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By Lieutenant James E. Meason, U.S. Naval Reserve
Canada’s Navy has experienced the rollercoaster ride of big plans and budget cuts. The current defense policy includes ambitious construction and acquisition plans— here, HMCS Halifax, lead ship in the Canadian Patrol Frigate program—but how well the plans will survive remains to be seen.
Over the past few years, and especially the last several months, nations around the world have had to reassess their foreign and national security policies to adapt to the striking changes underway throughout the world. Beginning with Mikhail Gorbachev’s public-relations offensive in the mid-1980s and continuing with the fall of the Berlin Wall in November 1989, the subsequent decline of world communism, the dramatic changes in East/West relations, the dissolution of the Soviet Union, and the Gulf War, capitals around the world are scrambling to balance domestic and foreign agendas.
These dramatic and unforeseen events have had a powerful effect on Canadian politics, and—in combination with Canada’s budget deficits and failed constitutional reform—have brought pressure on Prime Minister Brian Mulroney’s administration to slash defense spending in favor of domestic programs.1 Even though a weakened Mulroney won reelection in 1988, he reshuffled his cabinet to concentrate on domestic issues, particularly Canada’s federal budget deficit of about $30.5 billion (U.S.). Underscoring this new alignment was the appointment of William McKnight, an individual with no previous defense experience, as Minister of National Defence. This was a clear signal that Mulroney intended to deemphasize national security and abandon significant modernization programs announced only a year previously. Just a few short months later (April 1989) came the announcement by Finance Minister Michael Wilson, formally declaring Canada’s intention to implement $2.3 billion in defense cuts by 1994.
While this may have placated many Canadians, Mulroney has been unable to put Canada’s domestic ills behind him. The June 1991 failure to resolve the constitutional reform crisis and the ongoing unity crisis (a push by Quebec for autonomy and for recognition of the right of Indians and Inuit to self-government) have caused Mulroney himself to be blamed for Canada’s ills.2-3 His government’s standing has never been lower, and various polls put his approval rating at about 15%. The latest Gallup poll (Summer 1991) showed that 68% of Canadians believed Mulroney should resign, and, even within his own Progressive Conservative party, only 56% felt he should continue as party leader.
1987 Defense White Paper. Given this political and economic background, it is not surprising that Canada’s defense posture has swung like a pendulum from one extreme to the other over the last several years. Although a founding member of NATO, Canada traditionally has accorded a low priority to defense. Before the recent events in Eastern Europe, most Canadians believed the Soviet Union posed the greatest threat to Western security but felt that any attack on Canada would occur only as part of a larger strike on the United States. Implicit in this view was a U.S. obligation to protect Canada. Such an attitude resulted in a low regard for the Soviet threat and an inadequate defense posture for many years.
Pressure from Canada’s allies and a growing publie awareness that military capabilities were rapidly eroding- combined with the Conservative party’s victory in 1984. led to a formal reevaluation of Canada’s defense needs- National security became the focus of government planners, and their efforts were brought to the public’s attention in 1987 with the publication of a new defense policy, Canada’s first major overhaul of strategic thought in 16 years.4 It prompted the most vigorous peacetime debate on defense and national security in Canadian history-
The White Paper emphasized reequipping Canadian maritime forces, including improved capabilities for Arctic operations, while streamlining Ottawa’s European commitments. Calling for increased defense spending and ambitious construction and acquisition programs, the White Paper was, to some, “an extraordinary expression of political will and tactical cunning.” To others, it represented a blueprint for economic disaster.5
Post-White Paper Austerity. The commitment to an enhanced national security posture was short-lived, as world events and a downturn in Canada’s economy intervened
Th,
to lessen public support for the increased defense expenditures mandated by the White Paper. The Canadian military saw its priority decline significantly, and a large number of programs for reequipping the services were either slowed or abandoned.
Today, faced with outmoded NATO missions—e.g., its ground forces’ role to stop an invasion from Czechoslovakia; aircraft that can no longer reach the enemy, given the Soviet withdrawals from Eastern Europe; and a navy charged with protecting sea lines of communication (SLOC)—Canada has decided to reduce dramatically its ^ATO commitment and its uniformed strength.6 Another new defense policy was announced in September 1991, Us key feature being Ottawa’s decision to close its two European bases. At the same time, however, Canada underscored its commitment to the North American Air Defense Modernization Program and existing Canadian naval obligations.
e Canadian Maritime Forces
At the end of World War II, Canada had the third-largest Ueet in the world, with more than 300 corvettes, destroy- ^rs> and frigates, two cruisers, and an aircraft carrier, demobilization and budget cuts forced major reductions, |*nd, by the end of 1946, most of Canada’s fleet had °een consigned to the breakers—its complement reduced rom 100,000 to 20,000.7 The 1970s were even worse for k-anada’s navy, following the armed forces unification, which began in 1968 and was strongly opposed by most ()1 the admirals then in command. Several unsympathetic ederal governments downgraded the fleet’s role and left it starved for new ships and equipment. However, the commissioning of four Tribal-class destroyers, designed and built to Canadian specifications, was a positive development.8 Today, major fleet assets consist of only 3 Oberon-class diesel submarines, the 4 Tribal-class destroyers, and 14 frigates.
Rethinking Defense Requirements. In the early 1980s, a series of parliamentary concerns—including sovereignty, territorial jurisdiction, exclusive economic zone protection, and the security of maritime passages—emerged that forced a reassessment of national strategy. Exacerbating the situation was the 1985 transit of the U.S. Coast Guard icebreaker Polar Sea (WAGB-11) through the Northwest Passage, which underscored the U.S. refusal to recognize Canadian claims to sovereignty of certain waterways adjacent to Canadian territory and Canada’s inability to exercise sovereignty in the northernmost latitudes.9-10 U.S. and British submarine exercises under the ice, such as those announced in May 1987, continued to focus Canadian attention on its northernmost territories. Also contributing to the reappraisal of Canadian strategy was the increase in Soviet submarine under-ice capability, the modernization of Soviet naval power in the Pacific, and Canada’s increasing dependence on the Pacific market for its economic livelihood.
Pursuant to those concerns, the Canadian Navy prepared a study in early 1985 on the strategic and financial impact of acquiring nuclear-powered attack submarines (SSNs); the purchase of 10-12 was advocated." To find the necessary funds, the navy had to change its original ship construction plans, cutting the number of frigates from 24 to 12 and eliminating 6 diesel submarines (SSs).12
Maritime Boundary Dispute
On 30 October 1991, Canada declared the waters of Dixon Entrance were internal, but it also granted the United States “prior blanket approval” for U.S.
(but not allied) submarine transits to and from a U.S. acoustic facility, which opened in November near Ketchikan in the Alaskan panhandle.
The United States had not requested and will not request permission to transit the area. At least one Canadian Parliamentarian, upset with what he perceived to be his government’s de facto relinquishment of sovereignty, called for a blockade of the facility.
The announcement highlighted a long-standing maritime boundary dispute dating to a 1903 decision by a U.S./U.K. arbitration tribunal, which established the “A-B” line dividing the U.S. and Canadian territories. Canada claims the line also delineates the maritime boundary (meaning Dixon Entrance would be Canadian internal waters, with no
U.S. transit rights), while the United States contends the agreement relates only to the land
boundary, with the maritime boundary being an equidistant line through the area.
Of the four maritime boundary disagreements and one naval passage dispute between the two
countries, Dixon Entrance is the only dispute, other than the Northwest Passage, that draws significant Canadian political and public attention. Environmental and safety concerns related to submarine transits are complicated by commercial fishing interests. This has resulted in several incidents between fishermen and Coast Guards of both countries.
Canada is especially sensitive about sovereignty issues, and, when faced with the imminent opening of the U.S. acoustic facility, Ottawa’s announcement protected its legal position while attempting to keep the lid on domestic political pressures. Canada has successfully walked a political tightrope since that time, balancing domestic concerns against its relationship with the United States, and has kept this dispute from escalating into a major public controversy.
J. E. Meason
The White Paper, the Navy, and Budget Realities. The 1987 White Paper outlined by Defence Minister Perrin Beatty drew upon the Canadian concerns to call for increased defense spending of 2% each year for 15 years and to expand Canada’s maritime concerns beyond its traditional Atlantic and Pacific focus to include the Arctic.1’ The acquisition of 8-12 SSNs was the centerpiece of the sovereignty issue, as External Affairs Minister Joe Clark attempted to gain Parliamentary approval for the SSN acquisition program based on Arctic sovereignty concerns, countering U.S. influence in Canadian affairs, and countering the Soviet threat.14 Canadian admirals welcomed
the SSN program with open arms, as that type of platform would give Canada “independence at sea.” The construction of six frigates also was planned.
Responding to the fundamental concerns of the Canadian public concerning U.S. power and influence i° Canada, Canadian leaders believed their national defense policy had to strengthen their country’s sovereignty. Political leaders recognized the strong undercurrent of antagonism toward the United States among most Canadians, owing, in their view, to the pervasive U.S- involvement in Canadian affairs. Canadian governments, particularly the current Conservative government, believe
that appearing to placate U.S. interests endangers their domestic standing. To many Canadians, the White Paper’s recommendations for a bolstered defense, particularly the SSN, satisfied a deep-seated desire to safeguard against U-S. infringements on Canadian sovereignty.
A vociferous public debate ensued over the new defense strategy, focusing on the wisdom of the SSN acquisition Program. There was marginal popular support for the program, and opposition parties strongly criticized the defense minister’s hard-sell tactics. Substantive opposition to the SSNs stemmed from their high costs and fears that their acquisition would contribute to the arms race or draw Canada into the U.S. maritime strategy. Moreover, the SSN program had been linked too closely to the Arctic sovereignty issue; it was criticized as an expensive way to enforce sovereignty when other vessels, such as icebreakers, could do the job.15
In light of Washington’s frequent criticism of Canada’s c°ntribution to NATO, Ottawa assumed from the outset
that Washington would support the SSN program. The U.S. government, however, opposed the purchase of SSNs, as it would have precluded any other major defense mod- emizations and would have interfered with U.S. submarine operations, complicating an already touchy U.S./Cana- riian maritime relationship.'6 But, during a summit meeting w'th Mulroney in April 1988, President Ronald Reagan Publicly announced that the administration would support a British request to allow the transfer to Canada of U.S.- designed nuclear propulsion technology associated with the Trafalgar-class SSN.17 This announcement was calculated to strengthen the U.S./Canadian relationship, know- 'n8 that the U.S. Congress would remain a major, and "test likely fatal, hindrance to the supply of nuclear fuel."1
Gutting of the White Paper. For the Canadian military, 1989 was a year of disaster; the programs of the ^hite Paper were dashed by federal budget realities. The year began well enough, with the Conservative government newly reelected and the armed forces looking forward to implementing some White Paper programs. The navy, for its part, was confident that it would soon be able t° choose an SSN design.19 Confronted by a huge budget deficit and polls indicating a public dislike for anything nuclear, Finance Minister Wilson announced Ottawa’s intention to cut $2.3 billion from the defense budget through 1994, which effectively eliminated the SSN program and funding for other White Paper plans.20
In light of these events, and with the rapid deescalation °f the East/West conflict, the Canadian military viewed lts contribution to and role in NATO as a token force, and Subsequently believed that equipment modernization should be given top priority. It wanted to be released from 'Is NATO commitments by 1992. With Iraq’s invasion °f Kuwait in the summer of 1990, and the multinational tesponse to Iraq’s aggression, Canada’s military jumped at the opportunity to participate in a meaningful opera- ri°n. Canadian units, including CF-18 aircraft and four sJrips, deployed over the ensuing months to the Kuwaiti heater of operations.21 Back at home, however, the Cana- ■an government was criticized by opposition politicians and the public for spending large sums on the Gulf crisis instead of social programs. Ottawa also was chastised for following the United States too closely and for destroying Canada’s image as a peacemaker.
Canada’s New Defense Policy
On 17 September 1991, Defence Minister Marcel Masse announced a “new defense policy” that reduces projected defense spending and personnel over the next 15 years, but stressed that Canada would retain a military capability to respond to new global realities.22 Citing the changes under way in Eastern Europe and the consequential move from “a straightforward scenario of East-West confrontation to an ill-defined, relatively uncertain situation,” he called for the closure of Canada’s two European bases of Baden-Soellingen and Lahr, Germany, in 1994 and 1995, respectively, and for a reduction in uniformed personnel from 84,000 to 76,000 (9.5%) over three years.23 Not all of the savings from the various cuts will go back into the coffers, however, because significant amounts will be earmarked for the procurement of military equipment.24
Implications for the Navy. Despite reductions in Canada’s overall force structure, the new defense policy ostensibly calls for a reequipped navy. The fleet is slated to be restructured over the next 15 years to include up to 16 destroyers and frigates, 2 replenishment ships, 6 diesel submarines, 1 diving support ship, 12 naval reserve patrol ships, and 4 corvettes. This inventory will necessitate the construction and/or acquisition of 3 SSs, completion of the 11 remaining City-class frigates on order, and construction of 4 corvettes and 12 patrol ships, with the entire 1950s-60s vintage frigate force and 1 replenishment oiler being decommissioned by 2000. Navy officials hope the new diesel submarines will incorporate air-independent propulsion systems. Navy active-duty personnel strengths are slated to remain constant, with no change from the present manning level of 10,000. The primary reserve will increase by 500, to 5,000, and the supplementary reserve will increase to 3,500, from 2,000.
It appears that the formulation of a new defense policy was a closely held political endeavor with limited military (or at least limited navy) involvement. At the change- of-command ceremony for Canada’s Commander of Maritime Command (CNO equivalent) just two months earlier, outgoing Vice Admiral Robert George (who would become Deputy Chief of Defence Staff) pleaded for the publication of a defense policy to provide a rational foundation for executing the perceived defense cuts.
The importance to the Canadian Navy of the September announcement must be analyzed as much for what was said as for what went unsaid. The navy’s mission was scaled back from one encompassing three oceans to the traditional Atlantic and Pacific focus.25 While this represents a fundamental change in defense policy, no de facto change was felt, as Canada already lacked the ability to exercise sovereignty in its northern waters.26-27 The official mission of the navy was given more of a coastguard cast, focusing on sovereignty enforcement and nontraditional roles, such as drug and illegal alien interdiction.28 The NATO mission of SLOC protection has been explicitly downgraded, while other traditional roles were implicit casualties as well.
Outlook
The return to a de jure two-ocean focus is in line with the navy’s past, present, and future capabilities, and most importantly, is in line with Canadian attitudes regarding sovereignty. The navy will be able to operate effectively off all but the northernmost areas of its Atlantic and Pacific coastlines, but it will be unable to exercise sovereignty in the Arctic Ocean because of a total lack of ice-strengthened ships suitable for arctic conditions. The Canadian Air Force is slated to become increasingly involved in maritime surveillance; it will operate three Arctic and maritime surveillance aircraft in the northernmost territories.
While Canadian sensitivity to the potential threat posed by Soviet operations in the Arctic and north Pacific oceans has been diminished by current trends in East/West relations, Canada views the nonpermissive use of its land, water, or airspace by any foreign military as a violation of, and threat to, its sovereignty. Canadians have a special interest in the Arctic, and the Canadian government, universities, and research institutions carry out diverse scientific and technical research programs in that region. While the latest plans call for increased air force participation in maritime surveillance, rather than for ice-strengthened ships to maintain a northern presence, the Canadian government evidently feels that surveillance of its northern territories will suffice to enforce its sovereignty. Maintenance of a presence is cost-prohibitive and, as a consequence, nearly impossible politically.
In terms of platforms and personnel, the navy appears to have weathered Canada’s defense reorganization rather well. It remains to be seen, however, if the September 1991 announcement will become a paper tiger like its predecessor, the 1987 White Paper. There is no indication today that there exists within the Canadian government the political will to fight for the announced navy reequipment plans. One need look no farther than the decision to close the European bases before tackling the more difficult task of closing domestic bases to see that tremendous political battles lie just ahead. This will be compounded by federal elections that probably will be held in November 1992, and which must be held by November 1993. Further, force reductions and base closures must come early in the 15-year planning cycle to provide funding for such plans. Just as the U.S. base-closure process turned into a raucous affair, the Canadian experience promises to be quite similar, including calls for “peace dividends” to be used for domestic programs. In a nutshell, the government will be hard pressed to see its plans for the navy come to fruition, to say the least.
among all the Provinces to amend the Constitution. Meech Lake collapsed because two Provinces, Manitoba and Newfoundland, failed to endorse it.
The June 1991 report of the Citizens’ Forum on Canada’s Future (Spicer Committee) indicated that many feel Mulroney is to blame for the country’s problems. 4Challenge and Commitment: A New Defence Policy for Canada (known hereinafter as the White Paper).
5S. Smith, “Beefed-up Defence Program Part of Ottawa’s Abrupt Turn,” The Globe and Mail, 29 June 87, p. A.7., cited in J. McGee, “Call to Action in the Arctic,” March 1988 Proceedings pp. 89-97, 91. hOfficially known as the Maritime Command.
7J. Harbron, “Canada’s Independence at Sea,” March 1988 Proceedings pp. 94-99, 94.
•Id., at 95.
The Northwest Passage is the sea route that links the Atlantic and the Pacific north of the American continent.
'The status of what is loosely referred to as the Northwest Passage is a major issue in the Arctic contentions between Canada and the United States. Canada claims the waters are internal while the United States insists they are international- With regard to the Polar Sea incident, Ottawa was informed of the transit but permission was not sought. Canadian P-3s and ships shadowed the Polar Sea, and Canadian nationalists dropped rock-weighted messages and maple leaf flags onto its deck. T. Pullen, “What Price Canadian Sovereignty?” September 1987 Proceedings, pp. 66-72, 70.
"Jean Jacques Blair, Trudeau’s last defense minister, was actually the first to publicly call for SSNs, but came out with his position only a few months before Pierre Trudeau left office in June of 1984. Although then-candidate Brian Mulroney promised the continued expansion of the armed forces during the 1984 federal election campaign, he did not include SSNs in his platform. Harbron, supra, note 8 at 95.
l2Harbron, supra, note 8 at 97.
1J“We will provide the navy with modem, capable vessels for operations in the three oceans contiguous to our territory: the Atlantic, the Pacific and the Arctic.’ White Paper, supra, note 4 at 49.
l4The foundation of the new maritime posture was to have been a “fleet of nuclear- powered submarines to enhance the overall effectiveness of the Canadian Navy.’ White Paper, supra note 4 at 52.
I5P. Taggart, “Closing the Gap,” March 1988 Proceedings, pp. 92-93, 92.
16 Today, there are four maritime boundary disputes and one naval passage dispute between the United States and Canada. Further, one of the maritime boundary disputes involves access to a U.S. acoustic facility in the Alaskan panhandle, and thus possesses the characteristics of a naval passage dispute.
"Canada was considering both the Trafalgar-class and a modification of the French Amethyste-class SSN designs.
'"Congress would have had to pass an amendment to a 1959 nuclear agreement with Canada to ensure the supply of nuclear fuel for the Trafalgar-class SSNs. I9N. Friedman, “West European and NATO Navies,” March 1990 Proceedings, pp- 116-129, 117.
There existed a split in the Canadian cabinet between Defence Minister Beatty on the pro-SSN side pitted against External Affairs Minister Joe Clark and Finance Minister Wilson.
Tribal DDs 281 Huron and 282 Athabaskan, mod-Restigouche FF 259 Terra Nova, and Protecteur AOR 509 Protecteur.
"Statement by the Honorable Marcel Masse, member of Parliament for Frontenac and Minister of National Defence, at the National Press Theater, 17 September 1991.
“Civilian employees will fall from 32,000 to 31,000.
The Canadian government estimates that maintaining combat units in Europe a1 their current level costs about $880 million (U.S.) per year and that savings from the withdrawal will be roughly $9.5 billion (U.S.) over the 15-year period.
“The Navy will in future focus its activities primarily in our areas of responsi' bility off our east and west coasts . . .” Supra note 23.
The 1987 White Paper outlined Canada’s intention to protect its northern interests via strengthened defenses.
“Canada does not have a single naval ship capable of sustained Arctic operations- “The official mission of the Navy will be to: “maintain the capability to conduct surveillance and control in waters under Canadian jurisdiction; maintain a balanced surface, subsurface and air capability; focus on systems providing flexibility and versatility; decrease emphasis on capabilities required for protection of sea lines of communication; promote the total force by increasing involvement of naval reserves; increase surveillance capability in the Arctic; and increase capability 1° support other government departments for fisheries protection, drug interdiction, environmental monitoring, apprehending illegal immigrants, and protecting economic zone resources.” Background papers to Defence Minister Masse’s statement of 17 September 1991.
'A June 1988 Gallup poll showed that 33% of Canadians were in favor of Mul- roney submitting his resignation.
The need for reform arose from Quebec’s refusal to accept the 1982 Constitution unless certain demands were met. The 1987 Meech Lake Accord sought to meet these demands, the most notable of which was the recognition of Quebec as a “distinct society” within Canada. Quebec may have been the proximate cause of the crisis, but the fundamental problem lies in the Constitution itself—the need for virtual unanimity
Lieutenant Meason, an attorney with the Research and Special Programs Admin' istration of the Department of Transportation, just completed a temporary active duty tour with a defense intelligence agency. His reserve affiliation is with the Office of Naval Intelligence. He earned his bachelor’s degree from Southern Illinois University, a master’s degree from Georgetown University, and a juris doctor degree from The American University.