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The Army Blackhawk and Cobra helicopters crowding the deck of the USS Eisenhower (CVN-69)—on her way to Haiti last September—illustrate the present movement toward joint operations. But before gearing up for nearly every military action, we need to ask an important question: Is a joint task force really necessary?
Not long ago, the very mention of “joint operations” would be enough to start a fight in an empty Navy > officers’ club. The Navy didn’t need its sister services help; they couldn’t do the things we do. Besides, we re the nation’s foremost ....
Things have changed. Since the Goldwater-Nichols mandated defense reorganization of the 1980s, Navy officers have been singing the praises of jointness and doing their best to convince the other services, their own subordinates, and a skeptical Congress that the Navy is willing to put joint warfighting at the centerpiece of its strategy. By all visible evidence, the effort is taking hold:
Tactical publications are becoming joint-doctrine oriented; officers are scrambling to get joint assignments; and the I J U.S. Naval Institute’s annual warfighting essay contest is now named for a distinguished Army general and former chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Fair enough—we’re joint. But is jointness all it’s cracked up to be?
This question is important in the field, where our standard military response has been the formation of a joint task force (JTF). Joint task forces have been deployed to Somalia, to post-Desert Storm Iraq, and in response to several other political crises and natural disasters. In the two-tiered joint-task-force concept, the task force commander (CJTF), usually a two- or three-star flag officer, , reports directly to the theater Commander-in-Chief (CinC) of the region where the action is being undertaken. The experts and our own experience to date tell us that the JTF will be our nation’s premier post-Cold War military option. It is not a panacea, however, and its shortcomings must be given an airing.
What does the JTF look like today? By doctrine, each of the services will have a component commander reporting to the CJTF to command the forces from respective services. In other words, there will be an Army, Navy, ; Air Force, and Marine Corps component commander reporting to the CJTF, as well as a joint special operations 1 and joint psychological operations commander. The CJTF . is also provided a support staff, organized along standard staff lines: J-l is administration; J-2 is intelligence; J-3
ls operations; etc. The core of this staff probably will come from the designated commander’s regular staff, but a significant augmentation of officers from other services will be assigned to round out the JTF staff.
Joint operations have been successful in such diverse situations as hurricane relief and the Los Angeles riots. It would be folly to suggest that our forces could be employed effectively without a strong centralized field command structure, present in the two-tiered concept. Nevertheless, our experience in joint operations suggests that the tactical flexibility of the JTF as currently employed ls hampered both by its structure and the limitations of individual force components—
Which are ignored when joint forces take the field. Correction must begin with several key realizations, made in light of—or in spite of—the successes we have enjoyed in Joint operations to date.
The current joint taskforce °rganization doesn't make tactical sense. The organization for joint operations looks logical, but does it really Work? The answer is a clear- out, resounding “maybe.” The underlying concept—that each service will be represented in a JTF, allowing for the full Potential of our military— makes sense in a bureaucratic sort of way. Commanders of Joint task forces find themselves commanding Pentagon microcosms where every service gets a seat at the table.
This is the way we plan budgets and testify to Congress, hut is it the way we want to direct troops in the field?
Joint task force staffs are usually quite large, and manned by personnel who have never worked together. Principals on the staff may or may not understand the capabilities of other services, and it’s hard to get educated ■n the middle of a crisis. Decisions often are made in the finest American tradition: bargain and compromise. Planning cells in CJTF headquarters often look more like trad- mg floors, as staff members try to get a piece of the action for units of parent services. This leavening works fine fntil the ambitious (or paranoid) action officer gets in the Way, concerned that his or her service is getting the short end of the process. Concessions usually follow: “O.K., We’ll let the (fill in the blank) do this part of the operation so that everyone gets a hand in things.” This often happens in coalition operations, where every participating nation needs a role for political purposes.
Equal or token representation of forces in every joint °Peration is not appropriate. The mandate for joint operations in support of national military objectives has been interpreted as meaning that a joint task force must have
In our excitement over “going joint we may be confusing interoperability with interchangeability and losing something in the process.
representation of all services. Of course, we still speak officially of “unique capabilities” and “synergy” between our forces, but the practical application is that the table of organization for every joint task force must ensure that each service has someone launched over the chart.
The idea of every service getting a shot at JTF participation has led to turf battles and claim staking on tactical issues. It also has driven the development of joint tactics and procedures in areas such as air control, where an Air Force-run joint forces air component commander (JFACC) has become de riguer, regardless of the limitations of the air portion of the operation. The union-card attitude that this has generated—“this service does this; that service does that”—stifles tactical creativity and leads to bigger, but not necessarily more capable, joint task forces.
Jointness will not solve service-unique problems. Or, the corollary: Each service still has to do what it does best. For example, if you want sea control, including antisurface warfare, strikes at sea, and presence, call the Navy. If you want large ground assaults, call the Army; or extended bombing campaigns, call the Air Force. However, joint operations have developed a disturbing trend in splitting tactical missions, often forcing weapon systems (planes, ships, and those who operate them) into tasks for which they are neither designed nor trained.
The issue of “roles and missions” has become a hot topic—not only inside the beltway but also on the battlefield. Although policy wonks tell us the budgetary issues are at stake constantly during high-visibility operations, the services are each entrusted with a strategic role that should be the touchstone for a longer view. Critics point out duplications of service capabilities, but the real danger is the inverse: We may be leaving some critical missions unaddressed. These missions will probably not be joint in the strictest sense but are at the foundation of our military capability.
It is fashionable to emphasize how well our services work together, but we are in danger of confusing interoperability with interchangeability—and losing some complementary capabilities in the process. We have put Army helicopters on destroyers and aircraft carriers and have included them in coastal-surveillance and sea-control operations. But what should they be doing instead? We should ask the same question when we see the increasingly common photographs of Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps jets flying in a joint formation, or pictures of Green Berets and SEALs slogging through the mud together.
ARMY TIMES (McLEOD)
Where is the uniqueness that each service is supposed to bring to the war?
We don’t speak the same language! Communication among the various service components of a JTF is hampered on two levels. The first level consists of the service- unique glossaries that every officer speaks, thanks to service traditions and procedures. The early days of any joint operation resemble a planning session for the Tower of Babel. Fortunately, bilingualism comes easy when lives are at stake, and joint training and joint service tour requirements are broadening the common understanding of our military leadership.
erations remains. That’s the good news. The bad news is that we seem to be alone among the services in pointing , out the problems.
Navy complaints regarding joint operations generally I have centered on the inherent difficulties in supporting these operations from a forward-deployed posture where 1 resources are lean. The primary concerns are logistics, com- > munications, and a cumbersome chain of command that ties the hands of on-scene commanders. The Navy’s objections in these areas are based on longstanding and hard- . learned lessons doing the type of expeditionary operations for which we are trying to tailor all of our joint forces.
Issues have become icons in debates over joint opera-
The demand for equal participation in joint task forces often results in turf battles and claim staking—to ensure that each service gets a piece of the pie—but not all of our armed forces have a role in every military operation. Here, members of the Department of Defense’s four armed services are represented on the amphibious command ship USS Mount Whitney, (LCC-20).
More persistent and harmful is the uneven technical capability of our communications systems. We make it so difficult to get new communication equipment on board ships that the fleet always seems to be a generation behind. In joint operations, this is usually expressed in simple terms from the JTF headquarters: “Why can I talk to a battalion command in the field, but not to the aircraft carrier off the coast?”
Whatever the specific system, the Navy’s communications mindset needs to be changed. Today, the Navy is faced with conducting joint operations in the age of the cellular phone; we need to move forward with off- the-shelf technology that other joint forces are eager to embrace.
Many of the Navy’s traditional complaints about joint operations need to be addressed. Despite intensive efforts at rehabilitation, the Navy’s skepticism regarding joint op
tions. The best example is the infamous air tasking order (ATO)—which the Air Force sees as the linchpin for air operations and the Navy can barely read—for several reasons. The ATO is detailed, centralized, computerized, and inflexible. It is the product of a regimented, continuous planning cycle that is driven from the top down. Commands not in the link have a tough time impacting the process and getting air power allocated to their specific needs. The CJTF and his ground commanders needing close air support can be just as frustrated by the ATO process as the aircraft carrier’s air boss. However, the Navy’s incompatibility with the ATO has been cited as a shortcoming of our own making.
The ATO is a stalking horse for such other issues as diverse as helicopter fuel and message formats, which have bogged down joint operations at the tactical level. These issues need to be resolved with a “let’s work something out” approach. Most of the incompatibilities that disturb the Navy in joint operations are shared problems. Unfortunately, however, the Navy has taken the heat for commenting on the emperor’s wardrobe.
To make our joint task forces more cohesive and effective, we must address the most disturbing shortcomings in JTF operations. We should scrap the service component-oriented JTF command structure and return to the concept of organizing the JTF chain of command
around functional areas of responsibility: i.e., ground operations, air operations, and maritime operations. This would allow the joint force to be more flexibly controlled, with the focus on the type of mission to be accomplished. Assignment of the commanders of each functional area would be based on the preponderance of forces employed, with the ground commander either an Army or Marine officer, the air commander an Air Force officer (or even a carrier battle group commander) and so forth.
If an amphibious force is attached to the JTF, the amphibious task force commander (CATF) should report directly to the CJTF. The same can be said for other unique tactical forces that may add specific capabilities to the JTF, such as striking forces and logistics forces. Mission requirements—not service affiliation—must drive the command structure.
The Navy needs to get the right C3I systems to the right users. We should define discreet joint C3I packages that can be installed quickly and removed from fleet units as needed. In addition, the Navy must familiarize itself with the rapidly expanding capabilities being employed in joint operations. Two prime examples are: a downlink terminal for the joint surveillance, targeting, and reconnaissance system (JSTARS) and the joint warfare intelligence center (JWIC) system. Both of these systems not only provide data but also allow afloat commanders to network with other members of the joint force.
The ability of a JTF to accomplish its mission hinges °n the appropriateness of the force selected. Each JTF will be unique, but key questions must be answered before establishing a capable force structure:
Who 's in charge? Our military leaders are not interchangeable, but current philosophy holds that any flag or general officer will do when it comes to a joint operation. We are bending our doctrine to fit this concept. For example, plans have been set forth to deploy a joint force built around a naval task force with some preassigned ground troops and air support ashore. The whole group Would be commanded by an Army general at sea in the flagship. However, “when the general would be in charge,” “why he should be at sea,” and “why he would even want to be so” are concerns that remain unanswered.
The mix-and-match approach to joint command reflects a disturbing one-size-fits-all belief in joint operations. Common sense and military experience indicate that each JTF mission will have a particular warfare emphasis and that the leadership of the operation should have the deepest foundation in that specific discipline.
A everyone bringing something to the fight? Not all of °ur armed forces have a role in every military operation. Nevertheless, an unspoken rule in JTF construction is that every service should have some involvement. Each service has become skilled at high-pressure salesmanship, which often gains at least token involvement, whether it makes sense or not. CinCs and CJTFs should exercise discipline in tailoring joint task forces by including only what is necessary. “Stacking” usually results in bloated JTFs which are harder to support—and disrupts routine operations elsewhere. One-role strap-hangers can fill in a deployed JTF—they make good targets.
Is everyone reporting to the right boss? Joint doctrine has expanded the subtleties of command relations into a series of increasingly fine distinctions. Joint terminology— such as “TACON,” “COCOM,” “OPCON,” and “In Support Of’—is used to introduce new layers in the chain of command of joint forces, often realizing no real benefit. Part of the problem is an almost instinctive notion that command must be directed along service lines: i.e., only Army commanders can issue commands to Army units, Navy commanders to Navy units, and so forth. This leads to a stilted vertical structure within the JTF that extends down to the lowest level in the field.
The JTF chain of command must recognize functional lines, since the time-sensitive nature of contingency operations demands a streamlined decision-making process.
Are all the bosses in the right place? Keeping the JTF component commanders in close touch has been a perennial issue with Navy component commanders, who have been generally reluctant to leave the flagship and colocate on shore with the CJTF. The counter argument—that communications technology allows separated JTF commanders easy access to each other—is only partly true and begs the equally important question of how well individual commanders can communicate with subordinates.
From the Navy’s perspective, it is time to move our leading JTF command element ashore, if that’s where the CJTF is located. Capabilities such as the joint mobile operations command center (JMOCC) make this a possibility, leaving the only real problem to be one of mindset. A shore- based command link with forces at sea has become a necessity for Navy participation in joint operations.
Is a joint taskforce really necessary? Organizing a JTF has become the textbook solution for almost every military action. Establishing a JTF allows a single commander to draw on resources from each service, but it is unclear that every tactical deployment of our forces should be joint. Can existing forces handle the situation? Does adding “joint” give the commander any particular edge? Establishes a JTF takes time and resources, and the expenditure of both should be carefully weighed before a new task force is designated. More important, adding a joint flavor will not help an ill-conceived or inappropriately researched plan. Mission needs—not standardized procedure—should dictate how we send our forces into action.
“Jointness” has become both a mantra and a buzzword as budgets shrink and threats increase. The joint task force is where the talking stops and the business of war begins. It is a valuable military tool that must be honed and perfected. The ability to combine our forces into effective JTFs will be the key to our global military power for the foreseeable future. However, it is vital that we examine and refine our procedures for doing so with an unblinking eye and an open mind.
Commander McKeamey has participated in the planning of real-world joint operations in the Pacific and Persian Gulf. He served in Saudi Arabia during Operation Desert Storm and was assigned to the CJTF staff during Operation Restore Hope in Somalia. He has served as planner, director, and evaluator for a variety of joint exercises and wargames.