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Consigned to a supporting role by naval planners, Air Force assets—like this tanker refueling carrier aircraft during Desert Storm—often have been called upon only when Navy and Marine Corps capabilities are lacking. It’s time to widen our joint thinking. If the land-based tankers can get to the fight, so can other aircraft— like the B-2.
During a recent conference on “Naval Forward Presence and the National Military Strategy,” a U.S. Marine Corps general stated, “The Navy plus the Marine Corps equals naval.”1 The Marine general stressed that, in the post-Cold War world, the Navy and Marine Corps must fight littoral naval campaigns together; budgets and capabilities will dictate a joint approach.
For some, this thinking is a challenge. Some Navy officers have trouble thinking in terms of subordinating a fleet to Marine expeditionary forces ashore. Some Marine Corps officers have trouble accepting total reliance on the Navy for fixed-wing air support. Nonetheless, both services must shift their mind-sets to think jointly. Neither will have all the tools to fight a naval campaign alone.
But we must push this joint thinking even further. Can anyone imagine naval campaigns that exclude Air Force satellites, tankers, and transports? What about Air Force airborne-warning and control-system aircraft and other rapidly deployable command-and-control systems? Can’t the unique capabilities of the F-117 contribute to “naval” campaigns? With the B-2 bomber and F-22 air-superiority fighter scheduled for full operational capability within the next ten years, shouldn’t naval strategists be thinking about ways to bring these leading-edge systems to the “naval” fight?
Navy and Marine Corps officers tend to think primarily in terms of employing their own forces. They want mission-type orders from the joint force commander (JFC), then the flexibility to use their forces as they see fit to accomplish that mission. If they need air-defense capabilities, their first thought is to send carriers and Aegis cruisers and destroyers. If they need to attack a port, their first thought is to send F/A-18s, A-6s, and Tomahawk missiles. Often it is only when unilateral capabilities are insufficient to accomplish the mission that Navy and Marine officers think of what the other services can bring to the fight. Other services’ capabilities are additive; they
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support naval forces in the “naval” campaign, as opposed to being integral to the naval concept of operations. In other words, for many Navy and Marine Corps officers the naval jointness equation reads: Joint equals naval mission minus Navy/Marine Corps capabilities.
This mind-set has its advantages. By regularly training together on a focused mission, Navy and Marine Corps forces expose shortfalls in capability that can then be covered by changes in equipment and procedure. They also gain considerable interoperability. This translates into increased combat effectiveness from the first day of a fight. Moreover, with operational tempo already a significant concern, unilateral and joint Navy-Marine Corps training requirements may fill all the slots in the training schedule. Adding more joint training requirements, regardless of their value, may be impracticable. And, since fighting together without first having trained together is courting disaster, the lack of joint training opportunities may limit future joint operations.
Nonetheless, the disadvantages of this mind-set warrant review. Just as air campaigns involve more than just the Air Force, and ground campaigns involve more than just the Army, naval campaigns involve more than just the Navy and Marine Corps. For example, if the goal is to destroy an enemy naval base, Air Force systems could play an important role. The B-2 fleet, given even the most restrictive scenario, could drop at least 125 2,000-pound bombs on individual targets per night—anywhere in the World.2 Each bomb will hit within ten feet of its aimpoint, in any weather, and will penetrate hardened structures. B-ls and B-52s are also available. This bomber fleet packs a considerable punch; its capabilities deserve consideration from the outset when naval planners devise their attack plan. Unfortunately, naval planners give precedence to Navy and Marine Corps systems (Tomahawks, A-6Es, F/A-18s, A/F-Xs); Air Force capabilities are tasked only to cover shortfalls.
During a recent war game, naval strategists played an amphibious assault against a defended beach. Prior to and during the assault, only carrier aviation attacked defenses and provided air cover—even though Air Force land-based air was present in strength in the theater.
In a separate war game, naval planners assumed Air Force refueling tankers were available, but Air Force fighter/bombers were not, because of access restrictions. Carrier air wings were able to attack targets far from the fleet. However, since the presence of land-based refueling tankers assumes the existence of land bases, the rationale for excluding Air Force TacAir was thin. Although this inconsistency was apparent to all, it was deemed irrelevant. It was a naval mission, so naval forces were assigned the task. The only shortfall was in aerial refueling, so only Air Force tankers were brought into the concept of operations. Again, Air Force play was restricted to filling the gaps.
Regardless of budget level, the military utility of prioritizing weapon employment by service component is questionable. For an airman, a bomber is a bomber and a fighter is a fighter. Whether it takes off from an airfield or a deck, whether its pilot is Navy, Marine, or Air Force, is of little importance. What is important is the effectiveness of that system in the target area. If Air Force systems can be effective against naval targets, then naval strategists need to consider their use—not just as supplements to naval forces, but as integral parts of the joint team. Payoffs in terms of time, tonnage, and target coverage could be significant.
Some people may agree with everything so far but still not concur with reliance on Air Force squadrons. After all, the Air Force may be off fighting an “air" or "ground” campaign. Regardless of capability, the Air Force simply may not be available, so the Navy and Marine Corps must retain their own capabilities. This argument, while attractive to many, is weak. All components work for the same joint force commander (JFC).
It’s the JFC who decides which operations get which forces. For example, if the Marines are conducting an amphibious assault, the JFC will decide who provides the air cover. Similarly, the JFC may chop Air Force bombers to the naval component commander to attack an enemy port, while placing Navy Tomahawks under the air component commander’s control for strategic air-attack missions. In other words. Air Force fighters and bombers will be available to support the naval campaign when tasked by the JFC. Navy and Marine Corps fighters and bombers also will be available to support a naval campaign, but only when tasked by the JFC. The joint force commander, not his component commanders, decides availability.
The Marine general was right in pushing for a closer Navy and Marine Corps team. But we also need to take the next step—incorporating Air Force weapons into the naval concept of operations.
'Cosponsored by the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations and the International Security Studies Program at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University, 18-19 November 1992 in Cambridge, MA.
: Assumes 16 PAA, .5 sortie rate, 16 precision-guided missiles per aircraft.