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By Norman Polmar, Author, Guide to the Soviet Navy
Loose Nukes
The breakup of the Soviet Union promises to accelerate the transfer of weapons to Third World countries, some of which have long threatened western naval forces: The use of sea mines by North Korea at Wonsan in 1950 and by Iraq in the Persian Gulf in 1991; the antiship missiles launched by Egyptians against the Israeli destroyer Eilat in 1967 and by Argentinians against British ships off the Falklands in 1982 have demonstrated the effectiveness of both low- and high-technology weapons in the hands of even minor Third World military forces.
Some small, mobile nuclear warheads can easily be transferred from state to state. Will they wind up in the hands of friend or foe?
The beneficiaries of the dissolution of the Soviet Union and massive reductions in Western military forces will be Third World military forces. Most threatening is the potential for—in the Soviet vernacular—“weapons of mass destruction.” When the Soviet Union ceased to exist on 31 December 1991 there were some 27,000 nuclear weapons in 12 of the newly established republics and in Russian surface ships and submarines.' The most secure weapons appear to be the 1,387 intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) in the four republics and 912 submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) in 59 Russian-controlled strategic missile submarines.2 Other shipboard nuclear weapons as well as the larger, fixed-site antiaircraft/antimissile weapons also appear relatively secure in those republics.
Less clear is the status of thousands of nuclear artillery shells held by former units of the Soviet Ground Forces and aircraft weapons—bombs and missiles— held by the former Soviet Air Forces. These weapons lack the centralized control provisions of the strategic weapons, and most are relatively portable. The older and smaller nuclear weapons may lack effective protective devices. The threat from these weapons is their potential sale by military personnel to agents of Third World nations. In fact, a few months ago a group of Soviets attempted to sell new tanks “privately” to an unnamed country.
Although many Third World nations have Soviet-built ships, aircraft, and missile launchers, it is questionable whether they could properly prepare the nuclear weapons for launching. However, with the deteriorating economic conditions in the former Soviet republics, the possibility is strong that weapons will be sold or stolen, and that troops with special nuclear expertise (as well as civilian technical personnel) will make themselves available to Third World countries. A recent report of the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency is said to estimate that there are 5,000 nuclear experts in the republics who could help a Third World nation develop nuclear weapons. Some experts have already received offers—a1 least twice already—from Libya. Vyacheslav Rosanov, a deputy chief of Russia’s I. V. Kurchatov Institute of Atomic Energy, told the newspaper USA Today that Libya had twice offered two of his colleagues jobs paying much more than their ■. current salaries. The first offer, Rosanov said, came last summer for positions at Libya’s Tajura Nuclear Research Center during a conference in Moscow.1 (Soviets built the Tajura facility in 1982 and maintained it through at least 1985.) The second proposals came last December, with offers to the two scientists of monthly salaries of $2,000 each—much higher than their Russian income. “I’m scared this is just the beginning,” said Rosanov. There have also been recent reports of Iraq attempting to hire Russian nuclear specialists.
Former Soviet technical personnel in other weapon fields—including chemical weapons—also are targets for Third World recruiters. Beyond the specter of individuals selling weapons and knowhow to Third World countries is the probable acceleration of legitimate weapon sales to Third World nations. During the past couple of decades the “big five” nations—the United States, Soviet Union, China, France, and Britain—were the primary arms sellers to the Third World, This situation will most likely continue- With defense budgets being cut in those nations, there will be increased impetus for their defense industries to sell abroad in an effort to stay in business.
For example, while several Russian aircraft production lines are being shut down, their salesmen are traveling around the world, and Russian demonstration aircraft—some in foreign markings—arc seen frequently at air shows. Iran has already taken advantage of this situation: it is purchasing Su-24 Fencer high-speed, long-range strike aircraft and MiG-29 Fulcrum advanced air-intercept fighters as well as other Russian weapons.
Reportedly, Russian agents have offered to sell Israel every conventional weapon in the Russian arsenal at reduced
Table 1 Estimated Soviet Nuclear Weapons*
Republic | Strategic Forces** | Ground Forces | Air Defense Forces | Air Forces | Navy*** | Total |
Russia | 9,650 | 2,600 | 1,450 | 1,725 | 2,750 | 19,000 |
Ukraine | 1,300 | 930 | 125 | 1,050 | 500 | 4,000 |
Kazakhstan | 1,500 | 450 | 125 | 75 | ______ | 1,800 |
Belorussia | 100 | 270 | 125 | 575 | 150 | 1,250 |
Georgia | — | 120 | 75 | 125 | _ | 320 |
Azerbaijan | — | 120 | 75 | 100 | _ | 300 |
Armenia | ______ | 120 | 75 | ______ | _ | 200 |
Turkmenia | _ | 30 | 75 | 20 | ______ | 125 |
Uzbekistan | ______ | 30 | 75 |
|
| 105 |
Moldova | ______ | ______ | 50 | 40 | _ | 90 |
Kirgizia | ______ | . | 75 | _ |
| 75 |
Tajikstan Baltic | — | — | 75 | — | — | 75 |
Republics**** | — | 120 | 450 | 285 | ______ | 855 |
Total | 12,200 | 4,800 | 2,800 | 4,000 | 3,400 | 27,000 |
Source: Robert S. Norris and William M. Arkin, “Nuclear Notebook: Where the Weapons Are,” The Bulletin of Atomic Scientists (November 1991), pp. 48-49.
Includes strategic bomber weapons, ICBMs, and SLBMs; weapons for “medium” bombers (Backfire, Badger, Blinder) are listed under Air Forces and Navy totals.
*+lP°CS not inc'utIc submarine-launched SLBMs.
"All nuclear weapons were removed from the three Baltic republics prior to their achieving independence.
ficials
seek out foreign commercial con-
The
re'gn customers for the same reasons, resulting competition will lead to an
Pnces but on a cash basis. The Israelis (,ave rejected the offer, in part because eir maintenance, training, and logis- lcs infrastructure are now based on U.S. Weapons.
On the naval side, the Russians will ntinue offering modern weapons to respective buyers. Indeed, in December s ^ee modern Kilo-class diesel attack g1! marines were transferred from the ac.k Sea Fleet to Iran. Additional sub- arines, as well as surface ships, are eing offered for sale while shipyard ofsacts P°r hulls that will take up shipway ^Pace previously occupied by cruisers, sit 'erS' anc* destroyers. The submarine Nation is more difficult; a yard that 11 cruisers can easily convert to build- js® merchant ships, but a submarine yard fQrnore specialized and is poorly suited r commercial ship construction, urther, the “conversion” of military Colpyards to other products will be time- sk'li'Uming' ProbaWy w'll require fewer tern eC* Wor^ers- ar|d will destroy the po- j0rla b)r a long-term rebuilding of naval ejrCes’ Accordingly, the incentive for for- warship sales is considerable. and Vlli^arly> British, Chinese, French, for»; ^ defense industries are seeking
increase in offers of more sophisticated weapons to the Third World. There will be political efforts by the major nations to limit the sales of advanced weapons, but on a practical basis this will probably have little impact aside from nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons. In the current world environment, however, other countries will support the acquisition of even these weapons by Third World nations.
As noted above, former Soviet technical specialists in these fields are being sought by some nations. There are reports that Saddam Hussein has sent nuclear material and scientists to Algeria, prompting some Western intelligence analysts to fear the two countries have formed a “nuclear axis” to build an atomic bomb. According to the British press, more than ten metric tons of natural uranium were successfully smuggled past the allied military blockade before the first United Nations nuclear inspection teams arrived in Iraq last May.4 Official British sources believe that the joint Algerian-Iraqi program could produce two nuclear weapons of about 20 kilotons every three years. China has also been reported to be assisting Algeria in this endeavor.
Pakistan is said to be continuing nuclear weapons work to counter the superior Indian military forces. (India detonated a nuclear weapon in 1974.) The United States cut off all military and economic aid to Pakistan in October 1990 because of this nuclear program. On the other hand, both France and China have been assisting Pakistan with nuclear reactor development.
In January 1992, the Bush Administration revealed that Pakistan apparently had acquired the components for two nuclear weapons. The previous director of U.S. naval intelligence, Rear Admiral Thomas A. Brooks, had observed earlier: “A war between these antagonists—both more heavily armed and equipped than ever before—could possibly include the nightmare scenario of a nuclear exchange.”5
In addition to the “big five,” Israel and possibly India now have nuclear weapons; beyond Pakistan, Algeria, and Libya, some degree of nuclear weapons development is underway in Iran and possibly several South American nations as well. These nuclear efforts constitute a major threat to world peace, of course, but it is also important to note that late in 1991 South Africa abandoned its nuclear weapons program; and on the last day of 1991 North and South Korea initiated a joint declaration banning nuclear weapons from the Korean peninsula. (The latter action also forces the withdrawal of all U.S. tactical nuclear weapons from the Republic of Korea.)
The spread of chemical weapons also continues with little or no sign of abating, despite abortive international attempts to control the exports of components for such weapons. Fourteen countries outside of NATO and former Warsaw Pact countries currently have an offensive chemical warfare capability. Some of these countries are likely to assist others in developing such weapons. U.S. intelligence has identified ten additional countries that are either developing or seeking an offensive chemical capability.
Less is known about biological weapons (BW) in the Third World. Syria has an offensive BW capability and at least five other nations have offensive programs in varying stages of development. (Iraq had both chemical and biological weapons in addition to its nuclear development program.)
Meanwhile, several Third World countries are seeking to increase their conventional weapons capability. Here, too, denial by the United States or even a bloc of nations does little to deter proliferation. For example, although the United States has denied Pakistan further military aircraft or support for those on hand, France is selling the Pakistanis at least two squadrons of Mirage 2000 fighter- bombers. And, in December 1991 the vice president of the Russian Republic visited the Pakistani capital of Islamabad to offer the latest Russian weapons. Italy and China are also making proposals.
While the “big five” and other NATO nations are the major suppliers of weapons, several Third World nations are themselves manufacturing weapons that they must sell if their defense industries are to survive. These include relatively low-technology systems, from helmets and training aircraft from South American countries, to advanced electronic systems and the Barak shipboard missile defense system from Israel.
In aggregate, the future weapons potential for Third World countries is essentially unlimited. The breakup of the Soviet Union exacerbates the situation, especially with respect to nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons. In consequence, the challenge to U.S. military forces in future crises and conflicts could be formidable.
'Table 1 provides an unofficial estimate of Soviet nuclear weapon deployments in late 1991.
Apparently all surface ships and submarines still carrying nuclear weapons are in the Russian-controlled Northern (Arctic) and Pacific Fleets; there is a possibility that nuclear weapons do remain in a few antisubmarine cruisers of the Black Sea Fleet.
’Jack Kelley, “Russian Nuke Experts Wooed,” USA Today (8 January 1992), p. 1.
4”Saddam Helps Algeria Make Islamic Nuclear Bomb,” The Sunday Times (5 January 1992), p- 1- sRAdm. Thomas A. Brooks, U.S. Navy, statement before the House Armed Services Committee, 7 March 1991.
One Hundred Days
The Memoirs of the Falklands Battle Group Commander
by Admiral Sandy Woodward, with Patrick Robinson Foreword by The Rt. Hon. Margaret Thatcher
At times reflective and personal, at other times revealing the steely logic of a brilliant military tactician, this engrossing memoir of the Falklands War takes the reader to the vast waters of the South Atlantic as hopes for peace fade and strategies of war evolve and become a reality. From the defeat of the Argentine air forces to the sinking of the Belgranoand the daring amphibious landing at Carlos Water, the commander of the Royal Navy's task force provides the inside story of what really happened.
Admiral Woodward’s account not only presents the complete naval picture from the British side of the battle, both the successes and the failures, but also imparts his perceptions, fears, and reactions to seemingly disastrous events. His chronicle of the events in which he played a major role is both fascinating to read and a significant addi tion to the official record.
384 pages. 12 pages of photographs.
18 drawings by the Admiral. 6'Ax9V2 inches. ISBN 1-55750-651-5.
(Publication date: April 1992)
List Price: $24.95
Special USNI Members-Only 25%-Off
Prepublication Price $18.71.
(Now through 1 June 1992)