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By John Morrocco
The A-12 faded away because of cost overruns and manufacturing problems—but, say supporters, at least it was a real plane, under construction—and its problems could have been fixed far faster and for less cost than any possible successor.
More than a year after the fact, the Navy is still wrestling with the consequences of Defense Secretary Dick Cheney’s decision to terminate the A-12 medium-attack aircraft program.
Cancellation of the program and the budgetary changes that resulted continue to plague Navy officials as they try to sort out long-range procurement plans. But events also have created opportunities for radical changes in thinking about the basic character of carrier-based aviation, a debate that is just beginning to be joined.
With the benefit of hindsight, many Navy and industry officials are questioning the wisdom of the A-12 cancellation decision. They argue that the technical challenges associated with structural and weight problems on the aircraft eventually could have been solved. But a variety of political considerations precluded this.
The failure of the Navy and the two contractors, General Dynamics and McDonnell Douglas, to reveal the extent of the problems to senior Pentagon officials during the major aircraft review in 1990, the resulting storm of congressional criticism, budgetary pressures, and the unraveling of the Soviet Union were all contributing factors that forced Cheney to cancel the program.
The debate over the A-12 cancellation is now being played out in the courts. Whatever the outcome, however, one thing is certain—the implications for naval aviation of canceling the A-12 are extraordinary. “Many of our difficulties now are greatly compounded by the fact that we slipped the decision so that now it coincides with a pocketful of other problems,” one Navy planner said.
Shortly after the cancellation of the A-12, the Navy arrived at an alternative procurement plan. To solve the immediate problem of an aging A-6E inventory, the number of Intruders to be rewinged and upgraded was increased, and the service decided to move ahead with a
successor to the A-12—the AX.
Work on the AX began in earnest at the end of last year with the award of five AX concept-definition-and-explo- ration contracts to industry. Contracting teams led by General Dynamics, Grumman, Lockheed, McDonnell Douglas, and Rockwell International each received $20 million from the Navy. The service wants them to develop designs that can support its requirements at a minimum cost.
The Navy plans to seek approval in September from the Pentagon to begin the demonstration-validation phase of the program. Shortly thereafter, the service will issue requests for proposals to the industry teams. A contractor team is to be selected in May 1993. Navy officials maintain that AXs will start to enter the inventory in 2005.
At the same time, the service initiated a program to develop new E/F versions of the F/A-18. Originally, the Navy was looking at modest upgrades to the F/A-18C/D as a result of Cheney’s opposition to purchasing new F-14D Tomcats or remanufacturing older models. But with the cancellation of the A-12, Navy officials realized they also needed to bolster their medium-attack capability.
The F/A-18E single-seat model and the twin-seat F model will have a 25% larger wing area, a 34-inch center fuselage plug, increased fuel capacity, and two additional wing ordnance stations. The aircraft’s range is to increase by 40%.
The program is now in full-scale development with first flight scheduled for 1995. The first production aircraft would be delivered in early 1998 to begin replacing existing F/A-18s, which should start reaching the end of their service life in the mid- to late-1990s.
Navy Secretary H. Lawrence Garrett III, recently told Congress that the service needs both aircraft. But the plan is running into financial problems. At the same time the A-12 was canceled, Navy funding for aircraft procurement was also cut drastically. At roughly $4 billion a year, it is now about half of what it was two years ago.
Late last year a Congressional Budget Office staff report noted that the administration’s long-range modernization plans for naval aviation would require a dramatic increase in funding. Taking even the lowest cost estimate for new aircraft, the report said Navy funding for combat aircraft from 1998 to 2010 would have to average $8.8 billion annually, nearly 50% more than the
annual average projected for 1992-1997. Given this bleak fiscal outlook, many Navy officials now realize that they cannot afford both the F/A-18E/F and the AX, which are now estimated to cost perhaps $50 million and $63 million a copy, respectively. Both aircraft are now coming under increased scrutiny from a cost-conscious Congress.
Development costs for the F/A-18E/F program already have grown beyond initial estimates, which were pegged at $3.3 billion. The Navy now estimates it will cost $4.8- $5 billion, although critics have cited figures as high as $8 billion.
Cost increases are largely linked to engine upgrades and low-observable (stealth) enhancements, according to Navy officials. The F/A-18E/F will be powered by two upgraded F414-GE-400 engines and the larger intakes required mean more signature-reduction work.
The decision this year to eliminate from the Navy’s fiscal 1993 budget request the Advanced Air-to-Air Missile (AAAM), the successor to the Phoenix, also has weakened the case for the F/A-18E/F. Although the aircraft will have increased combat range, it will not match the F-14 in this regard. Navy officials had argued that the capabilities of the AAAM would allow the F/A-18E/F to conduct the outer air battle mission now performed by F-14s equipped with Phoenix missiles.
But the issue may not be as critical in the future, some F/A-18E/F supporters say. They argue that the decline of the Soviet military has lessened the importance of the outer air battle, and the threat from Soviet aircraft armed with long-range, antiship cruise missiles is less probable than two years ago.
Still, proponents of the F-14D are hoping these questions will create an opening for Grumman’s F-14D Quick- strike variant, an upgrade that provides the fighter with a significant ground-attack capability. The Quickstrike aircraft was originally considered as an alternative to the P/A-18E/F but was considered too costly, and Secretary Cheney’s unswerving and continuing opposition to buying any more F-14s makes this option highly unlikely. [See “The Ninth Life of the Tomcat,” Proceedings,
U.S. NAVY /INSET: MCDONNELL DOUGLAS
April 1992, pages 101-102.]
Meanwhile, the Pentagon’s new acquisition strategy has thrown a monkey wrench into the Navy’s plans for the AX. Deputy Defense Secretary Donald Atwood said the AX falls into the category of those programs that the Pentagon wants to spend more time developing and evaluating before putting into production. Funding for the AX program has apparently been cut by almost 50% over the next five years, reflecting this shift in acquisition strategy. The Navy requested $165.6 million for AX research and development in fiscal year 1993, slightly more than half of the $313 million the service sought in the revised fiscal years 1992-1993 budget it submitted to Congress last year.
Rear Admiral Jeremy Taylor, former head of naval, aviation plans and requirements who retired from active duty earlier this year, spelled out the consequences of such a move.
“We say 2005 is the IOC [initial operating capability],” Taylor said. "But I’m saying if the F-22 is [an] 18-19 year [program], what’s changed in the acquisition process to reduce that? There are guys out there now talking about a requirement, even after limited production, to conduct all operational testing and evaluation before you go into full production, not just elimination of concurrency but some improvements on that so that there is no risk whatsoever when you go into production.”
"So what do we have? An $11 billion program and that’s with one prototype,” Taylor said. “If it goes to two prototypes add $1.5 billion more. If it’s going to be run like the ATF [advanced tactical fighter—the F-22], it’s an 18-year program. Now you have a 2010 date for getting this airplane on line.”
Taylor compared this approach with that of the A-12,
which was scheduled to be a $4.5 billion program with an IOC of 1994. It should be noted, though, that Cheney said he killed the program because he could not be assured how much more it would cost and how long it would take to correct the aircraft’s problems. But Taylor postulates that even the worst-case estimates, another two years and another $2 billion, might have put the A-12 on-line in 1996 at a cost of $6.5 billion, far quicker and for less cost than the AX.
Stretching out the AX program also creates another problem for the Navy. It will put the AX in direct competition for scarce resources with future plans to develop a next-generation Advanced Short Takeoff and Vertical Landing (ASTOVL) aircraft.
Late in February,
McDonnell Douglas and British Aerospace agreed to cooperate on an ASTOVL strike fighter. The agreement followed a meeting last December between U.S. Navy and Royal Navy officials on the need for a replacement for the AV-8B Harrier II between 2005 and 2010. Given the technological risks involved, that would mean developing two prototype demonstrators by 1998 or 1999.
Some question whether the engine technology is mature enough to support such a program. Indeed, the two companies are hedging their bets, working on upgraded versions of the Harrier such as the radar-equipped AV-8B II Plus at the same time they are moving ahead on a next- generation ASTOVL aircraft. But proponents are confident and argue that a prototype demonstrator is just what is needed to answer those questions.
“There is'a need now to get on with the technology demonstration of ASTOVL,” Brian Phillipson. director of programs at British Aerospace’s Military Aircraft Division, said. “If we don’t do it, then there is no way of demonstrating that we are right and it is viable. Therefore, people will decide not to do it as their next program, and then you will skip a whole generation.”
But once again, budget considerations come into play. “Who is going to let naval aviation get three programs going [AX, F/A-18E/F, and ASTOVL] at the same time and with half as much money?” Taylor asked.
The Navy is faced with a plethora of alternatives. It could press ahead with the F/A-18E/F and delay the introduction of the AX and ASTOVL aircraft. It could drop the F/A-18E/F, build additional Hornet C/D models, and redefine the AX as a strike-fighter. Or. if stealth technology is considered a perishable commodity, it could drop the AX in favor of developing an all-weather F/A-18E/F
and move directly on to ASTOVL.
The viability of these various options is closely linked to the Navy’s perception of what the threat will look like in the 21st century. What will be the role of U.S. carrier aviation—and against whom will it be asked to fight?
Divining the answers to these questions poses a formidable task, one fraught with dangers. Forecasting political trends that may emerge 20 to 30 years from now is a tough proposition. The rapid pace of technological development and weapons proliferation makes the job even tougher. But one underlying assumption in the equation is painfully clear. The funds available to begin developing weapon systems in the immediate future to meet these long-range threats are declining.
Decisions that affect the F/A-18E/F, AX, and ASTOVL aircraft are complicated by other pressing naval aircraft modernization needs. Not only does the Navy face the problem of replacing a number of its combat aircraft; its combat support aircraft are also aging rapidly. Large numbers of E-2C Hawkeye airborne early warning aircraft, S-3 Viking antisubmarine warfare aircraft, and EA-6B Prowler electronic warfare aircraft will reach the end of their expected service lives before 2010.
The Navy had hoped to develop an advanced tactical support (ATS) aircraft that would combine the functions of the E-2C, S-3, and EA-6B into a single airframe, but those plans have been canceled. Similarly, the Navy canceled the P-7 antisubmarine warfare aircraft, which was to have replaced the P-3 Orion.
One way to defer the problem is by extending the service life of the existing inventory. The decision to rewing and upgrade a larger number of A-6 Intruders is one example; another is a program to get a better grasp of the actual fatigue life of aircraft. The Navy has recently invested more money in fatigue life indicators and test programs to do just that.
“We are on the threshold of not using years and months to measure the life of an airplane,” Taylor said. “What we are trying to stay with is airframe fatigue life ... we make the investment in indicators so we can measure thresholds, the things that really put wear and tear on the airframe.”
“Then we invest in a fatigue life test program that actually bends an airplane until it starts to break, and we know exactly what breaks and at what hours,” he said. “Now we start to manage the fatigue life so we know when the inventory is going to drop dead, or, conversely, what kind of investment has to be made to patch it up and stretch it out.”
While these efforts offer great benefits in terms of managing the service life of the Navy’s inventory of aircraft, they do not solve the long-term problem. Too many aircraft in the inventory will reach the end of their service lives at roughly the same time for this approach to be of real value. “They are all running on borrowed time,” Taylor said.
The quandary the Navy finds itself in regarding the future of naval aviation procurement planning has dire consequences for the service’s future. It directly relates to the Pentagon’s base-force concept and the burgeoning debate on roles and missions as planners look for ways to save money by streamlining and consolidation. Senator Sam Nunn (D-GA), chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, and others continue to ask tough questions about the size and shape of the future U.S. military.
The base-force concept forwarded by Cheney and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Colin L. Powell, would retain 12 deployable carriers. But the Navy’s projected funding profile for combat aircraft procurement is inadequate to sustain that level.
“We are taking things out of our modernization programs and everything else to try and finance the base force of 12 carriers,” Taylor said. “Is it really this kind of base force we are funded for? The answer is no.”
Defense budget cuts have caused the number of naval aviation research-and-development programs to drop from 60 to 10 in the last two years. Not only have big programs like the A-12, P-7, and ATS been canceled, but smaller programs have disappeared as well. “All the little programs are dying too, as a way to pick up the bill to maintain that base force,” Taylor noted.
“We have some very, very hard choices to make tied to how many carriers we are going to have and whether or not we are going to be allowed to keep big-deck carriers in the numbers that we are used to,” he said.
The debate could come to a head this year as Congress and the Pentagon bump heads on the merits of the base-force plan. Representative Les Aspin (D-WI), chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, has offered alternatives that would call for further cuts.
For the Navy, the point of the debate could be to focus °n the administration’s request for $832 million in advanced procurement funding in the fiscal year 1993 bud-
J.S. NAVY (O. NARLOCK)
The fleet will be flying versions of the F-14 Tomcat for years to come. This F-14D assigned to Operational Test and Evaluation Squadron <VX)-4 launches from the USS Nimitz (CVN-68) with Phoenix missiles during recent tests.
get for a new large-deck, nuclear-powered carrier_______
CVN-76. The carrier, estimated to cost a total of $4 billion, would be commissioned in 2003.
The carrier issue is closely tied to the question of when and if an ASTOVL capability can be brought on line. A Congressional Research Service report, weighing the pros and cons of funding CVN-76, noted that improved technology “could make possible VSTOL airplanes with performance characteristics much closer to those of conventional takeoff and landing airplanes than is now the case. Advanced VSTOL airplanes would permit smaller carriers to embark a much more capable airwing than at present, improving their cost-effectiveness,” the report said.
Deferring procurement of CVN-76 would allow the Navy to examine technological improvements to carriers along the lines proposed in a recent National Academy of Sciences study.
The question of aircraft carrier force levels is also part of a larger debate over roles and missions. Despite the decision to halt B-2 bomber production at 16 aircraft. Air Force officials are still beating the drum of the service’s "Global Power, Global Reach” white paper. The paper argues the case for long-range, land-based air power as the key to meeting regional contingencies around the globe, a role traditionally performed by Navy carriers.
Meeting these multiple challenges will require radical changes in the way the Navy thinks and does business.
Change is here and change requires reformation,” Taylor said. But when change gets so incredibly overwhelming you can t stay with just altering a little piece here and a little piece there. It’s time for transformers. We have got to tind those people within the ranks who can get off to the side and structure something that will be different, that will get most of the job done or all of it.”
John Morrocco is the Senior Military Editor for Aviation Week & Space Technology. He is the author of two books on the air war in Vietnam, Thunder from Above, and Rain of Fire.