This html article is produced from an uncorrected text file through optical character recognition. Prior to 1940 articles all text has been corrected, but from 1940 to the present most still remain uncorrected. Artifacts of the scans are misspellings, out-of-context footnotes and sidebars, and other inconsistencies. Adjacent to each text file is a PDF of the article, which accurately and fully conveys the content as it appeared in the issue. The uncorrected text files have been included to enhance the searchability of our content, on our site and in search engines, for our membership, the research community and media organizations. We are working now to provide clean text files for the entire collection.
i the aftermath of the Cold War and Desert torm, the Navy has crafted a new plan. One of s chief architects, Vice Admiral Leighton mith, says the white paper .. From the Sea harts a fresh course that will bring the Navy rom the sea—operating jointly—to the littoral eeions of the world.
Naval historians will tag 1992 as the year of . . From the Sea,” after the September release of the Navy/Marine Corps strategy white paper by the same name. This document provides the fulcrum upon which the Sea Services are fundamentally shifting their response to 'he new post-Cold War strategy. Although the Navy will continue its nuclear deterrent role with its sea-launched ballistic missiles and its sealift mission under 'he Military Sealift Command, naval forces will no longer focus attention °n open-ocean warfighting. Instead,
'hey win emphasize littoral warfare and maneuver from the sea. As demonstrated during the Operation Restore Hope relief operation in Somalia, the Navy and Marine Corps "ow anticipate serving as the enabling force for joint operations—humani- f^an efforts or high-intensity conflict.
According to Vice Admiral f-eighton Smith, Deputy Chief of Naval Operations, Plans, Policy and Operations (N3/N5), the Navy has shifted its focus from open-ocean warfighting at sea toward joint oper- at'ons conducted from the sea. Whereas the Maritime Strategy of the |980s, for the most part, envisaged a large-scale sea battle against a global Soviet Navy conducted concurrently wi'h an air-land battle on the European Central Front, “. . . From the Sea” anticipates a future in which regional conflicts will result in integrated operations, where the unique CaPabilities of naval forces to gener- a'e high-intensity power from the sea vvdl be extraordinarily important.
Vice Admiral Smith says that the White paper codified Navy thinking 'hat had been evolving. The formal P.r°cess took more than a year and re- 'ed heavily on contributions from eet operators.
To execute the new strategy, the Navy/Marine Corps team has identified— ln addition to its traditional capabilities °f forward deployment, crisis response, s'rategic deterrence, and sealift—four key °Perational capabilities: command, con- H and surveillance; battle-space dom- '"ation; power projection; and force sus- tair>ment. The white paper rests on two
major assumptions, says Vice Admiral Smith: that the United States and its allies can control the sea, and that all future military operations of any magnitude will be joint.
On the Surface_____________________
“The littoral is a difficult nut to crack, says Rear Admiral Philip Quast. Director, Surface Warfare (N86). "When you look at the globe, most of the world s
populations live within 50 miles of a coast, and most of the commerce transits within 50 miles of a coastline: that is the battle space we have to control as the enabling force.” He emphasizes that the littoral presents a more confusing picture than does a blue-water environment. Naval forces will have to deal with more
technical problems for radar and radio, owing to natural phenomena and topography and more rules-of-engagement restrictions because of the interspersion of neutrals and civilians.
Rear Admiral Quast has been working littoral problems with war games in which he has relied on a host of former Operation Desert Storm commanders: Rear Admiral David Bill, Director, Surface Combat Systems Branch (N865), who was in charge of battleship gunfire support; Rear Admiral (Select) Thomas Marfiak, Director, Surface Warfare Plans/Programs/Requirements Branch (N863), who was the antiair warfare (AAW) commander; and Rear Admiral Riley Mixson, Director, Air Warfare (N88), who was the battle group commander in the Red Sea. Rear Admiral Quast also draws upon the experience of a number of logisticians who served in the operation.
The war games are addressing a full range of scenarios from the Persian Gulf to the Korean Peninsula, Taiwan, and the Spratly Islands. Rear Admiral Quast has focused most attention on the Gulf, because it presents the most difficult challenge. “The logistics are the longest; the theater is surrounded by neutrals and potential enemies, air threats, and the Iranian submarine and cruise missile threats,” he says.
The Navy’s doctrinal emphasis on the Persian Gulf in many ways is analogous to the Army’s previous Cold War emphasis on the Central Front for its Air Land Battle and the Navy’s inter-war wargaming in the Pacific. . . From the Sea” announced that the Navy would establish the Commander U.S. Naval Forces Central Command as a three-star billet, which occurred when Vice Admiral Douglas Katz relieved Rear Admiral R. A. K. Taylor in October. Vice Admiral Smith says that the creation of the 0-9 billet is a
“demonstration of the Navy commitment to that region, while it enhances the commander’s ability to conduct exercises and develop coalitions.”
Naval Doctrine Command
The white paper also announced the establishment of the Naval Doctrine Command, which opened formally on 12 March 1993 in Norfolk, Virginia, with Rear Admiral Frederick Lewis as its first commander. The objective of the Doctrine Command, according to the white paper, is to “translate operational ma-
The Navy and the Strategic Defense Initiative Organization are collaborating to incorporate the Aegis system— here, in working order on board the cruiser Shiloh—into theater ballistic- missile defense. In this mission area, Aegis should be “a prime player,” according to Surface Warfare Director Rear Admiral Philip Quast.
neuver from the sea into naval doctrine” for expeditionary warfare.
Among the areas that Rear Admiral Lewis will study is the applicability of the composite warfare commander concept to littoral warfare. Vice Admiral Smith says that the concept was appropriate for the war at sea envisioned during the Cold war but needs to be reviewed for its relevancy in today’s anticipated operations. With better communications, potentially smaller threat sectors, and integrated operations in littoral areas, modification may be necessary.
The emphasis on littoral warfighting has highlighted the importance of the ongoing effort to develop the capability of Aegis as a theater ballistic-missile defense system in support of joint operations. Rear Admiral Quast says that during Desert Storm, Aegis demonstrated an ability to track Iraqi Scud Missiles. Now, the Navy and the Strategic Defense Initiative Organization are working together on an Aegis/theater ballistic-missile defense effort that would make Aegis “a prime player in antiballistic-missile defense.” The 50 miles inshore/50 miles offshore littoral battle space along the Kuwaiti/Saudi coast represents 70% of the value in the area in terms of harbors and oil fields, says Rear Admiral Quast. In time, the Navy will be able to “push the envelope” of ballistic- missile defense afforded by Aegis and the SM-2 Block 4 missile. The advantage of using Aegis is that it is a mobile and discreet system.
Surface Warfare is also applying research- and-development work
to counter sea-skimming missile threats. Compressing command decision times in the littoral, commanders need quick fire- control solutions against threats. Surface ships will get improved weapons and sensors that will integrate with other onboard and off-board sensors. The connection will come by way of Link 11, the joint tactical information distribution system (JTIDS), the Air Force airborne warning and control system (AWACS), satellites, and shore-based radars.
Space and Electronic Warfare
While individual surface ships must be self-sufficient in this area at the battle group level, Rear Admiral Quast says, connectivity is a Space and Electronic Warfare (SEW) issue. Last June, Vice Admiral Jerry Tuttle, Director, Space and Electronic Warfare (N6), released an SE” white paper, “Space and Electronic Warfare, a Navy Policy Paper on a New Warfare Area.” The paper presented the Navy policy, technology, and SEW commander functions. It identified the SEW warfare disciplines as operational deception, countersurveillance, counter command, control, communications, computers and intelligence (C4I) and electronic combat' Space and electronic warfare support disciplines are operational security, surveillance, C4I and signals management. Commanders for SEW are now deploying with battle groups and using existing systems- The Second and Third Fleets have a joint tactical memo on SEW command. The Third Fleet evaluated it during exercise Tandem Thrust last August.
Naval Aviation
Naval aviation also is refocusing its
thinking on the littoral. Carrier-based
aircraft will continue to emphasize intense sortie generation, augmented by the standoff capability of smart weapons and cruise missiles. According to Rear Admiral Mix- son, “. . . From the Sea” also formalizes the Navy/Marine Corps team and puts more emphasis on surveillance of the battlefield, as opposed to the previous focus on the interdiction aspects of power projection. Space and electronic warfare helps air warfare by improving the quality l,t' information to the cockpit thus better enabling “smart ordnance on target.”
Beneath the Surface
As for submarine warfare in the littoral, only the priorities have changed, but not the nuclear-powered attack submarine (SSN) missions, says Rear Admiral Thomas Ryan, Director, Submarine Warfare (N87). Submarines have been doing insertions and covert intelligence gathering since World War II. The Navy has developed the SSN strike mission over the last ten years. According to Reaf Admiral Ryan, in the 1980s SSNs would practice sea control in the Norwegian Sen as a sideline to their previous high-priority antisubmarine warfare mission.
He says that along the littoral the ASV submarine mission will still be very important. The Navy will use the SSN against Third World diesel submarines, where air and surface ASW assets may not be able to operate. It is “flat wrong, he stresses, to assume that an SSN cannot operate in shallow water. “SSNs frequently operate in less than 100 fathoms, and the Navy is increasing its training in shallow water and tuning the SSN sen-
With the Navy’s new .. From the Sea” focus, naval aviation must adjust to the concentration on the littoral and inevitable budget constraints. Rear Admiral Riley Mixson, Director of Air Warfare, concedes that naval aviation may have to settle for just two types of aircraft—the F-14 Tomcat and the F/A-18 Hornet.
sor suite toward the acoustic vulnerability of the diesel.” At the same time, SSNs '''ill maintain their blue-water capability to counter any emerging capabilities of Potential adversaries.
According to former Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research, Develop- ttent, and Acquisition Gerald Cann, the Navy is refocusing much of its research and development on the littoral environment, notably in ASW, short-range air defense, and mines. In ASW, says Cann, the littoral environment presents prob- iems for acoustic modeling that do not *end themselves to analysis. Nowadays, VSW is more frequently regarded as a subset of undersea warfare. Cann says that the Assistant Secretary of the Navy f°r Research, Development, and Acquisition for ASW position has changed the iust part of its name from ASW to Undersea and Mine Warfare. He also says that the Navy established a new program executive officer for mine warfare last year.
. Vice Admiral Smith also stresses the tucreasing focus on mine warfare— specifically, mine detection. Drawing a Parallel to the conception of the antiair "’ariare threat in the Maritime Strategy °f the 1980s, he says that, “The enemy minelayer or ground-based missile is the Uew archer with rather potent arrows, but Political considerations, translated into mies of engagement, may limit our flex- ’hility in attacking these threats. Thus, we need to understand the implications of °Perating in that environment, where Ranting and reaction times may be limbed.” According to Cann, for almost all °f the warfare issues in the littoral, research and development is looking at solutions that will “preclude the first shot.”
Passive Reorganization
The October Office of the Chief of
Naval Operations reorganization is having a noticeable impact on Navy planning. Vice Admiral Smith says that, “The reorganization is the boldest Navy move in years” and a “distinct tie-in with . . . From the Sea.’” The rationale was to advance jointness further by enhancing communication among the Navy staff, other services, unified commanders, and the Joint Staff. “OP-06 [now N3/5], for example, had no relation to the numbering system in any other staff in the world,” says Vice Admiral Smith.
Reorganization also eliminated the barriers between the platform sponsors and correspondingly between antiair, antisubmarine, and antisurface warfare. Now the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Resources, Warfare Requirements, and Assessment (N8), Vice Admiral William Owens, heads an organization that focuses on joint mission area assessments: joint strike, joint littoral, joint surveillance, joint SEW/intel- ligence, strategic deterrence, and strategic sealift/protection.
According to Rear Admiral Quast, this year is the first time that the Navy is selling its budget to Capitol Hill on the basis of mission areas, as opposed to platforms. The old organization had its so-called platform barons, three-star deputies who argued for the surface, undersea, and air warfare budgets along separate “stovepipes.” Under the new N8 organization, two-star admirals now defend the platforms, programs, and force structure in terms of joint warfare and joint mission areas.
Rear Admiral Quast, as N86, cochairs the joint littoral warfare assessment with Marine Major General Harry Jenkins, Director of Expeditionary Warfare, who oversees three surface-community issues: amphibious warfare, mine warfare, and special operations. The two cochairs have a common budget office. Rear Admiral Quast’s office is also responsible for strategic sealift/protection assessment, with input from the Military Sealift Command. Air Warfare (N88) has the responsibility for the joint-strike assessment and is cochair with Submarine Warfare (N87) for joint surveillance. The Submarine Warfare office is also responsible for the strategic deterrence assessment.
Within the Budget
The Navy is using “. . . From the Sea” as a guide to achieve a balanced force with a reduced budget. With a $3 billion reduction in its fiscal year 1994 budget, the Navy used the white paper as the foundation for determining force requirements, therefore more easily identifying where cuts should be made. “Previously, we would take a one-year shot with a tax on everybody,” says Vice Admiral Smith. “Now, we’re looking at what we want the Navy to look like in 1999 and beyond.” The service identified core competencies and the operational capabilities (command, control, and surveil-
lance, battle-space dominance, power projection, and force sustainment) to preserve them. The resulting budget decisions led the Navy to protect the centerpieces of its power-projection capability—the carriers and amphibious ships—at the expense of some other areas.
“. . . From the Sea” notwithstanding, the downward trajectory of the Navy budget has already caused “big dislocations and a rapid decompression,” says former Secretary Cann. In fiscal year 1990, he says, the Navy research, development, test, evaluation, and procurement budget was $43.5 billion; for fiscal year 1992, it was $30 billion.
According to Rear Admiral Mixson, budget pressures may force the Navy to focus sooner on two types of combat aircraft on the carrier deck—the F/A- 18E/F and what is now called the A/FX. The former will enter the fleet between 1998 and 1999; the A/FX, sometime between 2008 and 2010. Over the next six years, however, the Navy may take the interim step to reduce combat aircraft types to the F-14 and F/A-18.
The A/FX was previously the AX, the stealth replacement for the venerable A-6 Intruder and successor to the canceled A-12. In autumn 1992, Acting Secretary of the Navy Sean O’Keefe redesignated the program A/FX—a multimission aircraft. Vice Admiral Smith says that it makes little sense in the current funding climate to pursue single-mission aircraft. “The Navy needs to concentrate on areas where it can realize efficiencies, but within acceptable risk levels. A multimission A/FX provides that opportunity.” Precision-guided munitions are also important to the future, as they enhance the ability to project lethal power.
The same shift is evident in submarine warfare, where less money will be available for platforms but more funding will flow to weapon upgrades. Rear Admiral Ryan says that, . . From the Sea” emphasized the need to improve the shallow-water performance of torpedoes and the accuracy of Tomahawk missiles for strike warfare, both in targeting and flight profile. The Seawolf (SSN-21) nuclear- powered attack submarine program has survived—barely—with the decision last year to allow Connecticut’s General Dynamics Electric Boat plant to resume building the second one. Rear Admiral Ryan acknowledges that the Seawolf is “over-designed” for the littoral but maintains that SSN construction must continue as a “hedge” against the emergence of any other nation’s blue-water submarine capability. As for the newer Centurion program, he says that it will provide more-than-adequate capability for littoral warfare.
The Navy is using the white paper to guide a new way of packaging naval forces. Last year, Admiral Paul Miller, Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Atlantic Fleet, worked the force package issue using the Theodore Roosevelt (CVN-71) Battle Group and a Special-Purpose Marine Air/Ground Task Force. Admiral Miller’s idea was to build around flight-capable ships such as amphibious assault (LHA) and amphibious transport (LPD) ships, in addition to carriers, to allow a mix of forces to support a commander’s needs. Adaptive force packages could typically comprise a carrier, an LPD and some other amphibious ship, two Aegis ships, and an SSN.
Vice Admiral Smith stresses joint considerations here, saying that forward- based Army and Air Force capabilities could supplement naval forces, depending on the theater. Mediterranean scenarios are particularly flexible. Tailoring the force package—e.g., by reshaping the deck load—can continue after deployment while a force is in theater. Admiral Miller exercised this facet in March, while the Theodore Roosevelt was in the Mediterranean.
Perhaps most noticeable last year was the increasing integration of SSNs into the battle group, particularly in Mediterranean exercises. Last year even saw SSNs going into the Persian Gulf and operating regularly in the Northern Arabian Sea. Rear Admiral Ryan says that the Topeka (SSN-754) and the Louisville (SSN-724) have been visiting liberty ports in the Gulf. “Topeka was there in December as an unscheduled member of the battle group operating in the Gulf,” he says, “and it probably sent a signal to Iran before the Iranians received their first Kilo.” Both SSNs were also operating with the battle group during Operation Southern Watch in January 1993.
Vice Admiral Smith says that Operations Restore Hope and Southern Watch were classic examples of the concepts embodied in “. . . From the Sea.” The Tripoli (LPH-10) Amphibious Task Unit had been modified with advanced communications equipment (required to host a joint task force commander) just before its deployment to the Indian Ocean in October. Shortly after arriving on station, the Tripoli unit, accompanied by the maritime prepositioning ship M/V Lummus commenced the Somalia relief operation. The Ranger (CV-61) and several escorts joined the Tripoli prior to the Marines’ landing in Mogadishu. Later, the Kitty Hawk (CV-63) relieved the Ranger,; its air wing, like the Ranger's,
provided a variety of cover and service5 for the commander of Operation Restore Hope.
In early January, the Kitty Hatffc moved rapidly into the Arabian Gulf t0 provide additional punch for potential air strikes into southern Iraq. Demonstrating the flexibility of naval air power, she launched nine F/A-18s and nine F-l4s into Dhahran in case their services were needed before the carrier actually arrived- Four days later, when the Kitty Ha^l steamed into the Arabian Gulf, the air' craft recovered on board and were later an integral part of the air strikes into Iraq-
Jointness
As for jointness, Vice Admiral Smith says that the Navy is expanding crossservice discussions on weapon-system requirements, training, exercises, and operations. One significant operational step has been a commitment to upgrade all fleet flagships, carriers, and large-deck amphibious ships with communications necessary to host the commander of a joint task force and/or joint force air component commander (JFACC).
In Tandem Thrust, Vice Admiral Jerry Unruh, Commander, Third Fleet, served as commander of the joint task force l<] his flagship. Initially, the JFACC was collocated at sea; but it later shifted ashore- The improved communications on board provided the continuity of command necessary for Vice Admiral Unruh to continue to command effectively, despite being separated from a major component command. Air tasking orders (ATOs) were and continue to be transmitted routinely, in minutes rather than hours, t° and from all carriers, upgrades, flagship5- and large-deck amphibious ships.
In exercise Ocean Venture in Mu/ 1992 off the North Carolina coast, senior naval commanders successfully demonstrated three key joint-command relationships. Rear Admiral Robert Spans- then-Commander, Carrier Group EigM- was the Navy component commander, collocated with the commander of the joint task force at Fort Bragg. Communications from a new Fleet Mobile Operations Command Center ensured his connection with forces afloat. (The Navy has tested the center further in exercises and has established it in Bahrain for operational use by Vice Admiral Katz.) Naval Doctrine Commander Rear Admiral Lewis, then-Commander, Carrier Group Four, was Deputy Commander, Joint Task Force, to an Army lieutenant general- Rear Admiral James Lair, Commander. Carrier Group Two, was the Deputy JFACC to an Air Force major general-
Maritime prepositioning ships arrived only days after the first troops arrived in Mogadishu, Somalia. Here, the Pvt. Franklin J. Phillips unloads military supplies and vehicles in the port. The Military Sealift Command is conceding that it must be better prepared, because these types of low-level operations will occur more frequently in the future.
^avy/Marine Corps Team
Last year also saw the Navy and Marine Corps begin a broader program of integrating Marine aviation into Navy air w>ngs. In August, VMFA-312 became a Part of the Theodore Roosevelt air wing, and in December VMFA-314 joined the Abraham Lincoln (CVN-72) air wing. In addition, Admiral Miller’s initiative "nth the special-purpose Marine air- §round task force on board the Theodore Roosevelt has demonstrated the flexibil- uy of the carrier. Mixing and matching Navy and Marine tactical air and heli- c°pters have opened new horizons for tailoring deck *°ads to meet national needs. Aviators have ac- c°ntplished the integration °f Navy and Marine Corps tactical aircraft by increasing their emphasis on train- lng and close-air support.
Sealift
In the area of sealift, last year saw important contributions to Operation Restore Hope, as well as c°ntinued work on the con- Sressionally mandated Mobility Requirements Study,
"'hich focuses on projected Lft requirements for fiscal year 1999.
Vice Admiral Michael Kalleres, Commander, Military Sealift Command, expresses his task as “carry up ar>d marry up.” The command’s assets "'ill put ground forces equipment ashore from the sea to “marry up” with the people coming from the air. Success depends 011 close cooperation with the U.S. Transportation Command, the Army’s Military traffic Management Command, and the Vir Force’s Air Mobility Command.
Vice Admiral Kalleres says that,
. Sealift provides the tactical rhythm of J°int operations.” In the case of intense derations, the Army needs supplies for ^ to 15 days of combat, while the Air riorce needs five days of supplies. Ac- c°rding to him, depending on the type of cargo, one fast-sealift ship can equal 150 f“~5 aircraft.
. Operation Restore Hope gave the Military Sealift Command the chance to test lts sealift strategies on a relief operation, as opposed to combat. It was very different from Desert Shield/Desert Storm, ^here the Persian Gulf had modem ports, S°malia had a dilapidated and small Physical structure. Mogadishu had no pilots, no cranes, and no certainty as to depths and obstructions; thus, virtually all decisions had to be ad hoc.
Before the December landings, the command had worked the issue for two months. During the prepositioning phase, the Lummus delivered the first military cargo to Mogadishu in early December. Less than two days after she arrived in theater, ships from the Diego Garcia- based Maritime Prepositioning Squadron Two began arriving in theater with additional equipment and supplies. These ships also pumped all fuel and water to shore bladders. By early January, the
M/V American Osprey, an offshore petroleum discharge ship, began pumping fuel ashore.
In the surge phase, which commenced two weeks after the landing, fast-sealift ships began to deliver follow-on equipment for the Army’s 10th Mountain Division, as well as aircraft matting and well-digging equipment for the construction battalions, port handling gear, and combat-service support. The Military Sealift commander says that all fast- sealift ships were activated within three days of their activation orders.
In the sustainment phase, the command used U.S. commercial liners—including Lykes Brothers Steamship Company and Farrell Lines—to ship containers of sustainment supplies to the Egyptian port of Alexandria. The Strong Virginian, on a long-term charter, and the Gopher State, a ship in the Ready Reserve Force, shuttled the containers from Alexandria to Mogadishu. As of February 1993, the Somali port had handled 330,000 tons of
supplies, 3,600 vehicles, and more than 800 containers of food and consumables. The sealift operation consisted of 30 ships, both chartered and government-owned.
Among the lessons learned is the recognition that the command needs to prepare more for such low-level types of operations, which probably will be more frequent in the future. For example, three Military Sealift Command ships were involved in water-relief operations last year. The M/V Lummus provided water relief to the Philippines following the Mount Pinatubo volcano eruption in 1991 and to Guam following Typhoon Omar in 1992.
The M/V Baldomero Lopez provided water relief to Chuuk (formerly called Truk) after Omar. During Operation Restore Hope, the M/V American Cormorant delivered a reverse-osmosis purification unit to Mombasa, which was towed to Mogadishu in January.
With respect to the Mobility Requirements Study, the objective for 1999 is to have a capability to deliver 2 million square feet in the prepositioning phase and 3 million square feet in surge. Most of the funding will go for construction of roll on/roll off (RO/RO) ships, conversions, and new construction. The current sealift program is funded for 5 million square feet of cargo-lift capability. Actual numbers of ships will depend on proposals offered by private industry. Two caveats apply. No more than 15% of the total funds available for sealift may be used to convert foreign-built ships, and no more than five foreign-built ships can be converted.
“The problem,” says Vice Admiral Kalleres, “is that nobody is building RO/ROs.” He stresses that RO/ROs are important in allowing sealift to maintain tonnage-per-hour tempo. “In order of speed [for unloading], you go breakbulk, container, and RO/RO,” he says. “The only thing faster than a RO/RO is a pipeline, but you still need breakbulks for Somali-type ports where there’s nothing.” In addition, the Military Sealift Command is studying concepts for combination ships (container/RO/ROs) and seagoing barges.
The command continues its program of sealift enhancements testing. Last year, it successfully tested its offshore petroleum-discharge system off the coast of Florida.
Laboratory Streamlining
In the technology infrastructure area, last January the Navy consolidated 32 research, development, test-and-evaluation, engineering, and fleet-support activities into four warfare centers and a streamlined corporate laboratory structure. The consolidation established a Naval Air Warfare Center, a Naval Command, Control, and Ocean Surveillance Center, a Naval Undersea Warfare Center, and a Naval Surface Warfare Center. The streamlining merged the Naval Research Laboratory and the Naval Oceanographic and Atmospheric Research Laboratory. The new corporate lab retains the name Naval Research Laboratory and its existing facilities in Washington, D.C., the Stennis Space Center, Mississippi, Orlando, Florida, and Monterey, California.
Captain Paul Gaffney, the laboratory’s commanding officer, says that, “The new corporate laboratory is now a full re- search-and-development lab, covering every scientific discipline that the Navy and Marine Corps will need for the next 30 years.” Oceanography is still a priority in science and technology and comprises about one-fourth of the lab’s effort. Space technology, materials, systems, and sensors share the balance.
The merger provides a special link between the ocean and atmospheric sciences and allows the lab to take an interdisciplinary approach and a new vision to problem solving, says Captain Gaffney. The consolidation also presents a more cohesive science-and-technology structure.
Cohesion was also a priority in the reorganization of the Office of the Chief of Naval Research (OCNR) accomplished on 4 December 1992. It is now reconstituted as the Office of Naval Research and will integrate planning and management of Navy science and technology, from basic research to manufacturing technology. In October, as the Navy was working on the reorganization, the Navy Manufacturing Technology program transferred to this office.
The Chief of Naval Research, Rear Admiral William Miller, stresses that the reorganization reflects the Navy determination to regard science and technology as an integrated whole with an integrated process and strategic plan. "^e are going away from the stovepipe ap" proach to management by budget accounts,” says Rear Admiral Miller. believes that he has put an organization in place that will allow the transfer of scientific discoveries in universities—which do most of the Navy’s budget category 6.1 (basic research)—to technology development in the labs and finally into the private sector.
Rear Admiral Miller says that the funding levels will not change as the result of the reorganization. Navy science and technology realized almost 30% in real growth in fiscal year 1993 over fiscal yeaf 1992: from $1.1 million to $1.4 million' Most of the growth was in category 6.3A (advanced technology development), with the sums going from $214 million to $41^ million, a reflection of the driving force provided by last year’s Pentagon Science and Technology Plan that originated with the Director of Defense Research and Engineering. Rear Admiral Miller emphasizes that this director did not impose the science-and-technology strategy on the Navy, as some have assumed. On the con-
Highlights of 1992
On 22 February 1992 the salvage-and-rescue ship Brunswick (ATS-3) towed the auxiliary floating drydock Adept (AFDL-23) from Naval Station Subic Bay, in the Philippines, to her new home port in Guam.
► In January, three MH-53E helicopters from Helicopter Mine Countermeasures Squadron Fourteen (HM-14) conducted an extensive underwater search for hazardous material off the New Jersey coast. Using their AQS-14 sidescanning sonars, they located some 30 probable contacts
that led to the recovery of 21 containers lost by a commercial vessel. Four of the containers contained some 400 drums of arsenic trioxide.
► In February, the Navy redesignated its first super carrier, the Forrestal (CV-59), as a training carrier (AVT-59).
Commissioned in 1955, the carrier was the first built with an angle deck to permit simultaneous take-offs and landings. It replaced the Lexington (AVT- 16), which will become a museum in Corpus Christi, Texas.
► On 8 February, the Simpson (FFG- 56) conducted a routine communications exercise in the Mediterranean with the Commonwealth of Independent States Kara-class cruiser Kerch and the Krivak-class fast frigate Bezukoriznenny. On 21 October, the Jack Williams (FFG-24) and the Stephen W. Groves (FFG-29) conducted a Passing Exercise with the Russian Udaloy-class destroyer Admiral Panteleyev in the Eastern Mediterranean.
► On 12 February, the Navy successfully completed the deepest salvage recovery on record, when the Salvor (ARS-52) retrieved the forward section of a helicopter from a depth of 17,250
The new commanding officer of the Naval Research Laboratory, Captain Paul Gaffney, says that it will now cover “every scientific discipline that the Navy and Marine Corps will need for the next 30 years.” The Chief of Naval Research, Rear Admiral William Miller, says technology transfer is critical. “We want to think of dual-use right from the start,” he says,
“to have a positive impact on the economy.”
nology demonstration, domestic technology transfer, small-business innovative research, the Navy SDI Office, manufacturing technology, and low-observable technology. Dr. Bruce Robinson heads the Science Directorate and is responsible for investment in university and industry basic research.
trary, he says, the armed services helped to write the plan.
Technology transfer is a Navy priority, and Rear Admiral Miller is emphatic 'hat the Office of Naval Research will capitalize on its ability to develop technologies that also have commercial applications—e.g., in the physical sciences, engineering, electro-optics and electronics. “We want to think of dual-use right from the start, to have a positive impact °n the economy,” he says.
A key tool in this emphasis is the cooperative research-and-development agreement. Rear Admiral Miller says that the Navy’s use of such agreements is increasing. The first was in December 1988. By December 1992, the number had grown to 90, with new ones authored at a rate of three to four per month.
The Navy also has standing agreements for interservice reliance in science and technology. “We see the strong reliance currently among the military services as a major change in the way we sPend our science-and-technology money,” says Rear Admiral Miller, “and 'Ve want to bring the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) Office and the Defense
Advanced Research Projects Agency into an interagency reliance agreement.”
Under the reorganization, Rear Admiral Miller will have a civilian deputy to help manage the research lab and the four directorates—corporate operations, science, acquisition, and technology.
Dr. Arthur Bisson heads the Technology Directorate and is responsible for technology development, advanced tech-
The Industrial Base
Navy anxiety over the shipbuilding and nuclear-propulsion industrial bases continues. Says former Secretary Cann, “The Navy used to be criticized for not having an industrial base policy, but it’s very hard to have a policy if down sizing.” In 1982, the shipbuilding industrial base consisted of
Kuwait of Marines from the 11th Marine Expeditionary Unit. The commanding officer of Amphibious Squadron One said that the exercise was a demonstration of the ability to conduct seaborne amphibious warfare and of the U.S. commitment to the stability and security in the region. Participating were the Tarawa (LHA-1), the Ogden (LPD-5), the Fort Fisher (LSD-40), and the Schenectady (LST-1185). The operation ran concurrently with exercise Native Fury 92, which involved the offloading equipment from a maritime prepositioning ship.
> In September, a number of Navy units assisted in relief efforts following Hurricane Andrew. SeeBees from Mississippi, Puerto Rico, and Florida provided tons of supplies and equipment. Other assistance came from Mobile Inshore Undersea Warfare Unit 208, Logistics Support Squadron 60, the Naval Electronic Systems Engineering Center, Tactical Electronic Warfare Squadron 33, Naval Air Station Pensacola, Naval Medical Clinic Key West, Fighter Squadron 102, Naval Air Station Alameda, the Ponce (LPD-15),
Naval Technical Training Center Pensacola, and the Ashland (LSD-48).
>■ Also in September, following devastation in the Hawaiian Islands from Hurricane Iniki, the Belleau Wood (LHA-3) provided relief effort for the residents of Kauai, with sailors delivering medical supplies, mobile kitchens, water trailers, excavating equipment, and cargo trailers.
► On 1 October, the Saratoga (CV-60) inadvertently launched two Sea Sparrow missiles during exercise Display Determination 92. One missile struck the Turkish destroyer Mauvenet, which was engaged with other ships in active exercise role-playing in the Aegean Sea. The missile struck the Mauvenet in the bridge, killing five of the crew, including the commanding officer.
feet off the coast of Wake Island. The previous record was 14,800 feet off the coast of Madagascar in 1988. The Salvor located and identified the wreckage with an Orion multisen- s°r, towed platform. The Orion consists of a side-scan s°nar, a digital sonar-enhancement display, and an armored fiber-optic tow cable. The Salvor also used a remotely operated vehicle, CURV III, with television and still cameras, to document the wreckage on the sea floor.
* On 22 February, the Brunswick (ATS-3) towed the dry- dock Adept (AFDL-23), the smallest of three drydocks at Subic Bay in the Philippines to her new home port in Guam, beginning the last series of stand downs at the naval frcility. According to schedule, Fleet Logistics Support Squadron (VRC) 50 also relocated to Guam in August. On SO September, the naval station was disestablished after 47 ^ars of service to the U.S. Pacific Fleet. Until the end of 'he year, U.S. Naval Air Station Cubi Point was the last G.S. facility to remain in the Philippines.
V In April, Marines from the 24th Marine Expeditionary iTnit, SeaBees from Sigonella and Naval Mobile Construc- fion Battalion 40, and two CH-53E helicopters from Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 266 assisted with concrete frocks in Operation Hot Rock to stem the flow of lava from Mount Etna on the Sicilian town of Zaferana Etnae. A number of Sixth Fleet ships also lent humanitarian assistance.
^ In May, a Navy investigation into the 11 February collision between a Commonwealth of Independent States submarine and the U.S. nuclear-powered submarine Baton Rouge (SSN-689) determined that no punitive action "'ould be taken against the commanding officer of the Raton Rouge.
v On 3 August, Amphibious Squadron One commenced Op- cation Eager Mace in the Persian Gulf with a landing in
\
185,000 people in the private shipyards. With the end of commercial shipbuilding subsidies in the early 1980s, seven years later the base employed 110,000 people, and projections are that the work force could drop further to 55,000. Over the same period, Navy shipbuilding, he says, went from 22 ships annually to the six to ten range.
Mr. Cann says that the Navy budget alone cannot solve the problems in the shipbuilding industrial base, because U.S. shipbuilders cannot compete against for- eign-subsidized industries, such as the Republic of Korea and Japan. The Navy could provide incentives and an expanded manufacturing technology program to improve efficiency and save the base, he says, but that solution would mean fewer jobs.
The submarine and nuclear-propulsion base is another issue. Mr. Cann says that the nuclear-power industrial base is an entity virtually unique to the United States, and the country is now wrestling with the question of whether it needs to continue it. “It’s the general conclusion,” he says, “that if we stop building nuclear subs now, we may not start again, and we certainly won’t if we don’t face a Soviet-type threat.” His own view is that the Navy should maintain the base by building a few subs or prototypes until fiscal years 1995 to 1996, “when we see where the former Soviet Union is going.” He also says, however, that “there is no agreement yet” on that issue, either.
Mr. Cann cites one acquisition highlight last year that should not be overlooked—the solidification of real Navy attempts to use commercial off-the-shelf and “nondevelopmental item” approaches in designs and systems to bypass military specifications. In some cases, the approach has involved the use of what are known as “ruggedized” boxes as opposed to redesigned hardware. In others, industry is taking the lead and standardizing itself, for example, by instituting bus protocols that are now industry standards. One key system in particular— SEW’s tactical advanced computer three—has benefited. “The Navy should never have to build another enhanced modular signal processor. We should clearly use a commercial alternative.”
In the Wake of Tailhook
Also throughout last year, the Department of the Navy took action to eliminate sexual harassment and gender discrimination. In the wake of the scandal precipitated by the September 1991 Tail- hook convention in Las Vegas, the Navy began to regard sexual harassment and gender discrimination differently. “We see [them] now as part of a systemic institutional culture problem,” says Rear Admiral (Select) Marsha Evans, Executive Director, Standing Committee on Military and Civilian Women in the Department of the Navy.
In February 1992, the then-Secretary of the Navy H. Lawrence Garrett enacted new enforcement policies that called for mandatory administrative discharge processing in the case of an aggravated incident. By July, the service established the Standing Committee, which delivered a strategy to be implemented in October that included 80 recommendations to improve leadership, education and training, and accountability. “The Department of the Navy views the effort as long-term,” says Rear Admiral Evans, “because it addresses a systemic cultural problem for which there are no quick fixes.” By the end of January 1993, the Navy already had enacted 13 of the recommendations.
Also in January, Acting Secretary of the Navy O’Keefe issued an instruction on sexual harassment policy. According to Rear Admiral Evans, it is the first plain- language document from the Pentagon that defines sexual harassment in lay terms. More significant, the new policy also states that “supervisors are guilty of sexual harassment if they know or should have known of harassment occurring in their organizations and fail to take action.” To date, the Navy has discharged 20 and has 25 cases under review.
Between July and September 1992, every Navy and Marine Corps command had a one-day training standdown on sexual harassment. The Navy provided each command with a syllabus that included a module on alcohol abuse, a problem often linked to harassment incidents. The Navy is now developing annual training and career-leadership training modules for commands to use. On 1 December 1992, the department commenced its Navy-Marine Counseling and Advice Line for sexual harassment (800253-0931). Rear Admiral Evans says that the program is already a model for other federal agencies and private organizations. The Navy has shared information with other services.
The long-term strategy of the standing committee is to end discriminatory behavior and enhance the integration of men and women into the Navy and Marine Corps team, she says. The Department of the Navy has made steady progress in the last two decades. Statistics on women in the Navy, for example, show that the numbers have gone from 1.4% (8,034) in 1972 to 10.5% (58,948) today. In the late 1970s, women began going to sea. Today,
four women command ships; one woman commands an aviation squadron; and si* women have major shore commands- Early last year, the Navy integrated 4s recruit training in Orlando, Florida, the single site at which the service trains 4s women recruits.
Rear Admiral Evans says that prom0' tion rates are approximately equal in every competitive category. Navy and Marine Corps women serve in every role, except those precluded by the combat exclusion law and Department of Defense policy-
In response to the implementation °* the standing committee’s recommends' tions, the fleet commanders-in-chief sent messages to their subordinates to “eX" pand involvement of women in fleet training exercises as well as joint/corn- bined training exercises.” In 1992. women midshipmen participated in the NATO exercise Baltops. In another exercise, Commander Marsha. Fulham. Commanding Officer of Personnel Sup' port Activity Europe, deployed term porarily on board the John F. Kenned) (CV-67) as J-l (Manpower and Personnel) in a Joint Task Force exercise command element. A number of worne4 cryptologists served in the Red Sea exercise Dragon Hammer 1992. In July. Rear Admiral Evans personally sa"' some 60 women performing such role5 as air-traffic controllers and intelligence specialists during the Theodore Roosevelt air wing’s carrier-qualification exercise- “This degree of participation,” she says, “is not uncommon.” The Navy and Marine Corps are moving to expand the role of women officers and enlisted in a whole range of noncombatant operations, including humanitarian missions and counternarcotics. And in late March 1993, Admiral Kelso announced that women would begin being integrated into combat roles.
Also noteworthy, during Operation Restore Hope, female Marines deployed with their units. The manpower guidance issued for the operation said, “Our intent is to fully employ women in the skills they are trained for and the combat exclusion policy is meant to keep women out of direct combat action, not out danger.” The document continued, “Female Marines will conduct those operations associated with a defensive posture for any given situation, which in sorn® cases may necessitate limited combat action. The involvement of women in such action will not compel their extraction, which would be counterproductive to uni1 cohesion and readiness.”
Mr. Morton is a frequent contributor to Proceedings’ reporting on several defense-related matters.