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Learning from the Army

By Commander Thomas M. Cirillo, U.S. Navy

As an SH-60B LAMPS III detach­ment officer-in-charge, I had the op­portunity to incorporate a two-plane U.S. Army OH-58D detachment into our or­ganization on board an Oliver Hazard Perry (FFG-7)-class frigate.

First, combining OH-58Ds with the LAMPS III ship-air system works well. During Operation Desert Storm several frigates, notably the USS Curts (FFG-38), the USS Nicholas (FFG- 47), and the USS Jarrett (FFG- 33) used such combinations to pro­duce some very impressive results. Nicholas aircrews destroyed an oil platform used by Iraqi forces to launch attacks on allied surface forces; Curts aircrews attacked and captured Iraqi troops and weapons placements on Quarh Island; and Jarrett aircrews successfully de­stroyed a Silkworm missile site on Faylakah Island, clearing the way for battleships to fire on both the Kuwaiti coast and the island.

Success did not come easily.

The two airborne weapons systems Were made to work in spite of very real and challenging obstacles.

Those involved in Desert Storm in the North Arabian Gulf will re­member the challenge just to keep all the players straight. Any given ship “worked” for up to five dif­ferent masters—the Gulf Brothers- of which had differing ideas on how and when to employ both the LAMPS Ills and the OH-58Ds.

The surface ships and their helicopters appeared to be there to do the “surveil­lance thing” and the “mine thing,” but When it came down to taking out a patrol boat, the philosophy—and the resulting decision—was for the small boys to stand aside and let tactical aviation take care of business. In a few instances, OH-58D amd Royal Navy Lynx ship-air teams Were allowed to mix with the big boys: the results were devastating for the enemy.

Although but one instance, the fol­lowing example provides some insight into how effective the armed helicopter can be. Before the USS Missouri (BB- 63) and the USS Wisconsin (BB-64) could move into the battleship fire sup­port area, Silkworm missile sites on Fay­lakah Island and the Kuwaiti coast had to be knocked out. Thirteen raids over two days by carrier-based aircraft on Fay­lakah Island came to no avail.

The decision was then made to allow

the Jarrett's OH-58Ds and LAMPS Ills to reconnoiter the island and destroy the sites if they could be found. Battle dam­age assessment was to be provided by the Missouri's Pioneer remotely piloted ve­hicle and OH-58D forward-looking-in­frared (FLIR) recording of the mission. The OH-58Ds found the site and de­stroyed it with one Hellfire missile. What two days of tactical aviation raids had failed to destroy was thus eliminated by armed helicopters in less than 20 min­utes. The result: the battleships moved into position and pummeled the enemy.

So, it works, but—as noted earlier— you pay a heavy price to make it work. Let me state the obvious because it was apparent during Desert Storm that some players on the upper rungs did not rec­ognize the obvious: unlike ships with large decks, destroyers and frigates are capable of spotting only one helicopter on the flight deck at a time; on a two- plane LAMPS Ill-capable ship with two additional OH-58D helicopters, it is read­ily apparent that one of the LAMPS he­licopters is going to be on the flight deck or in the air all the time. Many did not

U.S. Army OH-58Ds with mast- mounted forward-looking infrared (FLIR) systems operated effectively from frigates like the USS Kauffman (FFG-59) during the Gulf War, but it wasn’t easy.

understand this important fact.

Any combined LAMPS III and OH- 58D mission requires three aircraft: the OH-58Ds maintain section integrity and one LAMPS III is required to provide electronic-support-measures coverage and radar vectoring beyond 15 nautical miles from home plate. Since during Desert Storm it was imperative to maintain a ready flight deck for emergency fueling and other inflight emergencies, a four-

Proceedings / September 1992

Equipping U.S. Navy SH-60B LAMPS Ills with the OH-58D’s capabilities—and heavier armament—makes sense, given the limited space on board U.S. Navy frigates.

plane, single-spot frigate was required to keep its remaining LAMPS III spotted and ready to launch on 30-minute alert to clear the flight deck around-the-clock.

Swapping LAMPS III aircraft from deck to hangar led to the follow­ing sequence: Launch the helicopter spotted on the flight deck; roll the other helicopter out of the hangar and launch it; re­cover the first SH-60B, maneuver-straighten, fold it, and stuff it in the hangar; and—finally— recover the airborne SH- 60B. On any given occa­sion this was a challenge (in light of the SH-60B’s inherent “automatic” blade-fold problems).

The entire sequence took approximately two hours to complete—two hours of non-operational tasking; two hours when the crew could not totally concen­trate on fighting the ship. To sum it up, here is the cost of putting four helicopters on a single-spot ship:

• Wasted flight time
• Wasted aviation fuel
• Reduced flexibility in flightdeck management
• Increased unscheduled maintenance
• Increased aircraft corrosion and aircraft down time
• Increased maintenance man-hours

>• Increased cost of operating two addi­tional helicopters

• Increased cost of housing 22 additional personnel (which is not an easy task on an FFG-7 ship)

In some cases more is better, but not when you put more helicopters on a sin­gle-spot ship. Thus, if more is not better, and yet “more” works, why not put more capability into each helicopter, rather than just adding more helicopters with the de­sired capabilities?

Here is what could be gained by putting offensive capability into the two SH-60Bs on an FFG-7-class ship. All of the drawbacks discussed would go away and additional benefits would accrue.

• On-station time would double.
• Combat radius would be double that of the OH-58Ds
• The communication nightmare would go away. With the SH-60B’s data link providing radar and forward-looking in­frared (FUR) data to the ship, there would be few questions about mission performance, battle damage assessment, and communications.

Critics argue that there is no need to worry: “You’re getting the Penguin mis­sile system and, besides, you don’t need to be armed—the TacAir community will be there to protect you.”

I would like to believe that our Navy was looking ahead when it decided to buy the system, but my perception is that there was a foreign military sale to be made with Norway and the Penguin missile system was the winner not be­cause of military need but for diplo- matic/NATO/political expediency. There are still those in the Navy who do not want to arm SH-60B helicopters with anything but a torpedo.

As for the TacAir umbrella, there are those in the Navy who refuse to let the helicopter community into the ordnance- on-target club for various reasons. If the U.S. Army can take proved, reliable, cost- effective weapons like Hellfire and 2.75- inch rockets and put them on an OH-58 helicopter, could not the Navy do the same? The LAMPS and surface com­munities have fought hard to get an an­tiship weapon and Penguin appears to fill the bill. But as Desert Storm has shown, there are a lot of targets for which Pen­guin would be an overkill.

The TacAir community spends bil­lions of dollars on weapon systems to make aircrews safer in the performance of their missions. Four helicopters on one deck is not safe. Why can’t we spend a few dollars on providing a safer platform

for helicopter aircrews? The answer lies, I’m afraid, in the fact that in Washington and Pentagon parlance helicopters are not glamorous. The generic view of many is that helicopters are sup­port aircraft that require TacAir protection. It is only through the good graces and a lot of determination by the sur­face community that the LAMPS III program be­came a reality. More than likely, the surface community will again staunchly support efforts to arm the SH-60B.

At the 1990 Naval He­licopter Association sym­posium the flag officer panel had to field the fol­lowing question: “Why do we need to have Army helicopters on Navy ships?” Although the question sounds parochial, further ex­planation by the questioner belied the same concerns as stated at the begin­ning of this article. Vice Admiral Richard M. Dunleavy, OP-05, began by stating (and I paraphrase), that if he had the ability he would take the OH-58Ds off Navy ships and provide the capability to Navy helicopters as the mission dictates.

I believe that he meant it.

It takes more than one vice admiral, however, to effect such change, which brings me back to my original assess­ment—why not upgrade our SH-60Bs?

My answer is based on 15 years of ob­servation, attitude, assessment, and per­ception. We have not armed our heli­copters because of fears that a crack would appear in the almost intractable armor of TacAir supremacy in all things relating to ordnance. No longer would the surface-helicopter community have to rely on the benevolence and protection of the carrier battle group TacAir commu­nity. There would be fierce competition for Pentagon dollars between the TacAir and helicopter communities.

Nothing could be farther from the truth. In no way does the helicopter com­munity consider replacing TacAir, nor does it believe that helicopters are better at delivering ordnance. When a ship is stationed ahead of the battle group or on independent duty, however, it cannot rely on TacAir to be available. The > lessons learned from Operations Earnest Will, Praying Mantis, and Desert Storm all point toward the need to arm heli- , copters for antiship, small-boat, and coastal-site action.

Future conflicts will undoubtedly in­volve Third World small-navy engage­ments. The ability of surface units de­ployed with armed SH-60B helicopters to engage enemy targets when first iden­tified, will allow TacAir to concentrate °n power projection. The cost effective­ness of arming enough SH-60B heli­copters to meet the threat should be as synergistic as combining SH-60Bs and OH-58Ds without the excess baggage. LAMPS stands for Light Airborne Multi­Purpose System. Let’s not stop short of taking advantage of this unique airborne platform. The Army, the Marine Corps, and the Royal Navy believe in the tacti­cal advantage of armed helicopters. Why don’t we?

Commander Cirillo is the executive officer of HSL- 43 at Naval Air Station North Island, California. Dur­ing Operation Desert Storm, he was the officer-in­charge of Detachment 2, HSL-45, on board the USS Jarrett (FFG-33).

If It’s Broken, Fix It

By Lieutenant Commander Lawrence E. Kinker, U.S. Naval Reserve

You’re in the cockpit of a U.S. Navy or Marine tactical aircraft flying in Operation Desert Storm. The flight cloth­ing you’re wearing, the aircraft you’re operating, the controls and displays that allow you to manipulate specific weapon systems and perform your mission, were the best—at one time or another. Unfor­tunately, that was from 10 to 25 years ago. To make matters worse, you know the enemy is equipped with a few items tactical equipment that match or ex­^Ceed the performance of your aircraft.

During Desert Storm, the cutting edge °f the U.S. Navy’s tactical air arm con­^sisted of a fleet of aging Vietnam-era ^~6Es, F-14As, and newer F/A-18s. The U.S. Marine Corps flew close-air-support tnissions using the AV-8B and F/A-18, aircraft manufactured in the early 1980s ^with flight systems and avionics devel­oped in the late 1970s.

Under the Naval Air Systems Com­mand’s advanced technology crew sta­tion (ATCS) program, Naval Air Warfare Center (NAWC) Warminster, Pennsyl­^Vania, personnel interviewed Desert Storm air crews who flew these aircraft, "fhe interviews focused on problems ex­perienced in the cockpit, and centered on crew-aircraft interface. The results con­^stitute a clear warning: equipment avail- ^ahle to U.S. Navy and Marine aircrews ^ls outdated compared to that of the U.S. ^it Force and, in some cases, other air forces, and the outlook for improvement

^,s limited.

Ergonomics, by definition, relates to biotechnology, that aspect of science con­^Cerned with the study of relationships be- hveen humans and machines, especially ^ln terms of physiological, psychologi­^Cal> and technological requirements. With exception of the F/A-18, overall de- ^Slgn and instrumentation have never been geared toward ergonomics, or the eas- j ^la§ of crew-station workload. For the ^m°st part, crew-station design in Navy ^and Marine tactical aircraft hinders air- _x^Crew performance.

During Desert Storm, aircrews were forced to overcome a myriad of obstruc­tions and obstacles in their cockpits. Switches located in out-of-the-way places, flight controls blocking display screens, misplacement of flight instruments ne­cessitating reliance on a head-up display (HUD) to attain redundant information, are only a few examples of many hurdles that aircrews had to overcome while fly­ing combat operations.

Outdated technology also was a fac-

This electroluminescent display radar­warning indicator has been proposed as an alternative to the cathode-ray tube displays installed in fighter and attack aircraft. It is compatible with night-vision goggles.

tor. Air crews flying air-to-ground sup­port, combat air patrols, and escort mis­sions were hindered by radar warning receivers and electronic jamming equip­ment, designed in the late 1960s and early 1970s, that reduced their ability to detect or counter enemy ground and air threats. The equipment was pitted against an Iraqi force that possessed French, Russian, and a variety of other modern and formida­ble foreign weapon systems.

Fleet surveys by Warminster person­nel uncovered problems concerning cock­pit crew-machine interface in six major areas.

Design. Without exception, every air­craft community (F/A-18, F-14A, AV- 8B, and A-6E) expressed concern over obstructions to vision presented by canopy design and the placement of equipment directly in front of pilots and or aircrew. The A-6E and F-14A com­munities were particularly vocal on this issue.

Problems concerning canopy durabil­ity and the tendency for the canopy to be­come crazed, pitted, and scored—either from aging or the sandy environment— were brought out in vivid detail. Poor canopy resistance to degradation from sand particularly affected Marine F/A-18 and AV-8B squadrons stationed at remote locations in the Arabian Desert. As one pilot said, “If you’re trying to find an ag­gressor in the air, and he’s only the size of a speck, you might not see him until it’s too late because of scratches and gouging on the canopy.”

Threat warning capability. Again, without exception, every community voiced concern about the poor reliabil­ity of the radar-threat-warning systems designed to detect enemy missiles and aircraft. The F-14A and the A-6E, for ex­ample, had threat-warning systems de­signed against weapon systems used by enemy forces during the Vietnam War 25 years ago. Detecting certain missiles op­erated by the Iraqis presented problems for these aircraft; subsequently, missions flown over Iraq and Kuwait had to be al­tered. The AV-8Bs and F/A-18s were equipped with the AN/ALR-67, an up­graded threat warning system, but anom­alies and ambiguities in the software af­fected system reliability. Once again, missions over enemy territory were mod­ified during Desert Storm operations be­cause of the problems exhibited by the AN/ALR-67.

Comfort. Comfort in the cockpit was

a major issue. Certain articles of flight equipment were described as obsolete, or so uncomfortable to wear that they caused fatigue. The longer individuals flew with some articles of flight equipment, the more their concentration in the cockpit and flying abilities degraded. All com­munities, for example, considered the CWU-62/P antiexposure suit (used for cold-water operations) physically un­comfortable and overly restrictive in tight cockpits, particularly when worn for any length of time. Crews did not use the CWU-62/P during Desert Storm, but Ma­rine Corps air crews, in particular, used it on transatlantic flights ferrying aircraft to Saudi Arabia. Wearing the CWU-62/P on missions longer than six hours caused difficulties.

Air Force flight helmets and anti-G suits were preferred over U.S. Navy flight equipment by many Navy aircrews be­cause they were lighter, more durable, and gave better performance.

Ejection-seat comfort was also ad­dressed. Even though this issue was clas­sified as minor, more than 50% of the in­terviews revealed that discomfort began after 2 1/2 to 3 hours, regardless of air­craft type.

Recorded information. The ability to record mission information from aircraft sensors and displays was another dis­couraging topic. Comments concerning the overall quality and reliability of air­craft video recorders ranged from terri­ble to acceptable. All communities com­plained that run-time on recording tapes was too limited, often curtailing their abil­ity to gain as much information as pos­sible after flying a mission.

Crews flying the A-6E described mis­sion display recorders as archaic. The A- 6E video recorder uses reel-to-reel tapes instead of a cassette cartridge; the tape has poor contrast and often breaks; and the overall system reliability is poor.

Marine Corps AV-8B pilots, also crit­ical of recorder reliability and tape qual­ity, were particularly sensitive to the in­compatibility of their system and that of the F/A-18; as a result, they could not play back each other’s mission tapes. They complained bitterly about the in­compatibility. Marine Corps AV-8Bs were not equipped with aircraft radar dur­ing Desert Storm operations, and, there­fore, were prohibited from flying air-to- ground support missions without Marine F/A-18s as escorts. Exchange of recorded combat information between squadrons after coordinated operations turned out to be tedious and time-consuming.

U.S. Navy F-14A squadrons had no recording capability connected with their AWG-9 radar, which is a very powerful and effective radar system. Radar Inter­cept Officers (RIOs) flying in the F-14A were discouraged over their inability to capture and review tactical information displayed on radar scopes after complet­ing combat operations.

Navigation systems. Aircrews com­plained that Navy and Marine aircraft lacking very-high-frequency (VHF) radio and Instrument Landing System (ILS) ca­pability—VHF and ILS hardware can be found in the majority of aircraft owned by the U.S. Air Force, and the equipment is heavily used throughout the United States, Europe, and the Middle East for navigation, communications, and preci­sion approaches. Air crews also said that they wanted the global positioning sys­tem (GPS) as a means of upgrading nav­igation capabilities.

U.S. NAVY

Air crews considered the CWU-62/P antiexposure suit overly restrictive when flying typical missions; long- duration ferry flights were cited as particularly fatiguing.

A-6E and F-14A air crews said their inertial navigation systems (INS) were unreliable and highly susceptible to drift. F-14A aircrews said their INS drifted anywhere from five to ten miles per hour while flying straight and level; if they en­gaged in high-G maneuvering flight, the drift increased to between 20 and 25 miles per hour. Some F-14A aircrews fly­ing missions over Iraq and Kuwait used Iranian tactical air navigation stations, which were up and running during Desert Storm, as a better means of navigation.

Computers. In general, all squadrons interviewed wanted faster computers with more memory. Memory capacity for flight computers in the F-14A and cer­tain versions of the A-6E is appallingly small—64,000 bytes, to be exact. The analog equipment is outmoded. Older computers with limited amounts of stor­age degraded mission accuracy during Desert Storm. The amount of time it took for such equipment to process data, com­bined with poor equipment reliability, garnered a multitude of complaints. A- 6E aircrews seemed to be most affected- A-6E crewmen said their computers often were unreliable, too slow, and some­times failed in flight.

The AV-8B and F/A-18 aircraft were equipped with better computers, with larger memory capacities and digital busses; such equipment had excellent re­liability. The only air crew comment was a desire to expand computer memory capacity to accommodate better naviga­tion and weapon systems.

Reality Takes Center Stage. One of the most interesting facts concerning cockpit ergonomics came from an F-14A pilot who had flown in the back seat of an Air Force F-15E Strike Eagle. His reaction to the overall sophistication and technol­ogy of the F-15E, which was used for air- to-air and air-to-ground missions during Desert Storm, was undiluted awe. The ease of pilot workload, advanced weapon systems, high-technology computers, sen­sors and radar, threat warning and as­sessment gear, and sophisticated layout of controls and displays—when compared with his F-14A—left him feeling that his aircraft was bordering on antiquity.

Exchange programs also exist between Navy and Marine F/A-18 squadrons and Air Force F-16 squadrons. These aircraft were designed and manufactured around the same time frame. The differences be^­tween F-16 and F/A-18 crew station er­gonomics and the sophistication of the avionics systems do not vary much. Many F/A-18 pilots, however, thought the F- 16’s one-piece canopy and the excellent cockpit field of vision was superior to that of the F/A-18, with its two-piece canopy and a structural cross-member ini' peding vision.

Vision aft also is a problem in the F/A-18. Pilots in every Marine Corps and Navy F/A-18 squadron complained about the visual obstruction created by the ejeC' tion seat. Many pilots said that their field' of-view between the 5 and 7 o’clock p⁰' sition, was obstructed by the width of the parachute head box.

But will we fight the next war with new or improved aircraft? Programs to improve and upgrade the Navy’s tacti' cal air capability have fallen by the way' side in recent years. Cancellation of th^e

A-12 and the start of the AX program have done nothing but prolong the pro­jected time the Navy must live with its A-6Es. Upgrading the F-14A to the F- 14D configuration, giving it better avion­ics along with improved controls and dis­plays (not to mention better engines), has been limited to buying 37 new aircraft and remanufacturing another 18. Only 55 F-14Ds are scheduled to reach the fleet. Few improvements are on the horizon for the Marine AV-8B Harrier II. Only a handful of new, night-attack AV-8Bs are being bought, although some aircraft are to be fitted with radar. Finally, de­velopment of a new and more potent F/A-18E/F fighter-attack aircraft has just begun.

Conclusions. The intent of these find­ings is not to criticize four Navy attack and fighter aircraft because of their short­comings. Instead, it is to proffer the find­ings of a survey, and address problems brought out by aircrews flying missions in Desert Storm. The Advanced Tech­nology Crew Station (ATCS) fleet sur­vey has revealed crew/machine inter­face problems existing in current aircraft. Unfortunately, the problems go far be­yond ergonomics.

Today, the U.S. Navy depends on equipment that has aged appreciably and the Marine Corps will be in the same sit- nation at some point in the future. If the Problems are not corrected, the next con­flict may see the same Navy and Marine aircraft pitted against even newer and , niore contemporary equipment. Modifi­cations and short-term improvements on existing fighter and attack crew stations "ill allow the Navy and Marines to main­tain the high level of readiness experi­enced over past decades. Modifications and short-term improvements will also buy the fleet time, while new and ad­vanced aircraft are developed.

Recommendations. The Navy should start upgrading existing equipment wher­ever it can be done. Aside from the F/A- 18, which has an excellent crew station layout, rearranging controls and displays inside other existing airframes, in order to alleviate aircrew workload and en­hance ergonomics, would require major airframe changes, take too long, and be too costly. Sad to say, aircrews today will have to live with the problems created by current layouts of controls and dis­plays while new aircraft are being developed.

Upgrading systems with new or off- the-shelf equipment and participating in research-and-development programs with other services is achievable. The U.S. Air Force currently uses very effective radar threat assessment equipment in its fighter-attack aircraft, and the Navy and Marine Corps could benefit from shared technology. Programs to improve over­all aircrew comfort, such as new and lighter-weight helmets, ejection-seat cushion development, and better aircraft restraint systems under the survival tech­nology restraint improvement program are being funded by the Naval Air Sys­tems Command, and developed by the Naval Air Warfare Center. More joint programs between the Air Force and the Navy are needed.

A joint program to improve canopy durability should also be considered; the U.S. Air Force experienced the same problems with abrasion as the Marines and Navy.

Updating video recorders, making all machines generic in the fleet, and tap­ing all mission-related displays and screens (in both crew stations on multi­crew aircraft) must be done not only for training purposes but also for an overall combat effectiveness. Here, we know the technology definitely exists.

The technology for improving com­puters, expanding memory capacity, and replacing analog equipment with digital systems certainly exists. Finally, upgrad­ing and improving aircraft navigation sys­tems is not only feasible, but imperative. GPS equipment is an absolute require­ment because of its accuracy and low cost. Integrated into other systems—such as aircraft radar, weapons computers, and forward looking infrared (FLIR)—GPS would not only enhance aircrew situation awareness, but also would prove invalu­able as a backup for aircraft inertial- navigation systems.

The problems elicited from air crews who flew Desert Storm missions should be viewed as a warning whose time has come. If the warning is taken seriously, acted upon expeditiously, and the prob­lems corrected, then the Navy and Ma­rine Corps will continue to maintain air posture that meets our nation’s needs.

Commander Kinker works on the Advanced Tech­nology Crew Station Program at the Naval Air War­fare Center, Warminster, Pennsylvania. A naval avi­ator, he has flown airborne mine countermeasures, logistics, and antisubmarine warfare aircraft. He has worked primarily in the areas of testing and eval­uation of U.S. Navy escape seating systems.

I

Amphibious Battle Groups

By Captain Carlton W. Meyer, U.S. Marine Corps Reserve

The naval services are facing their greatest doctrinal challenges since 'Vorld War II. For several decades, the U.S. Navy has focused on sea control ^and strategic strikes, while the U.S. Ma­rine Corps focused on land-based war­fare. The end of the Cold War now re­quires a shift toward rapid intervention ^ln an unpredictable world. Many unre­solved issues about the composition of forward-deployed naval task forces, am­phibious operations, and Navy-Marine Corps compatibility must be addressed. These challenges can be resolved by combining the ships of carrier battle groups (CVBGs) and amphibious groups (FhibGrus) with the Marines and aircraft ^ °f Marine expeditionary brigades to de­ploy amphibious battle groups (ABGs) routinely.

An ABG would consist of an aircraft carrier with a normal complement of es­corts, two V/STOL carriers, six to eight other amphibious ships, a Marine regi­mental landing team, and a Marine air group (MAG) with a mix of about 160 naval aircraft. By rotating deployments among three ABGs, the United States could maintain a powerful naval inter­vention capability, forward-deployed at all times. Whenever a major crisis erupts, an ABG could rendezvous with a CVBG to form a comprehensive naval strike force.

The United States does not have this capability today. Although two to three

CVBGs are routinely forward-deployed, the only deployed amphibious forces are amphibious ready groups, which usually consist of an amphibious assault ship (LHA-LHD-LPH) and two-to-four other amphibious ships. These groups embark the 2,300 Marines and 38 Marine aircraft of a Marine expeditionary unit (MEU). An Atlantic and a Pacific amphibious ready group is always forward-deployed to perform a myriad of special operations, but they lack the combat power to in­timidate or engage anything more than small, lightly equipped forces.

An amphibious task force at least the size of an amphibious group (PhibGru), with more than 10,000 Marines and 100 Marine aircraft embarked, is necessary to

Redesignating conventionally-powered carriers such as the USS Saratoga (CV-60) as Landing Carriers (LCV) would help fill a void in amphibious shipping.

intervene forcefully in most regions. Un­fortunately, the naval services continue to push the myth that such an amphibi­ous strike force can assemble in a few days. This assertion was tested on 7 Au­gust 1990, when Amphibious Group-2 was alerted to embark the 4th Marine Ex­peditionary Brigade and sail to the Per­sian Gulf. The Group was hastily as­sembled and not entirely underway until 22 August, two weeks later. It arrived off the coast of Oman on 17 September, more than five weeks after it was re­quested. [See “Getting Marines to the Gulf,” by Brigadier General Edwin H. Simmons, USMC (Retired), Proceedings May 1991, pages 50-56.]

Such delays preclude any workup pe­riod, let alone a practice landing—which is particularly important: most active duty Marines and sailors have never par­ticipated in a major amphibious landing against a hostile force. If a rapid-inter­vention force is truly desired, the Pacific amphibious ready group deployments should be expanded to amphibious battle group deployments. Three older conven­tionally powered aircraft carriers (CVs) could be redesignated as landing carriers (LCVs), and the Navy would organize a deployment cycle among three amphibi­ous battle groups—two from the Pacific Fleet and one from the Atlantic Fleet. A CV may substitute as the nucleus for an

ABG if an LCV requires a major over­haul. The Marine Corps would adapt its unit deployment program to Japan to an amphibious rotational deployment cycle among three or four MEBS.

Typical composition of an amphibious battle group:

>■ 1 Landing Carrier (LCV)

• 2 STOVL Carriers (LHA, LHD)
• 1 Ticonderoga (CG-47)-class Aegis cruiser
• 1 Los Angeles (SSN-688)-class nuclear- powered attack submarine
• 4 Destroyers (DD, DDG)
• 4 Frigates (FFG)

>• 6-8 amphibious ships (LPD, LSD, LKA, LST)

• Replenishment oilers (AOE, AOR)
• Maritime prepositioning ships (as required)

The most apparent objection to an am­phibious battle group deployment is that the Navy would never de­vote three aircraft car­riers plus escorts to deploy Marine forces. What skeptics should realize is that unless the Navy validates new missions for its carriers, the Congress will decommission an increasing number of them. The current drawdown requires that the Navy contract to 12 carriers by 1995. This represents only a 14% reduction in force, which is a smaller part of the 25% overall military reduction that was in the works even before the breakup of the So­viet Union.

Congress now en­visions shrinking the military by 40%. Pres­sure to reduce the force to 10 carriers is enormous. The Air Force claims that its strategic bombers can perform the carrier strike role and are far less expensive. The Brookings Insti­tution believes that the nine nuclear car­riers in existence or under construction are adequate. Senator Sam Nunn (D-GA), the powerful chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, has stated that 10 carriers would suffice.

The Navy can relieve this pressure— and fill a void in amphibious shipping— by redesignating three conventionally powered carriers as amphibious ships to

allow the carrier force to shrink to 10 CVBGS. One Carrier Air Wing (CVW) would be disbanded and another trans­ferred to the reserves.

Congress may view the proposal as a ploy to preserve carriers, since the Land­ing Carriers (LCVs) would not be mod­ified. An LCV could hardly be counted as a Navy aircraft carrier, however, since it would not have an air wing. The Wasp (LHD-l)-class amphibious assault ships are nearly as large as CVs, yet no one considers them aircraft carriers. In fact, the first flat-top amphibious ships were older aircraft carriers devoted to the de­ployment of Marine helicopters.

This proposal would satisfy other post­Cold War demands as well. Many in con­gress insist that the Navy rely more on the reserves as part of the total force concept. Historically, the Navy has been unwilling to maintain significant reserve < combat forces, and the 1995 plan for 11 active and 2 reserve CVWs is an exam­ple: reserve carrier aviation will represent just 14% of the total force. Marine avia­tion maintains about 25% in the reserves and the Air Force relies on an even greater percentage. The amphibious bat­tle group plan would result in a mix of nine active and three reserve carrier air wings—a 25% reserve representation.

The plan also would provide reserve CVWs with a specific mission. Currently- reserve carrier air wings are scheduled to operate from shore bases or provide re­placements to active wings. The am­phibious battle group plan would result in three LCVs and three reserve CVWs- This would allow the Navy to reconsti­tute three CVBGs easily if war with a major naval power threatened.

LCVs also would counter criticism about the Navy’s plan to cut amphibi­ous lift 38% by 1995. Three LCVs would offset the early retirement of all seven Iwo Lima (LPH-2)-class amphibious as­sault ships and the uncertain procurement of the larger Wasp (LHD-l)-class arm phibious assault ships.

Routinely deploying substantial nurm bers of Marine aircraft on board aircraft carriers would relieve budgetary pressures on naval aviation. One less carrier ah wing would reduce the requirement fo^f new procurement and permit the remain' ing CVWs to deploy at full strength.

Small detachments of Navy aircraft-" S-3s, E-2Cs, SH-60Fs, and KA-6DS-" would be attached to each seagoing Mm rine aircraft group to enhance its sea control capability. These detachments would be active duty components of th® reserve CVWS.

The Marine aviation component of th^e amphibious battle groups would vary

With the missions. (See Table 1 for a pro­posed mix designed around one CV, and two big-deck amphibious assault ships (LHD-LHA).

Navy helicopter countermeasures squadrons could deploy with the am­phibious battle groups. Otherwise, Ma­rine CH-53Es should become multipur­pose MH-53Es and accept a secondary role of minesweeping—an inevitable con­sequence of the Gulf War. Many Marines dislike the idea of using Marine assets for Navy missions, but it vould be ridiculous for an amphibious operation to be delayed for lack of helicopter minesweepers while Marine CH-53Es sit idle on the deck. These are but a few compatibility issues that amphibious battle group deployments Would highlight.

Some may be tempted to criticize the long-range, sea control capabilities of am­phibious battle groups when compared With carrier battle groups. The amphibi­ous battle groups are not designed for sea control, though. If the sudden need for high seas warfare appeared, the ABG could detach its amphibious ships to im­prove mobility and reduce vulnerability. To keep things in perspective, no other nation in the world deploys a naval task force more capable than an ABG. In view of likely conflicts, few would argue that two CVBGs could provide a more capa­ble intervention force than one CVBG and one ABG.

Best of all, an amphibious battle group would need to be under way less than three months of a six-month deployment unless a crisis warrants otherwise. A typ­ical deployment might involve a four- week stop in Hawaii, six weeks in South Korea, and a six-week visit to Kuwait. Marines would normally train ashore and the aircraft might operate from land bases. Ships would conduct normal in­port training routine. Such deployments would save millions in fuel and mainte­nance costs and make deployments far more interesting for Marines and Sailors.

Lift limitations would require the Ma­rine Corps to tailor its forces carefully to support an amphibious battle group. One consideration is to reduce the doctrinal standard of 30 days of supply to 10 days. This would be possible because a Mar­itime Prepositioning Ship (MPS) squadron with 30 days of supply could link up with any given amphibious bat­tle group within 10 days.

The need for a large, forward-deployed amphibious task force is more important in the aftermath of the Persian Gulf vic­

Big-deck amphibious assault ships like the USS Wasp (LHD-1), backed by the Navy’s unequalled seagoing logistic-support setup, are key assets in the conduct of littoral warfare.

tory. While the U.S. military reviews its own lessons learned, it must also recog­nize the key lesson learned by potential opponents: Attack immediately, while U.S. forces are weak.

An amphibious battle group supported by a carrier battle group would face a dif­ficult challenge against a large land army, but it would provide a far more power­ful force than U.S. paratroopers or a Ma­rine expeditionary unit of 2,300 Marines and sailors.

The ABG would become a key ele­ment in the unstable Middle East. Arab governments continue to deny the United States military bases. Attempts to prepo­sition equipment and supplies have also encountered opposition. Not surprisingly, Kuwait welcomes a U.S. military pres­ence. Its own instability and its location near Iraq and Iran make it a poor site for a U.S. base. The small island nation of Bahrain has agreed to allow prepositioned

Table 1: Proposed ABG/MAG 161 AircraftTypical LCV, LHD, LHA Mix

USMC              No. Mission

stocks, but it is also a poor substitute— the entire nation is linked to the Ara­bian Peninsula by a single causeway that could be easily severed.

The hidden value of ABG deployments

is that their establishment would force the Navy and the Marine Corps to resolve long-standing doc­trinal problems regarding am­phibious and coastal operations. Many technological advances have increased the threat to the landing force in the years since the last major amphibious landing at In­chon during the Korean War. The intervention requirement would en­sure that mine warfare could not be ignored. The integration of Ma­rine aviation would proceed. The Navy’s Composite Warfare Com­mander concept (CWC) has yet to be merged with amphibious war­fare doctrine. Articles in Naval pro­fessional journals frequently ad­dress these topics, yet little has been accomplished. More amphib- CWC training would increase real combat readiness.

Amphibious battle groups would pro­vide the Marine Corps with a sea-based deployment platform to react worldwide. There would be no need to maintain

Marines at Japanese land bases; the bases could be abandoned, with savings in dol­lars and personnel. If the United States wishes to maintain land-based forces in Japan, it should assign the task to the Army. Otherwise, the bases could pro­vide the Navy and the Air Force with fa­cilities to compensate for the loss of bases in the Philippines.

Congress has criticized the naval ser­vices for their inability to propose a plan to organize a comprehensive worldwide reaction force. Deploying large sea-based Marine forces and using Marine aviation on board aircraft carriers is the innova­tive answer. Once amphibious battle group deployments are accepted, they would soon be recognized as the na­tion’s key element in ensuring stability throughout the world in this post-Cold War era.

Captain Meyer is an engineer officer in the Individ­ual Ready Reserve. His background includes am­phibious landings with the 35th MEU, and the 4th and 9th MEBs. He manages a dental company in the San Francisco Bay area.

Shoes

Alone and Unafraid with the Brown

Lieutenant (junior grade) Stephen Cox, U.S. Naval Reserve

The fleet squadron aviation intelligence officer (AI) is a rare species. Found alone or in pairs, he is often the youngest, most junior member of the wardroom, and as a non-aviator, is also usually the ob-

ject of a steady stream of ready-room humor. If he is to adapt to the squadron environment, he must learn a new lan­guage, using terms such as ‘ roger and “check your six,” and hand signals such as the two-finger “let’s go” wave.

The intelligence officer is often cam­ouflaged in a flight jacket (complete with patches), brown shoes, and aviator sun­glasses—and can usually travel virtually unnoticed among aviators, thereby eas­ing the transition into squadron life. Once assimilated, the AI becomes resident ex­pert in matters of security and foreign weaponry, and has a call sign bestowed upon him (such as Lumpy or Pinhead— nothing as grand as Maverick ... or Ice­man). His acceptance in the ready room is complete when he proves that he can maintain a radar lock while pulling 4Gs without losing his breakfast.

Intelligence officers occupy a unique position within the naval aviation com­munity. Not really a black shoe and not quite an aviator, the AI routinely per­forms a balancing act on the fence sepa­rating the warfare specialties, taking all­source intelligence products and adapting them for squadron consumption. In ef­fect, the intelligence officer serves as a link between the intelligence community and the squadron.

The squadron spy is responsible for the collection and dissemination of in­telligence, maintenance and secure stowage of classified materials, training aircrews in foreign-platform recognition and weapon capabilities, and for ensur­ing compliance with the intelligence over­sight act. Essentially, he controls a minia­ture empire of safes, classified material, and secure telephones. One of his most rewarding duties is the contribution of analysis to decision making, which gives direct access to the commanding officer and exec in matters concerning sensitive intelligence. Consequently, the spy is often alone in a highly classified little world.

On board the carrier, intelligence of­ficers are part of the ship’s intelligence center team, but ashore they are on their own. This may lead to professional iso­lation, which creates difficulties in stay­ing current with intelligence develop­ments, and affects the accuracy and timeliness of the intelligence product given to the operator. The only 1630 des­ignator in a world of 1310s and 1325s— pilots and radar intercept officers—the AI is responsible for developing effective self-study plans and seeking follow-on training.

Though the intelligence officer con­tributes to ready-room training, much of what is discussed (weapons and emer­gency procedures) is inherently of little professional interest, and he may choose to concentrate instead on intelligence readings. The obvious solution to com­bating isolation (simplified) is to main­tain contact with other intelligence offi­cers, and to obtain well-rounded (as opposed to squadron-specific) training, which will make him valuable to his command as well as to the carrier intel­ligence center team.

Fleet squadrons challenge intelligence officers in many ways. The challenges are balanced, however, by the opportu­nities to work with some of the most col­orful personalities in the naval service, to fly, and to gain tremendous levels of responsibility and trust. These challenges and opportunities make the carrier-based squadron the most rewarding billet pos­sible for the first-tour intelligence offi­cer who can face the task alone and unafraid.

Lieutenant (junior grade) Cox is the air intelligence officer with Fighter Squadron (VF)-51 in Carrier Air Wing 15, assigned to the USS Kitty Hawk (CV-63).

Port Canaveral Coast Guard Station

Protecting the space shuttle is a big job, but the Coast Guard at Port Canaveral does it in stride.

If a terrorist were to strike at the United States, he Would want a target that Would put on the best dis­play. An airship with 500,000 gallons of liquid hy­drogen and 100,000 gallons of liquid oxygen bolted to the bottom of a $9 billion space­craft would make an appeal­ing target—especially when tens of millions of people around the world watch every time it launches.

When the space shuttle flies, it’s the job of the Port Canaveral Coast Guard Sta­tion’s Space Transportation System (STS—the space shuttle) operations to see this doesn’t happen.

On the southern end of one of America’s most highly visible restricted areas °n central Florida’s Atlantic coast, is an unpretentious and immaculate U.S. Coast Guard facility. The Port Canaveral Coast Guard Sta­tion supports operations car­ried on by its neighbors—

NASA’s Kennedy Space Center and the Cape Canaveral Air Force Station.

These latter two facilities are two of only three rocket launch platforms located in the United States. The Port Canaveral Coast Guard Station STS operations acts as the first line of defense and security for both of these operations.

Chief Warrant Officer Joseph Kilista, the station’s commanding officer, has a big job: his crews must respond quickly to search-and-rescue calls while simulta­neously maintaining flawless STS oper­ations.

Chief Warrant Officer Lee LePrell, who coordinates STS operations, is a 40- year Coast Guard veteran. He directs

By Paul D. Q. Campbell

the perimeter security oper­ations for NASA and the adjacent Air Force Station during rocket launches of all types. His Coast Guards­men protect what consti­tutes the majority of our space operations.

Protecting the space op­erations can range from keeping overzealous ob­servers at a safe distance during a launch to dealing with the threat of a terror­ist attack. To date, there have been no breaches of the security perimeter—in itself, a tribute to the effectiveness of this operation.

Forward presence is the main thrust during a shuttle launch. While there are only two full-time staff members concerned with space shut­tle operations, they don’t do it alone. During a launch, 32 additional reservists are called to temporary active duty. Yeoman Cynthia Barninger prepares the or­ders to call up the necessary reservists, processes their arrival and departure and ensures that they are paid. The STS operations at Port Canaveral serve as an operational training ground for Coast Guard re­servists. Reservists come from diverse backgrounds: law enforcement, firefight­ing, customs agents, emergency medical technicians, real estate. Augmentation for space shuttle operations is not limited to local reservists; requests for this duty come from all over the United States, and as far away as Hawaii.

At any given time, approximately 120 people appear on the list of applicants for this coveted assignment. Most have to be turned away because there are only 32 slots and many of those must be filled by personnel with previous space shuttle op­erations experience. An attempt is made to bring new people into the operation on every mission, but the supply of quali­fied candidates always outstrips the demand.

I was with the crew for the STS-45 shuttle launch of Atlantis. Delayed by a day because of mechanical difficulties with the space shuttle, the Atlantis lifted off at 0813 on 24 March 1992. By then, the Coast Guardsmen from Port Canaveral already had four days invested in the full-scale security operations, be­ginning with briefings and culminating with the perimeter security patrol on the morning of the launch.

The actual area restricted during a shuttle launch is several dozen square miles, including offshore waters out to approximately three-and-a-half miles.

The perimeter patrol for a shuttle operation begins nearly 24 hours prior to the anticipated launch time. In the case of STS-45, the delay turned it into 48 hours. On Sunday 22 March, the day before the scheduled launch, mo­bile Coast Guard units set up a com­mand post at the north end of the perimeter zone. Ten Coast Guardsmen patrolled the waterway from Mosquito Lagoon through Haulover Canal and into the Indian River.

While counterterrorism may seem like a questionable measure for an operation as visible as the space-shuttle program, it is more important than crowd control. With the shuttle program now in its eleventh year, spectators at sea have di­minished. With the lessened threat of a confrontation with former Soviet Union forces has come an increase in concern for terrorism. What the Coast Guard calls special interest vessels, such as Russian trawlers with high-gain antennae, do not show up for launches as frequently as in the past, but apprehensions about a ter­rorist attack by a nation like Libya or Iraq remain high, both inside and outside the military.

Costs are a constant concern for the Coast Guard as the budget shrinks. The mobile command post used for the Haulover Canal end of an STS operation consists of two motor homes rented from a private concern for the duration of the operation. Permanent facilities can hardly be justified when they are used two or three days every two months.

This is apparently also the reasoning behind using only two active-duty per­sonnel on the STS operations. Calling in the necessary reservists only for the ac­tual launch operations keeps the costs to a minimum and does not hinder the quality of the operation. Yet space launches will predictably become more frequent. A part-time team may not fill the bill. The U.S. Coast Guard and NASA must reevaluate the strain these additional flights will place upon the system.

As our vessel returned from monitor­ing the shuttle launch, we encountered a freighter from Copenhagen discharging a bright orange substance into the chan­nel. We stopped en route home to in­vestigate. It turned out to be large quan­tities of rust from the freighter’s bilges.

The point remains that as a training exercise for some on board, it was a real- life situation to deal with, and the skip­per went straight in without hesitation. There is simply no substitute for. hands- on operational training—and this program is one of the best.

Mr. Campbell is a free-lance photo journalist in Ti­tusville, Florida, with a background in engineering in the aerospace industry.

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