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Designing the Deutschland
By Kaptain zur See H. Kostrzewa, Federal German Navy
The Federal Republic of Germany’s export-oriented economy depends heavily on secure sea lines of communication. One-third of its exports and two- thirds of its imports are transported by sea. On any given day, 750,000 tons of goods for Germany are unloaded in European ports and about 7.5 million tons of goods bound for our country are at sea worldwide.
It is important in peacetime to demonstrate our determination to prevent this dependence from becoming our Achilles’ heel. Shipping faces threats from air attack and from mines—in coastal waters— but the primary threat comes from submarines. In addition to maritime patrol aircraft and submarines, surface combatants with a good antisubmarine warfare capability for escort and area operations are needed to protect shipping.
Germany has agreed to provide NATO with a suitable number of ships for this mission—16 vessels—and the current Frigate-123 project evolved from this agreement.
Of the 16 frigates and destroyers pledged to NATO, the German Navy in the 1990s will have remaining only eight suitable frigates of the Bremen class and three modernized Lutjens-class destroyers, which are extensively modified U.S.
coming more and more expensive, especially in terms of the number of personnel needed to man them.
In the mid-1980s, Germany participated in the eight-nation “NATO Frigate Replacement of the 1990s (NFR-90)” project. Initial plans were to build eight ships in two lots, with the first ship to be commissioned in 1992. Delays in the NFR-90 project, as well as operational and financial constraints, caused a change in direction in 1987. A new plan, approved that year, will replace the four Hamburg-class destroyers with four new frigates within the framework of a national project; the first ship is scheduled
This artist’s concept of the Deutschland reveals the evolutionary aspect of her design, which embodies features of the Bremen-class guided- missile frigates—which, in turn, evolved from the Dutch Kortenaers— and the MEKO export frigates.
Navy Charles F. Adams (DDG-2)-class guided missile destroyers. The four Hamburg-class destroyers, commissioned between 1964 and 1968, have been modernized to some extent, but have very limited ASW and air-defense capabilities- and one has already been decommissioned. Operating these older ships is be- to be delivered by 1994 at the latest' The basis of the new plan, the “Frigate- 123 (F-123) Project,” was in fact the F- 122 staff target, which had already recommended building twelve general- purpose frigates optimized for ASW.
The target specified the following missions for the F-123: ►Peace—continuous ASW training and submarine data gathering; readiness and presence; regular foreign port visits to foster friendly relations ►Crisis—increased submarine reconnaissance and data gathering; continued presence; participation in alliance contingency plans
►War—protection of shipping against submarines and, under certain circumstances, surface forces; ASW in conjunction with maritime forces of the alliance.
Design assumptions. The staff target Was supplemented by another document that specified the requirements for the F- •23 frigates:
►Modem equipment for the primary mission, while accepting compromises in secondary-mission equipment to limit unit cost to DM 650 million (about $425 million at December 1987 exchange rates) ►Flexible design, with provisions for growth in volume and deadweight to allow for cost-effective modernization ►Optimal location and arrangement of sensors and weapons, to permit weapon arcs for 360° air defense ^Special attention to the reduction of acoustic and radar signatures, and infrared emissions
^Improved combat survivability, based °n experience gained from the Falklands Conflict and the Gulf wars ►Modular construction to reduce costs, miprove availability, simplify retrofits, and shorten construction time ^Standardization of installations with the Rremen(F-122) class to the extent possible; where not possible, use of other equipment already in German or NATO service.
Because the first ship of the class was to be commissioned by 1994, it was clear •hat special approaches had to be taken. As a result of the ongoing F-122 project, •he previous conceptual work on the ^FR-90, and MEKO export projects, Management teams with the necessary expertise on the part of government and industry were available. In July 1987, the decision was made to eliminate the requirements for a feasibility-and-definition Phase, and to have the design specifica- h°ns and binding construction offer prepared by industry.
. The Defense Ministry approached var- '°us German shipbuilders to form an ad d°c union for the project. In late October , Bremer Vulkan, the main F-122 c°ntractor, and Blohm + Voss, the de- ^eloper of the MEKO frigate, formed the 'T*eitsgemeinschaft Fregatte-123, or bgate-123 Construction Company. The BG electronics trust acted as principal subcontractor, and two other shipyards that had already cooperated on the F-122 project—the Emden-based Thyssen Nord- seewerke (TNSW) and the Kiel-based Howaldtswerke Deutsche Werft (HDW)—were designated major subcontractors.
Though promising, the marriage was not long-lasting. A binding construction offer was to be made in November 1988, but, after the possibility of a more cost- effective solution was suggested, the State Secretary for Armaments asked the two principal companies if it were possible to build a lower-cost ship like the F-122 with the same combat power as the planned F-123.
Bremer Vulkan’s offer, based on the F-122, was $382.5 million per ship—10% below the December 1987 design-to-cost goal. After consulting with the two other shipyards, Blohm + Voss submitted an offer at the same price in October 1988. Their design was based on the MEKO frigate, and thus came closer to the original F-123 design. As a result, the consortium under Blohm + Voss’s leadership was awarded the contract to build the four frigates at the offered price, and the Ministry of Defense stipulated that the industries in the Bremen area be adequately involved in the project. The contract was signed on 28 June 1989—two years and nine days after the birth of the F-123 idea. The total cost of the program will be close to $1.6 billion, of which about $1.33 billion will go to the shipbuilding consortium and $246.5 million will pay for equipment furnished by the German government.
Work on the first ship—the Deutschland—began in April 1991; the ship is scheduled to be launched in mid-1992 and commissioned in December 1994. Final acceptance trials of the command- and-control system, developed by the Navy’s research-and-development establishment, will be conducted in the summer of 1995. To allow sufficient time to incorporate any modifications resulting from the acceptance trials, the next ship will be not be commissioned before the end of 1995. The third and fourth ships will then follow at six-month intervals.
The ship. The F-123 cannot conceal her F-122 and MEKO export-frigate origins. With a displacement of about 4,300 tons at the time of commissioning, the F-123 will be a little larger than the F-122 but smaller than the Hamburg-class destroyers she will replace. The hull and superstructure will be made entirely of steel. Quarters for a crew of 230 will be provided although the normal crew—including helicopter personnel—will total 219.
ASW equipment. The F-123 will be equipped with the Krupp Atlas Electronik hull-mounted sonar, especially adapted for use in shallow waters. Starting in 1997, the ships will be retrofitted with a towed-array sonar, which should improve their ASW capability. The ships will have two twin-tube sets of Mk-32 antisubmarine torpedo tubes, and will carry two dipping-sonar Sea Lynx helicopters armed with two torpedoes. Plans are to replace the Sea Lynx with the NH-90 NATO helicopter at the end of the decade but the NFI-90’s future is uncertain.
Surface sensors. The Dutch HSA Company (which is owned by Thomson- CSF, a French electronics corporation) will develop the system. The same sensor system is being built into ten Dutch frigates, which will facilitate close cooperation between the two navies in training, logistics, and software.
The long-range LW-08 radar will be mounted on the aft superstructure, but the main sensor for aircraft and missile acquisition will be the three-dimensional, medium-range Smart-S system, which will be able to detect and track targets automatically. Weapon direction and fire control will be conducted with two separate track and illumination fire-control radars, which is consistent with the design of the Dutch Karel Doorman frigates.
Antiair warfare. The F-123 will rely on the NATO Sea Sparrow for short- range defense; the missiles will be launched from a 16-cell Mk-41 vertical launch system (VLS); expansion to 32 cells is possible. This system, now standard equipment in the United States and Canada, reduces reaction time and requires considerably less maintenance and fewer personnel than do rotating launchers. Moreover, it can accept different types of missiles, which gives the system excellent growth potential.
For close-range air defense, two missile launchers—one forward and one aft, each with 21 rolling airframe missiles (RAM)—will defend against sea- skimming missiles. The F-123 will mount one Oto Melara 76-mm. standard multi-purpose gun forward as secondary armament.
Electronic warfare. The ship will carry an AEG improved FL-1800S electronic support measures-electronic countermeasures system, and two Breda SCLAR trainable chaff launchers that fire radar and infrared decoys.
Antisurface warfare. Surface targets will be acquired with the omnidirectional surface radars and engaged with MM- 38 Exocet missiles removed from the Hamburg-class destroyers. At the end of the decade, the Exocets will be replaced with supersonic Franco-German ANS missiles, which will have a range of more than 100 kilometers. The 76-mm. gun also will engage surface targets.
Combat information center (CIC). The heart of the ship’s fighting systems will be the SATIT F-123 command-and-con- trol system. The central computer complex, which will have U.S. AN/UYK-43 computers, will collect and analyze sensor-gathered data, maintain the situation plot, and initiate automatic engagement sequences. The tactical software will be prepared by programming teams from Germany’s Federal Office of Defense Technology and Procurement and by the Naval Command and Control Systems Command: the equipment software is being developed by private industry.
All data will be displayed on color monitors housed in multipurpose consoles developed by Krupp Atlas Electronik, using a console with two vertically arranged dual screens. There is extra space in the CIC that will permit additional consoles to be fitted in the future. To decrease cost—and risk—an optical data bus will not be installed; provisions for a later retrofit, however, are being incorporated.
The F-123’s extensive communications system will allow it to function as a flagship. There are provisions for containerized satellite communications systems and the NATO-standardized Link-11 will handle automatic data transmission with other units.
Hull design and propulsion. The propulsion system is basically the proved combined diesel or gas turbine (CODOG) system used in the Bremen class. For cruising speeds of up to 20 knots, one MTU diesel per shaft will be used, while maximum speed—approximately 30 knots—will be achieved by using one General Electric LM 2500 gas turbine per shaft. Spur gear units and low-noise, controllable-pitch propellers complete the propulsion system.
The electrical plant is similar to that of the Bremen class. The two power plants—each with two diesel engines and generators—are separated to improve survivability. Each will produce 1,500 kilowatts of electric power, routed through two control panels and several dispersed power distributors.
To protect the marine environment, the ships will be equipped with biological sewage treatment plants and bilge water oil separators, as well as garbage compactors and grinders.
Special features. Three design characteristics are worth additional comments: modular construction, built-in growth potential, and improved survivability.
The F-123 will have four weapon modules: two for the RAM launchers and one each for the 76-mm. gun and the Mk-41 VLS. The two masts are electronic modules. In addition, the equipment of several electronic stations will be palletized, i.e., in the CIC, on the bridge and in the radio room. In all, there will be eight electronic modules, 29 equipment pallets with and without ground rasters, two mast modules, and 17 machinery modules.
The well-known advantages of this approach include low operating costs; reduced construction time, which translates to lower costs for shipbuilders; and simplified modernization.
The modular design blends with another F-123 design feature: unused tonnage and volume. Based on the assumed life of 30 years, during which the ship will undergo one or two retrofits, growth margins of approximately 200 tons plus the corresponding spaces have been identified. Both can be used for various modifications, including an advanced towed- array sonar, a new on-board helicopter, or a next-generation antiship guided missile as well as new torpedoes and future air-defense missiles that could give the ship a limited ability to provide local area protection.
The designers emphasized survivability. The F-123’s key features include: several double bulkheads; one-piece box girders in the superstructure capable of retaining longitudinal stiffness even after several missile hits; dispersal of weapons and sensors over two islands; sloped sides and superstructure, plus a split funnel for reducing radar and infrared signatures; a split helicopter hangar; two separated electrical power plants fitted with lateral exhaust vents; and enlarged and com- partmentally self-contained ventilation, fire-extinguishing, and drainage systems.
The fierce competition among the shipbuilding companies and between subcontractors has kept the F-123 cost 10% below the upper limit on a fixed-price contract. The total system price of DM 585 million per ship (at December 1987 rates) includes all contractual services, initial supply (spare parts, documentation, instruction, training facilities), and all government-furnished equipment. The Navy will get a very advantageous price- performance ratio, which means a cost- effective-ship—not a cheap one,
The revolutionary political events that occurred in Eastern Europe in 1989 during the F-123 planning phase were unforeseeable, and the ships were conceived and designed on the basis of the contemporary, coordinated NATO threat analysis. As such, they will be multirole combat ships with a defined principal mission of ASW, but they will also have the capability to operate under a degree of aerial threat and to engage opposing surface forces.
Against the background of the dramatically changing security situation in Europe, such flexibility is crucial. The German Navy, which brought the F-123 project on line in the short space ot two years from concept to construction contract, is getting a balanced ship that can handle whatever missions arise.
Commander Kostrzewa teaches at the German Armed Forces Command and Staff College in Hamburg. He has an engineering background and was part of the German management team during the feasibility phase of the NFR-90 program.
Has Naval Air Missed an Opportunity?
By Captain Roger L. Crossland, U.S. Naval Reserve
As the Department of Defense struggles to orient itself to the terrain of the post-Cold War landscape, the U.S. Navy will find itself thrust again into the time-honored role of projecting armed presence just offshore, a role characterized in other days as gunboat diplomacy. The image of the Sixth Fleet camped on a troubled doorstep will continue to have a greater psychological impact on malefactors than the image of the 82nd Airborne Division sprawled across the ramp at Pope Air Force Base, North Carolina. The role of gunboat diplomat—and very few others— will shape the Navy’s composition and budget over the next decade.
As always, it is not what an organization has done in the past but “what
have you done for me lately,” that will determine its participation in future naval operations and its future health. It is the job of each community’s naval leaders to anticipate the trend of future operations and adapt to address those trends. Offshore diplomacy is one of those trends.
Foresight at periscope depth. As the prospect of large-scale confrontations be-
The U.S. Army’s first production MH-60K special- operations helicopter made its first flight on 26 February; it would be an ideal aircraft for a Navy special warfare squadron.
tween major powers diminishes, the submarine force with singular foresight is positioning itself as the linchpin in successful maritime special operations. The submariners realize that a key component in projecting armed presence in the future—offshore diplomacy— will be the capacity to mount maritime special operations. In the next decade landing and boarding parties of Marines or SEALs will be as central to the execution of future naval operations as those enterprises were to the prosecution of gunboat diplomacy at the turn of the last century.
Special operations’ slice of the shrinking Defense Department pie will grow proportionally larger as offshore diplomacy becomes increas- >ngly central to peace keeping.
That larger slice should be viewed as a measure of perceived usefulness, yet only the submarine community has anticipated naval special warfare’s increased market share.
Vacuum at 12 o’clock high. Unfortunately, submarines take time to place on station and—nuclear submarines, in particular—require deep water. Submarine lock-outs and lock-ins by combat swimmers °r SEAL-delivery vehicles offer a host of possibilities, but these techniques are impractical for the handling of wounded, prisoners, or rescuees. Undoubtedly submarines Will have a significant part to play ln maritime special operations, but surprisingly another naval community has failed to adapt its capabilities to the new landscape.
Naval aviation, despite a poten- bally broad offering, has been asleep on
Watch.
Only aircraft have the potential for Putting a landing party ashore anywhere ■u the world within 24 hours, and the Navy needs an aviation capability dedicated to naval special warfare in addition to a submarine capability.
Flawed attempts. The U.S. Navy struggled to respond in the USS Pueblo (NGER-2), Mayaguez, and Achille Lauro Jbcidents, but was handicapped by the ack of air assets required to put SEALs °n the scene. In the first two potential cUtting-out operations, no standard procedures had been developed for putting EALs near the ships, even if aircraft had een available. At the time of the Achille y*uro incident, the overworked Air Force Pecial Operations Wing had problems ^bh its aircraft. Members of SEAL Team
boarded three successive aircraft, only 0 team with each boarding that particu- ar aircraft was incapable of making the
flight. Understandably, the Air Force Special Operations Wing was run in accordance with Air Force priorities and training cycles, and was not keyed to anticipating Naval requirements.
In theory, military units should be able to interlock like Lego blocks, and any military unit should be capable of working with any other military unit. Realistically, however, the operational possibilities are overwhelming in number and the range of potential partners is very nearly as broad. The end result approximates a military version of the Tower of Babel. The benefits of jointness may
eventually prevail, but special operations missions performed in support of conventional forces will continue to be fragile structures at best—often requiring two sets of translators, interservice and intraservice.
Pick-up teams rarely work as well as standing teams and should be avoided at all costs.
Pick-up teams. Historically, the inclination of theater commanders is to use in-theater resources only. Forces outside the theater are strange, unfamiliar, untested . . . and oh-so-far away. That inclination and lack of confidence continues down the chain of command. At the lowest level and on the cutting edge, SEALs too are less likely to place their faith in pilots with whom they have never worked—and with whom they may never work again. “Better to make do” has been the prevailing philosophy. The final factor is that general support, out-of-theater aircraft will seldom have the special equipment and avionics required for such missions.
Perhaps for this reason, during Operation Just Cause in Panama every available in-theater Army and Air Force helicopter was stretched to its operational limit. As a consequence, a SEAL platoon that had suffered casualties was stranded and unable to evacuate them for an unconscionable number of hours, an eventuality that could have been prevented had that SEAL platoon had the option of dedicated air support.
An established relationship, a short menu of a potential missions routinely practiced, and the mutual confidence built out of constant communications, work far better to assure success for naval special warfare missions.
Eggbeaters from hell. What aircraft are needed for this composite naval aviation special warfare-dedicated squadron? Helicopters have evolved as the aerial drafthorses of special warfare for short-to-medium range missions. In addition to their ability to place landing parties with pinpoint accuracy on any ship or terrain feature, they have the added ability to recover those parties, and, when necessary, to make recoveries in the midst of a mission. During Operation Urgent Fury in Grenada, helicopters fast-roped SEALs into Government House, and during Operation Desert Storm in 1991, helicopters repeatedly placed SEAL boarding parties on merchant ships, often several ships in the space of hours.
The relationship that developed between SEAL platoons and the Seawolves of Light Attack Helicopter (HAL)-3 during the Vietnam War grew out of collocation and a common language. That relationship permitted some of the most sophisticated special operations of the period and undoubtedly increased the Navy’s special warfare effectiveness in the Mekong Delta. Tactical unpredictability was a hallmark, but that unpredictability did not carry over to the source of air support for SEALS.
Today, the HH-60, HH-53, HH-58, and the HH-6 are all helicopters with potential for participation in a composite naval special warfare-dedicated aviation squadron. The HH-60 was used for Army special operations in Operations Urgent Fury, Just Cause, and Desert Storm. The HH-53 was used in the ill-fated Son Tay and Desert One rescue attempts. The HH- 58 was used in Operation Desert Storm
A special-warfare version of the Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force’s large amphibian could get SEALs closer to the target—and do it safely.
and an Army HH-6 disabled the minelayer Iran Ajr, permitting SEALs from the USS Guadalcanal (LPH-7) to board her. Ideally the adaptation of these aircraft for maritime special operations would include fitting with special navigational and night-vision devices, plus passive electronic support measures.
Long-range fuel tanks, a ship-to-air fueling capability and armor modifications would bring these aircraft up to an acceptable standard. In many case—the MH-60K version of the HH-60 is an example—special operations models of these aircraft are already in production. The helicopter’s ability to pluck landing parties from objectives afloat or ashore makes it an indispensable part of any NSW-dedicated squadron.
Express mail. Parachute operations will continue to be the bread and butter of special operations. Given this, the C-2A Greyhound, used for carrier on-board delivery, is adaptable once fitted with the proper avionics, for medium- to long- range paradrop missions. It suffers from the inability to recover landing parties, but extends the NSW reach of a carrier battle group. The V-22 Osprey tiltrotor, if bought, will fill a comparable niche— with the added ability to land and takeoff vertically.
Serious consideration would have to be given to long-range, carrier-based aircraft when forming any NSW-dedicated squadron.
Flying special boats. The Navy’s inability to respond to the seizures of the Pueblo, the Mayaguez, and the Achille Lauro, underscores several lessons:
►The fastest way to project a recovery party is by air.
►The recovery party must be substantial (the equivalent of three or four U.S. Navy SEAL platoons at minimum).
►The recovery party must bring its small craft with it.
►The aircraft for maritime-recovery missions must have the range and size to accommodate the recovery party. It may be that no long-range, carrier-based aircraft can satisfy all these demands.
The U.S. Navy, with no flying boats, must resort to rubber-duck deployments—the parachuting of rubber boats and their crews into the sea, a technique adopted soon after the Mayaguez incident. This technique requires the C-130 carrying the SEALs to fly below the enemy’s radar horizon approaching the drop point, and then climb, possibly into radar coverage, to drop the parachutists and equipment for water landing. This maneuver, however brief, may expose the plane—and indirectly the parachutists— to detection by radar.
Exposing the parachutists to the elements is another drawback. Upon water entry, they are at the mercy of currents, water temperature, and the prevailing sea state until they can climb into their boat, which may not always be in the immediate vicinity. It is a poor technique, and demands too much of troops who are probably already tired from a long flight.
Moreover, the only method of recovering any boarding party by fixed-wing aircraft involves the hazardous and cumbersome Fulton pickup—winching onboard a cable with a balloon at one end and a few frogmen at the other. The rubber duck and Fulton techniques are at best employable by only a dozen or so party members per mission.
Flying boats are well suited to support clandestine and covert operations that involve the deployment or recovery of significant numbers of personnel using rubber boats beyond the 12-mile limit and out of sight of coastal radar. The Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force allweather Shin Meiwa US-1 flying boat has many of the C-130’s capabilities—and can land at sea. Flying boats are the extremely simple answer to a very complex problem.
The US-1, or a comparable U.S.-built aircraft with appropriate avionics, should be assigned to any NSW-dedicated aviation squadron. Planners also should explore the feasibility of obtaining additional flying boats from the Civil Reserve Air Fleet.
Atrophy by default. Historically, the Navy has been the service best able to place conspicuous muscle at a global hot spot. If, however, the Navy is not able to provide a full range of options when its task force reaches that objective, offshore diplomacy will quickly be perceived as an empty and outdated threat.
The Navy can adjust its ability to project a presence offshore to include a viable maritime special operations option— or it can allow that special global role to become degraded, and perhaps lost. Will the Navy default?
Is naval aviation, once a leader in innovation, letting the team down?
Captain Crossland is a corporate general counsel. As a reservist, he is the deputy commander of the naval staff designated for duty with Commander, U.S. Forces, Korea. While on active duty he served with SEAL Team One and Underwater Demolition Team Twelve. He has served in a variety of naval special warfare billets, and commanded Naval Reserve SEAL Team Two at New Bedford, Massachusetts.
Measuring Drug-interdiction Effectiveness
By Lieutenant Daniel A. Laliberte, U.S.Coast Guard
Devising methods to measure the effectiveness of the U.S. Coast Guard’s maritime drug interdiction efforts remains a daunting task. In past years the “bale count”—the pounds of marijuana or kilos of cocaine seized, the numbers of vessels seized and the number of persons arrested—had been the most widely accepted measure of success. More recently, the “interdiction rate,” or quotient of the amount of drugs seized by maritime interdiction forces divided by the total amount shipped by sea, has been used. A third commonly used gauge has been the price of drugs. Traditionally, rising prices were thought to be indicative of a drug shortage created by interdiction efforts.
Since the mid-1980s, however, these three yardsticks have failed to yield the evidence of success sought by policy makers. Despite increased patrol time, improved intelligence, and assistance from the Department of Defense (DoD),
•ysts
never really liked this measure,
Sources:
Lawson Brigham, Captain, U.S. Coast Guard, “The U.S. Coast Guard in 1990,” Proceedings May 1991, p. 143. ’
Commandant (G-OLE), U.S. Coast Guard. "Resource Hours” (Washington, D.C., 28 February 1988) U.S. Coast Guard. “Digest of Law Enforcement Statistics” (Washington. D.C., September 1990)
U.S. Coast Guard, “General Law Enforcement Digest of Interdiction Statistics” (Washington, D.C., September 1988).
Table 1 U.S. Coast Guard Drug Law Enforcement Patrol Hours and Seizure Data FY 1981-1990
Patrol Hours
Seizures
Year | Cutter | Aircraft | Vessels | MJ (lbs.) | Cocaine (ll |
1981 | 93,169' | NA2 | 184 | 3,720,977 | 0 |
1982 | 105,746’ | NA2 | 185 | 3,595,351 | 40 |
1983 | 110.169 | 9,124 | 145 | 2,299,825 | 55 |
1984 | 132.601 | 11,710 | 224 | 2,857,512 | 1,932 |
1985 | 130,117 | 18,155 | 186 | 1,952,076 | 5,890 |
1986 | 109,450 | 13,155 | 149 | 1,840,678 | 7,494 |
1987 | 152,717 | NA2 | 152 | 1,302,311 | 12,950 |
1988 | 126,786 | 18,486 | 67 (25 )3 | 644,811 | 14,591 |
1989 | 158,047 | 26.748 | 37 (17)3 | 311,966 | 15,863 |
1990 Notes: | 152,484 | 26,126 | 37 (59)3 | 54,000 | 30,181 |
'The figures for 1981 and 1982 are estimated as 70% of the total law enforcement resource hours reported for the year. The actual breakdown was not available.
The author could not find the number of aircraft patrol hours devoted to law enforcement for 1981 1982, or 1987.
'Parenthetical numbers represent seizures under the "zero tolerance” policy.
These bricks of cocaine seized by the USCGC Diligence (WMEC- 616) are typical of the high-value shipments at sea today.
these traditional measures of effectiveness have declined. (See Table 1.) Yet the seaborne flow of marijuana through the Caribbean to the United States appears to have been choked to a trickle, cocaine seizures are increasing, and many factors indicate that the maritime portion °f the drug-shipping industry is in disarray. It is apparent that we need a better yardstick.
The Coast Guard realized by the mid- 1980s that drug-war statistics could be misleading. Remember, the true objective °f the Coast Guard’s interdiction program has been not to seize as large a quantity °f drugs as possible, but to reduce the amount being imported into the United States by sea, principally by disruption °f smuggling routes and methods. As early as August 1985, the intelligence staff of the Seventh Coast Guard District m Miami, Florida, recognized that a ris- mg bale-count considered alone was not mdicative of success. Despite generally rising numbers of hours devoted to drug mterdiction, the amount of marijuana seized declined.
This does not necessarily mean, however, that the Coast Guard was finding a*td seizing a smaller percentage of the total amount being shipped by sea. While some would argue that the drug traffickers were becoming more sophisticated and more adept at concealing their cargoes, the Coast Guard was also becom- lng getting better at finding these hidden cargoes. Discoveries of cocaine—a much more easily concealable product than bulky marijuana—were becoming more frequent. This rising count could mdicate that more contraband was being shipped, rather than the rate of seizure improving, while a falling count could mdicate that less contraband was being shipped, rather than a loss of efficiency V interdiction forces. It is clear that a ale count by itself is a poor measure of success for a maritime interdiction campaign.
Interdiction rates. The Coast Guard Used the interdiction rate as its second Measure of effectiveness, and for several years this was one of the statistics passed 0 congress justifying the Coast Guard’s strategy. Coast Guard intelligence ana- °ugh. While the interdiction rate stayed airiy constant, analysts had a gut feeling at the published figure was much lower an the actual percentage being seized. e problem inherent with measuring the uterdiction rate was that the actual ^mount shipped by sea must be known closely approximated. This was rec- Snized during the evaluation of the Viet- am War’s Operation Market Time, which the Coast Guard studied while developing its own interdiction strategy.
The strategies share a common evaluation problem: the captures are the only known data ... while the misses remain an unknown quantity, as one authority put it—you have to know what you missed to evaluate what you captured. Determining the missing quantity is the difficult part. During the Vietnam War,
North Vietnam did not release data on its shipments; in the current campaign the drug traffickers hardly release theirs. As a result, analysts must collect what information they can, and then make an estimate.
Drug prices. Common wisdom holds that as an interdiction program improves, the supply of drugs will go down—resulting in a rise in prices. Furthermore, since prices have gone down, or at best remained stable, more dmgs must be slipping through, and thus the interdiction program must be failing. It is also common knowledge that common wisdom is seldom accurate. This instance is no exception. Drug prices are just not directly related to supply.
In 1988 the Bilateral Commission of the Future of United States- Mexico Relations report “The Problem of Drugs,” indicated that the associated production costs and initial transportation costs accounted for approximately 8% of the final price of illegal drugs. The rest of the price can be viewed as “value added.” Consider a kilo of cocaine at a price of $20,000. Only $1,600 is invested in getting that kilo out of its production country. If interdiction forces seized 50% of all shipments, the cost of that kilo would still be only $3,200. The Rand Corporation in 1988 estimated that “only about 10% of the final price of cocaine comes from smuggling costs.” In fact, even if in-interdiction forces seized a higher percentage of shipments, the total amount of imports may actually increase—resulting in a lower price despite the increased rate of interdiction. A look at the mathematics involved demonstrates that the price of a drug is a poor indicator of the effectiveness of an interdiction program.
The goal of interdiction. Thus, the traditional measures of success are inadequate. The next step is to examine the goal of the Coast Guard interdiction program, because only in this way can those factors defining success or failure be discovered. “Since 1986, the Coast Guard’s stated goal concerning interdiction has been'to eliminate the maritime routes as a significant trafficking mode for the supply of drugs to the United States by increasing the risk—route denial,” according to Lieutenant Dale Chittenden, U.S. Coast Guard, the service’s senior narcotics analyst at the Intelligence Coordination Center in Washington, D.C.
The tactics to used to accomplish this goal are; seizure of contraband and vessels; arrest of traffickers; denial of routes and destinations; and forcing smugglers to shift to new methods. The Coast Guard hopes to institute these tactics through maintaining a “high rate of contact with smugglers,” according to Chittenden. The high rate of contact is designed not just to increase seizures, but to intimidate smugglers into aborting drug runs, dumping loads, and changing modes of operations. According to the Coast Guard’s plan—a defense-in-depth strategy—the sustained high rate of contact by traffickers with Coast Guard units during routine operations would demoralize them. Indeed, much intelligence supports this theory, including statements of retired smugglers that they dropped out because the risk of getting caught had become too great, another officer at the center said.
Results of the Coast Guard strategy. In the late 1980s the Coast Guard observed a major shift from the traditional Caribbean routes followed by the drug traffickers—the Yucatan Channel and the
Windward Passage—to the Eastern Passes and Puerto Rico.
In addition, intelligence indicated that some loads were going to Europe, and some shipments were returning to the United States from the east. Vessels carrying contraband became likely to jettison their cargo at the first sign of a law enforcement aircraft—without waiting to see if a cutter was in the area. The Coast guard view is that the methodical approach and steady pressure by cutters and Navy ships operating under the joint Coast Guard-Navy Caribbean Squadron simply wore them down.
By late 1987, large-scale marijuana shipment by sea in the Caribbean was essentially finished. Although occasional small seizures still occur, all-source intelligence indicates that the days of mass marijuana transport are over—but the days of mass cocaine shipment have arrived. There has been an increasing switch to cocaine shipments, and a greater emphasis on use of commercial maritime resources and air resources. The Coast Guard retains the previously stated goal. While increasing cooperation with U.S. Customs in the air war, it maintains maritime pressure over the Caribbean highway, concerned that any letup will result in a resumption of the previous traffic.
Current Coast Guard measures of effectiveness. The Coast Guard is currently searching for an acceptable yardstick. The most recent method is subjective—the traditional indicators are considered in conjunction with several new factors, and evaluated in light of available all-source intelligence. The following factors are used in the evaluation:
►Amount of contraband seized or caused to be lost to smugglers ►Number of persons arrested and transportation resources seized ►Number of aborted runs caused—air and surface vessel
►Air and maritime routes denied ►Geographic regions denied ►Forced shifts to new methods of shipment (i.e., from bulk in the hold to concealed compartments or commercial modes) ►Amount of mistrust and dissension caused among smuggling organizations ►Intelligence collected from interdiction operation
►Other factors showing increased cost of operations to smugglers
These stated factors are more than just dry statistics. While any one of them considered alone may be meaningless, they gain significance when the intelligence background is explored. Consider the drop in marijuana seizures, for example. Alone, this could indicate a decline in effectiveness of Coast Guard efforts. When considered with the all-source intelligence that routes have shifted, smugglers are demoralized, shipments are dumped prematurely, cultivation is down and many crews just won’t take the risk anymore, an entirely different perspective is gained. In this case a decrease in seizures signals success. The point is that quantitative measures must be subjectively evaluated to gain a clear picture of the situation.
Acceptance of a subjective measure of effectiveness. The need for a way to measure effectiveness subjectively has been accepted by the Coast Guard. In June 1990, while answering an inquiry from the Senate Appropriations Committee, the Coast Guard Commandant stated for the record: “There is no single best measure of effectiveness . . . drug interdiction evaluations must also consider qualitative indicators of deterrence, disruption, and displacement.”
Congress, however, continues to press for objective evaluations. It is understandable that the body providing the funds for the interdiction program would like something concrete with which to measure the performance of that program- The challenge for the Coast Guard is to interpret these indicators, and to communicate this interpretation clearly to Congress.
Lieutenant LaLiberte is a staff intelligence officer if the Intelligence Division at Coast Guard Headquarters in Washington, D.C. He has served as the operations officer on the USCGC Escape (WMEC-6), and has a master of science degree in strategic intelh' gence from the Defense Intelligence College.
Keeping Aegis Ships Combat-Ready_______________
By Colonel William H. Sackett, U.S. Marine Corps (Retired), and Commander Marshall L. Dorman, Jr., U.S. Naval Reserve (Retired)
The Combat System Maintenance Central (CSMC) is an innovative concept that has proved to be a major asset on board USS Ticonderoga (CG-47)- class Aegis cruisers and Arleigh Burke (DDG-51) guided-missile destroyers. It provides an organized environment for the coordination and control of operability testing and maintenance, and the collection, evaluation, and timely dissemination of combat system operation^ readiness information.
The space evolved from little mofe than a broom closet to its present desig'. nated space; growth and evolution o'
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Proceedings / June 199'
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the concept was a major challenge and several iterations were subjected to design reviews before the space was finally fully approved by the Navy.
During the design of the later-canceled (CGN-42)-class nuclear-powered cruisers> which lagged the design of the Ticon- deroga class, it became apparent that the CSMC role would have to be expanded.
The new, expanded concept was conceived to meet the maintenance and readiness challenges of a fully integrated modern-day combat system (see Figure 1). As the design developed it became increas- ln§ly clear that prior maintenance practices and initialization of stand-alone Weapon systems,
'■e-t guns, missiles, and other surface Weapon systems, required extended system procedures.
R gun’s failure to fife, for example, could be caused by faults with the gun,
0r the electronics,
°r the computer programs, or one of niany other factors;
^olating equipment ls the most logical "'ay to determine the fault. This Process, however,
Would obviously cross over into several other systems and it became imperative that rigid casualty procedures e invoked to ensure rapid equipment restoration.
To obtain the controls necessary to ini- halize, maintain, and troubleshoot prob- ems, several already existing functions Performed in various spaces on the ship f;ad to be integrated into a common space. °r maintenance of the Aegis weapon ^ystem, the Operational Readiness Test ystem (ORTS—an automatic test and R°nitoring function system) and its pre- entive maintenance functions would be ^located. Status of all other combat sys- m elements, including their preventive aintenance data, would be presented Manually here.
Reconfiguration of the Aegis weapon ern> through the ORTS equipment,
(SERT), employed on several of the larger cruisers, convenes in the CSMC. Most cruisers use the SERT concept to initialize the integrated combat systems and to isolate difficult integration problems and repairs. Locating the Combat Systems library in the CSMC was considered, in order to provide technical documentation for the various functions operating in this space.
The preventive maintenance system was to be added to this space and partially automated by use of SNAP II computer-system procedures. All combat system corrective maintenance operations were to be directed from CSMC and facilities and communications for Repair 8 would also be added.
In summary, the CSMC was viewed early as a manned operational readiness center providing critical support to the combat system. Major functions were identified:
►Operation and control area—The status of the Aegis weapon system is monitored by the ORTS console, and this information is readily available in the operation and control area. The status of all other systems is monitored on status boards via inputs from system operators and technicians. The total information generated, gathered, and evaluated provides a maintenance status for the ships combat system. All maintenance actions and control for the total combat system are assembled and maintained in this area. ►Operational readiness area—The Aegis system is continuously monitored to ensure all parts are functioning. If not, fault alerts are received by the ORTS console operator, who then can direct their repair. ►Maintenance Control Area—The SNAP II general-purpose computer is used as the basis for preventive maintenance system planning and scheduling. In addition, a large conference area is located within the CSMC technical coordination area to accommodate planning-and-scheduling meetings.
►Technical coordination area—The large conference area is also used by the Shipboard Electronics Repair Team to resolve problems involving corrective maintenance to the combat system. Since Aegis is an integrated system, the SERT members will be from various combat system disciplines, as required. To support their work they may use information from ORTS inputs, the library, and telephone conference information from the technicians. ►Technical information area—Current documentation for the combat system is contained in the technical information area. It consists of hard copy and microfiche data. A microfiche- microfilm reader- printer and copy unit are part of this areas equipments.
During the early design phase of the Ticonderoga-class cruisers, the initial CSMC concept aligned the ORTS function with the repair function. Early planning located ORTS in the combat information center (CIC), primarily to support combat-system reconfiguration. Space constraints and revised criteria separated ORTS from the operational function. Later, the ORTS and repair functions were separated, because one did not complement the other as equivalent tasks, one being subservient to the other. At this time it was recognized that the status of other non-electronic monitored systems and the preventive maintenance functions did complement each other, and these were collocated.
Further studies also showed that collocating the Repair 8 function was appropriate since emergency repairs during Condition I required the same data as the
monitoring and planned-maintenance- functions. All of these functions were collocated in a very tight space on the USS Ticonderoga—the broom closet. Adequate communications, watch standers, and equipment were not feasible because of the small space.
Later, Ingalls Shipbuilding Division of Ingalls Systems and RCA were directed by the program manager to enlarge the CSMC to accommodate the proposed CGN-42 configuration on board the Ticonderoga as a major engineering change proposal. The space selected came from the central office complex, and closely approximated the area formerly used by the dispersed functions. The ORTS remained located close to CIC, meeting an old, but still recognizable support requirement. In addition, the new space was located in a well-protected area of the ship. The CSMC became a fully realized, survivable operating space.
The Ticonderoga's commanding officer, recognizing the importance of readiness assessment, assigned this task to CSMC. Several monitoring circuits had to be added to assemble and tabulate combat system readiness. Further, a manual display depicting readiness was added to CIC to keep the commanding officer informed on the combat system readiness.
Lessons learned from the Ticon- deroga'% operations led to another design review. Working closely with personnel from the USS Yorktown (CG-48), the CSMC designers created a new layout and functional control areas were more specifically defined. Several engineering change proposals were generated as the CSMC changed into a readiness area. The revised CSMC consisted of the following:
►Air weapon systems control area—This replaced the operational readiness area and the operational control area and is now concerned only with air weapons— the arrangement is basically the same as in the original concept. The air weapons supervisor controls this area and directs the operator monitoring ORTS, plus technicians and a talker. Most of the air weapon system equipment is automatically monitored and displayed on the test monitor central. These include the SPY-1A equipment, the Mk-1 command and decision system, and the Mk-1 weapon control system. Other systems not electronically monitored are monitored with status boards. The air weapons supervisor reports to the combat systems officer-of-the-watch.
►Combat system control area—This replaced the technical coordination area and was rearranged to accommodate the com
bat systems officer-of-the-watch, who required several status boards to collect, evaluate, and report readiness to the combat systems readiness officer in CIC. Additional communications were added to this area to help him maintain contact with the various combat-system supervisors and technicians.
►Technical area—This area is basically unchanged except that it now contains the SNAP II computer.
In addition, three discrete areas isolated from the CSMC are required to assess overall system performance—surface weapons, underwater weapon systems, and electronics support systems.
The surface weapons supervisor, stationed in radar room one, controls the surface missile systems and the five-inch gun. The underwater weapon systems supervisor, stationed in the sonar control room, controls the underwater fire control system, ASROC, the hull-mounted sonar system, LAMPS, the tactical towed- array sonar system, and the underwater countermeasures system. The electronics support systems supervisor, stationed in electronic shop two, is responsible for communications, surface and air radar systems (excluding the SPY-1A), and other assorted electronic systems, such as identification-friend-or-foe.
Activities within the CSMC are representative of an ongoing workload, shifting in emphasis only in terms of priority and required operational capabilities established for individual readiness watch conditions. The shift in emphasis corresponds to watch condition and varies principally between support of tactical operations in the CIC and that of performing system and subsystem maintenance. Readiness assessment, on the other hand, is an all-encompassing, full-time operation involving combat system monitoring, information gathering and correlation, and reporting of summary status on a real-time basis to command-and- control personnel. Following is a breakdown of the functions performed in CSMC during the various watch conditions:
►Condition I—Emphasis is on providing current and changing combat system readiness status and recovery information by the combat system officer-of-the- watch to the CO, tactical action officer (TAO), the combat systems coordinator, and the combat systems officer via the combat system readiness officer. Restoration of electronic casualties and urgent repairs to the combat system will be accomplished under battle-station conditions and coordinated through the combat system officer-of-the-watch in the CSMC. Critical communications will be
maintained with the CIC, damage control central, and manned combat system operating spaces.
►Condition III (wartime steaming)— Combat system status and recovery information will continue to be provided in the same manner prescribed for Condition I. Increased maintenance activity is permitted and therefore scheduled maintenance, and those unscheduled maintenance tasks essential to maintaining required combat system readiness levels may be assigned and performed. ►Condition IV (peacetime steaming)— Test and maintenance functions are extended to include verification of system performance capability and to minimize effects of damage, failures, and malfunctions. Preventive maintenance and corrective maintenance actions are scheduled, and immediate and long-term evaluation and reporting of the status and conditional state of the combat system is maintained. During in-port periods (Condition V), the CSMC will be manned and operating in accordance with the inport work schedule.
The CSMC is subject to ongoing review and upgrade on the basis of at sea operations, lessons learned, and evolving readiness concepts. The most innovative concept affecting he CSMC is the combat system operational sequencing system (CSOSS). Introduced to the fleet by Aegis ships, CSOSS is based on fundamental concepts of the engineering operational sequencing system (EOSS) developed by the Naval Sea systems Command for propulsion plant control, and integrates key readiness processes required to support combat system operations and perform casualty control. The system’s technical coordinator is the combat system officer-of-the-watch in the CSMC.
In addition to the above, preliminary speculation and planning have considered other areas. These include: computing tie- ins with the automatic displays to facilitate reducing mean time to repair of combat system equipments; fault implant evaluation; a readiness net that instantly updates the readiness of each ship in the task force; and configuration control of the total combat system.
The requirements that make a manned CSMC a vital space are real, and it has emerged as a vital on-board readiness center.
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