The Crowded Deck

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Located in the Caribbean basin just east of Cuba, Haiti has a history of unstable gov­ernment. It is the poorest nation in the western hemisphere, and a large percentage of the population carries dangerous commu­nicable diseases, including AIDS. More than 6,400,000 people inhabit the island, and intelligence estimates predict that—given the opportunity—80 to 88% of the popula­tion would migrate to the United States.¹

Throughout the past decade, Haitian immigration to the United States has taken a massive upswing, influenced by a myriad of social, political, and eco­nomic factors. Through versatility and seagoing experi­ence, the U.S. Coast Guard has curtailed several Haitian refugee flights and assumed the role as the leading gov­ernment agency in maritime alien migrant interdiction op­erations (AMIO).

Haitian migrants usually take to sea in small, unsea­worthy, and overcrowded sailboats. There are two major migration routes to South Florida, either 550 or 720 miles long. Haitian migration presents a dual concern to the United States. An exodus of Haitians is a national- security threat because the South-Florida region cannot absorb such massive numbers safely. Haitian migrants also pose a humanitarian concern because thousands of Haitians perish in their attempt to reach U.S. shores.

On 29 September 1981, President Ronald Reagan is­sued an executive order that marked the official begin­ning of the Coast Guard’s involvement in Haitian migrant interdiction operations. The order directs the U.S. Coast Guard to interdict and return Haitian migrants from ves­sels on the high seas to their country of origin whenever there is reason to believe that offenses are being com­mitted against U.S. immigration laws.² This order origi­nated from the heavy criticism of President Jimmy Carter after the 1980 Mariel exodus, in which 125,000 Cubans and 17,000 Haitians poured across the coast of Florida.

The 1981 executive order is unique, for it is the only agreement the U.S. maintains with any other nation that allows us to repatriate directly its citizens interdicted on the high seas. The 1981 executive order also placed Im­migration and Naturalization Service (INS) officers on board Coast Guard vessels engaged in AMIO to interview migrants and determine whether they were leaving for po­litical or economic reasons.

Migrants encountered inside the U.S. territorial sea (1 miles from a baseline extension) are entitled to a hearinj before a U.S. magistrate to determine if they have valid colorable claim for political asylum. A colorable) claim originates when INS agents determine that a mi grant would be subjected to political persecution if re turned to his or her country of origin. U.S. vessels cannot! pick up Haitians within 12 nautical miles of Haiti, because this area is part of the Haitian territorial sea. Consequently. Coast Guard operations are conducted exclusively on the] high seas.

The 1981 agreement curtailed illegal Haitian migration! to the United States. During its operation from October) 1981 to October 1991, 24,599 Haitians were interdicted and subsequently repatriated.³ Of these, only six were found by INS officers to have colorable claims and were transported to the United States for a hearing before a U.S magistrate.

In 1986, Haitian dictator Jean-Claude “Baby Doc” Du valier, with whom the 1981 agreement was made, was ousted from office, leading to four years of political tur moil in Haiti. Five new governments—all militant and op' pressive dictatorships—were formed, and each was sub­sequently overthrown. During this period, typical AMIO operations included one medium-endurance cutter on sta­tion; one helicopter deployed on board the cutter, making two two-hour surveillance flights daily; and one falcon jet, flying one four-hour mission daily.⁴

On 16 December 1990, Populist Jean-Bertrand Aristide became the first democratically elected president of Haiti and remained in office until 30 September 1991, when he was overthrown by a military coup d’etat. An unprece­dented, massive exodus of Haitians followed, prompting a dramatic rise in U.S. Coast Guard interdictions at sea-

Four weeks after President Aristide was overthrown- Haitians began to leave their country in record numbers. The Coast Guard interdicted 2,800 migrants in the firs¹ three weeks of October 1991 alone,⁵ and more than 20 Coast Guard cutters—which amounted to every avail­able cutter stationed along the Atlantic seaboard—were dispatched or diverted from other missions to respond to the exodus. Although the Coast Guard continued to in­terdict migrants, inadequate INS support and court re­straining orders prevented timely repatriation, forcing the Coast Guard to house migrants on the weather deck* of its cutters.

Under the terms of the original 1981 agreement, U.S- immigration officials had to determine whether Haitin¹¹

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^grants were leaving for economic or political reasons, 'i the past, the majority of migrants had fled for economic Masons. The 1991 exodus, however, was a product of po­etical turmoil following the overthrow of President Jean- ^crtrand Aristide, which meant that many Haitian mi­grants then departing had valid evidence to suggest that they would be subject to political persecution if repatri­ated by the Coast Guard—and according to U.S. law, they '''ere entitled to a hearing before a U.S. magistrate. Be­muse of the immediacy of the situation, the Immigration Naturalization Service did not have enough person­nel available for immediate deployment on board Coast ^Uard cutters. Consequently, in late October 1991, the ^ate Department temporarily suspended the repatriation ^Haitian migrants. The Organization of American States Placed an economic embargo on Haiti to protest the over­sow of the democratically elected government—which °Hy worsened economic conditions and increased the mi- H^rant flow.⁶

The State Department’s suspension of the 1981 repa­ration policy had a devastating effect on the Coast Guard. ^^Very cutter in the Windward Passage tilled quickly to a Saturation level, making it impossible to bring aboard ^ditional Haitian migrants, but Haitians continued to de­part in large numbers. In November 1991 the State De­partment lifted the ban on repatriation and put out a new directive, ordering the direct return of all Haitian migrants. Additionally, the State Department decided to waive the previously required interview by INS agents. In response, Coast Guard cutters immediately began returning Haitians directly to Port-au-Prince. However, the Coast Guard soon encountered an even more formidable obstacle: the Dis­trict Court of South Florida.

The Haitian Refugee Center (HRC), a non-profit Florida organization representing Haitians, filed a request on 20 November 1991 for a court order restraining the repatri­ation of Haitian migrants.⁷ The HRC based its claim on the fact that direct repatriation of Haitians without inter­views by INS agents violated the terms of the original 1981 agreement. The U.S. government violated its own immigration policies by failing to discover whether mi­grants were eligible for political asylum. The district court agreed with the HRC and placed a temporary restraining order on further repatriation of Haitian migrants.

The court’s action placed the Coast Guard in extremis. Many of the cutters on scene were at or near super-satu­ration levels, yet they could not return Haitian migrants. Once a cutter reaches super-saturation she is no longer ca-

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pable of operating within required safety limits and must anchor, unable to respond to any other operational de­mands that may arise. In addition, commanding officers were unwilling to take the time or risk to transport hun­dreds of migrants on the weather decks of their ships for the 550 miles to Miami.

The number of interdictions over the week of 18 No­vember 1991 averaged 100 per day. On 16 and 17 No­vember, however, the Coast Guard had averaged 300 in­terdictions a day. At that rate, all Coast Guard cutters would have reached super-saturation levels within ten days.

The Coast Guard had expended all available resources and no longer possessed the capability to handle the sit­uation safely. Migrants living on the weather decks of cut­ters severely limited the cutters operational abilities and also presented numerous sanitary, dietary, and medical problems. The longer the Haitians remained on board, the more the likelihood for violence increased.⁸ As the Com­mandant of the Coast Guard turned to higher authorities for assistance, the Coast Guard, with regret, allowed Hait­ian migrants to sail north toward Miami.

Fortunately, the Bush administration established a new Haitian migrant policy, which directed the Depart­ment of Defense to establish a tent city at the U.S. Naval Base, Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, as a temporary housing fa­cility for Haitian migrants. The Guantanamo Bay tent city would relieve the Coast Guard of the large number of mi­grants currently living outside on the decks of their ships, and the Navy reported that it would be able to have Guan­tanamo Bay open to commodate 2,500 migra: initially and could expan the tent-city to accommo date a total of 12,500 mi grants.

Upon disembarking thei complement of Haitian mi grants at Guantanamo Ba) Coast Guard cutters imm£ diately redeployed to con tinue their interdiction nii' sion. Haitian migrants wef interviewed by INS ageni stationed at Guantanam Bay to determine whethn they had colorable claim' The district court’s rulin essentially turned the Coat Guard into a ferry shuttl' service between Guan tanamo Bay, Cuba, an' Haiti.

The Guantanamo Ba! tent city proved quickly be an inadequate solution In the past, Haitian mi grants had attempted avoid Coast Guard cutter because they feared reps triation, but once the won

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a better option than staying in Haiti. Haitians at Guan tanamo Bay received three meals a day, fresh sheets¹⁽¹ sleep on, and medical care.

Instead of avoiding Coast Guard cutters, Haitian bo^s! captains looked for them. Boat captains took no food ^ot water with them and drastically overloaded their boat- It was not unusual for the Coast Guard to pick up 2$ Haitian migrants from a 35-foot sailboat. Upon reaching

Proceedings / December

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the Coast Guard cutters, migrants put on their Sunday - ¹¹ best clothes and began singing in celebration of their free­dom from Haiti.⁹

On 22 May 1992, the Coast Guard again became over­whelmed by the high volume of Haitian migration. Both the tent city at Guantanamo Bay and Coast Guard cutters Were filled to saturation levels, forcing the Coast Guard to announce that it would inter­dict only “those boats in dan­ger of sinking.” The Coast Guard allowed all others to ^continue their journey.¹⁰ This decision caused a great outcry from the public and from a number of humanitarian U.S. groups. Statistics showed that Haitians had less than a 10% ^chance of making the journey successfully; the rest would Perish at sea."

This decision by the Coast Guard required the President make a new policy deci­sion on the fate of Haitian mi­grants, and on 24 May 1992,

^resident George Bush sus­pended political asylum screening requirements for Haitian migrants found on the ¹² The Secretary of

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transportation subsequently directed the Commandant to °rder Coast Guard cutters to ^repatriate all migrants inter­dicted on the high seas—as "'ell as all migrants currently ^at Guantanamo Bay—without interviewing them.¹³ The only ^e*ception to automatic repa­ration would take effect if die commanding officer be­lieved that repatriation would Place an individual in excep­tionally grave physical danger. “Exceptionally grave dan­ger” was defined as an observable danger or a com­pelling statement made by an individual on his own Initiative that the individual was a high-ranking member °f the Aristide government and was actively being pur­ged by the de-facto government.¹⁴

The executive order allowed the Coast Guard to re­gain control of Haitian migration as well as empty the Guantanamo Bay tent city. Experience proved that the best "ay to curtail Haitian migration was to repatriate migrants 'aimediately. Acutely aware of U.S. policy shifts, Haitians dase their decisions about when to migrate upon U.S. Political and judicial decisions. Once word circulated that Coast Guard was no longer taking migrants to Guan­^tanamo Bay, Haitians stopped leaving their country. Haitian-rights advocates rejected the presidential order,

quired, violating the 1981 unilateral treaty. The Haitian Refugee Center filed suit against the U.S. government, claiming that the new policy would subject Haitians qual­ifying for political asylum to severe political persecution.

Following the 29 September 1991 coup ousting Aris­tide and up to the imposition of the 24 May 1992 execu­tive order, the Coast Guard interdicted approximately

37,000 Haitian migrants. Most were processed at the Guantanamo Bay Naval Base and either repatriated to Haiti or transported to the United States for a hearing before a U.S. magistrate, if deemed to have colorable claims.¹⁵ The largest maritime task group ever assembled by the Coast Guard was mobilized for this mission.

The Coast Guard inter­dicted all Haitian migrants without a single safety mis­hap—a remarkable record considering that Coast Guard cutters had hundreds of Hait­ian migrants living outside on the weather decks of their ships for up to two weeks at a time. More important, the Coast Guard prevented an enormous loss of life by in­terdicting Haitian migrants who otherwise would have perished at sea. Also, by in­terdicting Haitian migrants, the Coast Guard saved South Florida from the socioeco­nomic disaster that migrants would have inflicted if they had reached Miami.

The crews who took part in AMIO during this period administered everything from basic medical care to child birth assistance on board. Often, crews became attached to migrants living on board their ships and were emotionally impacted by their subsequent repatriation to Haiti. The Coast Guard demonstrated to the world its adaptability and mobility by rapidly deploying all available assets, continually alternating between search- and-rescue and law-enforcement missions, and coordinat­ing efforts with a large number of government agencies. At times, the entire burden of Haitian migration was im­posed on the Coast Guard, while other U.S. government agencies were seeking other solutions to the problem. In fact, the Coast Guard twice had to declare a crisis at sea—first in November 1991 and again in May 1992—be­fore receiving help from other government agencies and the White House.

The Coast Guard successfully controlled Haitian mi-

^ecause, once again, the INS interview was no longer re- gration for six months following the 24 May 1992 exec-

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