Gone are the Cold War aircraft carrier employment scenarios that called for deep interdiction strikes into the Kola, Kamchatka, and Crimean peninsulas. It is highly unlikely that the U.S. Navy will have to engage hundreds of Russian Backfire and Badger bombers to protect the carrier battle group, while launching long-range strikes deep into Russian territory. The next war Probably will be fought against an enemy more like those the United States faced in Korea, Vietnam, and Iraq: ground-force oriented, with limited naval power outside its coastal waters and limited capacity to project air power beyond its borders. In light of these probabilities, should the Navy change the power-projection mission priorities of the carrier battle group? If yes, what should the new focus be?
Aircraft carrier and carrier air-wing missions were very clearly defined during the 1980s. The Navy tailored the carrier air wing to the capabilities required by the Maritime Strategy, which centered on deploying numerous aircraft carriers to the flanks of the Soviet Union. Under the Cold War strategy, two or three carriers would operate in the fjords of northern Norway, and two or three would operate in the northern Pacific, menacing the Soviet ports on the Kamchatka Peninsula. An additional carrier or two would launch strikes into the Soviet southwest theater of military operations from the Aegean and Ionian seas.
Current air-wing composition was derived to support the Navy’s Maritime Strategy by countering the Cold War threat. F-14s armed with Phoenix missiles (and E-2Cs with long-range radar) were designed for the outer air battle, to kill Badger and Backfire bombers before they could launch their long-range air-to-surface missiles at the carriers. A-6s and A-7s were the long-range attack aircraft that would deliver ordnance into the Kola, Crimean, and Kamchatka peninsulas. S-3s provided the high-endurance organic antisubmarine warfare (ASW) necessary to nullify the Soviet submarine threat. The whole air wing was designed with the express purpose of taking the fight to the Soviet backyard.
The problem is that there no longer is a Soviet backyard, a Soviet threat, or a Soviet Union. There still are many military threats to U.S. interests, but none demands a U.S. Navy with 600 ships and 15 carrier battle groups. The same mix of aircraft, tactics, and weapons that were intended to fight World War III may not be the optimal mix for regional conflicts in the post-Cold War world.
This article will center on carrier air wing power projection: What is the new mission? What type and mix of aircraft would best suit the new power-projection role? If we define the mission carefully, the force descriptors should be readily apparent.
Various Threats and Their Mission Options
One threat the Navy must face is that of the potential emerging or re-emerging superpower. If the Russians were able to revitalize their now-hollow military into the global force the Soviet Union possessed during the 1980s and resumed a belligerent attitude vis-a-vis U.S. national interests, the Navy would be forced to keep its Cold War strategies.
Mission Option One is the continuation of the current carrier battle group (CVBG) power-projection missions and capability: deep strike and long-range antiair warfare (AAW). One facet of the Cold War military strategy was the belief that if the United States trained and equipped its forces to fight the Soviets, it would have sufficient capability to fight any other nation. Proponents of option one would suggest that Desert Storm is proof positive that the United States must maintain its full Cold War military capabilities. If it does, no regional war will ever pose a significant problem.
At the carrier battle group and carrier air wing level, this option would mean maintaining the current list of tactical aviation (TacAir) capabilities: long-range strike, long-range AAW, vector logic, chain saw, and complex suppression of enemy air defenses. Such a strategy would require keeping a mix of medium-attack, strike fighter, and long-range interceptor aircraft in the carrier air wing. This option could be called the high-high option: the highest capability attack aircraft combined with the highest capability fighter aircraft.
The Navy would ensure its ability to launch long-range power-projection missions with a radius of 500–700 miles. Such long distances would require keeping and refurbishing the A-6 Intruder or replacing the A-6 with an aircraft of similar payload and range—the AX currently is envisioned. The F-14 also would have to be replaced when it reaches block obsolescence around 2005. The F-14 replacement would be the Navy Advanced Tactical Fighter (NATF). Vice Admiral Dick Dunleavy, former Assistant Chief of Naval Operations for Air Warfare, represents the Navy leadership who support the continuation of long-range carrier aviation. “We owe it to the country to see that we never lose our capability to strike future enemies from afar,” he asserts.2
The primary strength of option one is that it maintains all the power-projection capabilities of today’s naval air force. No capability would be sacrificed or weakened. If this option is selected, naval commanders would continue to enjoy long-range, heavy payload attack plus the security of the long-range interceptors.
Option one does have significant disadvantages, however. Keeping or replacing the A-6, F-14, and F/A-18 would cost billions of dollars, even if the number of air wings is trimmed. In this decade of tight fiscal constraints, it will be hard to justify keeping Cold War capabilities or modernizing according to the Cold War schedule. The armed services now must choose one or two platforms to develop, instead of the three or four that were allowed during the Reagan era. Currently the Navy has to choose between the F/A-18 E/F, the AX, and the advanced short takeoff/vertical landing (ASTOVL) programs for the allocation of its scarce aviation research-and-development dollars. Rear Admiral Jeremy Taylor, former head of naval aviation plans and requirements, asks, “Who is going to let naval aviation get three programs going at the same time and with half as much money?”3
Another disadvantage for the long-range strike and AAW mission is that there are too few scenarios in the new world order that require these missions. Clearly, the Cold War did require long-range capabilities, and the Navy was able to use those capabilities to meet other needs. But forces for long-range strike and AAW are expensive; if those missions are no longer required, it may make more sense to build new forces specifically for a different mission.
The second scenario is the regional threat posed by bellicose nations that are powerful only within their regions. Iraq (prior to the Gulf War), India, China, and North Korea are examples of strong regional threats.
Mission Option Two, the answer to the regional threat, is to make regional littoral warfare the primary power-projection mission of the CVBG. Proponents of this idea argue that naval strike aircraft and fighter aircraft no longer need to be able to fly 500–700 mile (radius) missions. The Navy of the late 1990s and early 21st century is not likely to engage enemy forces that can defend the airspace outside their borders. Most Third World threat countries have modeled their integrated air defense systems (IADS) after the Soviet system. A traditional Soviet IADS relies on surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) as the first wall of defense, with fighter aircraft filling in the holes in SAM coverage. With this in mind, it is possible to envision an aircraft carrier safely approaching within 150 miles or even 100 miles of many potential threat countries.
Regarding offensive anticarrier capability, there is no Third World threat country that can mount a dangerous, coordinated strike against a U.S. CVBG more than 50 miles from the coast. Some countries could send one submarine, one or two surface ships, or up to four aircraft to attack a CVBG. Aside from Russia, however, there are no potential threat countries that currently practice coordinated air, surface, and subsurface, multi-axis antisurface warfare (ASUW) attacks. A U.S. carrier, with help from several AAW picket ships, could operate within 100 nautical miles of an enemy’s coast with relatively little risk-
In this scenario, Navy strike aircraft could launch just 100 miles from their closest targets. Since population density—and therefore target density—is highest near the world’s ocean coasts, a carrier aircraft that can Penetrate 150 miles into a country’s airspace would be able to attack most of the world’s targets. Under the joint application of N.S. military power, is it necessary to pay for a naval strike aircraft that can hit 90% or 95% of the World’s targets when the Air Force has the truly long-range striking power ad tanking assets to do the job? If the answer is no, the Navy could pare its strike inventory down to those aircraft with combat radii of 300–400 miles. A-6s could be retired without a replacement.
The absence of the long-range bomber/air-to-surface missile threat to the CVBG also alleviates the need for an outer air battle Navy fighter. No potential threat country possesses or is projected to possess the lethal combination of long-range bombers and long-range ASUW misses that the Soviets brandished in the Cold War. therefore, the F-14 and its replacement can be eliminated.
The best plan for option two would be for the Navy to reconfigure its air wings to all strike-fighter wings. A multimission strike fighter, especially the F/A-18 Hornet E/F with its “25% larger wing area, 34-inch center fuselage plug, increased fuel capacity, two additional wing ordnance stations, and 40% range increase,” could accomplish all the tactical aviation requirements of a Navy carrier battle group in the late 1990s and early 2000s, prodded that the threat allows the battle group to operate Within 100–150 miles of the coast.4 If Air Force tanker support is available, as it was in Desert Storm, the carrier could enjoy an even greater standoff distance or the ability to strike targets deeper in enemy territory.
Other not insignificant advantages to having an all strike-fighter air wing include:
- Cost savings from a single-seat cockpit (fewer aircrew to train and pay)
- Cost savings from having fewer airframes on which to train maintenance troops
- Cost savings from being able to buy a single airframe and its parts More missions per aircraft; no single-mission aircraft
Fiscal resources freed up from the A-12, AX, and NATF programs could provide sufficient funding for both the Hornet E/F and the ASTOVL program.
Disadvantages of option two include:
- Losing the flexibility of having several different aircraft
- No long-range, big payload A-6s
- No long-range interceptors
In effect the Navy would be putting all its aviation eggs in the strike-fighter basket, which would give it an aircraft that is very good at many missions but perhaps not the master of any.
The third threat scenario to consider deals with individual strategic targets anywhere in the world. Third World nuclear weapons research facilities, terrorist training camps, and command-and-control bunkers and their related air defenses all pose a threat to U.S. national interests.
Mission Option Three is to make regional strategic warfare the primary power-projection mission of the CVBG. This would mean keeping the long-range strike capability, while eliminating the long-range AAW requirement. Given that no regional threat country possesses the AAW and ASUW capability to threaten a CVBG more than 50–100 miles from the coast, the outer air battle problem is gone. In limited scenarios, however, the Navy may need the long-range strike capability that would allow for surprise attacks on facilities such as chemical and nuclear weapons factories, dictator’s bunkers, and terrorist training camps. Long-range strategic strike, especially if combined with stealth technology, would enable the Navy to penetrate enemy air defenses and take out strategic targets, like the Air Force F-117s did in Desert Storm.
The air-wing composition for this mission would be a high-low option: a high-cost, long-range, stealthy strike aircraft to accomplish the strategic bombing mission, and a lower cost strike-fighter for air superiority, close air support, and battlefield air interdiction.
The major advantages to option three are:
- The Navy keeps long-range strike capability, which would allow it to hit the Russian Kola Peninsula (if the threat re-emerges) and places such as Baghdad and Teheran.
- The cost of the single-mission F-14 and the Navy Advanced Tactical Fighter is eliminated.
- It provides an air wing with 60 strike-capable aircraft instead of the current air wing with 40.
Option three disadvantages include:
- The cost of developing both the AX and the F/A-18 E/F, or extending the service life of either the A-6 or the F/A-18 A/C/D
- The lack of long-range defensive AAW capability against proliferating fourth-generation fighters and cruise-missile-capable attack aircraft
The Best Choice
A new carrier aviation mission must be chosen, and the most logical choice is regional littoral warfare. The carrier battle group represents a power-projection force that is ideally suited to the regional conflicts that are the most likely threats facing U.S. interests in the post–Cold War world.
The regional littoral warfare mission is the best power-projection mission for future Navy carrier aviation. The world situation no longer requires naval long-range strike and long-range AAW. The shrinking defense budget will no longer support research, development, test, and evaluation of two or three advanced naval aircraft. The regional littoral warfare mission would allow the Navy to purchase and maintain a single type of fighter and attack aircraft in its air wings.
The cost benefits of the all strike-fighter air wing are numerous. Logistics and maintenance are cheaper for one aircraft than for two or three. Development, acquisition, and modernization also would be much cheaper. Training and paying fewer aircrew and maintenance crews—because they would be working on one aircraft rather than two or three—would save substantially in the operations and maintenance and personnel accounts.
Switching to a single strike fighter aircraft would be a force multiplier. Instead of having only 40 strike aircraft and 40 fighter aircraft, the air wing would have 60 or more aircraft capable of carrying out both missions. If the Marine Corps bought the same strike fighter, they would have the option of deploying on board the carrier, leading to greater mission integration.
Finally, in the joint warfare arena, regional littoral warfare is a mission the Air Force does not want or excel in. The Air Force does, however, have the F-117s, B-52s, B-1s, B-2s, and tankers that allow it to accomplish the long-range, strategic strike mission. Since joint is the way °f the future, regional littoral warfare would allow the Navy to concentrate on what it does best while reducing costs and eliminating redundancy.
The Navy-Marine Corps Power-Projection Team
Congress and the American taxpayer are demanding more bang for the defense buck. As it applies to carrier battle groups, more for less will mean fewer aircraft carriers to use in response to crisis situations. The Base Force calls for shrinking the carrier force to 12 operational flattops and one trainer. Trimming the number of carriers to less than 12 may become a popular option in the battle to balance the budget. It’s time for radical thinking.
One way to maintain the Navy’s ability to perform its Power-projection mission, despite fewer CVBGs, will be to rely on the large amphibious ships to take the place of, or to augment, the carriers. The big-deck amphibs are definitely suited to the forward presence and power-projection missions. Sailing off the coast, an amphibious assault ship could go a long way toward stabilizing a volatile situation in most countries.
If the carrier force shrinks to fewer than 12, forward Presence could be maintained by “tethering” the carrier battle groups to the amphibious ready groups (ARGs). Instead of insisting on an aircraft carrier in the Mediterranean at all times, the National Command Authority might be satisfied with alternating between a CVBG and an ARG. To make up for the amphibious ready group’s aviation weaknesses, a carrier could be tethered within seven bays sailing distance. This concept would, for example, make it possible to have a carrier in the Arabian Sea and an amphib in the Med.
Another way to pack a stronger power-projection punch would be to increase the number of strike-capable aircraft on each carrier. After the first week of the Desert Storm air campaign, the F-14s (one-third of the tactical aviation assets on the carriers) were virtually useless because they were not strike capable. In regional littoral warfare, now the most likely mission, the Navy needs a higher tooth-to-tail ratio. It can no longer afford any single-mission aircraft. Strike fighters, with their ability to fight their way in to a target, drop their ordnance, and fight back out, are the best mechanism for improving Navy and Marine aviation’s power-projection lethality.
The combination of the CVBG and the ARG would result in a stronger power-projection team. Navy strike fighters could dominate enemy air defenses through air superiority and suppression in the initial stages of the war. The carrier air wing could provide air superiority over territorial waters, the beach, and landing forces. Strike fighters also could support the landing forces with close air support and battlefield air interdiction. Marine jump jets (Harriers and ASTOVL) will be able to stage into unprepared areas for direct air support of the amphibious assault. Once the landing forces secure an airfield, the Marines (and Air Force, if participating) would be able to stage their own strike fighters and air defense assets ashore. If closer integration and training between the Marines and the Navy air wing were to be stressed, the Navy could even stage some of its aircraft to Marine Corps airfields, to further support the ground war.
In Desert Storm, the Marines enjoyed the convenience of basing their air assets at Shayk Iza in Bahrain. Convenient access to a 10,000-foot runway will not be the norm for most regional conflicts. If the Navy and Marine Corps ever had to fight against Libya, it is doubtful that the Tunisians or the Egyptians would lend U.S. forces a base from which to operate. A beachhead would have to be established using air cover from carrier-borne aircraft. After securing a large coastal foothold, Marines could secure an enemy airfield (or build their own) and bring in their own air power.
To best conserve capabilities, Navy carrier battle groups and Marine amphibious ready groups must train together as a team. Navy attack squadrons presently spend a very small proportion of their training time practicing battlefield air interdiction, close air support, laser spot tracking, and strafing. The bulk of Navy attack squadron training time is divided between war-at-sea, suppression of enemy air defenses, long-range multi-airplane attacks, and strategic, heavy bombing.4 But the world has changed. The primary power-projection mission for the Navy/Marine Corps team must now be regional littoral warfare, and it will require versatile Navy and Marine forces. Navy and Marine leaders need to recognize that in this time of downsized budgets the carrier battle group and the amphibious ready group must train, plan, and deploy together, to meet the new power-projection mission requirements.
1 John Morrocco, “A-12 Loss Haunts Naval Aviation,” Naval Institute Proceedings, Volume 118 (May 1992), p. 94.
2 VAdm. Dick Dunleavy, USN, “Leadership and Long-Range Strike,” Naval Aviation News, Volume 74, No. 3 (March-April 1992), p. 1.
3 Morrocco, p. 94.
4 Morrocco, p. 92.
s LCdr. Frederick Buesser, USN, interview held in Oakton, Virginia, 10 May 1992.
