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The U.S. Navy’s 40-year program to build nuclear-propelled aircraft earners has been called into question by a major analysis that concludes, in part:
The cost of nuclear power is not justified in peacetime or in wartime, in terms of useful military capability. Nuclear ships are more expensive, less available, and only comparable in generating and sustaining air operations. They operate as part of integrated and increasingly joint military missions close to land, and nuclear-powered carriers are not used any differently than their conventional counterparts.'
The 90-page report Aircraft Carriers: The Limits of Nuclear Power has nu-
The report, written by three defense analysts of the Greenpeace organization, bases its findings largely on an analysis of three U.S. Navy claims for nuclear- propelled carriers:
the promises or expectations of nuclear propulsion:
Nuclear-powered carriers do not transit faster to a region, remain longer
Number | Name | FY | Commissioned Status | |
CVN-65 | Enterprise | 58 | 1961 | Yard |
CVN-68 | Nimitz | 67 | 1975 | Active |
CVN-69 | Dwight D. Eisenhower | 70 | 1977 | Active |
CVN-70 | Carl Vinson | 74 | 1982 | Active |
CVN-71 | Theodore Roosevelt | 80 | 1986 | Active |
CVN-72 | Abraham Lincoln | 83 | 1989 | Active |
CVN-73 | George Washington | 83 | 1992 | Active |
CVN-74 | John Stennis | 88 | (1996) | Building |
CVN-75 | United States | 86 | (1998) | Building |
CVN-76 |
| 95 | (2002) | Planned |
‘ This listing includes current hull numbers. The CVN-65, CVN-68, and CVN-69 were designated |
originally as attack aircraft carriers (CVANs). They were changed to CVNs in 1975.
merous tables, is heavily footnoted, and effectively supports the authors’ conclusion. This report is the most in-depth public study of the value of nuclear propulsion for aircraft carriers since 1970, when Congress debated whether or not to build the CVN-70 of the Nimitz (CVN-68) class. The new report is particularly important at this time, as Congress considers funding a tenth nuclear-propelled carrier (CVN-76) in the fiscal year 1995 Defense budget.
> Virtually unlimited range at maximum speed
>• Ability to remain on station indefinitely without refueling
► Greater storage capacity for combat consumables, such as bombs and jet fuel2
The report’s findings conclude that during the Vietnam and Persian Gulf wars, the period between the two conflicts, and the operation of carriers in crisis response as well as routine deployments, operations have not matched
Critics such as the Greenpeace organization argue that military use of nuclear power, in particular nuclear ships—including the USS George Washington (CVN-73), the latest nuclear carrier to enter service—is justified neither in peacetime nor in wartime.
on-station, or drop significantly more ordnance or launch more aircraft sorties than do conventionally powered carriers. In fact, the Navy itself does not appear to distinguish between nuclear and conventional carriers in its operational planning or crisis preparation.3
The report also makes points against nuclear-propelled carriers in the context of their requirement for more shipyard
time with a related reduction in at-sea time; the costs associated with their uranium fuel cores—from design through disposal—are significant but barely factored in program costs; political liabilities associated with nuclear carriers, such as foreign port calls and overseas basing and transit through certain straits and canals; and the current plan to discard the nine nuclear-propelled cruisers, which will further reduce the potential effectiveness of nuclear carriers.
Not mentioned in the report, but another important factor is the increased cost of nuclear-trained engineering personnel for nuclear carriers compared to oil-burning ships. Also, with the demise of the nuclear cruiser force, the promotion and command opportunities for those men and women are reduced significantly—which will impact on their recruitment, retention, and cost.
The report thus questions the validity of the Navy’s 40-year nuclear carrier program, which began in 1954 with the start of a large-ship reactor test facility in Idaho. The first nuclear-propelled aircraft carrier, the Enterprise (now CVN-65) was authorized in fiscal year 1958 with little debate or argument. The year in which the ship was funded and started—1957— was a banner year for the nuclear propulsion program. The pioneer Nautilus (SSN-571) was setting new records in underwater performance, and the second and third “nukes,” the Seawolf (SSN-575) and Skate (SSN-578), were completed. By 1957 Congress had authorized another 16 nuclear attack submarines and that year funded the first three nuclear Polaris submarines. Also under construction was the first nuclear surface combatant, the Long Beach (now CGN-9), with the first nuclear “destroyer,” the Bainbridge (now CGN-25), soon to follow.
It would be another nine years before the second nuclear-propelled carrier was authorized. Congress did provide $35 million in the fiscal 1960 budget for long- lead-time nuclear components for a second aircraft carrier of the Enterprise type. The Eisenhower administration (1953-1961), however, deferred the project, and the ship was never built. The Navy had several major projects cut back in that period, in part to finance the high- priority Polaris program.* 2 3 4
More carriers were built: the America (CV-66) authorized in fiscal year 1961 and the John F. Kennedy (CV-67) in fiscal year 1963—both with oil-burning engines. There was, however, considerable debate over this carrier’s propulsion system. When the ship was proposed in early 1962, both the Secretary of the Navy, Fred H. Korth, and the Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral George W. Anderson, requested that the next large
carrier have conventional, oil-burning propulsion. At the time, it was estimated that a nuclear-propelled carrier would cost one-third to one-half more than an oilburning ship, and they felt that more time was needed to evaluate performance of the first nuclear surface ships.5
Led by then-Vice Admiral Hyman G. Rickover, head of the Navy’s nuclear propulsion program, the growing nuclear community within the Navy and several members of Congress pushed Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara to provide nuclear propulsion for the ship that would become the John F. Kennedy. The debate over propulsion raged for several months until, on 25 October 1963, McNamara announced that the ship would be conventionally—not nuclear—propelled. McNamara stated “this decision was motivated by a desire to avoid further delay, and does not prejudge the larger question of the application of nuclear power to the Navy surface vessels in the future.”
Although during the following year several members of the House of Representatives introduced bills to reverse the McNamara decision, none became law. By the mid-1960s, the escalation of the Vietnam War demonstrated the need for additional modern carriers, and McNamara approved the construction of three nuclear ships to replace the three Midway (CVA-41)-class carriers, which had been completed in 1945-1947. There was little discussion of propulsion for the new ships—as even McNamara agreed to the efficacy of nuclear carriers—and the Nimitz class was initiated.
As the table indicates, construction of the Nimitz class has continued. No large carriers were funded between fiscal 1974 and 1980. While long-lead funding for the Theodore Roosevelt (CVN-71) was included in the fiscal 1977 budget, neither the Ford nor the Carter administration would release the money. President Carter vetoed the fiscal year 1980 defense bill because it included funds for the CVN-71; Congress overturned his veto to fund the carrier. But debates and arguments within the administration and Congress over this ship centered on the requirement for carriers and not their propulsion. Nuclear propulsion had been accepted as a fundamental design characteristic for the Navy’s large aircraft carriers.
Thus, counting the Enterprise (now completing at three-and-one-half-year modernization) and the two carriers under construction, the Navy has nine nuclear carriers. The tenth U.S. nuclear carrier is proposed in the fiscal year 1995 Defense budget with completion of the ship scheduled for the year 2002. The $4.5 billion ship was being approved in Congress
with little debate or question as this column went to press.
The Greenpeace report represents a tour de force on nuclear-propelled carriers. It provides a convincing case that although it costs considerably more, nuclear propulsion may not provide a realistic additional capability for large carriers. The Greenpeace report, however, has three major faults:
First, the paper confuses the issues of the need for nuclear propulsion and the need for carriers. Obviously, smaller carriers with vertical/short take-off and landing aircraft (and even Tomahawk missiles launched from surface ships and submarines) can replace large carriers in some roles. But they certainly cannot replace them in many other roles.
Second, the authors raise the issue of eliminating the existing nuclear carriers with the savings “. . . put toward urgent domestic programs and foreign assistance projects, or reducing the sizable national debt.”6 This is preposterous. The Navy— and the nation—cannot afford to discard the investment of nine large carriers and their trained crews. Large carriers will certainly be invaluable for carrying out U.S. political-military policies for the foreseeable future.
Third, the “next” carrier, the report implies, should be a non-nuclear ship. That is impossible without the delay of several years and the considerable cost of large-ship design. If “one more” carrier is to be built in the next few years, the most cost-effective and the most expedient ship would be an improved Nimitz (the CVN-76).
The carrier situation should be reassessed beyond the CVN-76, and this Greenpeace effort should be read by everyone in the administration, Department of Defense, and Congress who will participate in decisions related to future carrier programs. The nuclear-propulsion issue should be reviewed, as should essentially all naval programs in this era of changing roles and missions, international political-military situations, and budgetary considerations. This Greenpeace report will be invaluable in such a review.
'Hans M. Kristensen, William M. Arkin, and Joshua Handler, Aircraft Carriers: The Limits Of Nuclear Power (Washington, D.C.: Greenpeace, June 1994),
p. 2.
2“Navy kicks off campaign to sell CVN-76 carrier to Congress,” Inside the Navy, 12 March 1994, pp- 7-8.
3Kristensen, et. al., p. 3.
“The Regulus II land-attack missile and P6M Sea- master flying boat programs were canceled to help pay for Polaris.
’These were the Long Beach (CGN-9), commissioned on 9 September 1961, and the Enterprise (CVAN-65), commissioned on 25 November 1961. Neither ship was fully operational when placed in commission.
6Kristensen, et. al., p. 2.