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The continuing Navy budget reductions will translate both to fewer new platforms with new antisubmarine warfare systems and the retirement of existing platforms that have the potential for ASW-upgrade packages. Overcapacity characterizes the ASW industrial base, and many are questioning whether industry can stay in the game on research-and-devel- opment funding alone, if acquisition is indeed becoming merely a continuous demonstration of technologies—some for upgrades and some for new capabilities.
War fighters worry that along with the demise of a dedicated Navy ASW sponsor in the Pentagon, and the designation of ASW as a support role instead of a primary warfare area, the new budget trends appear particularly ominous. In fiscal year 1987, ASW got $8 billion, but in the fiscal year 1994 Program Objectives Memorandum (POM) the funding level was $3 billion. In the forseeable future, funding priority will go to readiness and force structure; funding for modernization will continue to decline. Acquisition of next-generation ASW assets—e.g., buoys, weapons, processors—will be at reduced quantities and increased costs.
Congressional staffers say that ASW annual spending will settle at $1 billion, but they express no panic over either the types of systems in the pipeline or the lack of Uioney. Their overarching concern is about the ability of the ASW industrial base to keep developing baseline technologies, particularly in processing.
Dr. Arthur Bisson, the Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Navy for ASW (DASN/ASW), says that companies Will have to adjust their production to future Navy ASW acquisition, which will become more like the National Aeronautics and Space Administration’s (NASA’s) traditional approach to “building in ones and twos.” He says that NASA contractors can make a profit in research and development (R&D), and he appears to be pushing for a level of technology-base funding that would make ASW R&D profitable—and thus foster more competition.
According to Dr. Bisson, dual sourcing in ASW acquisition now is clearly too expensive an option. ASW will not fund enough procurement to justify it; hence, the Navy will opt for a single source.
Downselection to a single source for production will make it hard on those firms that cannot afford to shift emphasis from manufacturing to R&D. The Navy is working on a policy that would weigh industrial-base considerations.
The policy could save the platform-size programs, e.g., nuclear- propelled attack submarines, but it probably will not benefit ASW specifically. “Where an ASW firm may be one of six contractors, the Navy will obviously not be able to support them all,” says Bisson. “On the other hand, the Navy might develop a policy to shut down production at the component level for lines that could be quickly reconstituted.”
A major downselection occurred in September 1992 and probably contributed to the departure of the General Electric Corporation (GE) from the ASW business. Not three months after the Navy awarded the SQQ-89 sur- face-ASW combat-system contract to Westinghouse, aerospace manufacturer Martin Marietta acquired the SQQ- 89 developer, GE Aerospace. The next key downselect will be in torpedoes, for the production of the Mk-50. “The torpedo business is declining,” says Walter Dunkle, General Manager of the Oceanic Division of Westinghouse Electric Corporation. “The number of torpedoes needed against the Soviets in blue water were far more than those required for regional scenarios.” Until Westinghouse acquired Gould, four contractors shared the torpedo market. Hughes got the three-year production award with options for the Mk-48 advanced-capability torpedo. Westinghouse is competing against Alliant for the Mk-50 award. Frank Edwards, Manager of Advanced Programs Marketing for Hughes’ ASW Division, predicts that the downselect will reduce the number of torpedo suppliers to two.
The exception to single sourcing would be in sonobuoys, where the Navy has indicated that Magnavox and Spar- ton will continue to alternate receiving the sonobuoy awards. Magnavox’s manager of business development for the Data Systems Division, Charles Mark, remains concerned, however, that the funding levels may not support two suppliers. The sonobuoy market used to run about $125 million per year, says Mark, but fiscal year 1993 sonobuoy expenditures totaled $71 million. Historically, Magnavox has received 42% of the market.
The question arises whether the Navy will base selection on price, on performance, or on some other criterion. American Telephone & Telegraph’s Curt Weaver, marketing director for federal systems advanced technologies, says that the government as a whole is adopting the Army’s “best value” approach to selection. The Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) maintains a data base on all Pentagon contract records, with which a service can assess a contractor’s earlier performance.
The Navy has not yet adopted a specific approach to bidding, but it is looking for better selection tools, having learned some painful lessons during the A-12 and P7A aircraft-procurement flaps. Congressional staffers suggest that the Navy could follow the Air Force approach on the advanced technology fighter competition—where the service required contractors to submit sealed estimates on design, performance and cost, submitted before testing—which it compared to evaluation results for the downselect.
Says one source, “The climate is right for the Navy to insist on more realistic bidding for a total R&D effort, now that everybody knows that procurement will not cover
R&D.” With more power now residing with the Service Acquisition Executive (SAE), the Navy will expect estimates to be more realistic. Cost-plus contracting for R&D also will have a positive effect. Congressional staffers expect that these factors will prompt the SAE, systems commands or program managers to start pulling the plug on underbids as early as four months into a contract. However, Frank DeBritz, General Manager of GE Aerospace Ocean Systems, disagrees—saying that GE has seen a lot of low bidding recently.
Many ASW players in the budget process question the apparent absence of a commitment to fieldable prototypes in the Defense Department’s new acquisition strategy. They argue that an effective acquisition policy requires production, an effective test, evaluation, and certification process, and fieldable prototypes for the fleet’s operational evaluation for utility and for training. The Director, Defense Research & Engineering, who controls the money, is not presently requiring fieldable prototypes. But “It is absolutely important for the acquisition process to have at least small numbers for production,” says Bisson. But cost considerations dictate otherwise at present.
Westinghouse is particularly active in research and development. A major thrust is in unmanned undersea vehicles (UUVs) for mine-countermeasures (MCM) applications. The Westinghouse emphasis on MCM applications reflects a pervasive view in industry that ASW has i become more of a subset of undersea warfare (USW). For j example, Raytheon’s Submarine Signal Division (SSD) sees its work in ASW within the broader area of naval acoustics, which promises economies of scale for their j
technologies.
Technology: Insertion Is the Name of the Game
About half of the fiscal year 1993 sea-control and undersea superiority funding of $79 million went to ASW and half went to mine countermeasures (MCM). The majority of the ASW portion went to technologies to counter shallow-water diesels, primarily for improvements to existing systems. As for MCM, whose funding levels were close to zero, the infusion of money will have a marked impact.
Emphasis is shifting from today’s open-ocean/blue-water capabilities towards a regional, shallow-water, Third World focus. The funding puts highest priority on sensor technology, and other priority efforts are to be in computers and design automation— specifically technologies leading to improved acoustic and non-acoustic sensing systems and
advanced high-speed computational data-fusing techniques.
For a strong shallow-water/re- gional-warfare capability, priority goes to detection/classification/local- ization sensors (for small, low-target-strength submarines and mines in relatively cluttered shallow-water environments) and a shallow-water weapons—e.g., torpedoes—upgrade. The requirement for an ample plat- form-protection/point defense puts focus on MCM, torpedo defense, and affordable low-signature platforms. The Navy also seeks technologies leading to systems that are tactical multipliers—specifically interactive, oceanographic, off-board sensor systems on unmanned undersea vehicles (UUVs) and unmanned air vehicles (UAVs).
The Navy is also looking to improve magnetic anomaly detection (MAD), perhaps its best deep-level localization tool. The improvement will upgrade MAD from an analog to a digital system and will overcome the noise problems caused by the aircraft platform. The improvements should significantly increase MAD’s range.
Also highlighted is an advanced deployable system (ADS) for shallow-water surveillance. Last year, Congress made it a priority. This lightweight, highly transportable system employs fiber optics both for transmission and sensing. A UAV, UUV, or surface ship could deploy ADS.
Another effort that is currently popular with Congress is the submarine laser-communication system. It would provide communication with
ASW R&D also has potential for dual-use applications. Westinghouse is looking for commercial applications for the AQS-14 airborne MCM system. It has acquired the technology and assets of Spectrum Engineering, in part to obtain the firm’s laser line-scanner that could be used for undersea pipeline inspection. The Spectrum technology also offers a “spin-in:” Westinghouse will use the scanner in its MCM work to augment acoustic systems for minehunting classification. Magnavox is exploring the use of sonobuoys as ship-interdiction devices to monitor proprietary fishing and exclusion zones. Hughes is studying longer-term UUV, sonar, and processor technologies for such dual-use applications as drug interdiction.
Another approach to maintaining ASW production economies of scale is in the export arena. Currently, one-third of SSD’s business is overseas, and that ratio is expected to increase to 40-50% in the future. A Navy source says that the number of requests for ASW-export approvals for ASW has noticeably increased. The Navy is not yet entirely supportive of this approach, however. Despite the end of the Cold War, the service is tighten- >ng its export restrictions on ASW.
Looking to another trend, Dr. Bisson predicts more joint ventures as a way to reduce risk. In response to the shrinking buoy market, sonobuoy competitors Magnavox and j Sparton created the joint venture Erapsco for the expendable reliable acoustic path sonobuoy (ERAPS). U.S. firms could team with a foreign contractor to enhance competitiveness, as in the case of the Hughes/Thomson airborne low frequency sonar (ALFS). Sources agree that in such cases processing will remain with the U.S. company and that the international sub or partner typically will provide the wet end. Thomson has been especially successful via the ALFS program and Thoray, its joint venture with Raytheon for minehunting sonar systems. Other French and British firms that are good in magnetics and electro-magnetics could participate in joint ventures to enter the U.S. ASW market.
Any R&D that remotely deals with any possibility of detecting U.S. SSBNs and SSNs—e.g., advanced processing and towed arrays—will exclude foreign participation. The recent Thomson/LTV venture provides an example of growing sensitivity to foreign participation in the defense industrial base, both in Congress and in the Navy.
As for other examples of foreign participation: In the photonic mast (non-penetrating periscope) competition, all competing teams have foreign participants. Foreign government (mainly NATO) labs will continue to participate under existing agreements in U.S. lab activity (for example, in phenomena investigations) that will allow transfers to foreign firms.
The Navy labs are finding themselves far from insulated from the drawdown, and they are competing with industry—trying to pull more work inside. As a result of the reorganization, the labs now have the clout to challenge industry for the R&D dollars and their long-standing relationship is under stress. The Navy is very sensitive about its proprietary rights in any transfer of ASW technology originating in Navy labs. And some in industry are equally suspicious of the labs.
Mr. Morton is a Defense writer and editor based in Washington, D.C.
submarines running fast and deep, without the need for a buoy or for the sub to rise to periscope depth. It thus would enhance the SSN’s usability in combined ASW. This Program exemplifies the need to consider fieldable prototypes. The Proposed system would require the fielding of one satellite for fleet evaluation, to determine its utility and whether, as an adjunct to exist- tug system capability, it would Provide added value.
Two additional technology nearterm initiatives are those serving to ’niprove the periscope-detection fadar (PDR) for maritime patrol aircraft (MPA) and surface ships, and lo develop the laser-light-detection- and-ranging (LIDAR) system that reflects light off submarine hulls and mines. The PDR is an improved APS-137 radar that focuses on the clutter-rejection processing problem. lidar is based on existing systems and will begin demonstration in fiscal year 1994. It will provide a helicopterborne pod capability that will take advantage of the relatively slow speed of the helo. Another LIDAR effort will apply the technology to P-3s.
Low-frequency active (LFA) is the most promising technology in regional warfare, and the Navy is placing heavy emphasis on both LFA processing and transducer development. While most of the effort is in the processing area, the Navy is experimenting with transducers to determine the best frequency for active acoustics. Active acoustics are especially important for surveying and oceanography, in view of the Navy’s need to create a regional/lit- toral environmental database.
For passive acoustics, the emphasis is not so much on sensors but on the development of fieldable systems and architectures. Work with passive sensors is focusing on a search for cheaper and lighter systems, not necessarily those that are more sensitive. The Navy especially wants these transducer technologies for submarines. Passive acoustic efforts will evaluate transducer technologies, such as polyvinyl diflouride (PVDF), non-ceramic, and fiber-optic technologies.
With the active/passive towed sonar array program, the Navy is testing new active components to evaluate the system’s capabilities in different waters, accounting for open-ocean convergence zones and enclosed areas more appropriate to regional conflicts.
It appears that technology insertion will be the name of the game. The Navy picks will be systems for shallow water. If they are cheap and fuse to existing systems, the Navy will want them.
John F. Morton