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^he Red October is gone, but missions remain for the U.S. Navy’s tuclear-powered attack submarines.
as we assemble the next budget. Reality, however, demands that all warfare sponsors of the Navy and Marine team must adjust to the projected threat and evolving deployment requirements of the next 10-15 years. There are many sound reasons to maintain the industrial base, i.e., the private shipyards and factories that have so ably constructed our ships and provided our aircraft, weapons, and other military equipment. After carefully defining our naval roles and missions using affordable capabilities, we must direct available dollars for the good of the country, and for those who go down to the sea in ships.
By Capt.). E. O'Neil, )r., USN
Author Tom Clancy has given those of us in the sea services, as well as the general public, a great series of action-packed, hair-raising, military adventure novels in the past few years. For •He, the most riveting and intriguing of his books is the superb high-technology thriller, The Hunt for Red October. The novel "■'as filled with the author’s interpretations of open-forum literature about the “Silent Service,” as well as obvious details about submarine life from his contacts in our submarine float.
Recently, our former “Silent Service” has gone public, to high- iight the advantages of maintaining a large number of attack boats. This is a good start in stating the requirement for con- titiued investment in nuclear propulsion, but it must be tempered <’v*th the overall direction for the country’s naval forces.
The world is being transformed by justifiable concern over planet’s environment, the Third World population explo- s’°n, and the fiscal entitlements trauma in the developed counts. A new balance must be struck now that the paradigm has lifted from the open ocean to the littoral reaches. The world- agony index is on the rise, and the potential for U.N. (read U-S.) involvement—either invited or uninvited—is also on the r'Se- Littoral warfare has always been the venue of the Navy ®nd Marine Corps and should be maintained and enhanced. . °nte programs already have been adjusted to meet the pro- | Jected threat and the peacetime roles outlined in the 1992 Na- t|Qnal Military Strategy.
I f feedings / October 1992
It appears, however, that we have not recognized that all our naval forces must be dramatically adjusted. We have canceled ship, equipment, and aircraft production contracts in the past, even during wartime. Insisting that it will cost too much to cancel a contract may not always be a valid argument, but it may be a step we have to take. Jobs are important to the politician and the military alike, but a viable military force must be maintained as we build down.
Our shore-based training establishment and antisubmarine warfare force require immediate reduction; other Department of the Navy programs should be strengthened. The Department should readjust its fiscally intensive blue-water capabilities and “go littoral.” Our carrier force is well justified at 12, and the number of strike-capable surface ships is stabilizing with the Ar- leigh Burke (DDG-51) program. But naval air, strategic sealift, underway replenishment, research-and-development, precision weapons for fire support, mine warfare, amphibious warfare (and their support) all need adjustments— some up, some down. Fleet ballistic-missile submarine force levels seem a fait accompli, in that we will finish the 18 Trident boats. We appear to be completing the development and back fitting of the D5 missile in these vessels, but we should consider changing the number of crews, underway status, and missile capability. We are retiring several submarine tenders, rescue ships, and conventional service-force ships.
While our submarine forces have previously patrolled the dark reaches of the North, they now must patrol in the van of an amphibious strike task force to support the nation’s policy of forward naval presence. The key to weathering the adjustment process is to determine the right number of attack boats, their missions, and em- ployment/deployment options—all of which are receiving unprecedented coverage in the open press.
No one can hide behind the cloak of intrigue that concealed the special missions our submarine force has executed so capably in the recent past, missions as dangerous and real as those scripted by novelist Clancy. A truly balanced naval force of ships, aircraft, Marines, and attack submarines must be carefully articulated to those who work inside the Washington Beltway, as well as all those Americans who provide the tax dollars.
It is indeed a “Hunt for a New Mission By October
Captain O’Neil is a surface warfare officer with eight shipboard tours and two Washington staff tours.
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