these nations will develop their own offensive capabilities. Our efforts will thereby slow weapons proliferation and enhance regional stability.
In addition, even as we have shifted our emphasis to forward presence and power projection from sea to land, the Navy continues to provide a robust strategic nuclear deterrent by maintaining strategic ballistic missile submarines at sea. As long as it is U.S. policy to ensure an adequate and ready strategic nuclear deterrent, our highly survivable strategic ballistic missile submarines will remain critical to national security.
Crisis Response
Naval forces are designed to fight and win wars, as are all elements of our military arsenal. To successfully deter aggressors, we must be capable of responding quickly and successfully in support of U.S. theater commanders. Forces deployed for routine exercises and activities undergirding forward presence are also the forces most likely to be called upon to respond rapidly to an emerging crisis. The potential for escalation dictates that presence forces must be shaped for missions they may encounter. This provides theater commanders with credible crisis-response capabilities in the event normal conditions or outcomes do not turn out as we expect.
Building on normally deployed forces, we can mass, if the situation requires, multiple aircraft carrier battle groups into carrier battle forces, amphibious ready groups with embarked Marine expeditionary units, and as needed project our naval expeditionary forces ashore using the afloat maritime prepositioning force. Such a massing of naval units can be complemented by the deployment of Army and Air Force units to provide a joint force capable of the full range of combat operations that may be required.
A U.S. warship is sovereign U.S. territory, whether in a port of a friendly country or transiting international straits and the high seas. U.S. naval forces, operating from highly mobile “sea bases” in forward areas, are therefore free of the political encumbrances that may inhibit and otherwise limit the scope of land-based operations in forward theaters. The latter consideration is a unique characteristic and advantage of forward-deployed naval forces. In many critical situations, U.S. naval forces alone provide theater commanders with a variety of flexible options—including precise measures to control escalation—to respond quickly and appropriately to fast-breaking developments at the operational and tactical levels.
Whether surging from adjacent theaters or from continental U.S. deployment bases, naval forces are uniquely positioned, configured, and trained to provide a variety of responses in the event of an unexpected international crisis. Their operational flexibility and responsiveness are a matter of record. The most
recent examples of crisis-response operations are summarized in Figure 2.
Regional Conflict
Naval forces make a critical contribution in a major regional contingency during the transition from crisis to conflict. Forward naval forces deployed for presence and reinforced in response to an emerging crisis can serve as the transition force as land-based forces are brought forward into theater.
Using a building-block approach, U.S. naval forces can be tailored with specific capabilities. The resulting naval expeditionary force—conceptually built around fleet operational forces and a forward-deployed Marine expeditionary force—can provide a highly flexible force for a wide range of missions, including long-range strike operations and early forcible entry to facilitate or enable the arrival of follow-on forces.
In the event of a future regional conflict, U.S. naval force' will assume critical roles in the protection of vital sealift alo11: the strategic lines of approach to the theater of conflict, includin" the air- and sea-ports of debarkation. Our success in a major r£' gional contingency will depend upon the delivery of heav) equipment and the resupply of major ground and air elemen1' engaged forward. Sealift is the key to force sustainment joint operations, and we are committed to a strong nation*1 capability.
Joint and Combined Operations
No single military service embodies all of the capabilit11 that are needed to respond to every situation and threat. T'11 United States’ national strategy calls for the individual service j to operate jointly to ensure both that we can operate success fully in all warfare areas and that we can apply our miliwr'
power across the speC'
Figure 2: Sharing of Major Forces Between Theaters/Operations | |||
Date | Forces | Original Deployment | Crisis Location |
December USS Ranger Battle Group 1992 USS Tripoli Amphibious Ready Group/15th Marine Expeditionary Unit (SOC)* | Persian Gulf | Somalia Humanitarian Relief | |
January 1993 | USS Kitty Hawk Battle Group | Somalia | Persian Gulf Strike Operation Against Iraq |
June 1993 | USS Theodore Roosevelt Battle Group | Mediterranean/Adriatic | Red Sea Support of Tomahawk Strike Against Iraq |
October 1993 | USS America Battle Group USS Guadalcanal Amphibious Ready Group/ 22nd Marine Expeditionary Unit (SOC)* | Mediterranean/Adriatic | Somalia Response to Increasing Casualties on Land |
April 1994 | USS Peleliu Amphibious Ready Group/ 11th Marine Expeditionary Unit (SOC)* | Somalia | Mombasa Support of Distant Runner-Rwanda Noncombatant Evacuation Operations |
August 1994 | USS Tripoli Amphibious Ready Group/15th Marine Expeditionary Unit (SOC)* | Mombasa | Entebbe. Uganda |
October 1994 | USS George Washington Battle Group USS Tripoli Amphibious Ready Group/ 15th Marine Expeditionary Unit (SOC)* | Mediterranean/Adriatic | Persian Gulf/Red Sea Iraq |
•SOC- | Special Operations Capable |
|
|
trum of foreseeable situations—in peace crisis, regional confl>c1' and the subsequen\ restoration of peace. | The enhanced comb*'1 power produced by integration of all sup porting arms, which seek to attain throuS i joint operations, is 111 herent in naval expe^1 tionary forces. For & ample, the aircra'1 carrier battle group inte grates and focuses <*'j verse technologies at1'
combat capabilities
to
assure the dominance
of
Focusing on the littoral area, Navy and Marine Corps forces can seize and defend advanced bases—ports and airfields—to enable the How of land-based air and ground forces, while providing the necessary command and control for joint and allied forces. The power-projection capabilities of specifically tailored naval expeditionary forces can contribute to blunting an initial attack and, ultimately, to assuring victory. The keys to our enabling mission are effective means in place to dominate and to exploit the littoral battlespace during the earliest phases of hostilities.
Moreover, the unique capabilities inherent in naval tactical aviation operating from our sea bases or expeditionary airfields, as well as the capability to contribute to sustained land combat operations, provide theater commanders with flexibility in the conduct of littoral operations. Throughout the 20th century, Marine air-ground task forces, placed ashore initially as enabling lorces, have fought and contributed decisively in every major ground conflict. Similarly, naval tactical aviation has made pivotal contributions when the nation’s air power was needed in combat.
the air, surface, subsurface battle spa11' necessary for the pros1’ cution of subseque1’1 campaigns. Furthe1' Marine expeditionaO forces, employing rine air-ground tas force (MAGTF) cor>' , bined-arms doctrine. aft’ e. Establish^
,1H
the most versatile expeditionary forces in existence, by law to be “forces of combined arms, together with supp°rl ing air components,” MAGTFs are expeditionary, rapidly pandable air-ground formations, capable of operating from se bases, ashore, or both, simultaneously. They are the model t° the joint air-ground task forces evolving as conflicts gr°'' ' smaller and the forces available grow fewer.
Naval expeditionary forces have long operated as integral e | ements of joint forces acting with other joint or allied sea, lant' , air, and space forces. Just as the complementary capability of Navy and Marine Corps forces add to our overall strength i combining the capabilities and resources of other services an those of our allies will yield decisive military power.
Maintaining Our New Direction
The new direction for the naval service remains focused °1'
our ability to project power from the sea in the critical littor*1
regions of the world. We remain committed to structuring p11.
■d
naval expeditionary forces so that they are inherently shape'
0r joint operations, with the emphasis on operations forward fom the sea, tailored for national needs. Recent Department of ne Navy budget decisions, which resulted in a real increase in pending on littoral warfare and the means for power projec- !0lb are illustrative of the shift in priorities we have undertaken Sllce the publication of . . From the Sea.” As we continue 0 uriprove our readiness to project power in the littorals, we I!eed to proceed cautiously so as not to jeopardize our readiness °r the full spectrum of missions and functions for which we
3re
responsible.
In the
two years since
From the Sea” was published,
we have expanded on and capitalized upon its traditional expeditionary focus. “Expeditionary” implies a mind set, a culture, and a commitment to forces that are designed to be deployed forward and to respond swiftly. Our new direction provides the nation:
> Naval expeditionary forces
> Tailored for national needs
> Shaped for joint operations
> Operating “Forward . . . From the Sea”
Conclusion
“. . . From the Sea” was the initial step in demonstrating how the Navy and Marine Corps responded to the challenges of a new security environment. Our strategy and policies continue to evolve as we learn from our recent experiences and prepare for the new challenges and opportunities of this highly dynamic world. Naval forces have five fundamental and enduring roles in support of the National Security Strategy: projection of power from sea to land, sea control and maritime supremacy, strategic deterrence, strategic sealift, and forward naval presence. We will continue to carry out these roles to protect vital U.S. global interests, citizens, allies, and friends, wherever they may be at risk.
The Cold War may be over, but the need for U.S. leadership and commensurate military capability endures. Many of our most vital interests remain overseas, where the Navy and the Marine Corps are prepared for new challenges— forward deployed, ready for combat, and engaged to preserve the peace.
‘In November 1992, the U.S. Naval Institute published “. . . From the Sea” (Proceedings, November 1992, pages 93-96) by Admiral Frank B. Kelso II, Chief of Naval Operations; General Carl E. Mundy, Jr., Commandant of the Marine Corps; and Sean O'Keefe, Secretary of the Navy.
1997
1999
--- Increase
reflects shift in focus .. From the Sea"
Navy Support of Littoral Warfare
USMC Budget
\