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The closing of the U.S. bases in the Philippines signals a new era of independence and self-sufficiency for the nations of Southeast Asia. As the region's navies become larger and more sophisticated, multinational naval cooperation will become more desirable, but growing nationalism, vast political and cultural diversity, and concerns of sovereignty over littoral waters are just a few of the challenges that must first be addressed.
The utility of multinational naval forces has been a widely discussed topic recently. With the end of the Cold War and the demise of the long-term Soviet Maritime threat, NATO navies have turned their attention to new concepts for naval employment. Inspired by the success of international cooperation during Operation desert Storm and concerned by the threat of deepening defense budget cuts, these navies have been considering the wider application of multinational naval cooperation (MNCO), including for out-of-area operations.
Naval forces are particularly useful for military presence and response in crisis situations and are an attractive and easy way to present a unified front when countries perceive that their common interests are at stake. Thus it is argued that multinational naval formations should be available to respond to crises, preferably under the auspices of some suitable sponsoring organization. The United Nations is talked about for this role, as are NATO and the Western European Union (WEU), but the idea of MNCO outside the European theater by the latter organizations would be unacceptable in areas of the world that aspire to the regional resilience to look after themselves.
This is especially so in the Western Pacific, where there is special sensitivity—at least among the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)—to anything that can be construed as a heavy-handed approach by Western maritime powers. At a conference in Sydney in November 1991, the Indonesian Ambassador to Australia referred to the closure of the U.S. bases in the Philippines as the symbolic end to the military “Vasco da Gama epoch.”1 This was a reference to the work of Indian historian K.M. Panikkar, who postulated that the arrival of Vasco da Gama in Asia in 1498 marked the beginning of a clearly marked epoch in history when the rich cultures
In contrast to the North Atlantic, Pacific states view the sea and its resources as integral elements of a nation’s sovereign territory. Large areas of the regional waters are the territorial sea, exclusive economic zone, or archipelagic waters of one coastal state or another.
ROYAL AUSTRALIAN NAVY HYDROGRAPHIC SERVICE
and commerce of Asia would be dominated by the Western maritime powers. What commenced with the arrival of the Portuguese in the late 15th century ended with the departure of the Americans in the late 20th century.
This sensitivity was evident in the cool reception by Singapore, Malaysia, and Indonesia to the idea of international involvement in antipiracy operations in the Malacca and Singapore straits. Following a report in May 1992 that the Royal Navy was preparing to escort ships in these straits, the Deputy Prime Minister of Malaysia pointed out that the United Kingdom had “no right” to take this action.2 An Indonesian naval officer is reported as saying, “As long as the incidents occur within the jurisdiction of a particular country, then the handling measures would be more effective if conducted by the law enforcement force of each country.”3
If there is resistance to multinational operations involving countries from outside the region, what are the prospects for MNCO between the regional countries themselves? The short answer is, “Not very good,” although there have been some encouraging moves recently toward multilateral activities in Southeast Asia. And in the South Pacific, MNCO is well developed for the specific purposes of maritime surveillance and fisheries protection.
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These are exciting years in the Pacific. East Asia is the most economically and socially dynamic part of the world today. The center of gravity of world production already has shifted from the Atlantic to the Pacific, and more trade crosses the Pacific than any other ocean. The value of U.S. transpacific commerce exceeds $300 billion—nearly one- third larger than that across the Atlantic.4 Per capita incomes in several East Asian countries compare more than favorably with those of some European countries.
Economic growth in the region underpins an improving strategic outlook. Progress has been made in several previous problem areas, with reasonable prospects for the resolution of conflict in Cambodia, better relations between the Koreas, and a concerted effort, sponsored by Indonesia, to solve the problems of the South China Sea.
Nevertheless, an atmosphere of strategic uncertainty still prevails, with speculation about the consequences of a likely drawdown of U.S. forces deployed in the Western Pacific and about the aspirations of the new, potentially powerful, strategic players on the scene—China, Japan, and India. China’s policy in the South China Sea is seen as ambiguous because the rhetoric for peace is not being matched by action, and Japan’s role in Southeast Asia is viewed with great apprehension by other countries in the region.5-6
Specific difficulties remain: the minimal progress toward democratic reform in China; the uncertain social, economic, and political future of the Philippines; the lack of political stability and economic progress in Myanmar; the conflicting claims in the South China Sea; the ongoing secessionist movements in Indonesia, highlighted by the tragedy in Dili in 1991; and the major internal difficulties, both political and economic, faced by some South Pacific island states.
It is not surprising that spending by East Asian countries on maritime warfare capabilities (ships, submarines, and aircraft) continues to increase. It generally is accepted that these trends are not an arms race but a reflection of the legitimate national strategic concerns of countries that are now in an economic position to provide more adequately for their national security.
There is also a paradox in the current situation. While activities by the former naval powers in the region—the United States and Russia—may decline in the 1990s, overall naval activity could, in fact, increase. There will be
Many Western Pacific nations, now in better economic positions to provide more adequately for their national security, are turning from internal problems to building their maritime capabilities—here, patrol craft of Singapore’s Navy.
more navies of consequence on the scene, with the recognized regional naval powers of Japan, China, and India continuing to develop their maritime forces, and South Korea and Taiwan acquiring more powerful naval forces. Furthermore, most ASEAN countries—particularly Thailand and Malaysia—have broken away from their previous preoccupation with problems of internal security and counterinsurgency and are concentrating on their maritime capabilities.
The result is that, despite the probable reduction in U.S. and Russian maritime presence, the waters of the Northeast Indian Ocean, the China Sea, and the Western Pacific may be a more complex operating area for maritime forces than they have been in the past. There will be more navies of consequence, and they will have a greater range of high technology capabilities. Unfortunately, these navies are tending to “do their own thing.” Increased dialogue and cooperation between them is desirable, but this is inhibited by numerous factors that mark the Western Pacific in sharp contrast to the North Atlantic theater, where cooperation has been the norm.
What Inhibits Cooperation ?
The first factor that inhibits cooperation is the growth in national self-confidence of most regional countries, including the great importance they attach to their independence, particularly in matters of national security.7 Considerations of nationalism, national resilience, and national pride are driving forces in most East and Southeast Asian countries. Outside interference in national policy making—particularly where matters of sovereignty are involved—is unwelcome.
With this strong commitment to national independence, it is not surprising that there has been little enthusiasm for multilateral security arrangements beyond those provided by the Five Power Defense Agreement (FPDA)— the only existing multilateral framework in the region. Nevertheless, a vigorous debate has developed in the last two years on the security future of the Asia-Pacific region. The ASEAN Post-Ministerial Council (PMC) agreed at its meeting in January 1992 that security issues could be discussed within the ASEAN framework. And in April 1992, the Malaysian Minister for Defense, Datiik Seri Najib, launched the “Najib initiative,” calling for an Asia- Pacific-wide security forum involving both military and civilian representatives of regional countries.8
The broadening role of ASEAN and the increased importance of security issues also were apparent in the agenda for the latest meeting of the ASEAN PMC held in Manila in July 1992. The resulting wide-ranging dialogue included discussion of the security situation in the South China Sea, the overseas deployment of Japanese peacekeeping forces, the changing U.S. military role in the region, and the stalled peace process in Cambodia.9 All this activity may mean a lessening sensitivity toward multilateral activities.
Second, there are the vast differences between regional countries. Geoffrey Till has referred to the “bewildering range of local, domestic, and economic constraints affecting different navies in different ways.’ 10 Certainly the Pacific is much more culturally, ethnically, and politically diverse than the North Atlantic.
The status of the military, higher defense organizations, and the division of responsibility for maritime activities are handled differently from one country to another. In many countries of the region, for example, maritime aircraft are operated by air forces.
Third, there is the lack of a common threat perception in the Western Pacific. Harmonizing security perceptions here is going to be much more difficult than it was in Western Europe. Dormant tensions exist throughout the region because some countries are unable to discern the purposes and intentions of their neighbors. Even within ASEAN there is residual mistrust—conflicting claims to offshore territory, unresolved maritime boundaries, and the occasional controversy, such as the espionage allegations between Malaysia and Singapore in 1989 and the border incidents between Malaysia and Thailand in 1991.
Fourth, the maritime environment is regarded very differently between the North Atlantic and the Pacific. For the archipelagic states of the Pacific—and perhaps for others as well—the sea and its resources are regarded as integral elements of the territory over which the nation exercises sovereignty. North Americans and Europeans view the maritime environment as mainly high seas, with a strictly limited littoral area under some degree of sovereignty of the coastal state.
In the Western Pacific, large areas of regional waters comprise the territorial sea, exclusive economic zone, or archipelagic waters of one coastal state or another. The concern of regional countries is with their sovereign rights over their littoral waters, rather than with the freedoms of the high seas. “Creeping jurisdiction” by littoral states is alive and well in the waters of the Western Pacific. Some states (e.g., China, North Korea, and Vietnam) declare territorial sea baselines longer than those allowed by international law, and some (e.g., China, North Korea, Indonesia, and the Philippines) embrace potentially restrictive interpretations of the rights of innocent passage. Even Australia has raised the eyebrows of the international maritime community by introducing compulsory pilotage tor the highly environmentally sensitive areas of the Torres Strait and Great Barrier Reef. It may only be a matter of time before similar measures are taken for the Malacca and Singapore Straits.
Fifth, multinational naval cooperation between Western Pacific navies is made difficult by the lack of common doctrine and interoperability. Regional navies acquire their ships, submarines, and aircraft from a wide range of sources and avail themselves of training opportunities in many different countries. This leads to a wide diversity of doctrine and equipment. The problems involved become even more acute as the technological levels of the navies increase and systems involving the automated exchange of tactical data are introduced. There are numerous naval tactical data systems on the market, and they often are incompatible.
Common doctrine and interoperability are developed through regular training and combined exercises. With the exception of the annual maritime exercises conducted under the auspices of the FPDA, there is virtually no multilateral exercising in the Western Pacific at present. There is some bilateral activity within ASEAN and between the U.S. Navy and the Royal Australian Navy and between some Asian navies, but this is usually little more than basic passage exercising.
Finally, most of the experience with multinational naval cooperation so far has been with blue water, sea-assertion operations. The NATO navies have had a common purpose, and this has led to a considerable tradition of operating in a multinational environment, primarily in the context of protection of shipping and antisubmarine warfare. However, this is not the case in the Pacific. Most Pacific navies have in the past been optimized for brown- or green-water sovereignty or sea-denial tasks, which are not conducive to multinational activities.
On the credit side, the record of multinational cooperation in the South Pacific is good with regard to the successful negotiation of treaties, such as the South Pacific Regional Environmental Protection Convention (SPREP), the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone treaty (SPNFZ) and the Treaty of Nukulalofa (which regulates access by U.S. tuna clippers to the exclusive economic zones of island states). There also is progress toward a comprehensive, cooperative maritime surveillance regime under the auspices of the South Pacific Forum Fisheries Agency.
The latest development in multilateral cooperation in the South Pacific is the signing in July 1992 of the Niue Treaty on Cooperation in Fisheries Surveillance and Law Enforcement in the South Pacific Region by the South Pacific Forum countries. This is a world first in maritime law enforcement, in that it provides for third-party enforcement: a patrol vessel of one signatory country could arrest a foreign fishing vessel illegally operating in the exclusive economic zone of another signatory.
What Can Be Done?
In line with the changing economic and social scene in Asia-Pacific, there is some feeling that the familiar security framework of the past—based from a Western viewpoint on the Japan-U.S. Mutual Defense Treaty, the Australia-New Zealand-U.S. (ANZUS) treaty, and the Five Power Defense Agreement (FPDA)—is also in transition, although it is difficult to know where it might be headed. Nevertheless, 1992 has seen a vigorous debate develop on the security future of the wider Asia-Pacific region. The power balance of the region clearly has changed with the diminishing authority of the erstwhile superpowers and the economic growth experienced by many countries.
New security structures could well develop. For example, FPDA might evolve and expand.11 However, possible end-point institutional arrangements are not attrac-
tive in the current security discussion, particularly those based on the European experience. For example, the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe clearly was the inspiration for the Proposals from both the Australian and Canadian foreign ministers for new multilateral security dialogues to be instituted in the Asia-Pacific region. These Proposals did not meet with the approval of the United States and Were subject to criticism from within the region.
There is an obvious preference for a cautious approach to regional security cooperation in the Asia-Pacific region that does not force the pace in any institutional way. In the words of Professor Desmond Ball of the Australian National University,
Rather, a more fruitful approach for the 1990s is the establishment of “building blocks”—a multiplicity of subregional arrangements dealing with various security issues and involving various memberships, building on the wide range of bilateral and limited multilateral arrangements already in place and addressing the common security concerns already being identified in the region.12
. This is the process that now is under way. The ongo- lng workshops on the Spratly Islands sponsored by Indonesia, the successful negotiation of the Timor Gap Treaty between Australia and Indonesia, the increased fevel of bilateral naval exercising between ASEAN members, and the agreements between Malaysia, Indonesia, and Singapore regarding joint action against piracy in the vtcinity of the Singapore and Malacca Straits are all ex- ahiples of successful, purpose-oriented interaction and regional confidence and security building.13 The significant feature of all these activities is that they have been directed toward some common goal.
Before multinational cooperation can exist, the countries involved must have some common sense of purpose aad see some potential mutual benefits. The way to achieve this in the Pacific may be a bottom-up approach, VVlth the introduction of some modest maritime confidence and security building measures (MCSBMs) and °etter dialogue between regional navies on issues of common concern. This is a prerequisite to the operational evel of MNCO.
. The difficulty with multinatinal naval cooperation, if b Primarily encompasses combined operations by naval °rces of different countries in actual or potential conflict against some common threat, is that the participating na- ■ bons must agree somewhat about the nature of that threat. ^1 present, there is no such thing as a common Asia-Pacific threat perception.
The beauty of MCSBMs is that they can be perceived to be of benefit without addressing conflict scenarios or a common threat. The types of MCSBMs that have been suggested for the Asia-Pacific region include a regional maritime surveillance and safety regime optimized for a spectrum of tasks short of conflict, such as:14 >• Maritime surveillance, including the compilation of a shipping plot of all vessels within the regime at any one time
► Monitoring illegal activities, including drug smuggling, piracy, unauthorized population movement, and unlicensed fishing
► Planning for the naval control and protection of shipping transiting the area (noting here the strong and growing interest of most regional countries in the security of seaborne trade)
>• Search and rescue and maritime safety
► Controlling and monitoring marine pollution, and taking remedial action as required
>• Sharing maritime information and intelligence
Other MCSBMs include regional avoidance-of-inci- dents-at-sea agreements. These may be of value in preventing misunderstandings at sea between regional maritime forces, which are developing more sophisticated capabilities. However, these agreements are likely to be home grown, optimized for regional circumstances rather than based directly on the existing incidents-at-sea agreements between the Soviet and Western navies.
There also is room for more dialogue between regional navies at the working level. The principal gathering of regional navies at present is the Western Pacific Naval Symposium (WPNS), which meets biennially and is comprised of the ASEAN states’ navies, China, Japan, South Korea, the United States, Australia, New Zealand.
and Papua New Guinea. The first WPNS was hosted by Australia in Sydney in 1988, and the second was held in Bangkok in 1990. The most recent was hosted by the U.S. Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, in Hawaii in November 1992.
The Bangkok WPNS agreed that a technical workshop should be held with representatives of regional navies, to develop ideas about enhanced naval cooperation in relevant areas. Special mention was made of protection-of- shipping arrangements and the need for procedures that allow for the exchange of information on maritime activities of common concern. This WPNS workshop was held in Sydney in July 1992.
Applying the building-block approach, the workshop investigated areas of common concern and ways in which maritime information exchange might be improved. Noting that each country has a myriad of organizations with responsibilities for maritime safety and security, the workshop identified the need for a digest that lists organizations and contacts, to be available to participating navies as a means of furthering timely information exchange. Possible standard operating procedures for communication contacts between naval units also were explored and will be developed further at later meetings.
Conclusion
The U.S. Navy has played and will continue to play the major role in the Pacific in facilitating bilateral naval activity. The U.S. Navy may have difficulty fulfilling this role in the longer term, however, if budgetary pressures start to bite hard. The Australian government has expressed a strong commitment to working with other Pacific countries in building a stable regional security environment. The maritime components of the Australian Defence Force provide the backbone of the military commitment to these policies, with ships and submarines on rotational deployment to Southeast Asian waters and Royal Australian Air Force P-3C aircraft operating out of Butterworth in Malaysia undertaking regular maritime surveillance flights over the South China Sea, the Malacca Straits, and the Bay of Bengal. All units participate in occasional exercises with regional forces, including the annual FPDA Starfish maritime exercises.
But much depends on what is meant by multinational. If it means naval peacekeeping under the auspices of the United Nations, then there is not a problem. If it means the navies of like-minded, neighboring countries working together when there is some common objective, then there is not a problem. But if it means out-of-area, combined operations by extra-regional navies, then there will be problems. These could be particularly acute in the Western Pacific, where the sensitivity to external interference is high.
There must be circumspection in the way multinational naval cooperation is addressed and about how and where multinational naval forces might be employed. Grand global terminology suggestive of the international naval policemen should be avoided, lest alarm bells be rung in regions of the world that aspire to look after themselves.
Even if there is increased use of multinational forces at sea by NATO or some other alliance, doubts exist over whether there will be much of a move toward multinationality (in the sense of multinational forces operating together at sea) in the Western Pacific—at least in the foreseeable future. The contrary pressures at present are simply too great.
Rather a higher level of dialogue and cooperation between regional navies, either bilaterally or multilaterally. is a good starting point. This is a sound, practical MCSBM in its own right and a way of getting around some of the political stumbling blocks. As one commentator on the role of confidence building measures at sea has noted, “small steps in which States could find some common ground can help modify doctrinal thinking in a manner that might later make far-reaching measures possible.”15
'Sabam P. Siagian, “The Asia-Pacific Region in the Post-Vasco da Gama Epoch.” Address to the Maritime Change: Issues for Asia conference, Sydney, 21-22 November 1991.
'The Straits Times, 28 May 1992, p.18.
'The Jakarta Post, 29 July 1992, p. 9.
'James Baker, “America in Asia: Emerging Architecture for the Pacific,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 70, No. 5, Winter 1991/92, p.4.
'Nayan Chanda, “Treacherous Shoals,” Far Eastern Economic Review, 12 August 1992, pp. 14-17.
“Fred Burlatskiy, “Japan and the Security of Southeast Asia: Fearing the J rigger- naut,” Asian Defence Journal, 11/90, p. 28.
Geoffrey Till, “Navies and Security Policy in the Pacific Rim,” Naval Forces, No. 1, 1990, Vol. XI, pp. 49-56. The growth of national self-confidence is one of the factors that Geoffrey Till has identified as being of particular interest in understanding the naval environment of the Pacific.
'Singh Bilveer, “The ‘Najib Initiative’ and Confidence Building in the Asia-Pacific Region,” Asian Defence Journal, 7/92, pp. 6-13.
"Rodney Tasker, “Facing up to Security,” Far Eastern Economic Review, 6 August 1992, pp. 8-9. The PMC includes the ASEAN countries plus the so-called dialogue partners, the United States, Japan, Australia, Canada, the EC, New Zealand, and South Korea. Russia, China, Vietnam, and Laos also attended the Manila meeting for the first time as guests of ASEAN.
'“Till, op cit.
"As discussed, for example, by BGen. Lee Hsien Loong, “The FPDA and Regional Stability,” Asian Defence Journal, 2/90, pp. 28-32.
"Desmond Ball, “Building Blocks for Regional Security: An Australian Perspective on Confidence and Security Building Measures (CSBMS) in the Asia/Pacific Region,” Canberra Papers on Strategy and Defence No. 83, Australian National University, Canberra, 1991, p. 4.
"Indonesia has now hosted three workshops on Managing Potential Conflicts in the South China Sea. The third workshop held in Yogyakarta in mid-1992 agreed to establish two working groups, one on resource assessment and the other on marine scientific research. The Jakarta Post, 3 July 1992.
The so-called Timor Gap Treaty between Australia and Indonesia entered int° force in 1991, providing for a joint development regime in an area of the Timet Sea where there is a gap in the seabed boundary previously agreed between the two countries.
Singh Bilveer, “Confidence Building, Security Measures, and Security Regimes in Southeast Asia,” Asian Defence Journal, 3/92. pp. 5-17.
Three nation action plan to fight piracy,” New Straits Times, 5 June 1992. "Operational considerations with the implementation of regional maritime surveillance and safety regimes and incidents-at-sea agreements were discussed in 12- Ball and W.S.G. Bateman, "An Australian Perspective on Maritime CSBMs in the Asia-Pacific Region,” Working Paper No. 234, Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Australian National University, Canberra, July 1991.
1 R. Deyanov, “The Role and Security Objectives of Confidence-Building Measures at Sea in UN Department of Disarmament Affairs, ‘Naval Confidence-Building Measures, Disarmament Topical Papers 4, United Nations, New York. 1990, p. 15.
Commodore Bateman is Director General, Maritime Studies Program- Department of Defence, at the Navy Office in Canberra, Australia.