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An expanded NATO, to include former Warsaw Pact nations, can help ensure stability, prosperity, and security in Europe. Naval forces—versatile, rapidly mobile, and temporary—offer the sustainable forward presence necessary for this effort to succeed.
onumental events have occurred with breathtaking rapidity in the past three years: German unification, the collapse of the Warsaw Pact, the dissolution of the Soviet Union, rapid and far-reaching arms limitations agreements, the creation of entire new states, revolutions and ethnic strife, and a host of other developments. In an historical blink of the eye, vast changes occurred with one unquestionable result: the United States emerged as the sole global superpower. In Europe—where the changes were most pronounced—the key alliance, NATO, was opened for reexamination almost immediately.
Free from the Soviet threat and buoyed by a swift and successful war in the Middle East, even the most cautious elements found themselves swept up and embraced the downsizing of the U.S. military and a lessened commitment to NATO. The job was done. Peace, prosperity, and democracy were ensured. The only items left open for debate were the level of U.S. involvement in the world and
the rate of the U.S. drawdown. The perception of U.S. disengagement was heightened further by the election ofi president whose priorities clearly were domestic.
Reducing our commitment to NATO, however, is a dangerous and short-sighted route. Instead, the United States should work to build on this alliance’s past success by expanding NATO to encompass our former enemies. Through a policy of inclusion, we can bring to the former 1
Warsaw Pact nations the peace and stability that the NATO 5 umbrella provided in Western Europe and under which f c prospered. We should not allow Russian attempts to de- r rail NATO membership to succeed. Such appeasemen1 1 will signal a lack of resolve and undermine any confi' j dence Eastern European nations have in a secure future < NATO should offer full membership to the following I nations immediately: Poland, Hungary, the Czech and SlO' f vak republics, Bulgaria, Albania, Latvia, Lithuania, Es- 1 tonia, Slovenia, and Macedonia. Negotiations for meni' e bership should begin immediately with Russia, Belarus. Ukraine, Moldova, and Romania. c
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To understand the present opportunity, one must have t a clear appreciation of why NATO was formed, what i1 • accomplished, and what its very existence spawned. | t On a basic level, one could contend that NATO is 5 1 military alliance formed to deter a Soviet attack on West- t em Europe. With the demise of the Soviet Union, then, i it no longer has a reason to exist. But NATO always has c been much more than a simple defensive alliance. 3
The NATO alliance created a secure wall, behind which Western European nations and the United States drew together to create a formidable economic force with shared cultural, economic, and democratic foundations. The fact that the defensive military commitment was total—to include nuclear war—gave tremendous security and support to economic, cultural, political, and democratic fusion. The very extent of this melding previously would have been unthinkable on a continent with such a history of conflict. The NATO security structure is the bedrock upon which every subsequent European economic and political cooperation rested.
An expanded NATO could do this again on a larger scale. The first step would be to ensure military security, which would allow for reform and free market trade. No organization can do this better than a U.S.-led NATO.
Why is Europe Important?
Some Americans will ask why Europe is even important. Economically, Asia and the Pacific rim are our future. Europe is only our third most important trade partner, after Canada and Asia. Militarily, there no longer is a common threat; the Europeans can pay for their own defense and don’t want us there anyway. Isolationists contend that the sooner we depart, the sooner these nations will pay for their own defense.1
Yet no part of the world is more important to our nation. Virtually our entire cultural heritage is European. Our democratic, legal, governmental, ideological, and philosophical heritages are closely linked. As General Colin Powell asserts:
The Alliance is essential, not just because it connects armies, navies, parliaments, and peoples, but also because it connects the values and the principles that underlie them. Democracy, free markets, human rights, and the rule of law—the Alliance connects the family of Western nations, using the glue of our core beliefs.2
The preponderance of world military power—including nuclear—other than U.S. is European. All of the United States’ major military allies are European. With the exception of oil cartels, all of the major worldwide and economic organizations are largely made up of European nations. The combined economies of Great Britain, Germany, France, Italy, and Spain have a gross domestic product of 2,586 billion in constant dollars, compared to Japan’s 1,760 billion.’ This doesn’t even consider the enormous untapped Potential of the former Soviet and Warsaw Pact nations. This is probably the region of the world that has the greatest economic potential over the next 20 years.
The threats to European security and to the emergence of a democratic, prosperous, and stable Eastern Europe are many. The future of Russia is by no means certain. It is a nation under severe economic strain—with no democratic tradition—and it remains a potent nuclear power.
The Eastern European nations in the central region, too, have borders that are not accepted by all parties, causing them to fear for their security. Hungary alone has border claims with three of its neighbors. This reduces their ability to focus on desperately needed economic progress.
In the Balkans, the problems are immediate and potential precursors to far greater conflicts. Events in Yugoslavia are not likely to remain within its former borders. The conflict has the potential to impact Albania, Macedonia, Kosovo, Italy, Greece, Bulgaria, Turkey, and Russia. The potential for bilateral or multilateral coalitions is great and actually could result in conflicts that involve present NATO members. The economic impact of these Balkan conflicts already is severe, with rail, road, and river networks through former Yugoslavia interrupted.
There is considerable potential for further conflict in Eastern Europe. Most of the region is suffering from inflation, unemployment, and declining economies. Rising nationalism and ethnic strife, combined with rising fears of aggression by neighbors, are hampering the transition to democratic and free-market societies. Ukraine and Belarus have expressed concern over Russian intentions, while events in the Caucasus region appear to have reached full-scale war with threats of Iranian intervention.
Still, some critics contend that these are not issues that affect the United States. In June 1991, Stephen Szabo stated: “Virtually all of the problems and the new threats that the new NATO was designed to meet are problems for Europe, not the United States.”4 But how much escalation would it take before the United States became involved? NATO forces under the U.N. flag are increasing their involvement in Eastern Europe. At what point will NATO nations become engaged, possibly against each other or other former Warsaw Pact forces, if the alliance does not act as a whole and include former adversaries? Conflict is almost certain if a vacuum is allowed to persist. It might appear to be a European problem, but European wars have had a way of drawing U.S. involvement.
Can Another Organization Assume the Burden?
A number of organizations have been suggested to act in the place of NATO. The United Nations, the Western European Union (WEU), and the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) all have been suggested for various roles. Considering that the CSCE—developed in the 1970s to negotiate troop cuts in Europe— has little clout, no military structure, and no ability to implement its own decisions, it is hard to imagine what services this forum could provide.
William van Eekelen, Secretary-General of the Western European Union, has been a champion for that organization.5 Despite its best efforts, however, the WEU has little chance of replacing NATO or assuming any major NATO responsibilities. Smaller NATO nations view it with suspicion and fear being left out. Both the CSCE and WEU have their place and responsibilities, but they do not come close to the stature of NATO.
Other attempts to find a security apparatus to replace NATO abound. Most recently, Senator David Boren (D- OK), Chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee, called for “the creation of a United Nations multilateral military force that could be deployed in the event of crises to curtail regional conflicts, the proliferation of weapons, and international terrorism.”6
While U.N. endorsement, sanction, and sponsorship of military action lends significant legitimacy and is desir-
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able. Senator Boren’s proposal faces several obstacles. Financial constraints and military potency alone cripple his idea. Such a force would take years to form and mature. Even then it would remain hostage to the nation with the ability to transport it.
For the next 10 to 15 years any U.N. actions of more than small scale will be carried out by the armies of nations that are capable, with the U.N. flag brought along for legitimacy and international support.
Simply put, there is no organization presently in being with anything approaching NATO’s stature, political maturity, and military acumen that could give Eastern Europe the necessary assurance of security and support.
SYOMA (Q.OE KEERLE)
LI!
Threats to European security did not disappear with the Soviet Union. The strains within Russia— still a potent nuclear power—once again erupted as President Boris Yeltsin and Communist hardliners faced off and the Russian White House burned.
Out-of-Theater Action
With an expanded and inclusive NATO, the question would turn to the alliance’s ability to take out-of-theater action. For all practical purposes, this type of intervention already has occurred: a U.N.-sanctioned, U.S.-led coalition comprised largely of NATO forces in concert with Arab allies conducted the Gulf War. All significant military forces except Egypt and Syria were NATO (United States, Great Britain, France, and Turkey). A large part of the military buildup, logistics, and major forces came through NATO channels and bases in Europe. NATO standards were used in the tactical execution of the war. In addition, Ambassador James K. Bartleman notes:
World War II and the economic conditions in Eastern Europe and Russia. He calls for:
> Creation of a U.S. led orga-, nization to spearhead Western aid efforts
>■ Accelerated assistance to agricultural sectors
> Establishment of “enterprise funds” for reformist republics
> Expanded educational and information exchange programs8 :
Nations of the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe havei no such support. Already Romania’s economic reforms are faltering. The reelection of Jon Iliescu, a former high ranking Communist, raises fears that the Romanians will cease economic reform.9 Western business investment has been slow to materialize because of the economic risk and insecurity. Russia’s future direction is uncertain. Without immediate action, others will falter as well.
The first steps have been taken. The North Atlantic Cooperation Council was created in November 1991 and includes the eastern nations. It calls for cooperation but not a commitment to mutual defense. The Clinton administration’s recent initiative is a hesitant, small step in the right direction that still falls short of the crucial mutual-defense element. The United States, with the other NATO members, should work to expand NATO with unrestricted membership.
Force Structure Implications
NATO also agreed to supply direct military assistance to Turkey in response to its request as a NATO member state faced with the threat of a large Iraqi army on its southern border. The contrast in NATO response in these two theatres of the same war was instrumental in defining the boundaries of Alliance “out-of-area” involvement; it also set a precedent making clear that NATO accepted responsibilities outside its traditional focus on the Warsaw Pact threat.7
As in the war against Iraq, NATO members would not be required to participate in out-of-theater actions. But to deal with out-of-theater threats, ad hoc coalitions comprised of a core of nations that have a history of cooperation and military commonality will have a greater chance of success. It does not take much imagination to envision some of the out-of-theater threats that NATO may be forced to respond to in the future. An expanded NATO with stability and prosperity in Europe is far more likely to respond in an effective and decisive fashion.
The Economic Challenge
The United States and the nations of Western Europe prospered under the security provided by the NATO alliance. Former President Richard Nixon recently drew an analogy between the economies of Western Europe after
U.S. force levels need not expand simply because tltf NATO alliance has expanded. Nor would the military contributions of other nations need to expand. If anything, tltf security that NATO membership will bring to nations will allow them to downsize their forces—currently an economic necessity but thwarted by security concerns.
The United States will want to provide a credible mil' itary presence. Without an expanded NATO it appears that 100,000 U.S. troops in Central Europe is presently the op' erative figure. While Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, General John Shalikashvili stated:
I believe 100,000 is about right for Europe. It will mean U.S. Army forces in Germany will form two multinational corps with German forces: the U.S. V Corps will have one U.S. division and 5th German Armored Di' vision under its command, while the II German Corps will have one German Division and the U.S. 1st Armored Division under its command.10
Of course, these troops are stationed in Germany, f*>( from Dubrovnik, G’Dansk, Riga, or the Crimea. Only otf of these divisions is assigned to be available to tl^ presently forming Rapid Reaction Corps. Of the ten divisions from throughout NATO designated to be available, the Allied Command Europe Rapid Reaction Corp' may draw no more than four divisions. One of these could be the U.S. division mentioned by General Shalikashvili-
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however, this force is not yet ready. General Jeremy MacKenzie, commander of the Rapid Reaction Corps, states:
I have 12 nations’ worth of officers and all the communications, vehicles, and so on. All I now have to do is train them, and I haven’t had time to do that. My military capability is limited."
Once the Rapid Reaction Corps is combat ready, it too must deploy the units to the scene of action. General MacKenzie readily admits that, at best, these units would need 15 days before they would be ready to commence movement. The bottom line is clear. An expanded NATO alliance that will continue to want a U.S. forward presence cannot meet this requirement with forces stationed in central Germany. This is a potent force, but it is also a ponderous force that would not be dispatched except in extreme circumstances. Aside from the military/tactical and logistical difficulties, the political concerns include the potential destabilization or escalation that the introduction could induce. True forward presence for the newly included nations must be more visible and available to have the full psychological, political, and military impact. These nations need the forward presence of NATO—particularly U.S. elements—without the drawbacks associated with the stationing of troops on their soil or the arrival of the Rapid Reaction Corps.
This is a call for a naval forward presence.
Naval Expeditionary Forces
If an expanded NATO is to succeed, a sustainable forward presence is required, and this requirement can be met only by naval forces. This force should consist of two carrier battle groups with amphibious ready groups with embarked Marine expeditionary brigades. One would be permanently assigned to the North Atlantic and Baltic; the other would be in the Mediterranean and Black Sea. They could be supported and manned by forces presently in being. Both deployment requirements could be maintained with present capabilities and projected acquisitions, although naval drawdown would need to be less acute.
At first glance, the continuous requirement for two carrier battle groups appears large. However, we presently maintain one carrier battle group in the Mediterranean full time, as well as an amphibious ready group with a Marine expeditionary unit. The increase in the Mediterranean would involve only a ready group increase of eight to ten amphibious ships and associated Marine forces.
This effort is minimal compared to the benefits that could result. Now is the crucial moment to apply available resources to a strategic idea that promises great returns. If we miss this opportunity, we could face considerable risk and expense some years hence. A slower drawdown always will be cheaper than a rapid buildup.
The Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, and the NATO political decisionmakers would have a truly versatile and useful tool at their disposal that could execute the full range of options as required. Not the least of these Would be port visits; training with ground, air, and naval forces; humanitarian missions; and support of local forces
without the political momentum that would be required to move sizable forces out of Central Europe.
Naval forces have been the force of choice for the United States on numerous occasions since World War II and before. The unique, synergistic capabilities of aircraft carriers and Marine amphibious forces are ideally suited to contribute to an expanded NATO. In the most optimistic scenario, they could be redeployed to the United States without the impression of a withdrawal that the current Army reductions represent to some.
Domestic political requirements call for reduced defense expenditures and stateside basing. These are met by the naval forces outlined here. The international diplomatic arena calls for forces that are versatile, rapidly mobile, and temporary, yet still a formidable forward presence that is not so large as to to signal U.S. domination. The amphibious forces with carrier support meet these parameters. Economic demands call for less expensive and smaller forces. These naval forces exist and are far less expensive than large conventional forces based overseas.
Finally, we must adapt to a different military challenge than existed four short years ago. The present and potential challenges in an expanded NATO can be met, in large measure, by the naval forces outlined in this proposal. The naval refocus outlined in “. . . From the Sea” can find no better or more timely application nor promise of greater reward than in support of an expanded NATO.
The United States, with its allies, has a premier opportunity to reshape the post-Cold War world in Europe, to ensure peace, prosperity, and progress. Now is the time to take steps to ensure the integration of these nations into NATO. No single act could do more for the long-range stability, economic prosperity, and military security of Europe—and hence the United States. This strategic opportunity can be realized with a minimal commitment by a reliance on existent and proven naval expeditionary forces.
'Patrick Buchanan, “America First and Second and Third,” The National Interest, No. 19 (Spring 1990).
General Colin Powell, USA (Ret.), “The American Commitment to European Security,” Survival, Vol. 34, No. 2 (Summer 1992), p. 4.
■Megan Jaegermann, “Redrawing the Map, Based on Economic Powers,” The New York Times, 18 September 1992.
‘Stephen Szabo, “NATO’s Difficult Career Change,” The New York Times, 9 June 1991.
’William Van Eekelen, “The Western European Union in the Emerging European Security Architecture,” Canadian Defence Quarterly, February 1992, pp. 21-27. 6David Boren, Quoted in Armed Forces Journal, October 1992, from an article in The New York Times, 26 August 1992.
Tames Bartleman, “Unfinished Revolution: New Political Directions at NATO,” Canadian Defence Quarterly, February 1992, pp. 6-10.
8Richard Nixon, “The Time Has Come to Help,” Time, 13 January 1992, p. 27. ’“Romanian Chief Vows to Slow Economic Change” The New York Times. 14 October 1992, p. A6.
"General John M. Shalikashvili, USA, AFJI Interview in Armed Forces Journal, April 1993, p. 18.
"Gen. Jeremy MacKenzie, AFJI Interview in Armed Forces Journal, April 1993, p. 25.
Colonel Rape assumed command of the Marine Combat Training Battalion, School of Infantry, at Camp Lejeune in August 1993. A graduate of the Naval War College, he previously served at Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps as Head, Officer Evaluation, Career Planning, and Counseling and as the Marine Corps liaison officer to the U.S. Army’s 9th Infantry Division. He has served in infantry battalions in the 1st and 2d Marine Divisions.
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