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Who on this boan^n=fI7^Coa^tiuard Reserve? Applying lessons from the business world, the Coast Guard in San Diego has developed an integrated structure that makes the best use of the talents of reservists and regulars in contingencies and day-to-day operations.
The alarm sounded at 0545. A small boat was taking on water at the end of Zuniga Jetty at the mouth of San Diego Bay. As the 41-foot patrol boat pulled away from the dock, it contacted the Search-and-Rescue Center to list the Coast Guard personnel on board: two “full-time” and two “part-time.” A visitor in the center asked why some members of the crew were identified as part-time. The duty officer explained that, in the spring of 1992, Coast Guard Group San Diego and Reserve
Group San Diego had embarked on a bold plan to bett£f prepare reservists for surges in wartime and peacetime op' erations. The entire Coast Guard Reserve organization i" San Diego had been restructured, traditional reserve p0' sitions temporarily suspended, with reservists and reg"' lars integrated into a single organization. This integration the watchstander explained, forced the regulars and fe' servists at every level—from the commanding officers o11 down—to work together and get the most out of their train ing. “In fact” he concluded, “I am a ‘part timer.’ We don’t •hink of ourselves as reservists any more—just Coasties 'vith a lot of liberty!”
The Business Revolution
Government agencies seldom have looked much like businesses. But in the climate of the 1990s, the difference between government and business is widening—the Clinton administration’s proposed reforms notwithstanding, business in the United States is undergoing a profound Evolution in structures and strategies. Spurred by intending global competition, corporations have reorganized and now conduct themselves in radically new ways. Almost daily, there are reports that detail the ways businesses fre adapting to the rapidly changing world of high technology and global interdependence. The business landscape has undergone cataclysmic changes, and no company has been left untouched. Previously unthinkable things have happened: In response to the tumbling value °f its stock, IBM has cut its work force drastically. Battered by Japanese competition, General Motors launched a new car company, Saturn, that emulates the best of Japanese manufacturing processes and embraces a revolutionary sales approach. Telephone companies and cable- television companies are engaging in activities that blur 'be distinction between them as they jostle for position on 'he information superhighway of the 21st century. Of the '18 million Americans currently employed, almost 20 million have part-time or temporary jobs. The largest private eniployer in the United States is not a well-recognized c°rporate giant; it is Manpower, Inc., which employs ^60,000 people in temporary positions.
U.S. business was forced to change because of the climate of international competition. The U.S. government Mil be forced to change as well—not because of external 'hreats of foreign competition, but by a burgeoning budget deficit and an electorate that is increasingly skeptical °f traditional governmental approaches and forms.
^New Model Coast Guard________________________
Growing out of discussions between the regular and reserve leaders about how to improve the reserve’s performance, the Coast Guard’s experiment in San Diego rep- tesents a departure from the ways which the Coast Guard ^ministers, trains, and integrates its reservists.
. The pattern of the Coast Guard Reserve’s development 's similar to that of the reserve components of the other ll-S. armed forces. Formed during World War II, it began as a totally integrated force—a means to supplement ac- '•Ve-duty personnel to meet the wartime needs of the Coast Allard. Much like the other reserve components in the Vears after World War II, the Coast Guard Reserve grad- 'telly took on a separate and distinct life of its own. By "te 1960s, Coast Guard reservists usually met one night a Week in local armories and, more often than not, drilled lri reserve-only exercises during the summer. Many of 'bese reservists would not have been able to distinguish a regular Coast Guardsman from a mailman, and certainly would have been unable to perform many of the daily tasks of the Coast Guard. In the 1970s, the focus of the reserve moved to augmenting regular Coast Guard units. For thousands of reservists—e.g., boat crews—augmentation provided them substantive training; for the Coast Guard, it provided help in day-to-day operations.
While augmentation in daily operations became standard practice, the Coast Guard continued to maintain separate and distinct reserve organizations—reserve units and reserve groups. This policy had at least two unintended consequences. First, reserve organizations maintained a substantial degree of separation from regular units. Second, reserve-specific organizations required huge amounts of administrative time and energy. Hundreds of reserve officers and yeomen spent thousands of hours maintaining records, handling files, and creating paperwork. Furthermore, much of it was reserve-specific, with no counterpart in the regular Coast Guard. In effect, the Coast Guard Reserve program remained an artificial system in which there were a significant number of personnel—particularly administrative personnel—who were not being trained for rapid augmentation during a surge in operations and who had become dysfunctional in preparing other reservists to support surges in peacetime and wartime.
The San Diego Experiment
In the summer of 1992, Coast Guard Reserve Group San Diego temporarily suspended all of its traditional reserve-specific positions, instead assigning all of its officers as counterparts to active-duty positions. All active- duty and reserve records and administrative support were combined in one integrated personnel reporting unit (PER- SRU) for all Coast Guard personnel. In fact, the nomenclature of the program was changed—reservists now are referred to as “part-timers,” regulars as “full-timers.” This subtle shift in language reflected the program’s goal: to make all Coast Guard personnel fully qualified, with the only distinction between regulars and reservists being the amount of time they devoted to the Coast Guard.
The program has been under way for more than a year. Individuals and groups have had to change perspectives and long-held views. For regular department heads, their jobs have become more complex because their departments suddenly contained part-time personnel in various states of readiness, all of whom they are responsible for training. Many regulars had never worked with reservists and needed to learn about a new (to them) part of the Coast Guard. A few on both sides continue to have difficulty with the basic concept and yearn for the old days.
For most, however, the program has produced remarkable results. In a recent survey, reserve officers reported a significant decrease in time spent on administrative matters; 80% reported a significant increase in the amount of job satisfaction. Enlisted reservists have been equally enthusiastic; one yeoman said that it was the first time in nine years she felt like she was part of the Coast Guard.
Most regular leaders have come to see that the additional effort spent on the training and administration of their part timers means increased flexibility and enhanced
Replacing the customary reserve schedule—two weeks during the summer and one weekend a month—with a system that uses reservists where and when they are needed would improve the overall performance of the Coast Guard.
capabilities. In some cases, reservists have brought skills that none of the regulars possess. There is a growing satisfaction among reservists when they realize that their skills are needed and appreciated, and that they are being used to the fullest.
As more and more reservists become trained and qualified, they are being used throughout the local Coast Guard organization in short- and longterm assignments. A couple of examples:
► A yeoman was released early from active duty, leaving a major gap in the support staff. In a normal situation, the position would have been left unfilled, thereby reducing the effectiveness of the unit, or a yeoman would have been transferred or temporarily assigned—both expensive procedures. Instead, a fully qualified part-time yeoman from San Diego was called to two months of active duty. This saved the government a substantial amount of money and helped hone the part-timer’s skills.
>■ A patrol boat headed for Mexico required a Spanish speaker; the reserve officer who drills on that boat—and is fluent in Spanish—was called in to serve his two-week training period during the patrol.
► The local Marine Safety Office (MSO) called, seeking someone with special skills to help on a project that was due in
four weeks. A quick search of the database yielded the names of two part-timers with the needed skills. They were assigned to the MSO and the project was completed on time.
Based on the success of this program—and with encouragement from others who also are testing new models of reserve/regular interaction—Coast Guard reservists in many parts of the country are experimenting with the full integration of regular and reserve forces.
But Why Stop There?
Changing the field organization of the reserve program could lead to changes in reserve-related organizations at higher levels in the Coast Guard. Already several district offices of reserve have begun to function differently, giving broader authority and responsibility to local reserve groups while working more closely with other program managers at the district level. Technology allows local integrated PERSRUs to work directly and efficiently with pay centers and other offices. Perhaps some district-level reserve functions could be fully integrated and the billets redistributed to the district’s other program managers and larger field commands. Reserve liaison officers at the dis-l trict level would be able to focus on policy and coordi-| nation issues. Once district reserve offices are reconfig-j ured, the Office of Reserve at Coast Guard Headquarters I also might be able to change, concentrating its efforts on I policy and coordination issues.
Presently, the only limitation on full integration of the I
_____ Coast Guard Reserve with the[
regular Coast Guard is that sometimes no regular command exists where reservists are located. A* part of the Coast Guard’s overall effort to become more efficient, reserve billets should be moved to where they can best be trained and support Coast Guard operations. Certainly, such a relocation might not be popular with many reservists and with some political leaders. Nevertheless, there is a broader mandate—throughout the federal government—to increase effectiveness while decreasing redundancy and cutting costs. The San Diego model does just that.
Full integration of the reserve also smooths the process of activating reservists for varied types of tasks. In the past, using the reserve in a contingency response was a cumbersome process, which required contacting the district Office of Reserve and asking for a number of individuals with specific skills—neve* really knowing if they were available. After checking its rosters, the district reser'e office had to contact the local command with the list o> available personnel—and in many instances, they were] people the local command did not know. Now, whenever Group San Diego is called upon to respond to contingencies, the receiving command has at its fingertips the same rich blend of full- and part-time human resource5 that it has for its day-to-day operations.
The concept developed in San Diego—a unified loca Coast Guard command that can carry out a complex sel of daily and contingency responsibilities through a mofe efficient use of its human resources—could well become ] the model for the entire Coast Guard in the 21st century- In turn, an integrated Coast Guard—which uses imagin11' tive staffing techniques—could point the way to a behef future for many federal agencies.
A 1967 graduate of the Coast Guard Academy and a naval aviator. GF I tain Fitzgerald previously has been Chief, District Nine Office of Rea _l ness and Reserve, and presently commands Coast Guard Group/Air S111 I tion San Diego. The director of the School of Teacher Education 1 San Diego State University in his civilian career. Captain Mehaffy cl rently serves as Commander, Reserve Group San Diego.