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Through the good offices of Contributing Editor Norman Polmar, Proceedings on 22 October 1992 hosted the first meeting between the Russian who headed the team that designed the Typhoon and the American who was the leading engineer on the team that designed the USS Los Angeles (SSN-688). Academician Igor Spassky is general designer and head of the Rubin Central Design Bureau, whose projects have included Echo, Yankee, Delta, and Typhoon nuclear-powered submarines and the Kilo advanced conventional submarine. Mr. Alfred J. Giddings was the Naval Sea Systems Command’s Head Engineer for the Los Angeles project from 1970 to 1984. Former Soviet Navy Captain First Rank George I. Sviatov translated, assisted by Midshipman Second Class Christopher Akins, U.S. Navy, a Russian history student at the U.S. Naval Academy.
stabilizers on the stem and, as a rule, with significant areas. It complicates docking operations and [forces us to] pierce the compartments, but our theory says that [we need] this kind of stabilizer.
For more than 30 years I have been concerned about this, and I asked hydrodynamic engineers to study this question at basic research institutes such as the Krylov Institute in St. Petersburg, where they have excellent equipment, similar to that at the David Taylor Model Basin. Our hydrodynamic specialists also confirmed the necessity for such fixed stabilizers.
When you have fixed stabilizer, it is very logical to install in them the rudder actuators. You are right that these arrangements create very big loads, especially considering [the requirement for] vigorous maneuvers, but our engineering is such that we provide the necessary actuator strength.
For control, the rudder stocks go inside the pressure hull where each part of the rudder has its its own hydraulic cylinder.
Giddings: Two actuators?
Spassky: Sometimes we have tandem actuators. Sometimes to increase reliability they put two cylinders. Experience confirms the reliability of such systems. In my 40 years’ experience I don’t remember any jams.
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Giddings: It appears that all modern Russian nuclear submarines have their upper rudders configured with a fixed vertical stabilizer and what appears to be a movable rudder hinged with very little balance area. This is much different from U.S. and other nations ’ practice. What was the design rationale and how did you minimize the size of the actuators? Is it possible the lower rudder on the same actuator might be highly balanced without a fixed vertical stabilizer?
Spassky: [There Was a] possibility that the lower rudder using the same actuator could be highly balanced
without the use of a fixed vertical stabilizer. The Russian School of Naval Architecture [submarine design] gave us the firm opinion that, to provide [adequate] stability, it is necessary to have fixed
Giddings: Several classes of attack submarines are fitted with a pod on the upper rudder stabilizer. Have you read any of the speculative articles in the U.S., English, and other technical press relating to their use in magneto-hydrodynamics? What is your reaction? Spassky: [Laughter] Anyone who understands magneto-hydrodynamics couldn’t write such kind of nonsense. It’s impossible to do it. To employ such [a concept] it [would be] necessary to [have a pod] the diameter of the pressure hull. That’s clear, yes?
Giddings: Very clear. One of the most challenging tasks for submarines is keeping proper depth for effective and secure use of the periscopes and the antennas. This task is greatly magnified in
rough seas as the second-order wave forces slowly draw the hull toward the surface while the ship’s depth indicators and high- frequency movements are dominated by the first- order movements of the hull at the frequency of encounter. Has automation of subma-
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Campaigning for the Komsomolets
By Norman Polmar
Academician Igor Dim- itrivich Spassky is concerned about the sunken submarine Komsomolets. The head of the Rubin Central Design Bureau in St. Petersburg (Leningrad), Spassky was responsible for the design of the Soviet nuclear-powered submarine that sank approximately 300 miles off the Norwegian coast on 7 April 1989.
“Within a decade, the two nuclear warheads [on torpedoes] on the ship will be fully corroded by an electrochemical reaction involving salt water . . . and the highly toxic plutonium will escape from the damaged torpedoes and into the environment,” he says. Normally, the two torpedoes, both in titanium launch tubes, would not present a danger of radioactive leakage.
MORSKOY SBORNIK
When the Komsomolets struck the floor of the Norwegian Sea at a depth of 5,525 feet, however, there was an explosion—most likely caused by hydrogen gas generated when seawater reached the submarine’s electric storage batteries. The explosion, which cut open the submarine’s titanium pressure hull, may have caused—directly or indirectly—the subsequent detonation of explosive warheads in the conventional tor-
pedoes in the forward compartment of the submarine. This explosion damaged the two nuclear torpedoes carried in the submarine. Also, the outer doors to the torpedo tubes are open.
“One of the torpedoes is in essence destroyed, and another is damaged,” says Spassky. “Corro
sion is in progress.” Spassky reports that Russian scientists believe that at a water temperature of 20°C, the corrosion could reach the plutonium cores within five to six years. Because the water temperature is only -1°C at the site of the sinking, the corrosion will proceed more slowly, perhaps taking until the end of the decade or longer to breach the cores.
“This gives us more time, but not forever,” Spassky notes- The plutonium will not dissolve, but will coalesce with particles in the water, such as plankton, and could drift tens of miles.
The Komsomolets
The two nuclear torpedoes contain about 20 pounds of plutonium. Some Western sources estimate 450 pounds to 650 pounds of plutonium already have been discharged into Arctic waters through atmospheric tests of nuclear weapons. The addition of some 20 pounds would have relatively little impact on the existing level of danger. “Maybe only one-half person per 100,000 would die from this contamination,” estimates Spassky- Still, Spassky feels that reports of the release of the torpedoes’ plutonium would have a catastrophic impact on the Norwegian fishing industry. “When the leaks
rine depth-keeping been an important matter in Russian submarines? Are there any special indicators or other instrumentation provided to enable more effective manual control? Have there been special training facilities built with submarine ship motion simulators?
Spassky: The problem is very serious. The submariners didn’t like [short] periscopes. Twenty years ago, we began to design our submarines with [longer] periscopes. [We did this] by increasing the height of the conning tower and the diameters of the pressure hulls. We developed [better] instruments to measure submarine depth and an automatic control system. The combination allowed us to provide stability and controllability for our submarine up to sea states four or five. The submariners don’t like such kind of operations. But let me add for myself, when
operating contemporary nuclear submarines, this regifl^ is not so important.
Giddings: It depends on what your mission is. What about communications though?
Spassky: It is important, of course. For nuclear sub' marines, it’s not so important. For diesel submarines it >s very important.
Giddings: Some classes of Russian attack submarines have their sails hydrodynamically configured more like the cockpits of fighter aircraft than the fins so common in U.S., United Kingdom, and European practice. Is the dominant design influence hydrodynamic? If so, is the minimization of side forces in a turn, snap roll, the
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start, no matter how small, no one will buy Norwegian fish.”
The solution, according to Spassky, is to block all possible ways of plutonium release into the environment, such as sealing the holes in the forward portion of the submarine or to encase the first (torpedo) compartment. That would provide between 20 years and 50 years of protection from the plutonium leakage, by which time other solutions may be available.
Spassky is seeking Western help in solving the Komsomolets problem. He estimates that the numerous research ship expeditions to the Komsomolets' site, the 30 dives to the submarine by the twin, deepdiving Mir submersibles, the development of equipment and technology necessary to encase the forward compartment, and the actual operation will cost approximately $6.5 million.
Spassky believes that the solutions to the Komsomolets torpedo problem will help to develop methods for dealing with potential future problems from other sunken nuclear submarines. Two U.S. and three Soviet nuclear submarines are on the ocean floor, as well as one U.S. and at least one Soviet nuclear reactor. In addition, there are an estimated 50 nuclear warheads on board sunken U.S. and Soviet submarines.
The extensive submersible dives on the Komsomolets also have revealed the condition of the submarine’s reactor plant. Spassky is confident that the reactor will not
cause ecological problems. The primary loop is breached, he says, and sea water has entered the core, but for radioactive particles to escape, they must pass through a labyrinth to the ventilation trunk in the submarine’s sail. “We have taken samples inside the trunk vent and have found that there were only microscopic particles of Cesium 137 resulting in radiation slightly greater than background, and only near the trunk vent” says Spassky.
Addressing the Komsomolets, Spassky explains that submarine designers never expect their submarines to sink. He demands that his designers go on submarine trials and, on occasion, on operational patrols. Spassky himself has been under way about 30,000 miles in submarines. “Designers always think their submarine is the best design possible, but when they get on board, they see things that could have been done better.” But even excellent design efforts and extensive tests and exercises cannot prepare a submarine crew for a disaster at sea. Speaking of the escape capsule in the Komsomolets, in which five men attempted to escape (only one survived), Spassky observed:
The men did not know what to do in such a tragic situation. There had to be drills, but try and push 70 men into a chamber in the conditions of dead silence at a depth of one kilometer, when the sun is shining and nothing is threatening your life.1
The actual conditions when the Komsomolets was sinking were quite different: rough weather, with men screaming orders, and smoke filling the compartments. Forty-two men were lost with the submarine, including the commanding officer. There were 27 survivors.
Spassky continues to stress that safety features are a vital component of modern submarine design. Today, Russian-built submarines are the only undersea craft with escape capsules for their entire crews.
Today Spassky is seeking international support for the Komsomolets project. In a commentary in The New York Times, after discussing extensive U.S. efforts to partially salvage a Soviet missile submarine in the mid-Pacific in 1974, Spassky observed:
Today, the U.S. can spend considerably less and earn a great deal of international respect by joining the world community in taking on the challenge of the Komsomolets. This would be the ultimate sign that the Cold War has given way to cooperation, even under the water.2
'Yuri Teplyakov, “Komsomolets Designer Says Radiation Leaking From Torpedoes," Moscow News,
6 December 1992, p. 9.
:Igor D. Spassky, “Apathy Above, Terror Below," The New York Times, 3 June 1993, p. A23.
Mr. Polmar recently hosted Academician Spassky during his visit to the United States in conjunction with the 11th Naval History Symposium at the U.S. Naval Academy.
main purpose? Or is it the reduction of the relatively concentrated wake disturbance to the propeller? Or is {he reduction of overall drag the most important? How is fore-and-aft access provided to the upper-deck of Alfa-class submarines?
Spassky: An interesting question. We have two schools in Russia related to this problem. At the design bureau, shake hands. One school designs strategic submarines; this school’s [approach] coincides completely with American-designed sails.
Another design bureau, which designs attack submarines, has established a cockpit-type sail. Its only advantage [emerges] when you sharply change course—this is the °nly advantage. In other respects, this form is inferior. From the standpoint of drag, they are approximately equal.
Giddings: Photographs of Typhoon topsides show a well-rounded, carefully faired and generally smooth hull and appendages. The flat, hard-cornered, slab-like shape of the walkways around the sail and conning tower projection present a startling contrast. How did this happen? There has been occasional interesting speculation on this in U.S. submarine design circles. Spassky: This submarine has an absolutely unusual architecture. Submarine designers have [grave] responsibilities for the sailors on board the submarines. Increased survivability and better damage control capability were the dominant factors in the Typhoon design.
They have, in essence, two pressure hulls that are completely autonomous. The outer hull covers both of these two pressure hulls, which naturally are connected to
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Interview
each other. In the space where the control room is usually situated, there is another smaller, autonomous pressure hull. Our [philosophy] requires an escape chamber on the submarine; in fact, there are two chambers, which can accommodate the escape of the whole crew. The two escape chambers on the submarine [dictated] the submarine’s design. [Giddings comment: The escape chamber upper deck is evidently the flat deck (and side) visible on each side of the Typhoon; photographs show the separation lines.]
Giddings: U.S. submarine designers have evolved the design of submarine anchors into today’s flush housing
bottom anchor. It is located aft of the pressure hull in the bottom of the ballast tank or a free- flooding enclosure just aft of the hull to minimize the effects of flow noise over the inevitable rough slots and surfaces that remain. What solutions have been found in Russian designs?
Spassky: We solved this problem traditionally and we changed the structure to provide the least possible degree of interference and resulting noises from hydro- acoustics. [Giddings comment: They must have measures
to prevent the chain from rattling, as well as a smooth door over the conventional anchor—which also must be placed forward.]
Giddings: Many new proposed submarine systems and equipments are of a nature that permits them to be installed in an existing submarine for thorough evaluation and proof of their quality of operations at sea before their use in new construction and the fleet as a whole d permitted.
There are probably many similarities in the test and evaluation approaches for such systems in the U.S. and Russian navies. Certain other proposed innovations, especially those involving the entire hull form major structural innovations or propulsion developments cannot be installed in an existing ship since they themselves define the new ship.
It would be interesting to learn how the submarine design community in the Soviet Union approached the task of convincing first themselves and then those with authority over construction programs that adequate testing and analysis had been done, and the concept was ready for production. Spassky: The process of submarine development has multiple stages, for example, the stage of preliminary design during which several versions of the submarine are developed to find an optimal version.
This is followed by engineering design. Simultaneously* more than 300 other companies are producing the equip' ment. All this very complex procedure is orchestrated W | the chief designer.
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All elements of submarine machinery plant, armaments, and electronics go through an extensive preliminary engineering evaluations, which take place under the supervision of military supervisors. According to the programs mutually agreed-upon by the military and civilian shipbuilders, no element can go on the submarine without testing on land, sea, or on some kind of simulator.
As a result, when we get to the ship we have a significant degree of assurance about the reliability of all equipment. Then the ship is tested during several stages of sea trials. The process of sea trials is pretty extensive. A special government commission supervises all these tests, after which it issues about 500 notices.
Giddings: [In the U.S. Navy], they’re called INSURV notices [from the Board of Inspection and Survey.] Spassky: Rarely are they [critical]. We can usually fix them. These procedures provide us with certainty of reliability. In addition, designers participate in sea trials
during the first stages of fleet evaluation, which [affords] them many opportunities to improve designs. I personally have sailed about 30,000 miles to gain design experience.
Giddings: One of the most obvious differences that can be seen in photographs of surfaced Russian and U.S. submarines is the freeboard. U.S. practice has been to provide approximately 13% reserve buoyancy. It appears that Russian practice has been to provide up to 18%—or more. Some discussion of the design philosophy in this regard would be of interest.
Spassky: Again there are two schools. In essence, it seems to me they are connected with our and your geography. Our submarines must cross many [Western] defensive lines to reach the open ocean. American submarines have an advantage [in that even when experiencing difficulties] far from their bases they expect to get help fast; this is unrealistic for Russian submarines.
Impressions
Dr. Spassky is a man with extensive experience as a designer and senior manager of one of the largest enterprises actively creating modern submarines. He is formidable in appearance, and a thoughtful speaker. He was most courteous and interested while listening to and replying to the questions. The format of the interview, even though conducted through a competent interpreter, left no opportunity for the type of intellectual interchange typical of a genuine conversation. The flavor of the meeting convinced me that in a less structured and less time-constrained environment, even more interesting matters could have been explored. I wish I spoke Russian better.
For me, the occasion was both intense and not without irony. For many years I have been involved in the design and development of U. S. Navy submarines whose major objective was the effective defeat or neutralization of the very submarines developed under Dr. Spassky’s direction.
No startling revelations surfaced nor were any expected. There is a mostly unpublished but universally shared body of knowledge about
submarine design that we could talk about. Discussions of design philosophy and criteria are easy so long as numbers and quantitative measures of performance are avoided. For example, it was refreshing to hear the frank statements of Dr. Spassky on the potential for magneto-hydrodynamic propulsion of submarines, which confirmed the conclusions of many experienced designers in the United States. Also, the discussion of the Russian design philosophy and rationale for the provision of damaged stability while surfaced was not unexpected, but interesting on its own merits.
Another comment of interest relates to the “two schools” of thought among Russian designers in some areas. In one example, for diesel and nuclear submarines there are large differences in the priority of requirements for precision depth-keeping near the surface. Diesel boats must sometimes spend many hours snorkeling in all sorts of sea conditions. When depth keeping problems submerge the snorkel, the air intake valve closes and the engine draws air directly from within the submarine. The pressure in the boat drops quickly.
often the equivalent of the air pressure change in an airplane climbing 10,000 feet in a few seconds. Ear and sinus pain and discomfort are prompt and severe. A few such experiences result in demands front the diesel fleet for improved and automated depth keeping.
The same difficulties in a nuclear submarine, while embarrassing in a friendly environment and dangerous in a hostile one, do not cause the immediate pain that dunking the snorkel can. so there are not the same demands for automated control from the nuclear fleet.
The other issue for which Spassky said there were two schools relates to the configuration of the sail. One school applies to missile and “strategic” submarines and the other to attack or antisubmarine warfare submarines, whether diesel or nuclear. The missile boats are more “sedate” in their maneuvering and control requirements, so that the priority for the minimization of snap roll in turns is quite different from what it is in the more agile classes that seek direct combat with enemy ships.
Alfred Giddings
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■
Drill—Not Prayer
By Captain Edward L. Beach, U.S. Navy, Retired
The reference to the Triton (SS[R]N-586) in the interview is slightly misleading in that I do not recall ever having ordered “back emergency” except for drill or exercise. A couple of times, at Admiral Rickover’s request, we put the Triton into a 50° angle—up and down—at slow speed to test natural circulation effects. We did run her backwards, but, as expected, found control to be very poor, as had been the case in similar experiments with all my other submarine commands.
The reference is probably to the experiments we carried out in the Amberjack (SS-522) in 1948-49. We had originated the steep-angle tactics that are now pretty standard for our modern high-speed submarines, and had proved our ability to change depth rapidly in either direction, using as much as a 30° angle on the boat. We worked
The USS Amberjack (SS-522) comes out of the Gulf Stream off Key West during steep-angle maneuvers in 1948-49.
So, traditionally, we design a submarine with reserve buoyancy of more than 30%. This guarantees that the submarine can remain on the surface with one compartment and two adjacent tanks flooded. American submarines have no such capacity. I think that may be one tragedy we shared with the American submarine Thresher [SSN-593]. It probably would not have happened if she had had more reserve buoyancy.
But we lose something on this. The full submerged displacement is greater and naturally there are some losses in speed. Should you provide more horsepower, additional displacement [also is required.]
We understand that there are advantages in the American architectural philosophy of one-hull designs with less reserve buoyancy, and so we are seeking a compromise. And it seems we are finding it.
Giddings: I think you have answered my next question already. It’s the same question. It appears that Russian designers try to ensure that the surfaced submarine can remain on the surface after being damaged by a single
collision or single contact explosion. I understand that ! ■ bulkheads designed to hold up after flooding, to a pressure less than the full submergence pressure but greater \ than the design pressure for an equivalent size surface ship, are provided, and it may be that a major holding bulkhead designed to permit rescue from half of the flooded bottomed submarine is also provided. •
The penalties paid in additional weight of structural details and in constraints in arrangements of large internd systems can be significant. Would you comment on this? Spassky: By your questions, you gave the answer.
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Giddings: Okay, on to a different subject—women at sea. Has there been any planning for the accommodation of women at sea in submarines in the Russian Navy?
Spassky: [Laughter] No! No! We do not understand 1 why this is so important to the U.S. Navy.
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Giddings: It has been a requirement of U.S. submarine ' design that all openings to the sea greater than two- 4
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therefore, we simultaneously developed emergency procedures to regain control in such cases. The most dangerous of these was defined as stem planes jammed at full dive with the ship already going deep very rapidly (at full speed) in a 30° down angle. We worked up to handling this gradually and with great care, and I think that the Kindly Old Gentleman’s awareness of this may have influenced him to entrust this maneuver, with the much larger Triton, to us.
In brief, and specifically, with the stern planes “frozen” at full dive (actually held there by our battle stations stem planesman) and the boat at 15 knots, we found that by using all other possible control measures (full rise on bow planes, full blow on all forward tanks, full rudder, and back emergency), we never exceeded a 15° dive angle. The payoff was to do this with the boat already in a 30° dive. This we had arbitrarily selected as the optimum limit for our angle excursions, since our speed downward at this point was mathematically half our speed through the water.
Again, we went at this gradually, fully realizing that the mathematics of 30° cut both ways. Finally we were fully confident in what we were doing, and we demonstrated
the maneuver to squadron and force commanders, as well as anyone else we could entice aboard. Among the latter, I was delighted to note, was a well-known, combat- experienced, British submarine skipper, sent specifically to observe and report.
The figures always came out the same: at 15 knots, 30° down angle, stern planes “frozen” at full dive, the Amberjack would reach over to a 47° down angle before starting back to normal. As our speed through the water approached zero, we would stop our screws and begin venting tanks, and commonly found ourselves momentarily hovering on an even keel, about 150 feet below the depth at which the simulated casualty took place. Standard measures were thereafter required to maintain control. A huge air bubble could not be avoided when the tanks were vented, but under the circumstances this was accepted.
As it happened, never once did any submarine I served in experience a frozen stem plane—or frozen bow plane for that matter— although there were reports from other submarines that such casualties were not unknown. Nevertheless, the possibility was the reason we invented the drill.
Near the end of the Triton’s submerged circumnavigation, we did experience a severe stern-plane casualty resulting in total loss of stern plane control. The stern planes did not “freeze” in any position, however. Instead, they went, in effect, into free-wheeling. The hydraulic lines serving the stern planes burst, spraying the after torpedo room with atomized hydraulic fluid, and the planes went instantly out of action. The emergency system kicked in automatically, however, restoring stern-plane control almost immediately, and instead of jammed planes the immediate danger was either fire or suffocation of sleeping personnel in our after compartment. Swift action by a young sailor on watch in that compartment not only helped contain the casualty but prevented both dire possibilities; and I’m glad to report that Torpedoman’s Mate Second Class Allen W. Steele, since then a close friend, not long ago held his own submarine command, with great success, and recently retired in the rank of commander, U.S. Navy.
Captain Beach, a distinguished submariner, best-selling author, and long-time Proceedings contributor, commanded four submarines and an oiler during his career.
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plus centimeters in diameter be provided with two closing valves. Any of these that are above a selected larger size must be capable of being closed by hydraulic power controlled from a remote location. For openings that are not in piping systems, such as electrical penetrations and operating shafts, the same principle is used in regard to seals and gaskets.
These and many other requirements are detailed in the "SUBSAFE" program documentation that has been formally applied to U.S. submarines for the past 30 years. Is there an analogous formal program that applies to Russian submarines?
Spassky: It is necessary to provide some principle of double closures; if somebody violates this principle you can expect a misfortune or a disaster. It’s clear.
biddings: As a part of the SUBSAFE philosophy, it is fecognized that as a result of accident or combat damage, it is possible that the large control surfaces, especially the stern diving planes, might be driven to and jammed at full dive. If this were to happen while the
submarine is at a high speed, the resulting plunge, if unchecked, could destroy the ship very quickly. What design and analytical measures are taken to provide a capability to overcome the effects of such a casualty? Spassky: Should this occur, the automatic control system takes over and blows the ballast tanks, adjusts the bow planes, and [sets] the optimal speed. But this [kind of failure can cause] serious accidents.
Giddings: Well, just on that point, the U.S. Navy says back, blow, and pray. Reverse, blow ballast, and pray. Spassky: Backward speed can induce a lot of disasters.
Giddings: Oh, if you actually start going backward. I meant decelerating.
Spassky: Of my memory, I knew only one submarine commanding officer that practically used going backwards.
Giddings: Captain Ned [Edward L.] Beach, U.S.
Navy, did that in the Triton (SS[R]N-586). He went backwards.
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