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phe Fleet Marine Force is undergoing A a major reorganization, based in part °n lessons of the Gulf War and the reaction of the Corps’ strength. In addi- tlon, a new Marine-headed directorate for expeditionary forces is being established ln the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations.
The Marine Corps already is standing down its six brigade headquarters. Since 982 the Marine Corps has had a total of permanent Marine Air-Ground Task °rce (MAGTF) command elements:
ters will stand down during fiscal year 1994.
In the future, when MEB-size forces are deployed, the appropriate Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) headquarters will provide the necessary command elements to direct operations. The Marines retain the three MEF command elements and seven Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) command elements.2
The Marine Corps also is reorganizing the division structure, as shown in Figure 1. The new divisions will consist of neous reloading of the container. Three types of conventional warheads are available for ballistic-trajectory rockets with a range of more than ten miles. A longer- range rocket is in development. The Navy had considered the MLRS—redesignated ABRS (assault ballistic rocket system)— for naval gunfire support, but that concept has been dropped.3
The current Marine plan is for one MLRS battalion in the Marine Corps that can be assigned to deployed forces as required. The MLRS battalion will have
three Marine Expeditionary Forces, six marine Expeditionary Brigades, and six
Marine Expeditionary Units. Each com- 9>and element was intended to control a Marine ground combat element, air ele- lrier>t, and support element—the exact imposition varying with the available 0rces, combat requirements, etc.1
With the cutbacks, the 4th, 5th, 6th and 9th Marine Expeditionary T'gade (MEB) headquarters were deaerated in 1992; the 1st MEB headquar- some 14,000 Marines (plus Navy personnel), a reduction of almost 4,000 troops per division. The new divisions will have enhanced reconnaissance capabilities, an increased number of light armored vehicles (LAV), and the multiple-launch rocket system (MLRS) as required.
The MLRS is in wide use within the U.S. and several NATO armies. The U.S. Army’s track-mounted launcher has a 12- round launcher with automatic, simulta- two batteries (18 launchers) initially assigned to the 11th Marines on the West Coast and a third battery (9 launchers) assigned to the 10th Marines on the East Coast. Another nine launchers would be provided to the maritime prepositioning forces—enough for one platoon (3 launchers) with each brigade set—and there would be six launchers as war reserves, for a total planned procurement of 42.
The three Marine artillery regiments
105
r°cccdings / January 1993
Fixed-Wing Group | Rotary-Wing Group |
1 1 | 1 1 |
48 F/A-18C Hornet | 32 CH-53E Super Stallion |
24 F/A-18D Hornet | 96 CH-46E Sea Knight |
40 AV-8B Harrier | 54 AH-1W SeaCobra |
10 EA-6B Prowler | 27 UH-1N Huey |
12 KC-130 Hercules |
|
Marine Aircraft Wing
|
|
Headquarters | |
| |
| 1 |
Air Control Group | Wing Support 1 Headquarters Group | Squadron |
|
|
Figure 2: New Notional Marine Aircraft Wing
(10th, 11th, and 12th Marines) were reorganized in late 1992, with each regiment being assigned three or four direct support battalions and each battalion hav-
Do it out of respect for the dead.
And the living.
THE AMERICAN HEART ASSOCIATION MEMORIAL PROGRAM^
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American Heart Association
ing three firing batteries with six Ml98 155-mm howitzers. In addition to the Ml98 towed howitzers, each MEF has available 48 M101A1 105-mm towed howitzers, for use in special contingencies where the heavy Ml98s are not suitable. The present plan is to retain the Ml98s in artillery battalions until the Marine Corps receives the lightweight 155mm howitzer that will replace the Ml98.
The Marine Corps also is reorganizing the three Marine aircraft wings, as indicated in Figure 2. Helicopter strength will remain about the same as the current wings, but fixed-wing aircraft will be reduced by 26%, with A-6E Intruder and OV-IOD Bronco aircraft eliminated. The new wings will have a strength of about 12,000 Marines plus naval personnel; this is a reduction of some 3,000 Marines from the current wing strength.
In addition, the Navy is splitting off a naval expeditionary force directorate (N85) from the existing surface warfare directorate (N86, formerly OP-03).4 This Navy headquarters directorate—to be headed by a Marine major general—will control Navy amphibious ships, Navy mine countermeasure forces, maritime prepositioning ships, and certain Navy special-operations forces. It is a recipe for disaster, according to some observers.
First, an expeditionary warfare directorate already exists: it is called the U.S. Marine Corps. Marine headquarters already plans the nation’s amphibious landings and supervises Marine readiness and
training. Only a few years ago then-Cotn- mandant of the Marine Corps General Alfred M. Gray called attention to this role by changing Marine Air-Ground Task Forces from “amphibious” to “expeditionary” units.
Now a Marine officer will be made the “big daddy” of Navy amphibious, mine warfare, and other forces. He will not have commanded ships of these types, nor—with a few specific exceptions— have even served in an amphib except as a passenger. But he will be responsible for their readiness and training. Further, he will oversee officers and enlisted men who regularly will be reassigned to (of come from) other types of surface ships— the warships and auxiliary ships still > under N86 (formerly OP-03).
The Marine head of N85 will assume responsibility for formulating the requirements for numerous ship types, without any personal or corporate experience in acquiring any type of ship larger than a landing craft.
An analogy would be to split off the ballistic missile submarines from the cur- ' rent submarine warfare staff (N87, formerly OP-02) and give a new missile submarine directorate to a non-submariner. There may be some advantages, but neither the Navy nor the submarine force is ready for that.
In its quest to recoup respectability and credibility and to prove that the Navy is indeed reacting to the new world order, the Navy’s top leadership is striving to do what is “politically correct.” Jointness and an emphasis on expeditionary forces appear to be the politically correct stance at this time. But related actions must not sacrifice military effectiveness and morale, which this move appears to be doing.
The Marine Corps undoubtedly will be a key factor in future U.S. political-military operations in a strife-tom world. One hopes that the new organizational structures will enhance its deterrent and combat effectiveness.
'For example, while a MEF nominally consists of a Marine division and aircraft wing, in the Gulf Wat the I Marine Expeditionary Force controlled two divisions and the equivalent of more than two aircraft ■ wings.
The seventh MEU—the 31st MEU—was activated on Okinawa on 9 September 1992. Previously there had been six MEUs, three in the Atlantic and three in the Pacific.
’The ABRS was considered for arming both battleships and tank landing ships; see Scott C. Truver and N. Polmar, “Naval Surface Fire Support and the /owns,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, Novell*' ber 1985, pp. 130-133. f
4See N. Polmar, “The Mother of Reorganizations. U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, September 1992.
pp. 121-122.
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Proceedings/January 19$