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The only new warplane program on the horizon is the Navy- Air Force “Joint Attack Strike Technology,” or JAST, but if history is any guide, it will never produce an aircraft. While its failure might be a slight—very slight—inconvenience to the Air Force, it will be yet another devastating blow to the future of naval aviation. The Navy would be well advised to jettison JAST fast before the program wastes more scarce resources, and— worse, yet—irrecoverable time.
Historically, such joint operations have been dismal failures, most notably the failed TFX that then-Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara tried to force on the Navy. The Air Force, at least, got the F/B-l 11 tactical bomber; the Navy was forced to keep the A-6 around for three more decades. The Navy’s A-12 program also was advertised as a joint program with the Air Force “probably” on board for some.
When it was canceled, however, the Air Force bowed out. The worst example overseas came after the Royal Air Force assumed responsibility for the Royal Navy’s airplanes during the interwar period. As a result, the Royal Navy was still flying biplanes in 1941.
JAST advocates would undoubtedly counter by saying that the Goldwater-Nichols change commits both services. But does it?
The advocates overlook four crucial points:
> The Air Force does not need the program since it still has plenty of new F-15Es and FB-11 Is—admittedly older.
> JAST does not fit into the Air Force mission, which emphasizes long-range bombers.
>■ The Air Force cannot afford JAST along with the increasingly expensive F-22s and C-17s.
> As currently constructed, the program is so nebulous that the Air Force can easily opt out when the crunch really comes after the turn of the century.
The Navy, conversely, desperately needs a new medium-attack plane. The A-6Es will be phased out soon, leaving the service with only the F/A-18E/F, still considered inadequate for longer-range attack missions. The Navy had made the A-12 its top priority for a reason.
The Navy should make the case for a new aircraft, and, if not given its own program, should at least push for designation as the lead service for JAST. Although JAST directors will alternate between services, the current program head is an Air Force General. Remember, the Air Force can always operate a carrier-capable plane from an airfield, but conventional takeoff
and landing (CTOL) aircraft can rarely operate from carriers.
There are many other tough questions that someone show be asking these same JAST advocates. For example, does h make sense for the Air Force to have three dedicated long-range bombers: the B-52H, B-1B, and the B-2; one dedicated medium bomber, the F/B-l 11; and the shorter-range F-l 17 (which, despite the fighter designation is really just a dedicated light-attack aircraft), while the Navy has none? In addition, the Ait Force program director has stated that no short takeoff-vertica landing (STOVL) Harrier follow-on will be funded without dua service utility. Since when does the Air Force dictate Marine Corps policy? ?
More important, what is the Air Force really sacrificing- Since all future Navy-Marine Corps planes are contained in the JAST program, why has the $100 million (plus) F-22, still years away from production, not been thrown into the JAST pot—" or even the billions to be spent trying to develop a fina
fix for the B-lB In short, how did we get into a situation where the A'f Force can say, visa-vis the Navy- “What’s mine is mine . . . what’s yours is negotiable?”
Remember, the Air Force will enter the 21st century with five relatively new planes: the B-lB and the stealthy B-2, the stealthy F-l 17, the C-17 cargo plane, and the stealthy F-22- The Navy, on the other hand, will have only a modified, jury- rigged non-stealthy F/A-18E/F, which may end up the historical equivalent of the Royal Navy’s Swordfish biplanes.
The real problem, however, may be the nebulous nature ot the JAST program. Contracts are being let on technology programs with proposals for two prototypes, one probably an advanced short takeoff-vertical landing (ASTOVL) aircraft, to be built in about seven years. Of course, if the other prototype is a CTOL aircraft, it will be hard to make comparisons. Such plans fit into the Air Force schedule, since that service has so much on its plate—and that is the real worry.
Making predictions is always risky, but this author predicts that—like the Peanuts character Lucy holding the football for Charlie Brown—a combination of lack of funds and its desire for longer-range aircraft will cause the Air Force to pull JAST off the tee, and the Navy will land on its backside once again. Well, at least we’ll still have Snoopy flying his (Navy) biplane. Let’s just hope the enemy is still the Red Baron and not a sophisticated former Red aircraft.
Dr. George, author of The U.S. Navy in the 1990s: Alternatives for Action, published by the Naval Institute Press, is a Senior Adjunct Fellow with the Hudson Institute.