This html article is produced from an uncorrected text file through optical character recognition. Prior to 1940 articles all text has been corrected, but from 1940 to the present most still remain uncorrected. Artifacts of the scans are misspellings, out-of-context footnotes and sidebars, and other inconsistencies. Adjacent to each text file is a PDF of the article, which accurately and fully conveys the content as it appeared in the issue. The uncorrected text files have been included to enhance the searchability of our content, on our site and in search engines, for our membership, the research community and media organizations. We are working now to provide clean text files for the entire collection.
The Soviet View—Changing in 1990
By Captain William H. J. Manthorpe, U.S. Navy (Retired)
For the Soviet Union, 1990 was a year : °f political, social, and economic turmoil. The resultant uncertainty permeated all levels of Soviet society and affected all Soviet citizens. In earlier times, that uncertainty would have been met With increased communist political activ- *ty and propaganda. Today, however, the Communist Party has given up the “leading role” formerly assigned to it by the Soviet constitution, and its monopoly on Political activity is challenged by democratic and nationalistic opposition elements. Its grip on the national propaganda apparatus has been loosened by , Glasnost.
The Soviet Union has long maintained that its military is a “microcosm of Soviet society” and held that the factors affecting Soviet society also affect the military. That is true today, with the national Political, social, and economic turmoil bringing uncertainty to the professional and personal lives of all servicemen. In the past, the Soviet naval leadership, in
conjunction with the party, would have countered that uncertainty by political and propaganda means. One of the ways would have been through the pages of Morskoy Sbornik, the Soviet Navy’s monthly journal.
During the 1980s, the first section of the journal was titled “Political Affairs and Education,” devoted several lengthy articles in each issue to those topics. In past times of uncertainty on an issue of personal or professional importance to naval personnel, that section would have carried a strong editorial or a lead article by a representative of the Political Directorate of the Soviet Navy to state the party line and resolve uncertainty. Further, on such occasions as the 26th and 27th Congresses of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, the journal included new sections to prepare the readers for, report on the results of, and urge compliance with the resolutions coming out of those congresses.
In the 1980s, the journal’s second section was titled either “Theory” or “Naval Strategy.” Over the years this section published articles intended to further the development of the Soviet naval operational art and strategy. At other times, the journal carried an additional section devoted to the present achievements of the Soviet Navy and its future goals. On major holidays, such as Armed Forces Day in February and Navy Day in July, self-congratulatory articles on the technological progress and military might of Soviet ships and weapon systems and laudatory articles on the operational prowess of Soviet navymen were published to boost the confidence of the personnel and further allay any uncertainty.
Morskoy Sbornik. of course, formerly rounded out its slate with other departments containing articles on leadership and training, navigation and maintenance, and descriptions of foreign weapon systems.
In 1990, the contents of Morskoy Sbornik started off just about the same, but
The political turmoil in the Soviet Union has created real problems for the Soviet Navy. The navy must keep faith with its personnel while trying to justify its reason for being with the political leadership.
gradually underwent changes. No longer assured of the Communist Party loyalty or ideological purity of its subordinates and no longer having a monopoly on information about national and naval affairs, Soviet naval leaders had to modify how they communicated with their personnel. The issues on which naval personnel were trying to form their own views were considerably more diverse in 1990, and there were considerably more sources of information available from which to shape those views. Thus, the topics which the naval leaders had to address and the ways in which they tried to influence military views on those topics changed.
The lead political section was replaced by “The Times and the Navy.” In January, that section still contained a typical article on political training and education by the Chief of the Propaganda and Agitation Section of the Political Directorate of the Navy to initiate the training year. In February, an editorial and an article by the First Deputy Chief of the Political Administration of the Baltic Fleet set out the party line on the navy’s attitude toward the political turmoil in the Baltic Republics. Throughout the year, this section published a few other clearly political articles written by political officers, showing the continued link between the military leadership and the party. Nevertheless, by the end of the year, strictly political education articles had been relegated to the “Education and Training” section.
By March, moreover, the lead section focused more on the issues most affecting the personal and professional lives of navy men. In a letter to the editor, one captain first-rank touched on most of the important personal issues worrying officers and proposed a professional solution. He wrote:
“Crisis phenomena are noted in the Armed Forces as they are in all our society.”
“The principal reasons for such a situation are a drop in prestige in the profession of regular military personnel, a change for the worse in society’s attitude toward them, and the neglect of social problems: housing, job placement, catastrophic shortages of children’s preschool establishments and schools in garrisons, and an absence of social guarantees for officers and their families after discharge into the reserves.”
“The crisis can be overcome only by profound and comprehensive reform. Its ultimate objective must be actual battle readiness, combat-effectiveness, mobility, and the ability to accomplish assigned missions with quality both in peace and wartime. There is no question that servicemen’s professionalism has to grow and, in my view, its highest level is attainable only in a professional military . . . .” “The opinion is widespread that transition to a professional military will require too many material, above all financial, expenditures. ... the necessary funds can be sought within the existing budget if a serious change is made in the structure of our armed forces.”
“The following can be sources of material and financial means: a quantitative reduction of the Armed Forces staffs, political entities, some military districts, schools, academies, and military scientific research institutes; withdrawal of Soviet forces from all socialist countries; cessation of free military and military technical assistance to other states; and a reduction in the number of positions in the category of general admiral.”
In April a retired rear admiral highlighted the same problems and the same solution. He maintained that it is necessary to: “ . . . create normal, I emphasize, normal living conditions for officers and warrant officers and their families in remote and not so remote, but squalid, Navy garrisons.” He asserted that the funds to do this should be available from “ . . . selling ship hulls that have fallen into disrepair . . . from profits of Navy
industry . . . reprocessing worn out equipment for various precious metals.’’ He stressed that the basic funds should result from the expenditures not required because of the reductions. But he offered “that it will cost much more than we will manage to save.”
In June, obviously having listened “and fulfilling a promise given to the readers,” the editors offered an article by a military economist, not a political officer as might have been the case in the past. The author of “How Much Does a Professional Cost?” acknowledged that:
“Supporters of the Army and Navy’s transition to a professional footing have many advantages. They have in their hands such trumps as ’ increased battle readiness, reduced accident rates, and strengthened discipline. . . . they appear to be progressive reformers, people who show concern for the homeland. Their opponents, correspondingly, appear to be such retrograde persons zealous for stability who do not wish to agree to any changes in the existing manpower acquisition system. As we know, the heads of the USSR Ministry of Defense also prove to be among the latter.”
He, then, presented the other side of the case that funds to improve the lot of navy personnel and, thus, their quality, and, from that, the readiness of the Soviet armed forces, should be available. To do so, he cited the details of increases in pay, benefits, and expenditures for housing, medical services, and other support required for the U.S. conversion to an all-volunteer force and, then, applied those figures to the detailed structure and situation of the Soviet armed forces. He stated that “these calculations seem . . . more realistic” than the assumptions of the letter writers. Nevertheless, he concluded that: “Taking into account socio-
Political, psychological, and economic ■actors, as well as the real processes occurring in our country ... it would be advisable to deepen ... the existing ■nixed method of USSR Armed Forces manpower acquisition with a subsequent Phased increase in the numerical strength °f professionals.”
In addition, during the year, this sec- ■■on carried articles on a variety of other topics of current interest. Such articles as Glasnost’ and Secrecy,” “The Homeless Naval Officer,” “Democracy and Law,” and an explanation of the organi- Zat'°n of the new Soviet government explained issues and situations to the reader rather than dictated an official view.
Soviet naval officers now have an opportunity to raise their concerns openly, share them with their fellow officers, and CxPect an informative response, even if it supports the leadership’s views. The proCess has changed. It remains to be seen 'vhether the end result will change.
That section of Morskoy Sbornik dedicated to the development of Soviet naval operational art and strategy—titled Naval Strategy”—also began the year as it had in the past. In January and Feb- roary it contained articles by the Commander in Chief of the Soviet Navy, Admiral Vladimir N. Chernavin, on The Battle on the Sea Lines of Communication, Lessons of War and the Present” (see “Rethinking Forces and Operations for Anti-SLOC Warfare,” pages 101-102, June 1990 Proceedings). But, by March this section began to change.
In that issue, the Editor in Chief of Morskoy Sbornik, Rear Admiral G. D. Agafonov, wrote on “The Naval Element.” He pointed out that:
“In our Motherland’s history . . . the Navy has riveted the eyes of society on itself more than once: not by brief flashes of interest after celebrated victories, but quite the reverse, serious attention was shown the Navy when suddenly the lack of conformity of naval capabilities to the tasks of a great power became apparent. Then people took to reevaluating its role in the past, discussed the degree of need in the present, and anticipated development paths in the future.”
That is just what the admiral, then, set out to do. He began by noting: “. . . people have looked for an opportunity to economize here [on the Navy] more than once. Those who scorned the lessons of history paid severely for the haughty attitude toward the experience of their predecessors and for the delusion that the time they were going through was quite exceptional and unique.” By surveying the navy’s role, he showed that when Russia had a strong navy it was a world power, and when the navy was neglected, the nation was not influential in the world.
At this point, the admiral turned to the present and stated, “Here we take another look at our naval element today and see that it is not as we would like to see it.” He identified certain factors which he saw as leading to a decline in Soviet naval power and, thus, according to his historical survey, Soviet national power. The first of those is inequality with Wtst- ern naval forces because of the inability to enter into naval arms control agreements. Another is the attempt to convert Soviet defense industrial capability to civilian ends, which he said “gives rise to a shudder.” But, most important, is “the attitude toward the Navy, toward the naval element itself ... (by the) people or, more correctly, their state institutions. . . . ” It is on that note which he concluded with a warning: “ ... the naval element is not a whim and not a beautiful toy. It still remains a stem necessity. And it is very important that it not be shoved aside for the umpteenth time among the numerous concerns which have befallen us and that our successors not have grounds to reproach us
your
A.P. Moller selected CHOCKFAST ORANGE ® to protect their investment in the world’s largest marine engine on the Majestic Maersk, a super container ship, constructed at the Odense Steel Shipyard Ltd. Wfc Insert Illustration: MAN B&W 12K90MC,
/[ 12 cylinder, 67 080 BHP.
urn
Philadelphia Resins
Box
309
Telephone
Montgomeryville, PA 18936
215
855
B450
Fax
215
855
4688
M
-________________________________________________________________
AIR RAID PEARL HARBOR
December 7,1941
IBM, APPLE II 50TH ANNIVERSARY
Computer Simulation with Graphics!
SEND S.A.S.E. OR CALL FOR DETAILS
GENERAL QUARTERS SOFTWARE
P.O. Box 1429 Torrance, CA 90505 (213) 547-0597 (800) 541-1411 (Outside CA)
NEWLY
COMMISSIONED?
Let us introduce you to membership in your professional organization with 3 FREE issues of Proceedings.
All newly commissioned officers and warrant officers in the Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard are eligible.
For information and sign up, contact:
Membership Services U.S. Naval Institute Annapolis, MD 21402 301/268-6110
NAVAL, MARITIME MILITARY & AVIATION BOOKS
Our quarterly catalogs contain 48pp. and over 1500 entries of mostly out-of-print books.
Our reasonable prices and excellent service are enjoyed by people like you who use and enjoy books. Judge for yourself. Send only $4.00 for the next 4 issues.
ANTHEIL
BOOKSELLERS
2177P Isabelle Court No. Bellmore, NY 11710
------------------------------------------------ j
for shortsightedness.”
Admiral Agafonov’s article was followed by two articles, in July and September, covering the importance of the navy during World War II and the lessons that should be drawn for today. One lesson was that aircraft carriers played a key role in the struggle at sea. The article stated: “Under current conditions, aircraft carriers continue to maintain this role and, in the case of prolonged war with only conventional weapons, this role would be most significant. Underestimating it would be a dangerous blunder.” With both the November and December issues, the journal started a new series titled “The Fates of Doctrine and Theories.” Unlike the Gorshkov or Stalbo series of the past which set out new doctrines and principles for the further development of a strong Soviet Navy, this series was dedicated to “the historical reasons for maintaining a naval force.” The first two articles provided summaries of the debates which occurred at the naval academy and in the pages of Morskoy Sbornik during the period 19221925. At that time, the Soviet Union was trying to recover from a period of prolonged political turmoil, civil war, and economic hardship that had ravaged the national industrial base. Soviet naval academics carried on a debate over what kind of force structure the navy required. Clearly the arguments made on both sides in those days have relevance for the Soviet Navy today, as it tries to rebut civilian critics and convince the General Staff and the political leaders to sustain that strong navy in another period of political turmoil, economic hardship, and disrupted national industrial capability.
The use of history has long been a traditional form of advocacy in the Soviet Union where it has never been a good idea for an author to be too bluntly or clearly out of step with the party line and, even if he wanted to risk his career or neck by being outspoken, where getting articles past the censor was always a problem. Further, a new series setting forth a politically approved party line on the development of the navy would not, easily or willingly, be created because it would have to discuss theories for restricting the development of the navy to conform with the politically approved emphasis on shifting resources from the military to the civil sector of the economy to facilitate Perestroika. Rather, naval leaders have chosen to focus on the lessons of history to highlight the need to maintain a strong navy in times of economic hardship and to start a series on the development of the navy in such times which might serve as model for today.
Likewise, rather than inundating its readers with propaganda on the capabilities and achievements of the current navy, which would be clearly out of line with obvious reality, Morskoy Sbornik has begun to highlight the navy’s successes and leaders of the past.
For the regular reader of Morskoy Sbornik, probably the most striking change during 1990 was the significant increase in straight historical articles. Throughout the year, these articles spanned the entire range of Russian and Soviet naval history. All of these historical and biographical articles carried food for thought for the officers of today. In the Gorshkov memorial, for example, it was noted: “The difficult position of the new Commander in Chief [Gorshkov] was aggravated by the fact that ... the nation’s supreme leadership made the decision to . . . dismantle for scrap metal, not only all large gun-firing ships which were being built, but also ships essentially already built . . . Sergei Georgiyevich realized the erroneousness of such an approach and attempted to defend these ships. . . . The Minister did not support him in the government. This subsequently required restoring what had been lost with an exertion of effort. . .
Another area in which Morskoy Sbornik greatly expanded its contents in 1990 was the coverage of foreign navies. Not only did the journal publish more of its traditional descriptions of foreign weapon systems, allegedly “based on the foreign press,” but it presented a description of its own Oscar-class guided-missile submarine based on the “evaluations of NATO specialists.” An interview with Admiral Sir Julian Oswald, First Sea Lord and Chief of Staff of the Royal Navy, was published, as were the answers to Morskoy Sbornik questions by U.S. then-Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Carlisle A. H. Trost. There were several reviews of the contents of the U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings. In December, Morskoy Sbornik published an extended review of U.S. author Tom Clancy’s writings.
Finally, late in the year, Morskoy Sbornik added a new “Official” section in which it published announcements of a type not previously carried—e.g> '
awards, flag officer promotions, and officers receiving early promotions.
I
Captain Manthorpe is a former naval attache to Moscow and a noted expert on Soviet affairs. He has written the bimonthly “Soviet View” column for Proceedings since February 1986.