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It’s time that the United States look at Australia differently and strengthen its relationship with this important ally.
nique among U.S.
allies, Australia—though fiercely independent since World War 11—has stood by us in five conflicts this century. Despite its position as a geographic orphan far from the northern hemisphere’s centers of power, Australia has shown worldwide leadership in the United Nations and in the Southwest Pacific, far beyond what its Population and economy would dictate.
Australia, however, seems to be sometimes treated by the United States with disdain—not unlike a poor relative who stayed too long. As our ally, Australia deserves and needs continuing respect by the United States for its near- century of dedication to democratic ideals; unswerving support during armed conflict; and unique insights to the Southwest Pacific, Southeast Asia, and the eastern Indian Ocean. The United States must improve relations with Australia and support its position as a foundation for continued democratic and economic development.
Recognized as an independent nation in 1901, Australia
the British lead in foreign affairs. The two nations shared strong ties, especially during World War I, which exacted great losses from Australia: Of the 330,000 Australian troops dispatched overseas, 59,000 died—nearly 1% of Australia’s entire population.' By World War II, however, British leadership was not prepared to deal with the rapid development of Australia’s national identity. When the imminent Japanese invasion of the Northern Territories forced the return of Australian forces from Africa (over the objection of Winston Churchill), the Australian Prime Minister announced that Australia—though remaining a member of the British Commonwealth—would follow the United States’ lead in the conduct of the Pacific War.
Australia’s government developed by drawing on the best aspects of both the British and American tradition. The Parliament is bicameral, although they retained as Chief Executive a Prime Minister who leads the majority party of their elected representatives. Two major parties
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have developed, but both support alliance with the United States as the mainstay of their security policy. The Armed Forces of Australia share many common weapon systems with the NATO countries, especially the United States and Britain. Australia joined formally with the United States through the 1951 ANZUS treaty.
Australian participation in Korea, Vietnam, and Southwest Asia (Desert Shield and Desert Storm) has shown commitment to the democratic ideals espoused by U.S. administrations since World War II. The unwavering military commitment of Australia is especially significant because of its relatively small population and gross national product. Many U.S. leaders, however, take this relationship for granted. In 1992, President George Bush was the first U.S. President to visit Australia in a generation. President Bill Clinton’s recent visit to the Southwest Pacific, however, showed a return to old habits—Australia did not make the itinerary.
The Australian view of the U.S. alliance depicts a relationship in which Australian interests are continuously subsumed by the American point of view.
Australia is rather an interesting example of an ally of the United States which has differences of attitude and policy in certain areas but nevertheless is able to sustain the alliance at a high level of cooperative endeavor in a variety of fields of great importance to both partners.2
Differences in national interest will always exist between the United States and Australia, and to ensure mutual satisfaction, the needs of both nations must be considered:
Key to a successful alliance between two mature democracies is the management of differences in two senses: to ensure that differences are resolved . . . and that public opinion in the smaller partner is able to see and appreciate that it is not simply a matter of following the leader, whatever the leader does. The interests and contributions of the smaller partner have to be taken into account by the larger partner.3
Midway through the Vietnam War, the Nixon (or Guam) Doctrine represented a U.S. policy shift. Though Australia had made its point of view known throughout the war, President Nixon’s statement in 1969 made it clear that treaty commitments notwithstanding, Washington would look directly to threatened nations to be primarily responsible for manning their own defenses. Wondering whether or not the United States would commit itself short of a direct threat by the Soviet Union or China caused a fundamental reevaluation of Australia’s Defense Policy: “As it (the Nixon Doctrine) was interpreted in Canberra, Washington was signaling Canberra that if Australia was ever threatened by a regional opponent, it would need to provide the main forces for its own defense.”4
Exploring the partnership
The scope of U.S. strategic facilities in Australia and their use during the Cold War formed an important boundary in the development and maintenance of relations. Some
in Australia who opposed these facilities used arguments ranging from sovereignty of Australian territory to threat of Soviet attack, but most Australian governments were able to keep these important facilities in operation by maintaining more open communication about their scope and use. The sharing of intelligence information, as well, has helped sustain strong ties between the United States and Australia.
To maintain a joint operational capability, Australia and the United States participate annually in many different military exercises. Until recently, Cold War issues have been the predominant threat consideration. Today, however, the focus of these exercises has moved toward issues of primary concern to Australia.
Though not a world-trade superpower on the scale of Japan, Australia is an important U.S. trading partner. Australia is able to feed itself and remain relatively independent as a source for raw materials, but unemployment is currently about 11%, and the balance of trade remains strongly in favor of the United States. Australia receives no foreign aid and provides no subsidies to its farmers. The United States, on the other hand, touts free trade and demonizes foreign subsidies in everything from airplane manufacturing to farming, aggressively pursues an active program of its own subsidies, and threatens an increase in overt protectionist policies. Australia is challenged to avert further damage to its economy and to seek trade equity with the aggressive and protectionist policies of Japan and the European community.
The United States has stated that it is not withdrawing from the Western Pacific. Closure of U.S. bases in the Philippines, reductions in U.S. armed forces, and continued requirements in the Arabian Gulf and Mediterranean, however, create the perception of U.S. withdrawal, which prompts defensive reactions:
There is no strategic justification for a reduction in the United States’ defense presence in the region. Reductions should be limited to those U.S. forces earmarked for European and Atlantic service and to the strategic nuclear deterrent.5
i
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As the American military presence in the Pacific shrinks, the United States must consider how to strengthen its political and economic ties to this booming region and how to help ensure that rapid change does not lead to conflict and instability.6
Australia recognizes its strategic role and limitations. “Australia is a medium power with little real influence ofl global matters, but at the regional level we are a signifi' cant power.”7 Defense writings from both major partie- show policy based on statements such as, “Australia wi" continue to receive support from alliances ... but we mus> plan on carrying out primary combat tasks ourselves.’ Current key principles under consideration from the re- cent Australian Force Structure Review include:
► Maximizing combat capabilities by reducing the num' ber of service personnel at headquarters and support base*' and shifting to commercial and civilian support whetf feasible.
> Meeting the strategic focus on northern and western op" erations by extending western basing for the Navy ai^
Proceedings / March 19^
northern basing for additional Army units, and enhancing the forward-deployment capacity of Air Force units.
► Making greater use of reserves.9
Australia shares similar challenges—and could share solutions—with the United States, as the armed forces of each nation mold themselves to fit the post-Cold War era. Australians now emphasize joint operations and seek to expand and integrate many surveillance assets, shrink their wide array of surface vessels, extend service life of aircraft, and develop innovative reserve schemes.
Every country in the Asian-Pacific basin watches carefully how the United States treats Australia. Australia has described in its Strategic Plan for the 1990s the importance of its alliance with the United States and how important that is to other countries in the region.10 Australia has been content to operate as an observer in conjunction with the Association of Asian Nations (ASEAN). As the Minister of Defence, Robert Ray, explains: “What we’re trying to come to is an accommodation which says we’re part of the (ASEAN) region but of a distinctly different character.”" Australia is also a member of the Five Power Defense Arrangement (FPDA), the only operating regional security arrangement it has joined. A continuing negative trade balance with the United States may force Australia to seek closer regional treaties. The United States should prepare for Australia to shift its focus to the ASEAN, if we fail to provide the reliable kind of partnership it needs.
A call for action in the Southwest Pacific
Australia deserves better treatment from the United States. We not only have treaty obligations but also must give Australia an even stake in defining the future of the alliance. The United States should recognize Australian constancy, consistency, and loyalty in every aspect of our economic and foreign policies. We should also get behind Australia’s strategic initiatives and make a commitment to them. We need not always agree with the Australian Positions, and we should negotiate hard for our own positions. But we should be prepared to compromise, when necessary, on the basis that the Australian view is closer to the problem.
The United States would not be sacrificing its superpower status if it played second chair to Australia in the Southwest Pacific. We should support Australia’s initiatives and embrace a policy that says “What is good for Australia is good for the United States.” This would not hurt our interests; rather, it would enhance them by show- •ng Australia and other nations in the region that we recognize our own limitations. A growing number of small, ■sland nations look to the Australians for leadership in Maintaining their sovereignty and security, as seen in Australian leadership during the United Nations settlement in Cambodia.
The United States should go the extra mile and increase Military involvement with Australia in every service. Australian bases hold potential for increasing the strength of °ur alliance, and every ship we send to Australia benefits all concerned, both financially and in good will. Even fite opposition party in Australia seeks closer ties with the United States, by encouraging greater use of naval bases
on the north and west coasts.12 These bases are modern and would add greatly to our ability to maintain visible presence, at a lower cost than commercial facilities would demand.
The United States should explore enhanced operating arrangements with Australian units, not only in training exercises but also in normal operations along the west coast out of Fremantle, along the north coast out of Darwin, and off the east coast out of Sydney throughout the islands of the South Pacific. Ship visits to liberty ports are not enough.
Multinational naval cooperation (MNCO) concepts also should be explored—including a trial deployment with Australia working on maritime confidence and securitybuilding measures.13 U.S. involvement in issues of common concern is key to our long-term strategy in the region:
> Establish cooperative logistics with Australia.
> Involve ground and air forces in training with Australia forces in Australia.
> Explore increased exercise and deployment programs.
> Ensure that Australian strategic concerns form the basis of joint U.S.-Australia exercises.
The United States should exempt Australia from all routine U.S. trade restrictions. Too often, the United States has allowed Australian trade policy to be caught up in the furor surrounding trade difficulties with some other nation or trade pact. We must seek the closest possible relations with Australia, not only in recognition of our close historical ties but also with a view toward the future.
With continued devotion and sacrifice, Australia has risen to the call for basic rights, first by Great Britain and then by the United States. As Australia finds its place in the new world order, the United States must prove— through our actions and policies—that it respects Australia uniquely as a true ally. As our attention is drawn toward the economic wonder of Japan, the troubles of the Middle East, and the pleas of the former Soviet Union, we must keep Australia in the forefront of our interests. After all, which histories do we wish remembered—how we dealt with enemies, or how we treated friends?
'Ross Babbage, “Australian Defence Strategies,” Security and Defence, D. Ball and C. Downes, Allen and Unwin, Sydney, 1990, p. 209.
The Southern Center for International Studies, “On Being a Super Power’s Ally: The Case of Australia,” 27 June 1986.
’Ibid.
4Ross Babbage, “Australian Defence Strategies,” Security and Defence, D. Ball and C. Downes, Allen and Unwin, Sydney, 1990, p. 210.
5A. W. Grazebrook, “Regional Credibility Shrinks,” Asian-Pacific Defense Reporter, August-September 1992, p. 34.
"John Galvin, “America’s Asian Challenge,” U.S. News and World Report. 19 October 1992, p. 50.
7W. G. Home, “The Conceptual Basis for Australia’s Regional Security in the 1990s,” Australian Defence Force Journal, No. 93, March/April 1992.
"Robert Ray, Statement by the Minister of Defense to Parliament in Canberra, Australia, 30 May 1991.
’Ibid.
10Australia’s Strategic Planning in the 1990s, Government of Australia, 27 November 1989, p. 43.
"Gregor Ferguson, “Australia Attempts to Boost Security in Region,” Defense News, 28 September 1992.
"“Opposition Offers Broader View of Australia’s Defense Priorities,” Defense News, Volume 7 #44, 2-8 November 1992.
"Commodore Sam Bateman, Royal Australian Navy, “Multinational Naval Cooperation in the Western Pacific.”
Captain Frank is commanding officer of the USS Antietam (CG-54).
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Proceedings / March 1994