This html article is produced from an uncorrected text file through optical character recognition. Prior to 1940 articles all text has been corrected, but from 1940 to the present most still remain uncorrected. Artifacts of the scans are misspellings, out-of-context footnotes and sidebars, and other inconsistencies. Adjacent to each text file is a PDF of the article, which accurately and fully conveys the content as it appeared in the issue. The uncorrected text files have been included to enhance the searchability of our content, on our site and in search engines, for our membership, the research community and media organizations. We are working now to provide clean text files for the entire collection.
Large displays of Russian military equipment abound at military trade fairs and air shows—like this Su-35 at Farnborough 92. Russia is working to sell military equipment to anyone with the hard currency to buy it.
The Russian Navy, like the Russian government, is under a great deal of pressure at present. It is being asked to deliver a viable maritime defense while it >s being reduced in size, making major leadership changes, and reordering and reorganizing to deal with the changed geography of the country—and doing it all within a shrinking budget.
There are a number of powerful forces at work in Russia that will shape the Russian Navy of the future. Among these ure the ship-scrapping programs, a debate about military missions and functions, fewer defense dollars, and political decisions that have direct impact on shipbuilding. A declining economy and the costs of operat- 'Ug a large navy of older ships have driven the scrapping process. But scrapping itself has consumed considerable resources, and nuclear- ship scrapping promises only to increase those costs. Furthermore,
With the decline in the military budget and the changes in inter- uational circumstances, the roles and missions of the Russian military branches have come under debate. In view of the substantial capital costs of naval forces and of the Russian Navy’s traditional position as the fifth among five services, it should come as no surprise that naval officers are having to defend naval missions and naval force elements—and they are facing a daunting lack of support in the Political arena.
This is reflected in ship scrapping: the drawdown that has been underway is breathtaking. In a July 1992 special edition of the General Staffs journal, Military Thought, Rear Admiral A.A. Pauk gave the following figures for the current Uaval order of battle: 56 strategic missile submarines, 483 surface combatants (of Which 72 are blue-water combatants), 166 utultipurpose submarines (of which 89 are nuclear powered), 310 various small combatants, 950 auxiliaries, 1,580 aircraft, and 556 helicopters. This is a major reduction in almost every class of combatants, and the auxiliary fleet also is being shrunk. Admiral Pauk notes that by 1995 “the Russian Navy will be substantially reduced, given the planned removal of ships, as well as the reduction in naval strategic nuclear forces . . . and of the aircraft inventory of the fleets according to international obligations.” Since 1990, 136 submarines, 173 surface combatants, and 85 “boats” (principally patrol boats) have been scrapped.’ Some of the scrapping has been dictated by treaty commitments that reportedly will result in 30 more nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) being scrapped by 2000. Notably, Admiral Chernavin said in 1991 that no more SSBNs were under construction. If this comment and President Boris
Yeltsin’s recent remarks in South Korea about stopping submarine construction are true, there should be no more than 26 SSBNs in the Russian inventory by 2000.[1]
The drawdown in ships and facilities has had an ancillary impact on the navy in at least three respects. First, it costs money and uses scarce shipyard space and resources to scrap ships. “By the end of the 1990s, more than 100 nuclear- powered submarines and around 300 combatant ships will be subject to recycling, which will require over 8 billion rubles (in first-quarter 1992 prices).” Then there are the costs associated with the reduction in size and geographic changes. “Approximately 15 billion rubles will be needed for supporting the withdrawal of naval forces from the Baltic States and partially from the Crimea and Azerbaijan and for getting them settled at new stations.” Finally, there are costs associated with the reductions in numbers of naval personnel: “. . . appropriations will be required to solve the social problems of more than 35,000 naval servicemen being discharged from the service just from the areas of the Far North and Far East. . ,”[2] Of course, one man’s scrap is another man’s navy. Many older Russian ships and weapon systems—as well as weapons of the newest designs—are being marketed to other countries. Kilo-class submarines have been sold to Iran, along with Backfire bombers and other aircraft. Rumors of the sale of the carrier Varyag continue. Large displays of Russian military equipment abound at military trade fairs and air shows, like that at Fam- borough his year. Russia is aggressively working to sell military equipment to anyone with the hard currency to buy it.
A recent review of the newspaper Red Star turned up a wide assortment of what clearly are advertisements of weapons for sale, including the Ivan Rogov-class dock landing ship; the Slava-class guided missile cruiser; Tango- and Kilo-class diesel submarines; Krivak- and Grisha-class frigates; the Yakhont-class minesweep; the new Tunguska self-propelled air- defense system (30-mm cannon and surface-to-air missiles on a tracked vehicle); the AK-630 and AK- 306 30-mm naval cannons; the Yak-38 Forger and the new Yak-141 supersonic VSTOL; and the Su-27, Su-35, MiG-29, and Tu-22M3 Backfire aircraft. This is a mix of old and new, but the list indicates a willingness to consider sales of systems that previously would not have been made available to the Third World.
At the same time, Russia is engaged in an internal struggle to redefine the roles and missions of the branches of the armed forces. This struggle involves a potential redistribution of missions and force elements and is not unlike the current infighting on this side of the Atlantic. However, the relative resources and standing of the military branches in Russia and in the United States have been quite different. Evidence of the debate emerged at the General Staff Academy’s Military Science Conference, 27-30 May 1992. Judging from the published papers, several issues surfaced that would affect the size and nature of the navy.[3]
Pr
'oceedings / February 1993
103
For example, it was suggested that the navy could get by with smaller formations in the Baltic and Black Sea areas. The navy representatives “categorically disagreefd],” citing the requirements of deterrence and, in case of war, of dealing with the “aggressive intentions of other powers.” Moreover, navy representatives argued that retaining naval bases in the Baltic States—specifically at Liepaya in Latvia and Paldiski in Estonia—is also advisable. Although formation sizes clearly are within the purview of naval professionals to recommend, the issue of Baltic sovereignty goes beyond their brief, and is unlikely to be resolved solely on the basis of their perceived military requirements.
Questions regarding the transfer of components of the navy to the air force also were raised. The Russian Air Force apparently proposed that “missile-armed naval aviation” and “fighter aviation of the Air Defense troops” be assimilated into the Air Force. Russian naval officers countered that missile aviation must be retained within the Navy to assure suitable development of joint operations with surface combatants, submarines, and other elements of naval aviation. Furthermore, “the training of naval pilots performing missions over the sea surface differs substantially from that of their colleagues flying over land.”[4] 2 * 4 [5] Rear Admiral Pauk remarked that the navy could also “raise the question” of the transfer to the navy of the long-range aviation formations that now perform naval support missions, “but it is not doing this.”
The air force asserts that it is best placed to coordinate achieving air superiority, and that the air weapon must be centrally controlled from the outset, to ensure that objective. They view long- range strike operations as part of this equation, and thus argue for naval missile aviation to be incorporated into a single long-range aviation element. Similarly, because they see air superiority as seamless, they believe all air-defense- fighters should be coordinated with all other air operations—and so should all belong to the air force.
The navy argues that long-range missile-armed aviation is a key strike element of the navy, and that this service would not be better performed under air force control. Such air units require special training and must be coordinated with other elements of the navy—and so should remain with the navy. Moreover, naval officers note that land-based air is inadequate for naval defense, that the navy needs tactical aviation at sea to provide for the combat stability of its other forces, and that those forces actually will be more cost effective than land- based tactical aircraft in providing for defense of the periphery of Russia.
At the heart of the discussion of air forces for the navy are the aircraft carriers. While the state of sea-based, tactical naval aviation is in flux—as funds are cut and the primary shipyard is no longer under Russian control—the case for such ships continues to be argued. In one recent article, the cost of such ships was addressed in the context of naval mission requirements. The essential argument asserts that the principal naval arms capable of opposing enemy naval forces are missile-armed aviation and multipurpose submarines. For them to operate effectively in areas where the enemy is likely to be found, they will require “reliable cover above all against strikes by offensive air weapons. . . .” As neither land- based fighters nor organic, ship-based air defenses can ensure air superiority—either in the areas where Russian ships routinely operate or in forward locations— it is necessary to have “fighter aircraft operating in combat formations of force groupings operating at sea.”[6] Russian naval research indicates that naval elements supported by air-capable cruisers are 1.5-2.0 times as effective in carrying out their missions. Thus, the order of battle of the fleets would have to “. . . be doubled to achieve the very same results of operations by force groupings without heavy air-capable cruisers [italics in original].”[7]
In view of the current Russian economy, this argument for carriers seems doomed from the start, perhaps the reason for the explicit economic rationale. Carriers are key assets “. . . which can provide maximum possible return with minimum possible expenses for their realization and ensure the greatest increase in combat effectiveness of naval force actions.” Thus cost effectiveness and mission effectiveness both are claimed to be by-products of the navy carriers. But the concern of Russian naval officers may be reflected in the comments of one naval advocate of carriers who asserts, “. . . air- capable ships can be rejected only when there will be a basis to reject the navy entirely [emphasis in original].”[8]
With all these factors at play, it remains to be seen what manner of navy will evolve. The naval participants at the May conference advocated a three-part program aimed at solving their most difficult problems. First, they urged accelerated decisionmaking with regard to a new ten-year program for the navy. This would establish shipbuilding requirements and stabilize the navy for the future (with the current rate of ship acquisition, 67%-70% of the current navy will disappear in 10-12 years). Second, they proposed that the navy be allowed to be a “unified general client” for all armaments. This would overcome some of the problems of dealing with a monopoly industrial sector that for years has built ships for the navy on a take-it-or-leave- it basis. Third, the adoption of a state program for recycling nuclear reactor compartments was advocated—presumably separate from the navy’s budget. This would alleviate the tremendous drain of resources that nuclear dismantlement represents for the Russian Navy.
It is not yet apparent whether any of these steps will be taken. The squeeze on resources is likely to remain acute, and it is not clear that the air force will not succeed in some consolidation of at least land-based naval aviation. During similar reductions in the late 1950s, Nikita Khrushchev initiated force reductions and removed tactical aircraft from the navy- Notably, in the face of similar pressures today and without the political constraints that prevented such open discussion in the past, naval officers in Russia have become open advocates of carrier aviation- But that may not be enough.
The desires and deliveries of the Russian Navy are diverging. As its role in the Russian strategic deterrent declines in scale and as the Russians and Americans discuss mutual rather than opposing operations, the navy’s ability to sell itself has diminished. Moreover, there appears to be no Admiral Gorshkov in the current naval hierarchy who can sell his vision of the navy to a reluctant and distracted military and political leadership-
104
Proceedings / February 1993
[1]See address by B. Yeltsin to the National Assembly of the Republic of Korea, Rossiyskaya gazeta, 20 November 1992, p. 2. “We have already reduced our submarine construction by two times. I think that in two to three years we, on the whole, will cease to build new submarines for military purposes.” Subsequent clarification indicates Yeltsin was referring only to construction in the Far East.
’These statistics are from RAdm A. A. Pauk, “Purpose, Missions, and Makeup of the Navy Under Present Conditions and in the Future,” Voyennaya mysU July 1992, Special Edition, pp. 71-75.
[3]The discussion of the roles and missions debate a1
'See interview with Captain First Rank Bolshakov and Captain Second Rank Bykov, “Ships Are Abandoning Formation,” Morskoy sbornik, No. 7, July 1992, pp. 60-63, for a discussion of the categories of ships being written off and a detailed breakout by type and name of ships that have been scrapped.
the Military Science Conference is based upon Pauk. p.72 and comments by MGen A. S. Sumin, “Purpose. Missions, and Makeup of the Air Defense Troops Under Present Conditions and in the Future,” VoyeH' naya mysl, July 1992, Special Edition, pp. 64-68. 'Pauk, p. 72.
[6]Captain First Rank Kozyrev, “Backbone of the Navy,” Voyennaya mysl. No. 6-7, June/July 1992. pp. 58-59.
[7]Kozyrev, p. 61.
"Kozyrev, p. 62.