To successfully exploit the lessons of Gulf War combat, naval tactical aviation must give thoughtful consideration to operational and logistical applications and make appropriate modifications to post-conflict training. These changes will affect current carrier air-wing operations, support, and training—integrating Desert Storm joint-deployment, logistics, operations, and combat lessons and tapping the knowledge and experience of combat veterans as they rotate home. Multi-service joint operations will receive increased emphasis in response to forthcoming Department of Defense restructuring, and the era of composite forces will become a reality, as the boundary between service tactical missions becomes less distinct. As a consequence, an opportunity exists for naval tactical aviation (TacAir) to survive restrictive budgets and still develop new force capabilities to counter emerging threats.
The Hazard of Success
Danger lurks in victory: Success of the type and scale we experienced in the Gulf air war may foster a post-conflict environment that channels and restricts tactical thinking. We’ve experienced this before: Following a successful campaign, tactics are freeze-dried and taught to the next generation of aviators in de facto fashion.
Today’s combat-experienced junior officers are tomorrow’s leaders and tactics instructors. Student aviators eagerly subscribe to a combat veteran’s opinion as though it emanated from the burning bush, embracing a specific tactical mind-set that can impede the exchange and acceptance of new ideas.
In recent years, the F-14 and F/A-18 communities experienced tremendous frustration in shedding the “Vietnam mentality.” It took the costly lessons of the 1983 Lebanon conflict to spur the command structure into action—resulting in the adoption of today’s strike warfare doctrine. Even a subtle loss of perspective relative to Desert Storm operations could lead the TacAir community to project a universal application of tactics successful against the Iraqi threat, but possibly inappropriate for the next encounter.
Without the “combat-proven” seal of approval, new capabilities and tactics face an uphill battle for acceptance. Unless measures are taken to preserve and enhance the entire process of advanced tactical development, operational test and evaluation, and training, the future of naval TacAir may be characterized by stagnation of tactical adaptation and combat capability.
There is an identifiable cycle in naval TacAir combat experience:
Adversity
↗ ↘
Stagnation Innovation
↖ ↙
Success
To avoid tactical atrophy, we must proceed with caution from our Desert Storm success—enabling the next generation of aviators to shake the preconceptions of a potentially limiting “Gulf War mentality” and encouraging fresh ideas based on current intelligence and analysis of new threats.
Certain trends will emerge from Desert Storm that will demand innovative thinking on our part:
► DoD fiscal cutbacks will escalate.
► Potential foes (and allies) will dedicate massive resources to closing the gap in technology and tactical application that our forces had in the Gulf theater.
► Because our baseline tactical capabilities have been fully exposed, countermeasures will be developed.
To maintain our combat edge, we will have to develop new capabilities and tactics responsive to these new countermeasures—and in cost-effective ways.
The Desert Five
Fortunately, as a result of rapidly changing world situations, the Navy and the other military services are flexible, with sufficient organizational capabilities to process the immense volume of Desert Storm data, extract valid conclusions, and promulgate the results to the fleet.
The success of Navy and Marine Corps tactical aviation in the Gulf is largely the result of the foresight and determination of a few leaders who identified and corrected shortcomings in post-Vietnam tactical development and training—much as early Vietnam air-combat losses spawned the Navy Fighter Weapon School (Top Gun), and the 1983 Lebanon experience led to the creation of the Naval Strike Warfare Center (Strike U.) and the restructuring of tactics development, evaluation, and training. Significantly, these organizations were created in response to adverse or unexpected combat experience, where urgent requirements existed for improvement in operational effectiveness and survivability.
The finest Navy and Marine Corps aviators were assembled at Top Gun, Strike U., Marine Aviation Weapons and Tactics Squadron One (MAWTS-1), and Air Development Squadrons VX-4 and VX-5 and challenged to explore the full range of tactical applications. Loosely grouped under the title “The Desert Five,” this assemblage is charged with executing nearly all Navy and Marine Corps TacAir tactics development, operational testing, and simulated combat training.
The results speak for themselves. Naval carrier aviation evolved to become an awesome force capable of focusing devastatingly efficient power projection.
The Process: Its Strengths and Weaknesses
The Desert Five concept seems valid in theory. In execution, however, effective coordination between these highly charged and naturally competitive organizations is required to minimize redundant effort, disseminate time-critical information, and project a unified Navy position on procurement and training.
When Desert Shield turned to Storm, each organization responded rapidly and efficiently to the call for updated software and training. The contribution of key experts, many of whom traveled to the Gulf for direct participation, was instrumental in the successful employment of numerous sophisticated weapon and electronic warfare systems.
Separately, these organizations have distinctly different charters. VX-4 and VX-5 are the operational test and evaluation (OT&E) experts for air-to-air and air-to-ground missions, respectively. Where VX-4 aircrew would operationally test a new variant of the AIM-54 Phoenix missile on the F-14D Super Tomcat, strike pilots at VX-5 would evaluate AGM-88 HARM missile improvements.
For years this relationship contributed to a healthy rivalry with distinct boundaries, for both squadrons report to Commander, Operational Test and Evaluation Force. Matters became complicated when the Hornet’s multimission capability required OT&E, and both squadrons laid valid claim to the test program. Candid observers noted some friction as both the test responsibilities and the budget were divided. The recent flurry of interest in the Tomcat’s latent bombing capabilities further muddied the water.
Similar problems exist with Strike U. and Top Gun. Both were elevated to echelon II command status, reporting directly to the Assistant Chief of Naval Operations (Aviation Warfare) on matters pertaining to strike warfare doctrine and fighter doctrine, respectively. These boundaries began to blur almost immediately. Though the two are united in theory, obstacles existed to preclude agreement on significant issues.
By its nature, Strike U. focused on air-wing training through intensive, large-scale strike-warfare scenarios similar to the U.S. Air Force Red Flag program. Top Gun committed to a graduate-level syllabus for individual tactics instructors. Both assumed an aggressive approach toward the development of new tactics and subsequently progressed to tactical OT&E. MAWTS-1 quietly covered all the bases, consistent with the Marine Corps’ unofficial charter to “do more with less.”
It is getting harder to discriminate between the five. All disseminate a great deal of new information covering a wide array of topics. All are capable of providing expert appraisal of current and future, domestic and foreign Weapon systems. Each submits a recommendation on future procurement priorities to the Chief of Naval Operations. All five are interested in electronic-combat survivability, devoting extraordinary talent and effort to the extremely complex task of quantifying performance in electronic warfare.
Given the broad scope of interest shared by the Desert Five—and their dramatic impact on fleet combat preparedness—it is troubling to consider what may happen after impending budget reductions have taken place. Paced with an overflowing agenda and reductions in physical assets, the Desert Five may be forced to sacrifice responsiveness, objectivity, creativity, and synergism to ensure the proper support for key command-endorsed Programs.
Redefining the Mission
That the Desert Five functioned effectively with the ample budgets of the Reagan administration is not surprising. They were able to focus talent, money, sophisticated technological resources, and sound leadership on their task. The outcome seems less assured, however, when the same organizational structure must deal with both a rapidly changing world environment and a reduced budget.
For this desert coalition to survive as a productive entity, it must address the following key issues:
► DoD direction for future force disposition and posture
► Projected roles and missions and required capabilities, both conventional and unconventional
► New testing and training concepts required to achieve
► Proficiency and maintain readiness
► The role of intelligence and simulation in testing and training
► Joint-service testing and training standardization and co-use of limited resources
► The impact of logistics and the potential for joint-service commonality
Requirements
Tactics development, OT&E, and training are separate disciplines with different objectives and support requirements. OT&E is strictly operational, requiring a dynamic, high-fidelity, realistic environment. Development efforts must be focused and controlled, for precision parametric measurement. Training uses established profiles to provide baselines for replay and scoring.
The emphasis on quantitative measurement is accompanied by the demand for “realistic” results. Unfortunately, we cannot afford to engineer test and training facilities capable of providing enough precision measurement and combat realism to ensure both quantitative and qualitative results. Because of the cost and limited availability of high-value threat simulators, tests normally are structured as representative slices of combat scenarios. It may be inviting to attempt to combine these phases in response to limited technical assets and financial limitations; however, the outcome would be contaminated by inappropriate bias.
A new tactic may be conceived in any phase, but the development and testing of any tactic or capability is best performed under structured conditions with clearly defined objectives and measures of effectiveness, to ensure thoroughness and preclude the misuse of limited resources.
Back to the Basics
A suggested functional alignment of the Desert Five would include reestablishing baseline capabilities with clear-cut, individual command responsibilities. Long before the commands coalesced, each was created with a specific, distinctive charter. Merely focusing on the original primary mission areas, however, would yield an oversimplified baseline of generic responsibilities.
Each member should focus on its specialty, confident of its share of the overall program, yet constantly alert for new applications. The ground rules must be formalized, to contend with changing command personalities and to preserve the fragile alliance. Frequent pro-forma coordination meetings must be attended by staff members authorized to deal immediately with policy questions. It is impossible for a group of lieutenants representing the five members to establish and maintain the commitment and credibility required for organizational effectiveness if every decision or tentative concession is subject to post-meeting reversal.
Challenges and Recommendations
► Streamlining. Relocating Top Gun to NAS Fallon—reporting to a local flag officer whose command also would encompass Strike U.—would unify Navy TacAir training efforts into an efficient, streamlined organization.
► Joint Training. Initial Desert Storm operations highlighted significant problems stemming from the lack of standardized procedures for joint-mission planning and execution. Positioning a permanent detachment of Top Gun at Nellis AFB with the Air Force Fighter Weapon School and broadening its scope to encompass composite-force training could achieve significant joint-operations economies. Funding to upgrade Air Force TacAir training assets would have residual impact on Navy TacAir training. The Fallon/Nellis complex would become the Mecca of fighter tactics training, and our Navy and Marine fighter experts would be in place to benefit from Air Force programs, while providing feedback to Navy plans and programs on the direction of joint operations.
► Range Space. Operational range space is threatened by the encroachment of civilization and the pressures of environmental concerns. There is not a single TacAir range in the Continental United States that does not impose noise abatement restrictions, which limit the ability to simulate combat conditions. In particular, supersonic and low-altitude flight profiles are subject to strict limitations, which demand inordinate aircrew attention to artificial constraints and detract from overall mission effectiveness.
Capitalizing on current pro-military public support, the Pentagon should move immediately to acquire unrestricted overflight rights to new and existing range space. Eliminating as many artificial restrictions as possible will reduce test costs, increase test-result accuracy, and improve training quality. The State Department should solicit the lease of Mexican airspace to supplement the range space used by numerous Navy, Marine, and Air Force facilities in the southwest United States. The Mexican government may be surprisingly supportive if this request is tied to their North American defense responsibilities and reduction of their huge national debt.
► Joint OT&E. Navy TacAir OT&E programs must aggressively pursue joint application. Strengthening the bond between the Air Force Tactical Air Warfare Center, MAWTS-1, and VX-4 and VX-5 will enable the Navy to reduce redundancy and piggyback on funded Air Force projects. The Commander, Operational Test and Evaluation Force, should consider pushing for more joint test programs, pursuing commonality and the cooperative use of limited range and test assets.
► Navy and Marine Corps Interface. Marine and Navy TacAir operations need to be more closely aligned. Marine squadrons should make more carrier deployments and Navy squadrons should augment Marine land-based ground support more frequently, to apply and build upon the composite-force experience gained in the Gulf War. The outstanding results attained by MAWTS-1, despite limited assets and funding, should be acknowledged and closely examined by the other members of the Desert Five.
► Intelligence. Navy participation in joint intelligence processing and dissemination will increase as funding for service-specific intelligence activity is reduced. Near realtime intelligence provided during the Gulf War by the joint space command demonstrated the value and potential of joint global intelligence operations.
► Logistics. The service war colleges have begun to analyze Desert Storm operations. Priority should be given to their analysis of logistical support. It is doubtful that our next adversary will allow us five months to deploy and reinforce before engaging in combat.
The Gulf War experience needs to be assessed in the context of global composite operations. For instance, were our logistical priorities appropriate to counter a future offensive, given effective command and control? Where can we pursue commonality to achieve economy, reduce supply lag, and increase initial readiness? Most important, our training must incorporate realistic logistic support factors, if it is to be the basis of realistic planning.
► Relocation of Navy Flight Test Efforts. Consideration should be given to the potential economies in creating a joint test pilot school at Edwards AFB. Additionally, relocating all Navy and Marine Corps flight-test programs to Naval Weapons Center China Lake would secure Navy access to the finest test ranges available, while taking advantage of Air Force system upgrades.
Wrap-up
There are imposing obstacles facing naval tactical aviation. Budget cutbacks will affect new system procurement, operational tempo, and logistics. The Air Force and Army achieved high profile, positive visibility during Operation Desert Storm that will intensify the competition for limited funding. The loss of the A-12 and F-14D programs punctuate a shift in DoD priorities that bodes poorly for Navy TacAir system upgrades into the next decade.
It is important for the Navy to take the lead in defining the post-Gulf War joint-service posture. The Desert Five will play a pivotal role in getting the most from a declining inventory of aging weapon systems. Finally, we must capitalize on our superior experience in composite-force employment to win continued DoD support for the Navy and Marine Corps TacAir agenda.