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Before Operation Restore Hope commenced, foodstuffs moved through Somalia only at the pleasure of armed thugs—here, driving through Mogadishu’s “green line” area, which separated warring factions.
By mid-1992, Somalia, beset by factional strife and devoid of government, had become a lawless frontier. The Baders of 14 dominant clans, supported tty armed gunmen dubbed “militiamen by some, provided the only authority in lhe country. And that authority derived n°t from law but from influence, bribery, arTOs possession, intimidation, and outright violence, including murder.
The situation had deteriorated so much ■ riiat people were starving from a fractured marketing and distribu- rion system’s inability to provide f°od equitably. Armed clansmen and thugs commandeered food from warehouses and convoys, then either sold it at extortionary Prices or hoarded it, according to their whims. By some estimates, more than 300,000 Somalis had starved by mid-1992.1 Millions more were in jeopardy.
On 18 August, President George Bush ordered 145,000 tons of food, medicines, and other relief supplies Sent to the beleaguered Somalis.
Marine General Joseph P. Hoar, Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Central Command, appointed Brigadier General Frank Libutti, another Marine, as the commander of Joint Task Force (JTF) Provide Relief, insisting of 570 U.S. personnel.
Based initially in Mombasa,
Kenya, the task force had the mission of transporting supplies to Somalia and delivering them to private relief agencies for distribution.
The force, composed mostly of B.S. Air Force personnel, included representatives from all services, mcluding nine Marines and seven sailors from the Central Command headquarters element.
Operation Provide Relief flights c°mmenced on 28 August. Four C- h30 aircraft delivered 34 tons of sup- Plies—including beans, rice, and cooking oil—the first day. General Libutti struck an agreement with the Red Cross that the U.S. servicemen would neither carry weapons nor unload supplies from *he aircraft. Somalis did the unloading."
In September, the United Nations revived to send 3,000 troops to Somalia under its aegis. Pakistan responded first,
offering 500 soldiers for duty, but it lacked the means to transport them to eastern Africa. On 15 September, the Tarawa amphibious ready group (ARG), with the 11th Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) embarked, arrived off the coast of Somalia,3 where it provided command, control, and communications for the U.S. Air Force’s airlift of 500 Pakistanis and their equipment to Mogadishu.4
Operation Provide Relief continued
through early December 1992. Generally, the U.S. Air Force operated eight C-130 and three C-141 aircraft for the relief effort, flying the supplies into Mombasa, Kenya, and some distribution sites in Somalia, after which Somalis trucked them to distribution points.
On 11 November 1992, Brigadier General Libutti relinquished command of JTF Provide Relief to Brigadier General Paul
A. Fratarangelo, U.S. Marine Corps. By that time, the task force had transported 13,100 metric tons of supplies—including more than 50,000,000 meals to refugees in Kenya and Somalia. General Fratarangelo had been the deputy commander, I Marine Expeditionary Force (I MEF) at Camp Pendleton, California. Forty-five Marines from I MEF joined JTF Provide Relief with him.5
Before relinquishing command, General Libutti announced that the government was planning to turn over the airlift effort to contracted civilian airlines. Military flights would be halved by 1 December, and Operation Provide Relief would probably be wrapped up by 20 January 1993.
As the operation continued through November, conditions continued to deteriorate in Somalia, complicating the relief efforts. Theft, looting, and pillaging increased. Militiamen hijacked convoys or extorted “taxes” from them—as much as half their cargoes. During November, they dealt the relief effort an almost mortal blow by firing on storeships in Mogadishu harbor. With ships unable to dock and unload safely, the harbor closed. The 500 soldiers of the Pakistani battalion were not enough to stem the tide of lawlessness.
During late November, President Bush offered to add U.S. troops to the U.N. humanitarian- relief effort. The U.N. Security Council quickly accepted the offer and the U.S. Central Command was ordered to commence enhanced relief efforts.
General Hoar named Lieutenant General Robert B. Johnston, the Commanding General, I Marine Expeditionary Force, to head the joint task force conducting Operation Restore Hope. The task force’s mission was “to secure major air and sea ports, key installations, and food distribution points in order to provide open and free passage of relief supplies; to provide security for convoys and relief organizations; and to assist U.N. nongovernment organizations
Navy SEALs and Marine recon units, hoping to accomplish last-minute beach reconnaissance under cover of darkness, found their cover blown by the bright lights of the media and their actions televised live for viewers around the world.
in providing humanitarian relief under U.N. auspices.”6 The U.N. resolution authorized the task force “to use all necessary means to establish as soon as possible a secure environment for humanitarian relief operations.”7
Using the I MEF staff as a nucleus, General Johnston built his joint task force staff at Camp Pendleton, adding members of all services to it. Planning and preparation continued even as its leading elements arrived off the Somali coast and prepared to go ashore.
Early on 9 December, U.S. Navy SEALs swam ashore at Mogadishu, followed closely by reconnaissance Marines in rubber boats. Their arrival was greeted by the glare of video lights and photo flashes. A mob of reporters and photographers lined the beach, photographing and filming the landing and requesting interviews from the startled and disconcerted servicemen. Halfway across the world, Americans—for the first time ever—watched a live broadcast of a landing operation. Encountering no resistance, the SEALs and recon Marines pushed through the throngs of reporters to the airfield, while other Marines and SEALs landed at the Mogadishu seaport.
The 15th Marine Expeditionary Unit (Special Operations Capable) [MEU (SOC)], commanded by Colonel Gregory S. Newbold and comprised of Battalion Landing Team (BLT) 2/9, Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron (HMM) 164, and MEU Service Support Group (MSSG) 15, had arrived in the Indian Ocean on board the ships of the Tripoli amphibious ready group, which included the USS Tripoli (LPH-10), the USS Rush- more (LSD-47), and the USS Juneau (LPD-10). The Ranger carrier battle group (CVBG) was diverted from its Persian Gulf deployment to provide air support for Operation, Restore Hope. The USS Ranger (CV-61), the USS Valley Forge (CG-50), and the USS Kinkaid (DD-965) made up the CVBG. Approximately 600 Air Force personnel, commanded by Brigadier General Thomas R. Mikolajcik, (including some 400 who had served on Operation Provide Relief) provided airfield operations support.
Many of the Marines of BLT 2/9, accompanied by Navy Construction Battalion (SeaBee) personnel, followed the
SEALs and recon Marines ashore. Transported in landing craft air cushion (LCAC), assault amphibious vehicles (AAVs), and both medium-(CH-46) and heavy-lift (CH-53E) helicopters, the Marines landed and pushed out beyond the port and the airfield. They established check points and security positions, to control the port and airfield. They also occupied the U.S. Embassy compound, which had been vacant since January 1991, and raised the American flag. AH-IW Cobra attack helicopters conducted low-level aerial patrols. The SeaBees and combat engineers worked to restore the port, airfield, and other facilities.®
The efforts of Special Envoy Robert B. Oakley went far to ensure lack of resistance to the landing. He had negotiated with the two warlords who dominated Mogadishu, obtaining acquiescence for the arrival of U.S. forces. Only a few armed Somalis remained in Mogadishu when the Marines arrived.
With the battalion landing team ashore, Phase I of Operation Provide Hope was complete. Phase II included the deployment of additional I MEF units and elements of the U.S. Army’s 10th Mountain Division from Fort Drum, New York, commanded by Major General Steven L. Arnold, and—as the additional troops arrived—securing some additional distribution points. Phase III objectives were to secure the port and airfield at Kismayu, 260 miles south of Mogadishu, and the rest of the eight main distribution sites, and to continue relief operations.
Phase IV was to include peacekeeping operations, while transferring responsibilities to the U.N. multinational force being assembled.
The facilities in Mogadishu contrasted sharply with those available in the Pet' 1 sian Gulf during Operations Desert Storm and Desert Shield. The airfield was small and lacked room for all of the support' ing aircraft and their attendant equipment' The port was both smaller and shallower, and lacked cranes. Those circumstances combined to inhibit the flow of both troops and material into Somalia. The commanders, accordingly, limited the operations initially to the areas nearest the port and airfield in Mogadishu.
As the facilities were upgraded, units . of the 10th Mountain Division arrived, along with additional Marine units and detachments, such as a communications detachment from the 1st Force Service Support Group (1st FSSG) on 11 December and Marine Light Attack Helicopter Squadron (HMLA) 369 on 27 December. The Kitty Hawk CVBG arrived on 18 December and relieved the RangH CVBG. Substantial portions of the Ah Force’s strategic-lift capability were dedicated to supporting the operation.
Troops arrived from other nations, as well. By 17 December, 19 nations had either promised or provided contingents- Reflecting its international nature, Join1 Task Force Restore Hope became, within a few days of arriving in Somalia, Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) Somalia-
Initially, the Somalis welcomed the U.S. forces, greeting them warmly, waV-
M
'he task force. The choice of an amphibious landing, they groused, was opportunistic and politically motivated, funded in the desire to justify the Ma- r*ne Corps’ existence and, thus, to inCrease its share of a diminishing Defense budget. One unnamed Pentagon source jealously suggested that a refusal of the Army’s offer of 82nd Airborne units was evidence of that alleged parochialism."
In fact, though, at the end of November the 15th MEU (SOC) was the nearest U.S. military unit capable of carrying °u' the mission. Further, maritime prepo-
urines to lead the way and command
Speeial Envoy Robert Oakley—here, with U.S. and Belgian troops and a grateful Somali woman during the dedication of a new bridge near Kismayu— exercised great diplomatic skill in minimizing opposition by the local warlords to the relief effort.
'ng and smiling. That soon began to change. The Marines, taking their duties seriously, confiscated weapons from individuals and vehicles at checkpoints and during other random encounters. While most Somalis applauded that effort, those who lost their weapons did not.
. While SeaBees and support Marines improved facilities and performed many critical logistical functions, the combat Marines in Mogadishu manned roadblocks and other security positions and inducted patrols in the city near the port and airfield for the first few days in country. As troops and supplies built up, expanded operations became possible. Within a few days, the combined force began to move beyond the capital city.
That move came too slowly for some critics. The United States should have moved more aggressively and more Widely, some relief agency representatives complained. The single landing at Mogadishu, they argued, had driven s°me militiamen and armed thugs underground; others simply moved other areas, practicing their vi- °lence on new victims. Some of 'be thugs escaped across international boundaries with their Weapons. The U.S. forces, they smd, should have landed simulta- "eously in each of the critical dis- tiibution centers to capture and disarm the thugs, preventing their migration and escape and reduc- lng their means to cause violence. ti*ne author suggested that “the Marines’ caution in Somalia . . . may spring partly from awareness 'hat a calamity could jeopardize 'he Corps’ future . . . .” Commanders and staff officers, though, ci'ed the limited U.S. logistical capabilities and other factors which Prevented operations of that mag- "i'ude from occurring that quickly.10
Other critics complained of Parochialism, favoritism, and unseemly politics in selecting
sitioning squadrons, with Marines’ equipment and supplies staged on board, promised the quickest possibility of sustaining follow-on forces in Somalia, and were the least taxing on U.S. strategic lift capabilities.
The U.S.-led coalition also received criticism from many sources for failing to disarm Somalia and for failing to perform civil-police functions to reduce the violence. Initially, although troops confiscated visible weapons at checkpoints and some other locations, the combined task force did not actively seek and confiscate weapons concealed in homes or vehicles. Furthermore, U.S. procedures, in fact, seemed inconsistent. A unit at one location would confiscate weapons, but in another location Marines would check Somali visitors’ weapons at a compound gate and return them when the visitors departed. In one incident, an incredulous Marine, after reporting by radio the discovery of a significant weapons cache, received orders to withdraw without tak-
ing any action. In another incident, a senior Marine officer ordered confiscated weapons returned to Somalis who had complained and were becoming unruly and threatening.
Such confusion on the scene reflected a diplomatic-level dispute over the disarmament policy. U.N. Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali argued publicly that the task force should implement procedures for systematically disarming Somalia. That, he suggested, was a “prerequisite” for stabilizing the situation there. U.S. officials disagreed. Disarming the clans, General Hoar contended, is “a
political issue, one that needs to be settled first and foremost by the Somalis.”12 While that debate continued, Lieutenant General Johnston, who had arrived in Somalia with his staff on 11 December, began to expand the operation. On 13 December, only four days after the arrival of the first troops, a contingent comprised of 230 U.S. Marines, 450 10th Mountain Division soldiers, and a few airmen landed by helicopter and occupied the airfield at Bale Dogle, an intermediate objective partway to Baidoa, a city in the heart of the famine region. The local Somalis offered no resistance and, in fact, welcomed the U.S. forces to the area. But after agreeing initially, several ranking Somali representatives refused to exchange weapons for food, claiming that they required their clan leader’s direction to do that.13
U.S. forces pushed farther into the interior on 15 December, as 530 Marines of the 7th Marine Regiment and 142 French Foreign Legionnaires occupied Baidoa in a two-pronged operation. A heli- bome contingent secured the Baidoa airfield, while a convoy of 77 vehicles, covered by Marine AH-IW Cobra and UH-1 Huey helicopters from the Tripoli ARG and Navy A-6 and F-14 aircraft from the Kitty Hawk (CV-63), pushed into the center of town after more than 18 hours on the road from Mogadishu.
In a symbolic gesture, Marines that same day delivered food to an orphanage in Baidoa. More important, protected convoys began to move shortly from Mogadishu to Baidoa, unmolested by armed militiamen for the first time in almost two years.
SEALs and recon Marines “monitored” Purple Beach (and its approaches) at Kismayu through the early morning hours of 19 December, and at 0630, Marines and Belgian paratroopers conducted a daylight amphibious landing, under cover of jets from the Kitty Hawk. Experiencing no resistance, but observed by two or three thousand Somalis who lined the beach, they pushed quickly inland and secured the airfield. C-130 relief flights into the Kismayu airfield began later that day, as SeaBees worked to improve the field. The Marines later returned to their ships, leaving responsibility for the security of Kismayu to the Belgians and elements of the 10th Mountain Division.14
As the U.S. forces moved inland, circumstances began to deteriorate in Mogadishu. “After an initial few days of good behavior,” The New York Times re-
Marines hold back Somali spectators as an Air Force C-141 unloads at Mogadishu airport. Relatively limited port and airfield facilities in Somalia hindered the effort to get emergency relief inland.
ported, “many gunmen reappeared on Mogadishu’s streets, particularly in areas not covered by the troops and their checkpoints.” The gunmen reportedly came to believe that U.N. troopers would not interfere with them as long as they threatened only Somalis. Shooting and violence increased in Mogadishu and some of the gunmen grew bolder. Marines began to experience sniper fire while on patrol. As the incidence of sniping increased, the United States announced a more aggressive disarmament policy, threatening to “disarm Somali gunmen who refuse to give up their weapons.”15
Despite the escalating violence in Mogadishu, the combined forces continued their operations in the interior. French forces secured Hoddur; Italian troopers occupied Gailalassi; and on 28 December, American and Canadian troopers secured the village of Belet Uen, the last of the eight distribution center objectives, weeks ahead of schedule.16
Although things remained fairly calm in the interior of Somalia, and those Somalis seemed to accept the foreign presence without hostility, violence continued to escalate in Mogadishu. The combined force’s presence diminished the power and authority of the warlords, creating a power vacuum. Some of the armed clansmen began freelancing, and violence in the streets increased. Somali males, whose masculine identity is inextricably dependent upon owning firearms, resented their weapons being confiscated. Shooting incidents occurred frequently and added to the tension. In one, French Legionnaires shot at a truck that ran past a checkpoint, and several Somalis were killed or injured. In another, U.S. Marines fired on a vehicle that contained three Somalis—one of whom aimed his rifle at the Marines— and killed all three. The combined forces encountered more and more hostility, including disparaging gestures and remarks, rock throwing, and increased sniping.
One U.N. worker was killed and three others were injured when their jeep struck a mine. The combined task force responded to the increased violence by patrolling and confiscating more aggressively. On the positive side, Operation Provide Hope had become one of the largest humanitarian relief operations ever
conducted, as well as one of the most widely supported international humanitarian efforts in history. By the end of the year, more than 12,500 U.S. military personnel were serving in Somalia, with another 2,300 supporting the operation from ships in the Indian Ocean. More than 6,000 troops from 17 other nations had arrived, with more on the way.17 CJTF Somalia had become United Task Force (UNITAF) Somalia. Ships laden with relief supplies were once more unloading at Mogadishu’s docks, and relief flights were landing at several airfields. Troops provided security at the eight main distribution centers and protected convoys that ran from ports and airfields to those distribution centers and beyond, into neighboring villages. The flow of relief supplies and multinational troops into Somalia increased daily, and there were distinct signs that the distribution effort was taking hold in the interior.
On 21 December, Secretary General Boutros-Gahli had argued that the United States should not withdraw its forces by 20 January 1993, as the Bush administration initially had announced it would. Boutros-Ghali argued for a long-term U.N. presence, including a substantial U.S. contribution, and “peace enforcement,” a new venture in U.N. activity. By 31 December, it was apparent to most that U.S. troops would be in Somalia beyond President-elect Bill Clinton’s inaugural, but the international response had exceeded anyone’s expectations. General Hoar was able to announce that the United States was reducing the number of combat-arms personnel, in favor of increased support troops.18
On 28 December, a meeting between the two most powerful Somali warlords augured well for the war-torn nation. Ali Mahdi Mohamed and Mohamed Farah Aidid met amiably and walked together along the “green line”—the dividing line between their clans’ territories and the most strife-torn section of the capital. They agreed to dismantle the green line. Special Envoy Oakley, whose negotiations had ensured the unopposed arrival of U.S. forces in Somalia—and who had conducted similar negotiations for the ex-
I
US MARINE CC’ ^
pansion of operations inland—broket in
the meeting. Sp
Although the outcome of Operati01* 1 C( Provide Hope remained unclear on 3 p(
December 1992, much had been accofl1' th
plished. The United States and a nuff' tr ber of other nations had cooperated undet hi U.N. auspices to assist a nation on thL l verge of self-destruction. Joint e,
forces, once again, made key contribu p
tions. A growing number of Somalis wer‘' Sj receiving relief, and continued improve ment seemed assured. ai
_____________________________ ts
■ ti
'Maj. John F. Antal and Capt. Robert L. Dunawah E “Peacemaking in Somalia: A Background Brief, ^ j H rine Corps Gazette (February 1993): pp. 38-43.
-The Washington Post, 29 August 1992. j,
’Commanded by Col. Michael W. Hagee, the U I ‘ MEU included Battalion Landing Team (BLT) V' P Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron (HMM)-l^ j b and MEU Service Support Group (MSSG) 11. §
4Washington Times, 29 June 1992, A9. A j
'CMC Washington, D.C. R 121954Z Nov 92, HQM'j | News Summary 46-92; Inquirer (Philadelphia, PA' ^
13 November 1992; Union Tribune (San Diego, CA J 4 November 1992. C
6Editor, “Marines ‘Restore Hope’ to Somalia,” Nli ^ rine Corps Gazette (January 1993): p. 3. nThe Washington Post, 4 December 1992. ; ^
8CHINFO, Washington, D.C. P 092300Z Dec. 9 J j Navy News Service; and Editor, “Provide Hop6, ; Marine Corps Gazette (January 1993): p. 3. I .
'By 18 December, France, Belgium, Canada, Jord^j Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Italy, Britain, and Pakistan J1 i had troops in Somalia. The New York Times, I December 1992. J
10Christian Science Monitor, 14 December 1992; T1 New York Times, 13 January 1993; American tinel, 10 January 1993.
"The New York Times, 13 January 1993.
,2The Washington Post, 15 December 1992; D* fense Dialog (Washington, D.C.). 15 December 199 ’
13The Washington Post, 16 and 17 December 199 ’
The New York Times, 17 December 1991; America | Sentinel, 3 January 1993. l4CHINFO, Washington, D.C., P 232300Z Decem^ 1992; CMC Washington, D.C., R 311954Z Deceit ber 1992.
"The New York Times, 19 and 23 December 1992- 'bThe New York Times, 11 January 1993.
17The Washington Post, 30 December 1992. I
1 “Editor, “Somalia Update,” Marine Corps Gazet (February 1993), p. 4; The New York Times, 19 Ve ; cember 1992.
Lieutenant Colonel Richards is head of the Histof cal Branch, Marine Corps History and Museums Vv vision. An infantry officer, he began his current & signment after service with the 3d Marine Division