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Smith, frequently the butt of Rupertus’s abuse. (Of the several Marine General Smiths, Oliver P. is the one who commanded this same 1st Marine Division in Korea during the critical days of November and December 1950.)
For five weeks beginning 15 September, the Marines fought across the
Inset: Generals W. H. Rupertus (right) and O. P. Smith set up a temporary command post in a Japanese tank trap, as 1st Division Marines advance slowly through intense mortar, artillery, and small-arms fire on Peleliu.
beaches and up the Umurbrogol cliffs; Lewis Puller led the 1 st Marines, Harold Harris the 5th Marines, and Herman Han- neken the 7th. In portraying the fierce ground combat, the author’s use of a long roster of personal experiences shows his diligence in collecting data, but the vignettes often overwhelm the battle narrative of which units did what, where, and when. A greater flaw, and it is a major one, is that the few, small tactical maps inadequately support the combat narrative. The picture section, however, is superior. Several are the standard shots that accompany all Peleliu accounts, but
Peleliu: Tragic Triumph (The Untold Story of the Pacific War’s Forgotten Battle)
Bill D. Ross. New York: Random House, 1991. 367 pp. Bib. Illus. Ind. Maps. Photos. $21.50 ($19.35).
Reviewed by Rolfe L. Hillman III
A journalist with World War II combat correspondent experience, Bill D. Ross has followed his well-received Iwo Jima: Legacy of Valor (Vanguard Press, 1985) With this narration of the Marine Corps’s °rdeal on Peleliu, Palau, in September and October 1944.
It is easy reading, a popular history unburdened with, and consequently unsupported by, documentation. The “tragic triumph” of the title reflects that the invasion of the Palaus—
Planned to protect the eastern flank of General Douglas Mac Arthur’s invasion of the Philippines—proved unnecessary and, as Ross puts it,
‘served no offensive purpose 'ti the defeat of Japan.”
The subtitle regarding the untold story” is inaccurate.
This is not, as the publisher states in the jacket notes, the first time this battle has been brought to light.” Frank O.
Ilough wrote The Assault on Peleliu in 1950 (U.S. Marine Corps monograph No. 7);
Stanley Falk Bloodiest Victory, The Palaus (Ballantine Books, 1974); Harry A. Gailey Peleliu 1944 (The Nautical & Aviation Publishing Company of America, 1983); and E. B. Sledge With the Old Breed (Presidio Press, 1981). Nevertheless, Ross makes a useful contribution With his detailed and revealing account °f the deficiencies in interservice planning and battlefield command and control before and during the invasion.
In particular, we now have a comprehensive explanation of the actions of the commander of the 1st Marine Division, Major General William H. Rupertus, Which Ross summarizes as “start-to-fin- lsh eccentric behavior.” Consequently, there is a highly favorable view of the staff and leadership role of the quiet, highly competent assistant division commander Brigadier General Oliver P.
additional new ones evoke the reality of what the Marines endured. The photographs are supplemented by artist Donald L. Dickson’s small sketches of Marines in combat.
Ross carries the 1st Marine Division from the beginning of the war through Guadalcanal, New Britain, and training on miserable Pavuvu; the Peleliu invasion finally appears on page 133. This is a Marine division’s story, and the role of the Army’s 81st Division during the Peleliu invasion, secondary but ably accomplished, is mentioned only briefly.
The 1st Marine Division fought a heroic battle on Peleliu that cost them dearly: 1,121 killed, 5,142 wounded, and 73 missing. Ross concludes, as have others before him, that it wasn’t necessary. It was a “tragic triumph” indeed.
Mr. Hillman served in 1975 and 1976 as a Peace Corps volunteer on Peleliu. His article “Grim Peleliu: The Aircraft” was published in the Spring 1989 issue of Naval History.
Rules of Engagement
Joe Weber. Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1991. Gloss. 399 pp. $19.95 ($17.95).
Reviewed by Senator John McCain
The Vietnam War taught U.S. policymakers one primary lesson: Once committed to battle, our men and women in uniform must be given a coherent strategy that has as its goal military victory. Committing our nation to war without heeding this lesson is an unconscionable disservice to those who serve in time of war.
In this era of all-volunteer armed forces, fewer and fewer citizens experience war firsthand. To them the lessons of Vietnam are often theoretical and tenuous. Joe Weber—jet pilot and Vietnam veteran, known for his Presidio Press best-sellers DEFCON One (1989) and Shadow Flight (1990)—does an ad-
Valley of Decision: The Siege of Khe Sanh
John Prados and Ray W. Stubbe. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1991. 551 pp. Bib. Ind. Maps. Notes. Photos. $29.45 ($26.50).
Reviewed by Colonel William H. Dabney, U.S. Marine Corps (Retired)
Valley of Decision is a thoughtful, well-researched account of the series of battles that culminated with the siege at Khe Sanh. The work is a vast improvement over previous statistical, psychohistorical, and “sea story” treatments of the subject. It stands alone as a dispassionate description of a flawed strategy in the microcosm of one of its major battles.
The authors properly ascribe the concept of the Khe Sanh campaign to General William Westmoreland, who chose the battlefield and was then forced to defend his choice against armchair strategists in Washington and the press
Chaplain Ray Stubbe leads Marines defending Khe Sanh in prayer on 26 January 1968.
mirable job of evoking in such readers a visceral understanding of the restrictions that precluded victory in Vietnam.
Even readers completely unfamiliar with naval aviation will sympathize with Lieutenant Brad Austin’s infuriated chase after the North Vietnamese ace who downed his shipmates’ Phantom. Austin’s predicament was shared by all aviators in the Vietnam War. In order to do the right thing militarily—that is, to down the enemy, thus avenging a friend’s death— Austin had to break the rules of engagement (the chain of command’s directions and limits on how an officer should fight).
The Johnson administration’s rules of engagement made the job aviators had to do in Vietnam unnecessarily dangerous.
I am convinced that had the war been prosecuted in a decisive manner, and had the military been given a freer hand to direct the war, many American lives would have been saved and the prospects for victory enhanced. Although rules of engagement and victory should never be at odds, decisions on board an aircraft carrier in the Tonkin Gulf were a constant life-and-death struggle with the rules of engagement.
Naval aviators will pore through Weber’s book riveted by the action and reminiscing on their own service. They will find the description of the various weapons and procedures fascinating. The drama will be heightened by an aviator s ability to visualize fully what is happening in the combat scenes. In the process, Weber’s political points will hit close to home, and they will strengthen the resolve of many, such as myself, who are determined never to allow the mistakes of Vietnam to be repeated.
The average uninitiated reader may find Rules of Engagement a bit difficult to follow. Because Weber so convincingly conveys the tragedy of Vietnam on a personal level, however, it is must reading for those who were not there. It is as close as you can get.
It is my hope that the success of our forces in the Persian Gulf War has driven home the lessons of Vietnam. Those lessons cannot be repeated enough, and Weber’s novel is a valuable effort in teaching them. In this respect, it is itself a great success.
The Honorable Senator McCain (R-AZ) is a member of the Committee on Armed Services. In 1967 his A-4 Skyhawk was shot down in Vietnam, and he was held as a prisoner of war for five years. He retired from the U.S. Navy as a captain in 1981. His review of Going Downtown: The War Against Hanoi and Washington (Orion Books, 1988) appeared in the September 1988 issue of Proceedings.
:orps. West moreland argued that Khe Sanh could serve first as a killing zone distant from the populated coastal plain, should the North Vietnamese Army (NVA) choose to attack it, and thence as a springboard for an offensive he envisioned into Laos to cut the Ho Chi Minh trail. The offensive, Lam Son 719, was eventually launched in the spring of 1971 by Westmoreland’s successor and former deputy, General Creighton Abrahms. That the results of that offensive were catastrophic for the South Vietnamese is germane to the history of Khe Sanh and to Westmoreland’s justification for seeking battle there. The book would have been more complete if the offensive had been discussed in some detail, even in an epilogue.
The setting—an almost idyllic remote plateau in the Annamite Range—and its gentle, simple people, the Bru, are beautifully captured in the opening chapters. Eauallv well described is their virtual an-
nihilation as the result of events they neither controlled nor understood. Their destruction flowed from their irrelevance, and the account of it is moving.
Prados and Stubbe then discuss, in ' almost exhaustive detail, the plethora of advisory and clandestine U.S. Army and CIA units operating on the plateau. The reader must extrapolate from the material to grasp the absurdity of the presence of these units during the siege.
It was a collection of disparate and uncoordinated entities based at Lang Vei, numbering fewer than 50 Americans in the aggregate, without a common commander or defensive plan, and independent of the overall tactical commander at Khe Sanh, Colonel David Lownds. This force (for want of a better word) was left six miles from the defensive perimeter | directly athwart the most likely avenue , of approach for a multidivision North | Vietnamese attack. The folly of its position was testament both to interservice rivalry and to the unrealistic expectations ■
the U.S' Army had about the effectiveness of Special Forces and simile units in general.
As is often the case, at Khe Sanh these units served little purpose other than to inhibit interdicting fires along the main NVA corridor of advance. Once the battle was joined, they were as irrelevant as the Bru and, inevitably, they suffered the same fate. Prados and Stubbe do not take issue with Lownds’s decision not to attempt an overland relief. Casualties in the relieving force would likely have fnt exceeded the numbers in the force to be relieved. The failure to question the ex-
portrait of Colonel Benedict Arnold, as commander of the provincial troops sent against the British stronghold in Quebec the year before.
istence of the force at Lang Vei could be construed as a lapse of analysis did the facts not speak so starkly for themselves.
The overall plan for defense of the base during the siege is as well documented as is possible, considering that the plan evolved as forces were made available more than having been designed coherently in advance. The performance of the defending units is well described to the extent that they were called upon to perform. Given the massive firepower available and the esprit of the individual Marines, the final outcome was certain, even had there been an assault, and the authors capture that certainty. The prevailing view in the trenches during the siege was that any uncertainty about the outcome existed more as a creation of the Press than in the minds of the defenders. This account suggests that the Commander-in-Chief took counsel of the former, and that his consequent attempts to manage the battle from the White House Situation Room were less help than hindrance.
Chaplain Ray Stubbe was a participant in the siege; John Prados is a historian. Their collaboration has produced a balanced, accurate, and eminently readable history of a long-running battle that in its conduct, no less than in its outcome, typifies the frustrations of the Vietnam War. The authors’ use of those North Vietnamese sources that are presently available, and their careful research and reasoned analysis, lift the book from the Plane of a good story to an excellent history. It is unlikely to be surpassed unless and until there is unrestricted access to Hanoi's archives.
The contiguity of North Vietnam and China led the United States to flail at the hornets instead of destroying the nest. This is a first-rate account of the battle lhat epitomizes that dilemma.
Colonel Dabney commanded India Company, 3/26. during the siege of Khe Sanh, he was Officer-inCharge of the regimental outpost on Hill 8S1 South.
Benedict Arnold: Patriot and Traitor
Dillard Sterne Randall. New York: William Morrow, 1991. 667 pp. Bib. lllus. Ind.
Maps. Notes. $27.95 ($25.15) hardcover; Ms.00 ($13.50) paper.
Reviewed by Commander Michael Ellis, *°yal Navy (Retired)
If Benedict Arnold had died at Saratoga in October 1777, where he was Severely wounded leading the decisive at- hick on Burgoyne’s center, he would have
joined that band of heroes who achieved their apotheosis dying as they won a battle. He may have become as legendary a figure as Major General James Wolfe or Vice Admiral Horatio Nelson.
The parallel with Nelson is not fanciful. In the first 18 months of the American Revolution, Arnold had shown himself to be innovative in tactics, capable of wide strategic thinking, a successful admiral, personally brave, and adored by the men he led. He also had many enemies in the establishment, and his life was touched by scandal: he was suspected of financial fraud.
Indeed, Arnold’s intervention at Saratoga, in direct disobedience of his commander, Major General Horatio Gates, is similar to Nelson’s famous act of placing his telescope to his blind eye to disobey his superior’s orders to disengage before Copenhagen.
Arnold is not a legendary hero, however, and judging by a straw poll I have conducted among British and American friends, you would be unusual if you did not consider his name a byword for treachery.
This excellent history,
Benedict Arnold: Patriot and Traitor, may make you reconsider that view. Author Willard Randall makes few judgments; he has carefully researched facts from such sources as newly discovered Canadian archives of captured American documents, and he weaves them into a highly readable tale that is full of exciting detail about Arnold’s enterprises before, during, and after the Revolutionary War. The story also illuminates the war itself: both sides showed frequent examples of amazing incompetence and bureaucratic restriction. Finally, readers are left to decide for themselves why Arnold, judged by Washington to be his finest field commander, chose to change sides at such a critical point in the war.
Benedict Arnold was typical of those Americans who were ripe for revolution in the 1770s. Born of puritan New England stock (later becoming a successful
businessman, shipmaster, and smuggler), Arnold as a youth assisted the British regulars in the French and Indian Wars of 1754-63, and he was an early member of the Sons of Liberty, formed to resist British taxation policy. He was full of the energetic, fresh approach of those colonists who were ready to exploit a continent of boundless resouces and an ocean of burgeoning sea trade.
As soon as the Revolution broke out, Arnold proposed, planned, and executed (despite interference by Ethan Allen) a raid on Fort Ticonderoga in May 1775. This provided the cannon sorely needed to break the stalemate of the siege of Boston. This action was the start of a career of military, naval, and combined operations brilliance. Arnold’s next enterprise was to lead an expedition up the Kennebec River in the fall of 1775 to mount an attack on Quebec, Britain’s most important fortress in North America. This expedition was a new form of mobile warfare, combining naval and military elements into rapid movement over terrain previously considered impassable. It can be said to foreshadow 20th-century air mobile and special force operations.
Randall’s description is fully worthy of the epic struggles of Arnold and his men (and two women, incredibly) to complete the operation. Its aim of surprise was compromised, but the force joined up with an army led by Brigadier General Richard Montgomery who had advanced from Ticonderoga through Montreal to lay siege to Quebec. In an assault on Quebec on 31 December 1775, Montgomery was killed, Arnold wounded, and the Americans thrown back. Winter, lack of supplies and reinforcements, smallpox, and the buildup of British forces in the spring forced a retreat from Canada in 1776, bringing Arnold back to Ticonderoga and Lake Champlain.
Today, Lake Champlain—bordering
upstate New York, Vermont, and Quebec, a region crisscrossed by highways, railroads, and air corridors—seems a literal backwater, but in the 18th century this long, broad lake pointing south to New York City in a trackless wilderness was of highly strategic importance. The significance of sea control of Champlain was in that theater as important as control of the Mediterranean in the Napoleonic Wars or the North Atlantic in the World Wars. Arnold realized this and began a shipbuilding program to establish a fleet on the lake.
The British responded with a similar program at the north end of the lake. But, whereas they could disassemble and transport ships up the Richelieu River, using experienced shipwrights and seamen from the fleet, Arnold had to build from scratch using the variable skills of such men as Congress and state authorities sent him. The naval arms race ended in October 1776 at the Battle of Valcour Bay. Although both sides claimed a victory, it signaled the end of American control of the lake. Nevertheless, Arnold’s shipbuilding and fleet-in-being had delayed the British counteroffensive against the Revolutionaries for another year. This establishes Arnold as one of the founders of the U.S. Navy.
In May 1778 Washington offered, and
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Arnold cheerfully accepted, the post of Military Governor of Philadelphia. Randall considers this probably the worst mistake either man ever made. It placed Arnold in the center of a political crossfire between competing factions in Congress, the Pennsylvania government, and the Army. Certainly Arnold was unhappy almost from the start of his appointment, and the constant political bickering may well have led him to consider defecting to the British.
At this point the narrative of Benedict Arnold: Patriot and Traitor enters a wholly different phase. Randall superbly describes the dealing between Arnold and the British before his defection, the codes and intermediaries, the offers and counteroffers, the delays and misunderstandings—all of which took place in an atmosphere of intrigue and mistrust. Many Americans at that time had doubts over their loyalties as they realized their Britishness was inevitably slipping away and they sought to back both horses. Even Ethan Allen was negotiating with the British. The final countdown to Arnold boarding the sinisterly named HMS Vulture in the Hudson River in September 1780 is complex and exciting, as Arnold nearly engineers the capture of General George Washington and the Marquis de Lafayette by the British, and Arnold’s British intermediary Andre is captured—to be rapidly tried and executed. This section reads like a thriller by John Le Carre.
Once on the British side, Arnold continued to display his military and naval genius, notably in raids on Richmond, Virginia, and New London, Connecticut, and in advising strongly against General Charles Cornwallis establishing himself at Yorktown. But none of this helped the British in the long run, and with the end of the war, Arnold had to begin a new life in London. Irrepressible, he returned to fight in the West Indies against the French in 1794 and 1795 as the British Commander-in-Chief’s volunteer quartermaster. Arnold died of old age in London in 1801.
I began this review with a historical “What if . . . ?” The book raises this type of question regularly. What if Arnold had been made commander of an American squadron in the West Indies instead of Military Governor of Philadelphia? What if he had accepted Washington’s new offer of field command in July 1780? What if he had been promoted to Major General on the date Washington recommended? What if Congress had paid Arnold any of the money due to him for his service to the Continental Army?
I recommend that you read this book.
It will probably give you a new view of Arnold and make you think about what makes defectors act. In Arnold’s case, the answer probably lies in the “What ifs.”
Commander Ellis retired from the Royal Navy it 1984 after 32 years of service. He now manages the Strategic Communications Group of EDS-Scicon, a computer systems company. His review of Old Friends, New Enemies (Oxford University Press, 1990) appeared in the Spring 1992 issue of Naval History.
The Shield and the Storm
Thomas G. Blake, et al. Point Pleasant, NJ: The Commemorative Group. 519 pp.
Photos. $59.95 for the master edition;
$37.95 for each service edition.
Reviewed by Lieutenant General John H. Cushman, U.S. Army (Retired)
This comprehensive and beautifully il* lustrated memento of the Gulf War is aimed at the half-million U.S. troops who served there, the many people.who got them there, and all of the people who supported them while they were there.
Written in a personal style—that is, telling stories, naming names—and proudly covering the troops’ achievements in all dimensions of the Gulf War effort, it resembles an expensive unit history, wherein each senior commander has written a testimonial. It also presents the war’s political and military background, but too many errors jump right out in the review copy to consider this work an authoritative treatment. (The edition going on sale worldwide is supposed to correct errors such as the charts that call the U.S. Army’s 1st and 3d Armored Divisions the 1st and 3d Artillery Divisions; listing the unified combatant commands as “specified commands” and the specified commands as “unified commands”; and placing the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, in the chain of command to those combatant commands while setting the Secretary of Defense outside that chain of command).
But the photographs and war stories, and the breadth of coverage, are great, tf you can afford it (it comes in service-specific volumes, each with an emblem embossed on its cover, and in a master edition), if you want something to remember the Gulf War by, and if you can accep1 the possibility of errors, this book may be for you.
Lieutenant General Cushman served three Vietnai” tours and has commanded both the 101st Airborne Division and the Army’s Combined Arms Center His review of 11 other Gulf War titles appeared >" the October 1991 issue of Proceedings.
Books of Interest
By Lieutenant Commander Thomas J. Cutler, U.S. Navy (Retired)
America at the Threshold: America’s Space Exploration Initiative
The Synthesis Group. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1991. 215 pp.
Append. Bib. Gloss. Illus. Photos. $1.25 ($1.12) Paper.
With stunning color photographs and other graphic aids supplementing an informative narrative, this book charts the proposed future of the U.S. role in space. Influential arguments for a variety of space-related initiatives are Presented, including the establishment of a permanent human presence on the Moon, the •exploration of Mars, and the utilization of material resources in space.
Desert Storm:Ground War/Sea War/Air War
Nans Halberstadt/Arnold Meisner/Robert F. Dorr. Osceola, Wl: Motorbooks International, 1991. 128 PP- each. Append. Illus. Ind. Photos. $12.95 tS 11,65) each, paper.
These three books are part of Motorbooks International’s “Power Series.” Together they c°ver the main warfare areas of operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm. Each book c°ntains 100 dynamic pictures (both color and monochrome) and an accompanying narrative to bring the war to life.
Dberstadt and Forrestal: A National ^kcurity Partnership, 1909-1949
Jeffrey M. Dorwart. College Station, TX: Texas A * M University Press, 1991. 240 pp. Append.
B‘b. Ind. Notes. $35.00 ($31.50).
lames Forrestal and Ferdinand Eberstadt were Doth graduates of Princeton and wealthy inVestment bankers who came to New Deal Washington in 1940. Both had a great impact 0,1 the national security planning of the United States for nearly a decade: Forrestal as Secratary of the Navy during World War II and, Subsequently, as the nation’s first Secretary °f Defense; Eberstadt as an outside consul- 'ant who played a key role in the design of ’I>e National Security Act of 1947, which re- 0rganized and redefined much of the execute branch of the government. The relation- sItip between these two men and their mfluence on the national security establish- rnent of this nation are explored in this schol- but readable treatise.
Dyes of the Hammer
B°b Mayer. Novato, CA: Lyford Books, 1991.
'3l PP- Gloss. $19.95 ($17.95).
This fast-paced novel offers an exciting look 'nto the world of today’s U.S. Army Special (orces (“Green Berets”) as they do battle with Colombian drug lords. Stephen Coonts (author "I the Naval Institute Press’s Flight of the Intruder) describes this book as “a scorcher of a first novel.”
The F-117A Stealth Fighter
Steve Pace. Blue Ridge Summit, PA: Tab/Aero Books, 1992. 80 pp. Append. Bib. Ind. Photos. $10.95 ($9.85) paper.
The stealth program began in 1978 under a cloak of secrecy; ten years later, the F-l 17A emerged to astonish the aviation world. This brief but fact-packed book describes the history of that aircraft’s development, its technological marvels, and its combat debut during Operation Desert Storm. Numerous photographs—both color and black-and- white—illustrate what a truly revolutionary aircraft design this is.
Jane’s Fighting Ships 1992-93
Capt. Richard Sharpe, RN. Alexandria, VA: lane’s Information Group, 1992. 850 pp. Gloss. Illus. Ind. Photos. $225.00 ($202.50).
From the insightful analysis found in the foreword, to the tabular and graphic entries of the ship reference section (Albania to Zaire), to the several indexes, to the color reproduction of flags and ensigns, to the glossaries of terms and abbreviations, this edition of Jane’s Fighting Ships measures up to the high standards of a long tradition of excellence in providing valuable reference material to those with an interest in the world’s navies.
Joseph E. Johnston: A Civil War Biography
Craig L. Symonds. New York: W. W. Norton,
1992. 465 pp. Bib. Ind. Maps. Notes. Photos. $29.95 ($26.95).
While serving (in exemplary fashion) as chairman of the history department at the U.S. Naval Academy, Professor Symonds somehow found the time to produce this first-rate biography. Johnston emerges as both an enigma and a marvelous study in command, as Symonds recounts his strategy and tactics (as evidenced at the Confederacy’s first victory at Manassas and in the Western and Georgia campaigns), his political complications (owing primarily to an intense feud with President Jefferson Davis), and his unusual personality. This biography is more than an account of a singular man; it is also a clear reflection of the great conflict in which he fought.
M.I.A. or Mythmaking in America
H. Bruce Franklin. Brooklyn, NY: Lawrence Hill Books, 1992. 240 pp. Append. Gloss. Ind. Notes. $17.95 ($16.15).
In a book that is bound to be controversial, Franklin builds an effective case for his contention that there are no live POWs in Vietnam. He asserts that the whole issue began as a political expedient and has since grown into a powerful myth with ramifications that have backfired.
[5 The Right Kind of War
John McCormick. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1992. 352 pp. $21.00 ($18.90).
The third novel from the Naval Institute has arrived! This book has big shoes to fill, following in the wake of The Hunt for Red October and Flight of the Intruder, but it is equal to the task. McCormick, a combat veteran of World War II (four times wounded), is a powerful writer whose characters and sense of humor make this story of Marine Raiders in the Pacific one that will surely rank among the greats of World War II fiction. Advertising for this book calls McCormick “a fresh but mature literary voice,” and that is right on the mark!
U.S. Marines in Vietnam: The War That Would Not End
Maj. Charles D. Melson and Lt. Col. Curtis G. Arnold, USMC. Washington, DC: History and Museums Division, U.S. Marine Corps, 1991. 322 pp. Append. Bib. Gloss. Ind. Maps. Notes.
Photos. $21.00 ($18.90) paper.
The eighth volume in a projected nine-volume history of the Marines in Vietnam, this book deals with the period flanked by the departure of the III Marine Amphibious Force in 1971 and the cease-fire in 1973. It is an account of departure, return, and departure again in a conflict marked by many contrasts and frustrations. Numerous photographs, extensive ap-
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pendixes, and a thoroughly researched narrative make this the definitive account of Marine activities in Southeast Asia for the period.
U.S. National Security Strategy for the 1990s
Daniel J. Kaufman, David S. Clark, and Kevin P. Sheehan, editors. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1991. 287 pp. Ind. Notes.
$42.50 ($38.25) hardcover; $14.95 ($13.45) paper.
In their introduction, the editors—each a faculty member at the U.S. Military Academy— caution that this book “is designed not to offer definitive answers to difficult strategic questions, but rather to stimulate the strategic debate and contribute to the development of strategists.” The contributors, all noted experts in the field, concentrate on four strategic options: “discriminate deterrence, finite containment, strategic independence, and liberalism.”
Veterans’ Benefits Handbook
Lee E. Sharff, Eugene Borden, and Fred Stein.
New York: Prentice Hall, 1992. 192 pp. Tables. $10.00 ($9.00) paper.
Who is eligible, what benefits are available, and how and where to apply for them are all covered in this useful manual. Included is information on pensions, health care, education, employment assistance, burials, loans, the latest relevant legislation, and special programs offered by Social Security, the Small Business Administration, and the Departments of Education and Labor.
The Wilson Administration and the Shipbuilding Crisis of 1917: Steel Ships and Wooden Steamers
William J. Williams. Lewiston, NY: The Edwin Mellen Press, Ltd., 1992. 220 pp. Append. Bib.
Ind. Notes. $69.95 ($62.95).
Because of Germany’s decision in January 1917 to conduct unrestricted submarine warfare on merchant shipping, the United States faced the momentous challenge of replacing the anticipated lost shipping tonnage. This crisis was initially mishandled by the relatively new Shipping Board, and the very outcome of the war was, for a time, in question. Lieutenant Colonel Williams—director of military history at the U.S. Air Force Academy—details this crisis through meticulous research, and the result is an enlightening view of a significant but relatively unknown chapter in U.S. maritime history.
Other Titles of Interest
The Death Lobby: How the West Armed Iraq
Kenneth R. Timmerman. Boston: Houghton [ Mifflin Co., 1991.443 pp. Append. Figs. Ind. Notes. $21.95 ($19.75).
Flying Tigers: Claire Chennault and the American Volunteer Group
Daniel Ford. Washington, DC: Smithsonian Institution Press, 1991. 450 pp. Append. Bib. Ind. Notes. Photos. $24.95 ($22.45).
International Handbook on Chemical Weapons Proliferation
Gordon M. Burck and Charles C. Flowerree. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press Inc., 1991688 pp. Append. Bib. Ind. Notes. Tables. $95.00 ($85.50).
Renegade Lightning: A Novel
Robert Skimin and Ferdie Pacheco, MD. Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1992. 286 pp. $19.95 ($17.95).
War and the Ivory Tower: Algeria and Vietnam
David L. Schalk. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991. 258 pp. Bib. Ind. Notes. Photos. $24.95 ($22.45).
The Wings of Democracy: The Influence of Air Power on the Roosevelt Administration, 1933-1941
Jeffrey S. Underwood. College Station, TX- Texas A & M University Press, 1991. 234 pp- Append. Bib. Ind. Notes. Photos. $39.50 ($35.55).
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Add postage & handling to each order In accordance with the following schedule: All U.S. Naval Institute books, prints, and insignia items:
For delivery in the U.S.
Orders up to $30.00—S3.50 Orders of $30.01 or more—$4.50
For delivery outside the U.S.. invoices will include actual postage & handling costs. All special order books. *
Invoices for special order books will include actual postage & handling costs for all orders regardless of destination.
•(The special order book service is provided for USNI members only):